Sarah Athersmith

PFD Report Partially Responded Ref: 2017-0350
Date of Report 30 November 2017
Coroner Zafar Siddique
Coroner Area Black Country
Response Deadline ✓ from report 29 January 2018
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
An unprotected level crossing lacked warning systems, causing confusion when multiple trains passed, and double-height freight carriages obscured views, increasing pedestrian danger.
View full coroner's concerns
[IL1: PROTECT] 1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that the Wallows Lane level crossing is an unprotected crossing and there is no method of warning of an approaching train.

2. There are whistle boards (train drivers should sound their whistles/horns on approach) in place to warn users. However, the crossing relies on users actively stopping, looking and listening for approaching trains before deciding if it is safe to cross.

3. There is a clear and present danger that pedestrians can become confused, as happened in this case when two trains pass each other at the same time and do not realise there is a further train on the opposite rail track.

4. It also emerged that the freight train carriages were double height and obscured the opposite train drivers view.

5. In 2011, there was a near miss with a school girl on Wallows lane crossing.

6. The crossing has remained closed to members of the public since the 26 September 2017 and it appears there has been minimal impact on the local community.
Responses
Network Rail Private Sector
25 Jan 2018
Action Taken
Network Rail confirms that the crossing was closed to members of the public on 26 September 2017 via temporary order granted by Walsall Local Authority and remains closed today. In 2016 enhancements were made including extending the crossing deck, installing low level solar lighting studs, and de-vegetation works. (AI summary)
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Dear Sir Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths Sarah Athersmith (Deceased) I refer to your report dated 30 November 2017 made under paragraph 7, Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 in relation to the inquest into the very sad death of Sarah Athersmith, As noted in your report, Sarah Athersmith died on 26 September 2017 as a result of fatal injuries sustained when she was struck by a train at Wallows Lane footpath level crossing. The conclusion of the inquest held on 28 November 2017 was accidental death. Application to close Wallows Lane level crossing Your report identifies at Section 6 the following action that you consider should be taken to prevent future deaths “Walsall Local Authority may wish to consider urgently reviewing any application to close the crossing made by Network Rail or converting it into a controlled crossing using suitable methods,” We confirm that Network Rail’s preferred option is permanent closure of Wallows Lane level crossing. The crossing was closed to members of the public on 26 September 2017 via temporary order granted by Walsall Local Authority and remains closed today. Network Rail has not received nor been made aware of any complaints relating to the temporary closure of the level crossing It should be noted that, regrettably, is not within Network Rail’s power to simply close a level crossing that carries a public right of way. Even when a clear safety case exists for closure of a crossing, Network Rail requires the relevant local authority to first support and then to progress the necessary statutory process.

Matters of concern identified in your report Your report also identifies a number of matters of concern. I have detailed below Network Rails considered responses to the matters raised in your report. Method of protection at Wallows lane level crossing All level crossings on Network Rail’s infrastructure are risk assessed to determine the level of protection that is required to reduce the risk associated with that crossing so far as is reasonably practicable. Wallows Lane level crossing is an unprotected or “passive” crossing. There are approximately 2,200 such passive footpath and bridleway crossings on Network Rail’s infrastructure, including 200 on the London North Western Route. To place this into context, Network Rail’s national level crossing estate extends to approximately 6,000 level crossings in total. In accordance with the risk assessment of the crossing, the protection measures at Wallows Lane level crossing rely on users actively stopping, looking and listening for approaching trains before deciding if it is safe to cross. These instructions are provided to crossing users via signs installed at the crossing. Further protection has been installed at Wallows Lane level crossing in the form of whistle boards. Train drivers are required to sound their horn at the whistle boards to warn users of an approaching train. The sound of the horn is intended to be a further warning to any user who is actively assessing whether it is safe to cross. To supplement these measures, Network Rail’s Level Crossing Managers undertake safety awareness events in the local community and regularly stop crossing users to promote and encourage safe behaviours. Ways to mitigate the risk of trains passing at crossings Trains (passenger and freight> pass frequently at Wallows Lane, as they do at many level crossings. There is currently no known product that may be installed at passive level crossings to show users which line an approaching train is travelling on. Freight trains on the network are limited to one container in height and are a similar maximum height to passenger vehicles. The height of any proximate passing train does not impact on the way in which a train driver will proceed across a crossing. The risk assessment for Wallows Lane level crossing has considered if any existing technology may be used to warn of approaching trains at this location. Due to the close proximity of signals and junctions in both upside and downside directions, options to use technology are very limited and the evaluation concluded that risk at the crossing is reduced so far as is reasonably practicable.

To eliminate the risk entirely, Network Rail agrees that the best solution is closure of the level crossing. Formal avenues to pursue closure are considered wherever possible and are discussed with relevant local authorities
— as has been the case for Wallows Lane. Whilst a crossing remains open Network Rail periodically reviews its risk assessments; we consider whether further mitigation is appropriate and/or if alternative technical solutions have become available. Near miss at Wallows Lane level crossing in 2011 We have record of a near miss reported by a Driver in 2011 involving a young girl in school uniform who was at Wallows Lane level crossing with three other school children. The young girl was stood in the space between the rails and jumped clear of an approaching train at the last moment. A Network Rail Mobile Operations Manager attended the level crossing immediately after this report to confirm that the crossing remained safe. As part of Network Rail’s continuous improvement to level crossing safety, in 2016 a number of enhancements were made at Wallow Lane level crossing to encourage safer user behaviours. These included:
• Extending the crossing deck and painting with a “stop” marking to create a defined decision point;
• Installing low level solar lighting studs along the edges of the crossing deck;
• Undertaking extensive de-vegetation works;
• Painting pedestrian gates yellow to warn a user that they are entering a different environment; and
• Painting signage posts white and highlighting with yellow tape to draw a user’s attention to safety signage. Census cameras have also been installed to gather further information about the usage of the crossing. There was no reported misuse at this location between November 2015 and September
2017. I hope this response answers your concerns but if I can be of further assistance, or if you would like further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me. Finally, on behalf of all at Network Rail, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere condolences to the family of Miss Athersmith.
Walsall Council Local Authority / Fire Service
Noted
Walsall MBC are undertaking an urgent review of Network Rail's revised closure application and continue to provide assistance and guidance to Network Rail in the closure application process. As Walsall MBC is not the landowner, it has no authority to convert the crossing into a controlled crossing. (AI summary)
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REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS FOLLOWING THE INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF SARAH MARIE ATHERSMITH WALSALL MBC RESPONSE
1. This is a response to the Senior Coroner Zafar Siddique's opinion on the actions that should be taken to prevent future deaths as detailed is his Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 30.11.17 ("Regulation 28 Report") which followed the Inquest Hearing on 28.11.17 into the tragic death of Sarah Athersmith at the Wallows Lane Railway Crossing on 26.09.17 . 2 The Regulation 28 Report's opinion on the actions required are as follows: Walsall Local Authority may wish to consider urgently reviewing any application to close the crossing made by Network Rail or converting it into a controlled crossing using suitable methods: Walsall MBC's ((WMBC" urgent review of any application to close_the crossing made_bY Network Rail 3 As explained at the Inquest; the most appropriate procedure for the permanent closure of a level crossing is under the Stopping Up of Rights of Way across a railway is a Rail Crossing Extinguishment Order Regulations under Section 118A of The Highways Act 1980. 4 This prescribes a set application form in Schedule 1 of the Regulations and as part of an application for extinguishment of a footpath under S118 HA1980, the reasons to be considered and included are set out within the Application.

5. The closure application needs to be made by Network Rail ("NR") and will then be advised upon and considered WMBC as the Highway Authority: 6 As was heard at the Inquest Hearing of 28.11.17, discussions had taken place between WMBC and NR and although WMBC had provided appropriate guidance on the closure application process, no application had been submitted by Network Rail for the permanent closure of the Wallows Lane Railway Crossing at that time. 7 On 14.12.17, NR telephoned WMBC to inform that had posted the closure application and wanted to discuss the same. WMBC had not received any such application and NR then emailed the same on 14.12.17. 8 Following NR's submission of the closure application on 14.12.17, WMBC urgently arranged meeting with NR for 19.12.17 to discuss the application and to provide guidance and advice on any deficiencies in the same. 9_ On 19.12.17, WMBC held a meeting with NR to discuss the closure application: WMBC advised NR that at that stage the application is considered to be incomplete, and would require updating and resubmission to ensure it can be considered in context of the legal criteria and procedures, thereby allowing the council to validate the application and demonstrating sufficient evidence has submitted to proceed with an order. NR were advised that whilst WMBC will provide support on the application, NR needed to appropriately complete the application in accordance with the legal requirements and WMBC recommended that NR's legal team approve the application to submission.
10.At the meeting, WMBC reiterated to NR that The Rail Crossings Extinguishment and Diversion Orders Regulations 1993, under Highways Act 1980, Section 118A Public Path Extinguishment Order in accordance with Schedule 1 of the Order; sets out the following criteria for extinguishment: they been prior

(a) Give reasons for the proposed extinguishment of the rail crossing: Include information about: The use currently made of the existing path, including numbers and types of users and whether there are significant seasonal variations, giving the source for this information (any circumstances preventing or inhibiting such use must also be mentioned);
ii. The risk to the public of continuing to use the present crossing and the circumstances that have given rise to the proposed order:
iii. The effect of the loss of the crossing to users, in particular whether there are alternative rights of way the safety of these relative to the level crossing, and the effect on any connecting public rights of way and on the network as a whole.
iv. The opportunity for taking alternative action to remedy the problem such as a diversion, bridge or tunnel, or the carrying out of safety improvements to the existing crossing The estimated cost of any practicable measures identified under iv. Above; and vi: The barriers and or signs that would need to be erected at the crossing or the point from which any path or way is to be extinguished, assuming the order is confirmed. 11_ WMBC also explained at the meeting that although the footpath is currently closed temporarily, it should be considered in context of the level of use that would be expected (9 or 10 trips per day as indicated by the Network Rail Census figures) if it was open_
12.Furthermore, WMBC explained that it appeared that there were incidents of concern in the NR's Risk Assessment of 2015 which resulted in some safety improvements being carried out at the level crossing and as such it would be beneficial for NR to provide an evidence statement to set out a chain of events and explanation of the risk assessment criteria and how the priority has been affected following the fatality This may give reference to the Coroners' recommendations at the Inquest of Closure or technological safety improvements as well as an updated risk assessment post the date of the fatality.
13.At the meeting of 19.12.17, it was also discussed that the likely alternative route that Network Rail would be recommending as part of their application submission will be the route shown in the Temporary Traffic Regulation Order Map. As this is restricted byway there will be requirement to consider the impact of the

closure on cycling as well as walking and it would be useful to check whether there are any known Road Safety concerns at the location:
14.After the meeting, WMBC's Road Safety Team were contacted for their view on the suitability of the alternative route This has been provided by the Road Safety Team who have advised that the alternative route is not a dedicated route and would require further investigation. This advice has been forwarded to NR on 5 February 2018.
17.On 20.12.17, NR emailed WMBC a draft letter that it proposed to send to potential interested parties such as local residents and commercial premises regarding their closure application.
18.On 21.12.17, WMBC emailed NR providing advice and suggestions on NR's draft letter to the interested parties_
19.On 09.01.18, NR emailed WMBC informing that it had now received some responses to its letters to the interested parties and wanted to know if WMBC had the chance to consider the statutory consultees_
20.On 15.01.18, WMBC responded to NR with the following email advice: Thank you for email dated 9h January: In order to assist further , the requirements are set out in the prescribed application form Schedule 1 of the Rail Crossing and Diversion Orders Regulations 1991_ We attach a copy of the form for your ease of reference. Section 1.e) refers to the requirement for names and addresses of owners and occupiers of land on either side of the to be extinguished to be listed, and section 1.f) requires details of any consents of persons with an interest in the land to be provided. Section 2 further sets out that details of public utility undertakers who may have apparatus that is likely to be affected are provided. As you will recall in our meeting of 19h December; we discussed in detail that Network Rail consultations would need to be completed with land owners and with public utility undertakers to check for any interest in the land and for any requirements which may need to be taken into consideration or dealt with prior cycle your path

to making an order: details of this and responses to the consultations should be included with the application for the Extinguishment Order under the relevant sections; There is no specific reference within the prescribed application form for wider consultations to be undertaken, although during statutory consultation on a Rail Crossing Extinguishment Order under S118A of the Highways Act; the Council has a duty to serve notice on a list of additional prescribed interest groups including, for example, the Ramblers Association, Open Spaces Society and British Horse Society. The Council will consult all relevant parties including these when making an order in accordance with the statutory procedures: We would also contact these parties at the informal consultation stage, which we would arrange following receipt and validation of your application Although not discussed previously at the meeting, you may wish to consult with these additional prescribed bodies directly at this time and submit details of any responses received with your application. This could help to identify any potential objections and allow them to be addressed at an early stage. Your legal team may be able to advise on the application and make some recommendations in relation to this. hope the above assists and do let me know if you require any further information or guidance on the application process
21.WMBC's email also requested to know when NR thought it would be in a position to submit the application.
22.WMBC also asked NR to consider the legal criteria applied to the (TTRO) Temporary Traffic Regulation Order Closure following the fatality and as the Coroner's Inquest has taken place, what legal criteria NR were to apply to ensure this is still met:
23.In an email dated 16.01.18, NR informed WMBC that it was collating the closure order information and will forward it to WMBC.
24.On 31.01.18 an electronic version of NR's closure application was received by WMBC and a paper copy was received on 05.02.18 Any

25.As in the past;, WMBC are undertaking an urgent review of the NR's revised closure application and continue to provide assistance and guidance to NR in the closure application process_ 26 Having undertaken an initial review of NR's revised closure application, WMBC's initial observations are as follows: There is a reference to a revised risk assessment but no risk assessment has been received; A number of objections have been received to the NR consultations, which will need to be examined; No alternative route available for use following closure has been proposed and therefore no assessment has been made of the adequacy of it:
27.WMBC have contacted NR to request a meeting to discuss the revised application within the next 7-10 days and it is envisaged that the above and any other deficiencies in the closure application will be discussed with NR and WMBC at this meeting_
28.WMBC will therefore continue to provide all relevant guidance and support to NR in its closure application and will further continue to urgently review any revised closure applications and supporting evidenceldocuments submitted by NR B Converting Wallows Lane Railway Crossing _into a controlled crossing using suitable_methods:
29.As WMBC is not the landowner or the operator on which Wallows Lane Railway Crossing is located, it has no authority or legal power to convert the Wallows Lane Railway Crossing into a controlled crossing using suitable methods. will the

30.If NR determines (whether as a result of the Coroner's Regulation 28 Report or for any other reason) that a technological safety improvement is required, NR as the landowner and operator will have to consider converting the Wallows Lane Railway Crossing into a controlled crossing using suitable methods. Signed Mr Kevin Gannon [Team Leader of Highways Development Control and Public Rights of Way] On behalf of the Chief Executive of WMBC Dated this 6 February 2018
Sent To
  • HM Inspector of Railways
  • Network Rail
  • Office of Rail and Road (ORR)
  • Walsall Local Authority
Response Status
Linked responses 2 of 4
56-Day Deadline 29 Jan 2018
About PFD responses

Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.

Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On the 27 September 2017, I commenced an investigation into the death of school girl, Sarah Athersmith. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 28 November 2017. The conclusion of the inquest was a short narrative conclusion of accidental death.

The cause of death was:

1a Traumatic Head Injury
Circumstances of the Death
i) On the afternoon of the 26 September 2017, Sarah was walking home after school with a school friend. ii) She stopped to feed some horses in a nearby field and then arrived at a train crossing gate at Wallows lane Footpath railway at approximately 3pm. This is an unprotected crossing and notices have been placed around the crossing to alert pedestrians to the dangers. iii) She initially stopped to let a freight train pass and then crossed the rail tracks but did not see another train coming in the opposite direction. iv) Sadly, Sarah was hit by the train sustaining fatal head injuries and died at the scene a short time later.
Action Should Be Taken
1. Walsall Local Authority may wish to consider urgently reviewing any application to close the crossing made by Network Rail or converting it into a controlled crossing using suitable methods.

Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.