William France
PFD Report
Historic (No Identified Response)
Ref: 2014-0409
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Railway crossing barriers malfunctioned due to a single-arm treddle, causing long delays. Drivers also faced obstructed visibility and a poorly located emergency telephone.
Sent To
- Network Rail
Response Status
Linked responses
0 of 1
56-Day Deadline
13 Nov 2014
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On the 4th and 5th September 2014 I held an Inquest before a jury into the death of William Dennis FRANCE who died at Athelney Railway Crossing on the 21st March 2013. The jury returned a narrative Conclusion namely:- “Dennis William France died on the 21st March 2013 when his car was struck by a High Speed Train when he attempted to drive across a railway crossing at Athelney when the Automatic Half Barriers were down.
In all probability the decision to do so was influenced by a desire to get to work on time pending his retirement and the prolonged period the barriers had been down due to an earlier movement of an engineering train.”
In all probability the decision to do so was influenced by a desire to get to work on time pending his retirement and the prolonged period the barriers had been down due to an earlier movement of an engineering train.”
Circumstances of the Death
The circumstances were that the deceased who was on his way to work either thought that he had time to cross the main Taunton to Westbury railway line before the arrival of a train and/or the automatic half barriers had not been functioning correctly. Whilst crossing the Upline the deceased’s car was hit by a high speed train going from Exeter St Davids to Paddington at a speed of approximately 100 miles per hour. The car not being visible to the driver of the train until 1 or 2 seconds before impact.
Whilst the accident was entirely brought about by the deceased’s own actions, part of the problem was due to the automatic half barriers being down for a period between 75 and 103 seconds, instead of the normal 29 seconds. This had been caused initially by an earlier Tamper train activating the strike in treddle whilst proceeding in the wrong direction on the Upline. As the treddle only had one arm, the mechanisms had become out of synchronisation causing the barriers to come down and 4 minutes later rising again and setting signal E93 at red. At either this stage or a later testing by the signalman at Exeter led a cyclist to cross the line when the barrier was down. However the lowering of barriers prior to the deceased’s death was the result of the signalman at Exeter setting sign at E93 at green so as to clear the yellow signal UA136 prior to the arrival of the Paddington bound train.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch prepared a very detailed report that was published on the 24th February 2014 and I assume that you are in possession of a copy. Subsequently the strike in treddle on the Upline which is located 1.1 miles from the crossing has been fitted with a two armed lever which if it had been installed prior to the accident would have prevented the long delay.
There is also concern that :-
(1) Motor vehicle drivers approaching the crossing from either side have to go up a rise and their visibility towards Taunton is obstructed in part by the barrier controls and the road crossing which is also at an angle. (2) Although not a factor in the death the telephone at the level crossing was some 8 metres beyond the pedestrian stop line.
Whilst the accident was entirely brought about by the deceased’s own actions, part of the problem was due to the automatic half barriers being down for a period between 75 and 103 seconds, instead of the normal 29 seconds. This had been caused initially by an earlier Tamper train activating the strike in treddle whilst proceeding in the wrong direction on the Upline. As the treddle only had one arm, the mechanisms had become out of synchronisation causing the barriers to come down and 4 minutes later rising again and setting signal E93 at red. At either this stage or a later testing by the signalman at Exeter led a cyclist to cross the line when the barrier was down. However the lowering of barriers prior to the deceased’s death was the result of the signalman at Exeter setting sign at E93 at green so as to clear the yellow signal UA136 prior to the arrival of the Paddington bound train.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch prepared a very detailed report that was published on the 24th February 2014 and I assume that you are in possession of a copy. Subsequently the strike in treddle on the Upline which is located 1.1 miles from the crossing has been fitted with a two armed lever which if it had been installed prior to the accident would have prevented the long delay.
There is also concern that :-
(1) Motor vehicle drivers approaching the crossing from either side have to go up a rise and their visibility towards Taunton is obstructed in part by the barrier controls and the road crossing which is also at an angle. (2) Although not a factor in the death the telephone at the level crossing was some 8 metres beyond the pedestrian stop line.
Action Should Be Taken
(a) Consideration should be given as to whether or not it is possible to improve the visibility for approaching motorists although to a degree this is hampered by a bridge immediately on the downside of the level crossing. (b) Consideration should be given to repositioning the telephone and amending the warning sign to draw driver’s attention the need to use the telephone when the barriers have been down for an unusual length of time.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.