Rail line capacity constraints
43 items
2 sources
Anticipated capacity challenges on specific rail lines (e.g., West Coast Main Line) hindering infrastructure development.
Cross-Source Insight
Rail line capacity constraints has been flagged across 2 independent accountability sources:
42 inquiry recs
1 PFD report
This issue has been identified by multiple independent accountability bodies, suggesting it is a recurring systemic concern.
Inquiry Recommendations (42)
FENN-142 — London Underground to build King's Cross subway link or relieve congestion
Recommendation: London Underground shall build a direct subway link between the tube lines and the Metropolitan and Circle Lines at King's Cross or provide alternative satisfactory means of relieving the serious congestion.
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FENN-16 — Research air movement and provide criteria for safe train operation during fire
Recommendation: London Underground shall undertake further research into the effect of trains on air movement in the Underground. London Underground should provide criteria by which line controllers, who have received a report of fire, can judge whether it is safe to …
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LADB-10 — Prohibit changes to line 3 operations until risk assessment proves safety
Recommendation: No change should be made in the direction of running on line 3 or in the current speed limits on any of the lines out to two miles six chains from Paddington Station unless and until the following have been …
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LADB-47 — Implement unique, persistent alarm for all SPAD occurrences
Recommendation: There should be a unique alarm for SPADs, which should sound until it is turned off (para 12.21).
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LADB-48 — Enhance signaller speed for emergency point movement actions
Recommendation: The speed with which signallers can take action to move points in an emergency should be improved (para 12.22).
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LADB-49 — Investigate automatic signal replacement to Danger after SPADs to prevent collisions
Recommendation: There should be a study of the possibility of the automatic replacement of a signal to Danger where a SPAD has occurred and the layout is such that there is a significant danger of collision (para 12.27).
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LADB-5 — Require holistic safety and risk assessment for all track or signalling changes
Recommendation: Where a material change to track or signalling or both is proposed, there should be an express consideration of all relevant safety issues by an analysis of the material factors, if necessary by means of a risk assessment. This should …
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LADB-50 — Introduce automatic audible cab warning for CSR trains passing danger signals
Recommendation: Subject to satisfactory risk assessment, an arrangement should be made whereby, when a train which is fitted with the CSR passes a signal at Danger, an audible warning automatically sounds in the cab (para 12.28).
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LADB-51 — Establish national direct radio communication system between trains and signallers
Recommendation: There should be a national system of direct radio communication between trains and signallers (para 12.29).
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LADB-52 — Instruct IECC staff to preserve CSR data disks following SPAD incidents
Recommendation: Signallers, managers and maintenance staff working at IECCs should be instructed as to the need to preserve CSR data disks in the event of a SPAD taking place (para 12.30).
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LADB-53 — Consider HST cab and bogie enhancements for improved driver protection and safety
Recommendation: The enhancement of the cabs on HSTs to improve driver protection along with energy absorption and compatibility with other vehicles, and the enhancement of measures for the retention of bogies on the coaches of HSTs, should be considered, subject to …
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LADB-54 — Review crashworthiness standard for new vehicles after Ladbroke Grove crash
Recommendation: The current standard for crashworthiness in respect of new vehicles should be reviewed in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove with respect to the objectives referred to in Recommendation 53 (para 13.4).
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LADB-55 — Consider retrofitting Turbos with enhanced welds, couplers, and anti-overriding devices
Recommendation: In the case of Turbos, the enhancement of end pillar weld connections, the possible enhancement of crashworthiness by weakening the ends and strengthening the saloon of the cars, and the fitting of shear-out couplers and anti-overriding devices should be considered, …
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LADB-56 — Review crashworthiness standard to safeguard survival space after Ladbroke Grove crash
Recommendation: The current standard for crashworthiness should be reviewed, in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove, in order to ensure that there are adequate measures for safeguarding survival space (para 13.5).
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LADB-57 — Consider improved welding and aluminium grades for new aluminium vehicles
Recommendation: In the case of new vehicles constructed of aluminium, consideration should be given to: (i) the use of alternatives to fusion welding; (ii) the use of improved grades of aluminium which are less susceptible to fusion weld weakening; and (iii) …
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LADB-58 — Revise crashworthiness Group Standard for realistic scenarios and high-speed testing
Recommendation: The revision of the Group Standard for crashworthiness should be pursued with particular reference to: (i) the design requirements for more realistic scenarios; (ii) high speed accidents; and (iii) dynamic verification testing (para 13.17).
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LADB-59 — Consider retrofitting enhanced security for seating in Turbos and tables in HSTs
Recommendation: The enhancement of the security of seating in Turbos and of tables in HSTs should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting (para 13.19).
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LADB-6 — Improve Railtrack procedures for implementing and monitoring accepted recommendations with clear accountability
Recommendation: Railtrack procedures, and the actions of management to enforce them, should be directed to ensuring that: (i) a recommendation which is accepted is implemented according to a defined timescale; (ii) the person to whom a recommendation is allocated for implementation …
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LADB-60 — Conduct market research on safety measures to include informed passenger views
Recommendation: Comprehensive market research in regard to safety related measures should be carried out in order to take account of the views of informed passengers (para 13.20).
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LADB-61 — Enhance fire protection by reviewing fuel tank standards and repositioning vulnerable tanks
Recommendation: The following measures should be considered with a view to enhancing protection against fire: (i) a review of Group Standards in respect of improved crash resistance of fuel tanks; (ii) consideration of the feasibility of reducing fuel inventories and of …
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LADB-62 — Extend Railway Safety Case Regulations to include emergency escape arrangements explicitly
Recommendation: The scope of Schedule 1 to the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 should be extended so as to include explicitly the arrangements which the duty holder has established in regard to facilities, instructions and signs for the escape of persons …
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LADB-63 — Ensure HSE provides adequate guidance for evacuation and escape provisions
Recommendation: The provisions in the schedule as to evacuation and escape should be supported by adequate guidance from the HSE (para 14.3).
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LADB-64 — Keep public information code of practice on train safety and emergencies updated
Recommendation: The code of practice on public information on train safety and emergencies should be kept up to date (para 14.6).
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LADB-65 — Standardise passenger safety information and train evacuation and escape procedures
Recommendation: So far as is feasible, the safety information issued to passengers and the means by which they can be evacuated or escape from a train should be standardised (para 14.8).
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LADB-66 — Establish system to collect human factors data on passenger safety after rail accidents
Recommendation: A system should be established for the collection of human factors information pertinent to issues of passenger safety following rail accidents (para 14.8).
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LADB-67 — Provide general safety advice to passengers before and after boarding trains
Recommendation: Passengers should be given general safety advice both before and after they have boarded their train (para 14.14).
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LADB-68 — Obtain expert advice on passenger actions during known serious onboard dangers
Recommendation: Expert assistance should be obtained on the advice which should be given to passengers as to what to do in the event of there being a known threat of serious danger to them in remaining on board (para 14.14).
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LADB-69 — Endorse providing onboard explanatory information about individual train emergency facilities
Recommendation: The provision on board of explanatory information about the emergency facilities of individual trains is endorsed (para 14.14).
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LADB-7 — Extend recommendation implementation monitoring to include Train Operating Companies
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to extending sub-para (ix) of Recommendation 6 to recommendations which are directed to one or more of the TOCs and others (para 7.106).
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LADB-70 — Endorse using onboard announcements to highlight passenger safety information
Recommendation: The use of on-board announcements to draw attention to safety information is endorsed (para 14.16).
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LADB-71 — Make luminous emergency sign requirement retrospective for all trains
Recommendation: The requirement for emergency signs to be luminous should be made retrospective (para 14.18).
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LADB-72 — Develop universally understandable emergency signs for all trains, without text.
Recommendation: So far as is feasible, emergency signs on all trains should be capable of being understood by passengers without the necessity to read text (para 14.19).
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LADB-73 — Research and implement a common emergency signage system across all Great British trains.
Recommendation: There should be research with the aim of arriving at a system of signage which is common to all trains in Great Britain (para 14.20).
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LADB-74 — Research methods to safeguard emergency lighting systems from sudden deceleration forces.
Recommendation: Research should be carried out into the means of safeguarding emergency lighting systems from disablement by the forces involved in sudden deceleration (para 14.21).
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LADB-75 — Consider providing "snap wands" as supplementary emergency lighting on trains.
Recommendation: The provision of “snap wands” should be considered as a supplementary means of providing lighting in an emergency (para 14.22).
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LADB-76 — Modify internal coach doors to facilitate emergency egress by December 2003.
Recommendation: In the case of every coach (on any train) which has internal doors which slide in the same direction one of the following should be carried out by 31 December 2003: (i) the coach should be fitted instead with opposite- …
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LADB-77 — Install override devices on staff-only doors for passenger emergency use.
Recommendation: The staff-only doors on all trains should have an override device to enable them to be used by passengers in an emergency (para 14.29).
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LADB-78 — Develop illuminated pictogram signage for emergency door mechanisms, conforming to standards.
Recommendation: Signage primarily in the form of pictograms similar to those used on aircraft, and depicting the correct operation of emergency door mechanisms, should be developed. The signage should conform to current human factors standards on signage and be displayed prominently …
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LADB-79 — Ensure emergency ladders are readily usable and quickly releasable on trains.
Recommendation: The daily routine check of every train should include confirming that all ladders can readily be used. A mechanism to enable ladders to be released quickly should be devised and fitted (para 14.35).
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LADB-8 — Railtrack to complete signal risk assessments for the Paddington area promptly.
Recommendation: Railtrack should ensure that the risk assessments and any consequent actions required under Group Standard GK/RT 0078 in respect of the signals in the Paddington area are carried out as soon as possible (para 7.125).
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LADB-80 — Review emergency hammer adequacy, signage, and illuminated location with backup power.
Recommendation: There should be a thorough review of the adequacy of the number of, and signage relating to, emergency hammers. This should include the provision of means of illuminating the location of hammers in an emergency, with a back-up power supply …
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LADB-81 — Research removable windows and window adequacy for emergency egress and spacing.
Recommendation: There should be research into the feasibility of, and risks associated with, removable windows, the adequacy of windows as a means of emergency egress, the number of dedicated windows which are necessary and the provision as to the maximum distance …
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