Micael McMonigle
PFD Report
Historic (No Identified Response)
Ref: 2016-0289
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Staff showed a lack of knowledge and failure to follow policy regarding leave for informal patients, risk assessments were not updated, and the response to the patient's absence was delayed and did not conform with procedures; staff knowledge of leave policy was inadequate.
View full coroner's concerns
(1) The lack of knowledge of the policy for leave for informal patients amongst ward staff and the Consultant Psychiatrist in particular: (2) The failure to follow the policy in terms of conducting an assessment prior to the handover (3) The failure to apply the policy in terms of ensuring that leave arrangements are clearly understood by the patient and communicated to relatives: See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8, the policy of Leave from Hospital and Leave of Absence under Section 17 Mental Health Act 1973, policy no CLINOO025.
(4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm and suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10h August 2015. Instead;, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family: (5) Failure to respond to Michael's absence until well after 19.20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively 21:OOhrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that that was the normal time for return from leave: (5) The response to Michael's absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure; ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally; a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users , check of CCTV footage: (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22.30hrs at earliest; an attempt t0 telephone Michael from 22.40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22.30 hrs at the earliest (Michael $ mother said 23.15) , Police at 23.45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at O0:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12 2Ohrs at the earliest: Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Patients Procedure was inadequate:
(4) The Face risk assessment, PARIS case notes and intervention plan were not updated with assessment of risk of self-harm and suicide and details of conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10h August 2015. Instead;, it fell to staff to verbally convey this information to colleagues who had not attended at the formulation meeting and to members of the family: (5) Failure to respond to Michael's absence until well after 19.20 hrs, when it was admitted by ward staff in evidence that interventions could have been commenced, alternatively 21:OOhrs when it was conceded that the alarm could have been raised given that that was the normal time for return from leave: (5) The response to Michael's absence did not conform with paragraphs 7.3 of the Missing Patients Procedure; ref. CLIN-0006-V4 in that there was no search of the hospital internally; a search of the grounds, enquiry with other staff users , check of CCTV footage: (6) The following responses were undertaken after 19.20 and 21.00 when in conclusion of the jury the alarm could have been raised: enquiry with friends or relatives from 22.30hrs at earliest; an attempt t0 telephone Michael from 22.40 hrs at earliest, contact with relatives from 22.30 hrs at the earliest (Michael $ mother said 23.15) , Police at 23.45hrs at the earliest, other hospital staff at O0:15hr on 12th August at the earliest, the medical staff at 12 2Ohrs at the earliest: Staff knowledge of the Leave policy and Patients Procedure was inadequate:
Sent To
Response Status
Linked responses
0 of 1
56-Day Deadline
10 Oct 2016
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 17lh August 2015 commenced an investigation into the death of Michael Peter McMonigle; ("Michael") born 25ih October 1969. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 8h August 2016. The conclusion of the inquest was Suicide, contributed to by neglect: The jury stated made the following entries in Boxes 3 and 4 of the Record of Inquest; including a narrative on issues in Box 4: Box 3: Michael McMonigle was admitted at a voluntary patient to the Farnham Ward at Lanchester Road Hospital on 5ih August 2015. Michael was able to leave the hospital unaccompanied on August 2015 , leading to his death on 11 in woodland at Trinity School; Trout Lane, Lanchester, Co. Durham by suspension by ligature and was declared dead at 07.35 hrs on 2th August 2015_ On the balance of probabilities the jury concluded that the admitted failure of not updating the face risk assessment; PARIS case notes and intervention plan with the assessment of risk of self-harm or suicide and the conditions tor escorted leave made at a formulation meeting on 10h August 2015 probably more than minimally or trivially contributed t0 Michael's death: The manner and extent that Michael's family were informed of the assessment of risk the conditions for escorted leave following the formulation meeting on 10"h August probably more than minimally or trivially contributed to Michael's death: The manner in which the handover to his family was prepared for and conducted when Michael left the ward on 11hh August 2015 probably more than minimally or trivially contributed to Michael's death: Finally, the lapse of time between Michael leaving the hospital on 11lh August 2015 and when it was recognised he might be a missing patient probably more than minimally or trivially contributed to Michael's death: Box 4: In conclusion Michael's death was caused by suicide whilst the balance of his mind was disturbed: His death was contributed to by neglect: Due to inadequate communication of potentially significant information between Michael's family and staff members, Michael was at significant risk on 11lh. Trust leave policy was not fulfilled to a satisfactory level and staff knowledge of policy, particularly from the Consultant Psychiatrist was unsatisfactory: Whilst the jury thought that the policy was adequate, the failure of staff to recognise and fulfil all aspects of the policy was severely lacking and probably more key and put than minimally or trivially directly contributed to Michael s death Appendix 3 Missing Patient report completed after Michael was found to be missing the jury held to be lacking in that not all initial actions deemed vital were fulfilled. They heal it evident that there were several occasions prior to 22.OOhrs where the alarm of Michael's absence could have been raised particularly from 19.20 to 21:00 hrs: Finally the effect that business and staff pressure had on the leave and death of Michael on 11 August was a contributing factor t0 Michael's death of note, the lack of handover to Michaels parents on 11th by the Acting Ward Manager which did not fulfil the Trust policy best practice and was therefore insufficient:
Action Should Be Taken
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe you and your organisation have the power to take such action YouR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 of the date of this report; namely by 10lh October 2016. 1, the Coroner; may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setling out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed_
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.