Failure to make a direct referral to a legal aid provider and failure to make reasonable adjustments
17. Before we decide if we should conduct a detailed investigation of a complaint, we look at whether there are signs the organisation has got something wrong. We do this by comparing what should have happened with what did happen. We have done this and have not found any indications that something has gone wrong.
18. At the core of this part of the complaint is Mr A’s view that, because of his vulnerability and the difficulty he experienced securing representation, the LAA should have taken additional steps to identify or refer him to a legal aid provider. He considers this was necessary both as a reasonable adjustment.
19. The LAA’s position is that, while it can assess eligibility for legal aid and grant funding where the statutory criteria are met, it does not have a duty to secure representation on behalf of an applicant or to compel a contracted provider to accept a case. It says its role is to administer funding, not to allocate solicitors.
20. We do not doubt Mr A’s account that he was unable to secure a solicitor willing or able to take on his case, and we recognise that this would have been highly stressful, particularly in the context of ongoing High Court proceedings. We accept that, from Mr A’s perspective, being granted legal aid funding but remaining unrepresented felt unfair and undermined the practical value of that funding.
21. The LAA is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice responsible for administering public funding for legal services. This includes assessing applications for legal aid, determining whether cases fall within the scope of the scheme, applying the relevant eligibility and merits criteria, and granting funding where those criteria are met.
22. Legal aid providers are independent legal professionals and firms who choose whether to enter into contracts with the Agency and, within those contracts, whether they are able to accept individual cases.
23. As part of this, the LAA administers the Civil Legal Advice (CLA). This is the LAA’s telephone and online gateway service for certain areas of civil legal aid. Its role is to assess eligibility, provide initial triage, and signpost applicants to legal aid providers who may be able to assist. Once it has done this, it has completed the service it has a duty to deliver.
24. The LAA’s responsibilities are set out in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), which established the current legal aid scheme in England and Wales. In this case, Mr A’s expectation was that funding would be accompanied by active assistance in securing representation.
25. The legislation does not place responsibility on the LAA to provide legal representation directly. Its role is to administer the funding framework set by Parliament, rather than to allocate or assign solicitors to individual applicants or compel solicitors to accept cases in the way Mr A would have liked.
26. Mr A also says that he told the LAA he is vulnerable and explained he was dealing with urgent and complex legal proceedings. He also explained he was unable to secure a solicitor despite his best efforts.
27. Mr A’s view is that those facts alone should have triggered the LAA’s duty to consider and implement reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010 and the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED).
28. It is important to note that it is not our role to make interpretations about whether or not an organisation in our remit has acted in a way that is discriminatory. Such determinations are legal issues. Our role is to consider if the LAA has acted reasonably and in line with the rules that inform its work.
29. Under sections 20, 21 and 29 of the Equality Act 2010, the duty to make reasonable adjustments arises where a person is disabled (as defined by the Act) and a provision or way of delivering a service puts them at a substantial disadvantage which a specific adjustment could alleviate.
30. It is important to note that it is not our role to determine whether an individual is disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010, nor to make findings about entitlement to reasonable adjustments in law. Those are ultimately legal matters and sit outside our remit.
31. Our role is to consider whether an organisation has given reasonable consideration to the relevant legislation and guidance that informs its work, and whether it has acted in a way that is consistent with those obligations in practice.
32. We refer to the Equality Act and PSED to provide context for our assessment and to consider whether the Legal Aid Agency’s actions were reasonable and proportionate, not to make a legal determination about Mr A’s status or rights under that legislation.
33. Disclosing vulnerability is not necessarily the same as requesting a reasonable adjustment. Vulnerability can be relevant background, but the duty is about removing disadvantage, not responding to hardship in general. A reasonable adjustment is about how a service is delivered, not what the service must achieve. It does not require an organisation to deliver outcomes it does not usually have a duty to provide.
34. While we recognise that Mr A repeatedly disclosed vulnerability and difficulty engaging with the process, expressing vulnerability is not the same as requesting a specific reasonable adjustment. The duty does not require a public body to anticipate or infer what adjustment might be required in the absence of a clear request linked to the delivery of its service.
35. We also note that the Equality Act requires adjustments to be reasonable. This means service providers are entitled to consider what adjustments are practicable and appropriate in the context of their statutory role and the service they provide.
36. Any reasonable adjustments would therefore relate to how the LAA communicates with an applicant, how it processes an application, or how it supports engagement with its procedures. They would not necessarily extend to securing a solicitor, allocating a provider, or requiring a provider to accept a case, as those outcomes fall outside the LAA’s statutory role.
37. The duty is not a requirement to provide any adjustment an individual requests, or to guarantee a particular outcome. In this case, the adjustment Mr A effectively sought was the securing of legal representation, which is not an adjustment to the delivery of the LAA’s service, but a different service altogether.
38. Mr A has said that his circumstances were exceptional and that, given his vulnerability and the urgency of his legal proceedings, the LAA should have taken additional steps to refer him directly to a legal aid provider. He considers that this was necessary to ensure meaningful access to legal aid in practice.
39. We have seen evidence that the LAA considered whether to take such steps. The LAA explained that, while it may in limited and exceptional circumstances assist applicants by signposting or helping them contact providers, this is not a routine part of the service it offers.
40. In its complaint response of 11 July 2025, the LAA addressed Mr A’s request for a direct referral as a reasonable adjustment. It acknowledged his vulnerability and the urgency of his active High Court proceedings, but explained that these factors alone did not demonstrate he was unable to contact providers himself.
41. The LAA noted that Mr A had confirmed he had already been contacting face-to-face providers independently. It explained that, while it may in rare cases contact providers on a client’s behalf as a reasonable adjustment, this is only where there is a clear reason why the client cannot do so themselves, rather than where providers have declined to accept a case.
42. Given that many applicants to the service are vulnerable or face urgent circumstances, the Agency concluded that the threshold for departing from its usual approach was not met in this case. This shows the LAA did not apply a blanket policy but exercised judgment in light of Mr A’s circumstances. The fact that the LAA reached a different conclusion about whether the circumstances justified departure from its usual approach does not mean it failed to consider them.
43. The PSED, set out in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, requires public bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good relations when conducting their functions.
44. The duty flows from the Equality Act, and like the Act does not prescribe a particular outcome, nor does it require public bodies to take positive action in every case. The level of consideration required depends on the circumstances, and it is for the decision-maker to decide what weight to give to relevant factors.
45. The duty does not prevent decisions being taken that may disadvantage an individual, provided equality impacts have been consciously considered.
46. In this case, we have seen evidence that the LAA considered Mr A’s vulnerability and the urgency of his situation. In its complaint response of 11 July 2025, the LAA explicitly acknowledged these factors and explained why it did not consider that a direct referral to a provider was appropriate.
47. It set out that many applicants to the service are vulnerable or face urgent circumstances, and that assisting by contacting providers on a client’s behalf is reserved for situations where there is a clear reason why the individual cannot do so themselves, rather than where providers have declined to accept a case.
48. The LAA also explained that Mr A had already demonstrated an ability to contact providers independently, and that the difficulty he experienced related to provider availability rather than barriers to accessing the LAA’s own service. In that context, the LAA concluded that departing from its usual approach was not justified.
49. Based on the we have seen no indication that the LAA failed to act in line with the legislation, policies and guidance governing its work. The LAA’s role is limited to administering that framework, not to securing a solicitor or ensuring representation in every case. For this reason, we cannot investigate this complaint further.
50. Mr A also complained that the Legal Aid Agency failed to explain what, if any, special procedures or accommodations were available for vulnerable applicants who are unable to secure representation. He said the Agency provided no meaningful escalation route where there was a lack of suitable providers and relied instead on repeating the same triage process, which he found unhelpful and distressing.
51. Mr A considers that, in circumstances where an applicant is granted legal aid funding but cannot in practice obtain representation, the absence of an alternative mechanism undermines access to justice. He believes that limiting the service to the provision of provider details, without direct referral or escalation, fails to meet the Agency’s legal and ethical obligations.
52. We understand why Mr A holds this view, and we recognise the force of his argument that funding without representation can feel meaningless in practice. However, questions about whether the legal aid framework provides sufficient routes to representation, or whether additional mechanisms ought to exist in cases of provider shortage, are matters of legislative design and public policy and fall outside our remit.
Complaint handling
53. Mr A also complains that the Legal Aid Agency did not respond adequately to the concerns he raised through its complaints process.
54. In considering this part of the complaint, we have had regard to the Ombudsman’s Principles of Good Complaint Handling. These require public bodies to comply with the law, act within their statutory powers, follow their own complaint handling procedures, and treat complainants fairly.
55. They also require organisations to engage meaningfully with complaints, explain their position clearly, and signpost complainants appropriately once the complaints process has been exhausted.
56. The evidence shows that the LAA issued more than one written response to Mr A’s complaint. In those responses, it addressed the main issues he raised, including his concerns about access to legal representation, vulnerability, reasonable adjustments, and equality duties.
57. The LAA set out its understanding of its statutory role, explained the limits of what it could do, and responded to the legal and equality arguments Mr A advanced.
58. We also note that, in its response of 11 July 2025, the LAA upheld part of Mr A’s complaint relating to how his interaction with the service had been characterised. This demonstrates that the LAA did not take a blanket or dismissive approach to his concerns and was willing to acknowledge fault where it considered this appropriate.
59. While Mr A strongly disagrees with the conclusions the LAA reached, and remains dissatisfied with the outcome, disagreement with an organisation’s position does not of itself mean that a complaint has been handled inadequately.
60. We have seen no indication that the LAA failed to respond to Mr A’s complaint, ignored relevant points, or closed the complaint without explanation. The LAA clearly communicated when it had reached its final position and signposted Mr A to our organisation (and to the Solicitors Regulation Authority and Legal Ombudsman) once its complaints process had been exhausted.
61. While we appreciate why Mr A is still unhappy, based on the evidence we have seen, we are satisfied that the LAA handled Mr A’s complaint in line with the Ombudsman’s Principles of Good Complaint Handling. We have therefore seen no indication of maladministration in how the LAA dealt with this aspect of the complaint.