Assessment in relation to standing
22. Ms A told us the ambulance crew that attended to Mr A on 3 August 2022 did not check he could stand. She said he was unable to stand, so he should not have been left at home as it was not safe.
23. Mr A had fallen, which was the primary reason for the initial 999 call. The electronic patient report form (EPRF), which is a form used by paramedics and clinicians to contemporaneously record patient data at the scene, states Mr A’s shaking legs had caused him to find mobilisation difficult (though not impossible) for the last six months. He had fallen in the street, having been able to walk there. We understand from our paramedic adviser this shows his inability to stand, given that he had fallen in the street, was likely a new presentation or an acute worsening of his current situation. Ms A told us he fell again before the ambulance crew arrived and had to be lifted into a chair by a neighbour. The second fall supports that he was unable to stand. Mr A was sitting upright with his legs raised in a recliner chair when the ambulance crew arrived.
24. Our paramedic adviser told us the assessment of a patient following a fall is complex and multi-faceted, reflecting that there are many reasons a patient might fall. The JRCALC guidance on ‘falls in older adults’ states ‘a thorough and careful physical examination is required along with a high index of suspicion, to exclude common but easily missed injuries’.
25. JRCALC states ‘postural hypotension should be checked for if there is no clear extrinsic cause of the fall, if there are no features to suggest an alternative cause, if symptoms are typical such as light-headedness, dizziness or feeling weak and faint on standing and if the patient is being considered for management at home’. Our paramedic adviser told us that Mr A did not have an extrinsic factor which include external or environmental influences that increase the likelihood of a fall, such as environmental hazards, mobility aid issues or medication-related effects.
26. He therefore should have been assessed for postural hypertension (low blood pressure when you stand up). We have not seen anything in the records to indicate Mr A was asked to stand up. As such, this assessment could not have taken place.
27. JRCALC also indicates that a functional assessment of mobility should be considered. It advises to ‘observe the person getting up from their chair, balancing on standing, walking around their home (including turning) and sitting down again- using their usual walking aid if applicable’. It further states that steadiness, safety and confidence in relation to weight-bearing should be considered and ambulance crews should also consider whether the person can get to the toilet/commode and transfer on and off it safely.
28. The EPRF states ‘pt is not able to weight-bear just to having a fear of falling and the recurring shaking legs’ which shows Mr A was able to move his legs normally when sat down, but this is not a sufficient alternative assessment to determine if his legs were strong enough to support his body weight i.e. that he had enough strength to stand.
29. As the records do not show Mr A’s walking and ability to stand was assessed in line with the above guidance, our current thinking is the Trust did not act in line with applicable standards.
30. In relation to Mr A’s head injury due to the fall, the JRCALC head injury guideline says assessment of a head injury should include assessment of focal neurological deficit including ‘loss of balance’, ‘general weakness’ and ‘problems walking’. From what we have seen, none of these factors were assessed.
31. Our paramedic adviser commented that the EPRF states ‘no abnormal gait’ and says this cannot have been established if Mr A had not been asked to stand. As a result, our current thinking is the documented neurological assessment is not reflective of the assessment carried out on scene.
32. With this in mind, and as we have no evidence showing the details of what exactly was said in the call to the 111 doctor, we cannot give any view as to whether the decision to agree Mr A could stay at home was safe.
33. The Trust’s complaint response of 22 September 2023 acknowledges Mr A’s legs were weaker than usual and this was not taken into consideration when completing the clinical assessments, which impacted the ambulance crew’s decision making. However, its complaint response dated 12 February 2024 states adequate assessments were carried out in relation to Mr A’s ability to stand, indicating it does not consider there were any failings in relation to the assessments of Mr A’s ability to stand. We cannot see the evidence available supports the view that adequate assessments of Mr A’s ability to stand were carried out.
34. The evidence suggests the above assessments were not carried out, so the true clinical picture in relation to Mr A’s ability to stand was not clear. We consider this fell below the standards expected. We have considered the impact of this failing below.
Risks of not attending hospital
35. Ms A is concerned the Trust did not advise Mr A about the risks of not going not going to hospital when it assessed him.
36. Ms A said by the time she arrived at his home at 10.15pm, he was unable to sit up, meaning he was unable to use the bathroom or even a bottle to relieve himself. She said he was having focal aware seizures (brief seizures where the person remains conscious and alert) and developed sepsis (a life-threatening response to infection) and pneumonia (lung infection) by the time the second ambulance crew arrived the following morning.
37. We have seen no evidence of what risks were explained to Mr A of not attending hospital either for the fall or for the head injury. The EPRF indicates Mr A refused to go. As he did not want to go, the ambulance crew had a discussion with the 111 doctor and the agreement was for him to stay at home with safety netting advice and a recommendation to contact his GP the next day about his legs.
38. Our paramedic adviser explained that for Mr A to make a decision to refuse transportation to hospital, he must be appropriately informed of the risks so he can weigh up the information. This is described as the ‘Montogomery Principle’. The responsibility is on the health provider, in this case the Trust, to disclose material risks to the patient so that they can make an informed decision about their treatment. Whilst Mr A should be involved and asked for his decision on what he wanted to do, he needed the information to make that decision in his own best interests.
39. Lots of patients will express a preference not to attend hospital, but that is not the same as refusing to attend hospital if they are advised to do so. The EPRF states Mr A ‘does not want to go to ED’, but we do not know if his decision would have been different had he been provided with and understood the full risk of not attending. We have not seen clear evidence in the records that the risks of remaining at home were explained to Mr A. The EPRF states he was given ‘worsening advice revolving around hitting head on blood thinners’ rather than specifically stating why he should attend hospital and the risks of not doing so.
40. We consider the lack of clear evidence explaining the risks of not attending the emergency department is a failing and a missed opportunity for Mr A to make an informed decision about whether or not to go to hospital.
Impact
41. Our paramedic adviser told us that, had an adequate assessment of Mr A’s mobility been carried out, the ambulance crew may have identified that Mr A was unable to function safely within his own home. The lack of an adequate assessment therefore led to a missed opportunity for Mr A to make a different decision about transfer to hospital. We consider the impact of this is the uncertainty of not knowing if he would have made a different decision about whether or not to go to hospital and the distress this will cause to Ms A as a result.
42. Whilst it is unclear whether Mr A did not want to go or refused to go to hospital, we consider that on balance, he missed the opportunity to make a different decision about transfer to hospital due to not being properly informed of the risks of not going. As above, we consider the impact of this is the uncertainty of not knowing whether Mr A would have made a different decision and the distress this will cause Ms A.
43. As we cannot give any view on the balance of probabilities that Mr A would have decided to accept transfer to hospital on 3 August if a full and comprehensive discussion about risks had taken place, we also cannot give any view that Mr A’s deterioration and Ms A’s clearly very stressful experience in caring for her father that evening were avoidable.
44. However, for reassurance, we discussed with our emergency department adviser whether Mr A was showing signs on 3 August of the illnesses he would go on to receive care for when he attended hospital the next day. This is because we know Ms A is very worried that her father needed treatment for sepsis and pneumonia on the evening of 3 August.
45. We understand from our emergency medicine adviser there is nothing in the records that shows Mr A had sepsis or pneumonia when the ambulance crew attended to him on 3 August. The EPRF states Mr A’s NEWS score was 1 on 3 August at 8.32pm. NEWS (National Early Warning Score) determines the degree if illness of a patient using a 0-20 points system where 1 would indicate low-risk mild physical deviation from normal. As there are no indications he had pneumonia or sepsis or that these conditions should have been diagnosed when the ambulance crew attended to him on 3 August, we cannot say he needed to be taken to hospital for treatment of these conditions at that time. We hope this provides reassurance to Ms A.