Doreen Stapleton
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2017-0043
All 1 response received
· Deadline: 21 Apr 2017
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
An obsolete email address caused a critical district nursing referral to fail upon discharge, compounded by inadequate, explicit communication to a vulnerable patient and family about the fatal risks of missed medication and follow-up contact.
View full coroner's concerns
Doreen Stapleton had been admitted to the Whittington Hospital previously and diagnosed with pulmonary emboli. Upon discharge, ten days before her death, a plan was made for district nurses to attend her home daily, to administer tinzaparin injections. However, the referral was never received by the district nursing team, because an obsolete email address that had not been deleted from the computer system was used.
I am satisfied that Whittington Health has already taken steps to deal with the cause of the failure of the district nursing team to attend – the obsolete email address. I write in respect of an ancillary, but nevertheless important matter, that of the instructions given to Ms Stapleton and her family upon discharge.
During her six day admission, Ms Stapleton was told explicitly by one of her treating consultants that without medication she could die, and she did understand this. She was then persuaded to remain in hospital for treatment. However, she later decided that perhaps she wanted to leave after all, so on the afternoon of Friday, 2 September 2016, she was detained under section 5(2) of the Mental Health Act.
By Monday morning, she was deemed fit for removal of the section, and fit for discharge. It well may have been that her confusion on the Friday had been a consequence more of her low oxygen saturations at that time, than of her schizophrenia. Nevertheless, she was a vulnerable patient.
When she was discharged, although the plan of daily district nursing visits was made clear to her, no member of the team had another very explicit conversation with her or with her two sons, about the potential consequence (i.e. death) of the visits and medication administration not taking place. She and her sons were not given the telephone number of the district nursing team and were not told to ring if nurses failed to attend the following day. I understand that patients are now all given a leaflet with the district nursing team telephone number, but I am concerned that there is still a lack of emphasis on this aspect of discharge advice.
I heard from one witness that this is a whole team responsibility. Any member of the team – consultant physician, consultant psychiatrist, discharge nurse – could have had this very direct conversation with Ms Stapleton and her family, but nobody did. I appreciate that there may be a reluctance to be so blunt because of a fear of scaring patients, but any reluctance must be overcome in certain situations if patients are to be supported in the best way possible. Indeed, it had already been overcome by one consultant earlier in Ms Stapleton’s admission.
I am satisfied that Whittington Health has already taken steps to deal with the cause of the failure of the district nursing team to attend – the obsolete email address. I write in respect of an ancillary, but nevertheless important matter, that of the instructions given to Ms Stapleton and her family upon discharge.
During her six day admission, Ms Stapleton was told explicitly by one of her treating consultants that without medication she could die, and she did understand this. She was then persuaded to remain in hospital for treatment. However, she later decided that perhaps she wanted to leave after all, so on the afternoon of Friday, 2 September 2016, she was detained under section 5(2) of the Mental Health Act.
By Monday morning, she was deemed fit for removal of the section, and fit for discharge. It well may have been that her confusion on the Friday had been a consequence more of her low oxygen saturations at that time, than of her schizophrenia. Nevertheless, she was a vulnerable patient.
When she was discharged, although the plan of daily district nursing visits was made clear to her, no member of the team had another very explicit conversation with her or with her two sons, about the potential consequence (i.e. death) of the visits and medication administration not taking place. She and her sons were not given the telephone number of the district nursing team and were not told to ring if nurses failed to attend the following day. I understand that patients are now all given a leaflet with the district nursing team telephone number, but I am concerned that there is still a lack of emphasis on this aspect of discharge advice.
I heard from one witness that this is a whole team responsibility. Any member of the team – consultant physician, consultant psychiatrist, discharge nurse – could have had this very direct conversation with Ms Stapleton and her family, but nobody did. I appreciate that there may be a reluctance to be so blunt because of a fear of scaring patients, but any reluctance must be overcome in certain situations if patients are to be supported in the best way possible. Indeed, it had already been overcome by one consultant earlier in Ms Stapleton’s admission.
Responses
Action Taken
The organisation has written to doctors, nurses and pharmacists highlighting learning points. They raised the issues at the Medical Committee and reintroduced patient leaflets about pulmonary emboli on inpatient wards, with spot audits to ensure they are in place. (AI summary)
The organisation has written to doctors, nurses and pharmacists highlighting learning points. They raised the issues at the Medical Committee and reintroduced patient leaflets about pulmonary emboli on inpatient wards, with spot audits to ensure they are in place. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Ms Hassell
Re: Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD)
Thank you for your Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) report in relation of Doreen Elma Stapleton sent to Mr Simon Pleydell, our CEO, on 24th February 2017. I am replying on his behalf.
You originally asked us to reply by 24th April but your office kindly agreed to an extension until today.
The actions we have taken in relation to your letter are as follows:
1) and I, as Director of Nursing and Patient Experience and Executive Medical Director respectively, will write to our doctors and senior nurses and pharmacists to highlight what we think are the key learning points that arise out of your concerns, so that they can consider how to embed these in their clinical practice from now on.
2) I have raised the issues that you highlight in your letter at our Medical Committee on 16th March 2017 – this is a monthly meeting of the trust’s consultants and management in which there are regular discussion around safety and learning, and there was good discussion in this meeting about how consultants might take this learning back to their teams.
3) On the specific issue of helping patients to understand the significance of pulmonary emboli, we have reintroduced patient leaflets about pulmonary emboli on all of our inpatient wards, and a spot audit to ensure that these are in place will take place next week and again in one month’s time
4) I have asked our Associate Medical Director for Patient Safety, , to raise this issue on the Patient Safety Forum - this is a forum that is explicitly focussed on safety and learning and is multidisciplinary, including pharmacists and professions allied to medicine, as well as doctors and nurses. Dr Richard Jennings Executive Medical Director Whittington Health Jenner Building Magdala Avenue London N19 5NF
Email: r t Tel: 020 7288 5906
5th May 2017
Established as The Whittington Hospital NHS Trust
Chairman: Mr Steve Hitchins Chief Executive: Mr Simon Pleydell
5) I have asked our Chief Pharmacist to share this learning with all pharmacists on our inpatient wards so that they can make an important contribution to ensuring that patients understand the significance of their medication on discharge. I have attached a copy of the letter that we are sending to our doctors and nurses and pharmacists, and I have also attached a copy of the letter that wrote to at the CQC on 17th March. We are copying this letter to also. Please let me know if you feel that there is anything else that we should do to make changes to embed the very important learning from this sad case.
Re: Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD)
Thank you for your Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) report in relation of Doreen Elma Stapleton sent to Mr Simon Pleydell, our CEO, on 24th February 2017. I am replying on his behalf.
You originally asked us to reply by 24th April but your office kindly agreed to an extension until today.
The actions we have taken in relation to your letter are as follows:
1) and I, as Director of Nursing and Patient Experience and Executive Medical Director respectively, will write to our doctors and senior nurses and pharmacists to highlight what we think are the key learning points that arise out of your concerns, so that they can consider how to embed these in their clinical practice from now on.
2) I have raised the issues that you highlight in your letter at our Medical Committee on 16th March 2017 – this is a monthly meeting of the trust’s consultants and management in which there are regular discussion around safety and learning, and there was good discussion in this meeting about how consultants might take this learning back to their teams.
3) On the specific issue of helping patients to understand the significance of pulmonary emboli, we have reintroduced patient leaflets about pulmonary emboli on all of our inpatient wards, and a spot audit to ensure that these are in place will take place next week and again in one month’s time
4) I have asked our Associate Medical Director for Patient Safety, , to raise this issue on the Patient Safety Forum - this is a forum that is explicitly focussed on safety and learning and is multidisciplinary, including pharmacists and professions allied to medicine, as well as doctors and nurses. Dr Richard Jennings Executive Medical Director Whittington Health Jenner Building Magdala Avenue London N19 5NF
Email: r t Tel: 020 7288 5906
5th May 2017
Established as The Whittington Hospital NHS Trust
Chairman: Mr Steve Hitchins Chief Executive: Mr Simon Pleydell
5) I have asked our Chief Pharmacist to share this learning with all pharmacists on our inpatient wards so that they can make an important contribution to ensuring that patients understand the significance of their medication on discharge. I have attached a copy of the letter that we are sending to our doctors and nurses and pharmacists, and I have also attached a copy of the letter that wrote to at the CQC on 17th March. We are copying this letter to also. Please let me know if you feel that there is anything else that we should do to make changes to embed the very important learning from this sad case.
Sent To
- Whittington Hospital NHS Trust
Response Status
Linked responses
1 of 1
56-Day Deadline
21 Apr 2017
All responses received
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 29 September 2016, one of my assistant coroners, Richard Brittain, I commenced an investigation into the death of Doreen Elma Stapleton, aged 78 years. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on yesterday. I made a narrative determination at inquest, which I attach to this letter.
Circumstances of the Death
Doreen Stapleton died on 15 September 2016 at the Whittington Hospital from a pulmonary thromboembolism.
Copies Sent To
Care Quality Commission for England
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.