Turner Review

The quality and quantity of overall capital in the global banking system should be increased, resulting in minimum regulatory requirements significantly above existing Basel rules. The transition to future rules should be carefully phased given the importance of maintaining bank lending in the current macroeconomic climate.

Offshore financial centres should be covered by global agreements on regulatory standards.

Retail deposit insurance should be sufficiently generous to ensure that the vast majority of retail depositors are protected against the impact of bank failure (note: already implemented in the UK).

Clear communication should be put in place to ensure that retail depositors understand the extent of deposit insurance cover.

A resolution regime which facilitates the orderly wind down of failed banks should be in place (already done via Banking Act 2009).

Credit rating agencies should be subject to registration and supervision to ensure good governance and management of conflicts of interest and to ensure that credit ratings are only applied to securities for which a consistent rating is possible.

Rating agencies and regulators should ensure that communication to investors about the appropriate use of ratings makes clear that they are designed to carry inference for credit risk, not liquidity or market price.

There should be a fundamental review of the use of structured finance ratings in the Basel II framework.

Remuneration policies should be designed to avoid incentives for undue risk taking; risk management considerations should be closely integrated into remuneration decisions. This should be achieved through the development and enforcement of UK and global codes.

Clearing and central counterparty systems should be developed to cover the standardised contracts which account for the majority of CDS trading.

Both the Bank of England and the FSA should be extensively and collaboratively involved in macro-prudential analysis and the identification of policy measures. Measures such as counter-cyclical capital and liquidity requirements should be used to offset these risks.

Capital required against trading book activities should be increased significantly (e.g. several times) and a fundamental review of the market risk capital regime (e.g. reliance on VAR measures for regulatory purposes) should be launched.

Institutions such as the IMF must have the resources and robust independence to do high quality macro-prudential analysis and if necessary to challenge conventional intellectual wisdoms and national policies.

The FSA should complete the implementation of its Supervisory Enhancement Program (SEP) which entails a major shift in its supervisory approach with: • Increase in resources devoted to high impact firms and in particular to large complex banks. • Focus on business models, strategies, risks and outcomes, rather than primarily on systems and processes. • Focus on technical skills as well as probity of approved persons. • Increased analysis of sectors and comparative analysis of firm performance. • Investment in specialist prudential skills. • More intensive information requirements on key risks (e.g. liquidity) • A focus on remuneration policies

The SEP changes should be further reinforced by • Development of capabilities in macro-prudential analysis • A major intensification of the role the FSA plays in bank balance sheet analysis and in the oversight of accounting judgements.

The Walker Review should consider in particular: • Whether changes in governance structure are required to increase the independence of risk management functions. • The skill level and time commitment required for non-executive directors of large complex banks to perform effective oversight of risks and provide challenge to executive strategies.

New capital and liquidity requirements should be designed to constrain commercial banks' role in risky proprietary trading activities. A more formal and complete legal distinction of 'narrow banking' from market making activities is not feasible.

International coordination of bank supervision should be enhanced by • The establishment and effective operation of colleges of supervisors for the largest complex and cross-border financial institutions. • The pre-emptive development of crisis coordination mechanisms and contingency plans between supervisors, central banks and finance ministries.

The FSA should be prepared more actively to use its powers to require strongly capitalised local subsidiaries, local liquidity and limits to firm activity, if needed to complement improved international coordination.

A new European institution should be created which will be an independent authority with regulatory powers, a standard setter and overseer in the area of supervision, and will be significantly involved in macro-prudential analysis. This body should replace the Lamfalussy Committees. Supervision of individual firms should continue to be performed at national level.

The untenable present arrangements in relation to cross-border branch pass-porting rights should be changed through some combination of: • Increased national powers to require subsidiarisation or to limit retail deposit taking • Reforms to European deposit insurance rules which ensure the existence of pre-funded resources to support deposits in the event of a bank failure.

Regulators should take immediate action to ensure that the implementation of the current Basel II capital regime does not create unnecessary procyclicality; this can be achieved by using 'through the cycle' rather than 'point in time' measures of probabilities of default.

A counter-cyclical capital adequacy regime should be introduced, with capital buffers which increase in economic upswings and decrease in recessions.

Published accounts should also include buffers which anticipate potential future losses, through, for instance, the creation of an 'Economic Cycle Reserve'.

A maximum gross leverage ratio should be introduced as a backstop discipline against excessive growth in absolute balance sheet size.

Liquidity regulation and supervision should be recognised as of equal importance to capital regulation. • More intense and dedicated supervision of individual banks' liquidity positions should be introduced, including the use of stress tests defined by regulators and covering system-wide risks. • Introduction of a 'core funding ratio' to ensure sustainable funding of balance sheet growth should be considered.

Regulatory and supervisory coverage should follow the principle of economic substance not legal form.

Authorities should have the power to gather information on all significant unregulated financial institutions (e.g. hedge funds) to allow assessment of overall system-wide risks. Regulators should have the power to extend prudential regulation of capital and liquidity or impose other restrictions if any institution or group of institutions develops bank-like features that threaten financial stability and/or otherwise become systemically significant.