The Wagner Group and beyond: proxy Private Military Companies

Foreign Affairs Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 30 Mar 2022 Closed: 26 Apr 2024 Parliament page
This inquiry will explore the challenge posed by Private Military Companies (PMCs) that some states use as proxies in conflict and to destabilise fragile countries. It will also examine how the UK Government is responding. The inquiry will focus particularly on the Wagner Group. Read the call for evidence for … Read more
19 Recommendations
20 Conclusions
1 Report
3 Oral sessions
1 Letter
3 Events
Activity timeline 9 events
30 Oct
2023
Report published
26 Jul
2023
Report published
15 Mar
2023
Correspondence
6 Feb
2023
Oral evidence
6 Feb
2023
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 8, Palace of Westminster
1 Nov
2022
Oral evidence
1 Nov
2022
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Wilson Room, Portcullis House
19 Apr
2022
Oral evidence
19 Apr
2022
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Grimond Room, Portcullis House
Oral evidence sessions 3 sessions
6 Feb 2023
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Foreign Affairs Committee
Ben Fender OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hazel Cameron · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office Leo Docherty · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
1 Nov 2022
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Foreign Affairs Committee
Jason McCue · McCue Jury & Partners Mikhail Khodorkovsky Professor Jason Blazakis · Middlebury Institute of International Studies
19 Apr 2022
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Foreign Affairs Committee
Christo Grozev · Bellingcat Dr Sean McFate · Atlantic Council Dr Sorcha MacLeod · University of Copenhagen
Title HC No. Published Items Response
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed HC 167 26 Jul 2023 39 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
39 results
1 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Wagner Network operates globally, undertaking military and non-military operations in many countries since 2014.
The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the committee's description of the Wagner Network, stating it prioritizes intelligence gathering, has sufficient resources to track Wagner, and continually assesses the group and its impact through various sources and international partners. It confirms ongoing monitoring of at-risk countries and efforts to dissuade engagement with Wagner.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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2 Conclusion Accepted in Part
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Wagner Network is opportunistic but ultimately guided by the Russian state, delivering geopolitical benefits.
The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the committee's analysis of the Wagner Network, outlining its ongoing use of sanctions to deter and disrupt malign Wagner activity, including recent designations of 13 individuals and businesses involved in Mali, CAR, and Sudan, and will consider the committee's analysis for further action.
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3 Conclusion Not Addressed
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Host governments engage Wagner Network due to perceived security benefits, furthering regime objectives.
Host governments and other non-regime actors must perceive benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network, because they consider it the most effective form of protection and security. There are examples of its fighters furthering a regime’s security objectives, even if … Read more
Government Response
The government's response begins by stating 'Disagree' but then discusses the importance of close coordination on sanctions with the EU and US, and later mentions travel bans, none of which directly address the committee's observation regarding host governments' perceptions of benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network.
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4 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Wagner Network functions as an international criminal mafia, committing atrocities and plundering resources.
There is a significant gap between perception and capability when it comes to the Wagner Network. Despite the continued belief by some that inviting them into a country will result in benefits, the reality is that regimes pay a high … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the committee's assessment of the Wagner Network's harmful impact and atrocities, demonstrating this by proscribing the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization on September 15th, making support for it a criminal offense and enabling the seizure of its assets.
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5 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Wagner Network's continued growth presents serious national security threats to the UK.
There are serious national security threats to the UK and its allies of allowing the network to continue to thrive, not to mention devastating human consequences, including contributing to the refugee crisis for example, Sudan. (Paragraph 30) Guns for gold: … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the committee's observation, highlighting its ongoing efforts to counter Wagner's destabilising influence and promote stability in Africa through diplomatic, defence, and development support, including £63.7m spent via the CSSF Africa in 2022/23.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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6 Conclusion Acknowledged
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Wagner Network's links to the Russian state confirmed, but countries may still engage.
Over the past year and a half, the Russia-Ukraine war eroded the Wagner Network’s deniability and Prigozhin’s public arguments with the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed the network’s long-suspected links to the Russian state. The brutality of its fighters in … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the observation, stating its International Development Strategy addresses conflict and fragility in low-income countries, with ODA allocations prioritising these areas, and an additional £2.5 billion over two years for refugees, while noting no plans to reintroduce the FCAS spending commitment.
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7 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Explicitly state government opposition to countries cooperating with Wagner Network and impose consequences.
We recommend that the Government explicitly states that it opposes the co-operation of any country with the Wagner Network, or future iterations thereof, due to the security threats of the ‘Wagner model’ of business and governance. Where countries can be … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the recommendation, stating it has a dedicated team and Senior Official coordinating its response to Wagner and driving international cooperation. It outlines ongoing efforts, including monitoring activities, collecting evidence, and addressing conflict-related sexual violence through its 2022 PSVI strategy, and confirms the HMG Russia Unit will continue to coordinate efforts to counter Wagner.
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8 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Government prioritises military support to Ukraine for countering the Wagner Network.
Supporting Ukraine militarily is the Government’s priority when it comes to countering the Wagner Network. We fully support the continued supply of defence assistance and wider support to Ukraine as it fights to liberate itself from Russian illegal occupation. Through … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the conclusion, welcoming the support for its priority. It outlines increased efforts to highlight Wagner's abuses, enhanced policy coordination, existing sanctions, and commits to consider further designations, improve sanctions enforcement, and explore additional measures to counter illicit finance.
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9 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Focusing solely on Europe for Wagner Network activities is a significant failing.
However, it is a significant failing to see the Wagner Network primarily through the prism of Europe, not least given its geographic spread, the impact of its activities on UK interests further abroad, and the fact that its wealth creation … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the conclusion, explaining its new four-strand approach to countering state threats outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, which takes a 'whole of government view' and uses a full range of powers to tackle organizations like Wagner, including efforts to deepen understanding, foster cooperation, and contest malign operations of PMSCs globally.
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10 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Government acknowledges increased importance of understanding Wagner Network's activities.
The Government believes that it is becoming more important to consider the network’s activities, although it did not say where it would do so. In February 2023, the FCDO told us there was now “much more activity” in Government to … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the conclusion, detailing its ongoing engagement with international legal frameworks related to PMSCs. It commits to engaging with the International Code of Conduct Association to advance debate on definitions, monitoring UN Convention progress, and promoting the Montreux Document to raise industry standards and state accountability.
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11 Conclusion Acknowledged
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Government's delayed and limited focus on Wagner beyond Ukraine is regrettable.
The Wagner Network began its activities in 2014. By early 2022, when the Government began to invest greater resource in understanding the network, Wagner fighters had already undertaken military deployments in at least seven countries. It is deeply regrettable that … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the conclusion, accepting the need to tackle Wagner and the value of declassifying intelligence where feasible. It highlights its efforts to expose Wagner's activities and states it has recently enhanced communication channels, particularly in Africa, to address the network's evolution.
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12 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
No evidence of serious government effort to track Wagner Network activities outside Ukraine.
We have received no evidence of any serious effort by the Government to track the Network’s activities in countries other than Ukraine.
Government Response
The government agrees that intelligence gathering on Wagner's activities is a priority and states it has sufficient resources and ongoing efforts to track the network globally, regularly assessing its impact and coordinating with international partners.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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13 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Improve intelligence-gathering on Wagner Network activities in more countries and establish a taskforce.
We recommend that the Government improve its intelligence-gathering on the Wagner Network’s activities in a wider range of countries, particularly in the countries where 54 Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed we have medium-confidence of attempts at Wagner involvement. … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees intelligence gathering on Wagner is a priority and confirms it has sufficient resources, uses network-mapping capabilities, and continually refreshes its understanding through extensive monitoring and international cooperation. It also states that a cross-Government taskforce on Wagner is already established.
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14 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
UK's Wagner Network sanctioning efforts and allied coordination remain inadequate.
The UK’s efforts to sanction the Wagner Network are underwhelming in the extreme, compared to those of the European Union and the United States. The responses from the Minister leave us with limited confidence that the UK coordinates effectively with … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, stating that the Wagner Group was fully designated in 2022, and it continues to use sanctions policy, designating 13 additional individuals and businesses in July. It explains that its sanctions regime has different statutory requirements and approaches (e.g., ownership and control) compared to the EU and US, and welcomes the committee's analysis for future consideration.
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15 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Government's blanket Wagner Group sanctions approach creates enforcement gaps for linked entities.
The Government claimed that its sanctioning of the ‘Wagner Group’ automatically covered all the entities that the Group owns or controls. This approach under- appreciates the complexity of the network. It is also completely unrealistic. It leaves both enforcement agencies … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, reaffirming that the Wagner Group was fully designated in 2022 and explaining that the UK's sanctions regime relies on 'ownership and control' provisions, meaning subsidiaries are not designated separately. It also notes recent additional designations and will consider the committee's analysis in detail for future action.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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16 Conclusion Not Addressed
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Ministerial knowledge and FCDO-Treasury coordination on Wagner sanctions waivers are insufficient.
The Minister had no specific knowledge of work within his Department to analyse whether Wagner activities undermine the financial impact of UK sanctions on the Russian war machine. Despite finding it “likely”, he could not confirm that the FCDO had … Read more
Government Response
The government's response outlines its general sanctions policy and recent designations against the Wagner Group but does not address the committee's specific concerns about ministerial knowledge, FCDO and Treasury coordination, or sanctions waivers for Prigozhin.
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17 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Expedite and strengthen sanctions against all Wagner-linked individuals and entities, closing enforcement gaps.
We recommend that the Government move faster and harder in sanctioning Wagner- linked individuals and entities. Specifically, it should: (Paragraph 58) (a) Sanction all individuals and entities provided in Appendix 1, which the United States and European Union have already … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, highlighting recent designations of 13 Wagner-linked individuals and businesses in July, some of which were not targeted by the EU or US. It explains that the UK's sanctioning ability depends on building individual cases under its own statutory requirements and it will consider the committee's analysis in detail for future action, implying a selective approach to additional sanctions rather than a blanket acceptance of Appendix 1.
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18 Recommendation Rejected
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Establish a regular mechanism for coordinating Wagner-linked sanctions with US and EU partners.
We recommend that the Government establishes a specific and regular mechanism for coordinating with the United States and the European Union over Wagner- linked sanctions; it should report back to us on what these mechanisms are, and how frequently and … Read more
Government Response
The government explicitly rejects the recommendation, stating that strong coordination mechanisms are already in place with the EU and US, including frequent working-level engagement, a quarterly bilateral format with the EU, and a newly established UK-U.S. Strategic Sanctions Dialogue.
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19 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Prioritise introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals, collaborating with Turkey.
We further recommend that the Government prioritises introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals as a likely deterrent to involvement in the network, in particular working with Turkey, a popular holiday destination for Russians. Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees that travel bans have a deterrent effect but states that UK sanctions have limited impact on travel to Turkey. They commit to continuing discussions with international partners on possible sanctions or travel bans they could adopt.
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20 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Committee compiles public Wagner-linked names to aid government understanding of the network.
In the public interest, we have compiled Wagner-linked names that are already a matter of public record, as identified via our commissioned open-source research (see Appendix 2). In doing so, we hope to challenge the mystique that the Wagner Network … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's compilation of Wagner-linked names, stating they already use sanctions policy to deter and disrupt malign Wagner activity, having designated the Wagner Group in its entirety and recently sanctioned 13 additional individuals and businesses.
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21 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Urgently assess compiled Wagner-linked names and impose sanctions if thresholds are met.
We implore the Government to urgently assess these names and impose sanctions on these individuals and entities if the necessary threshold is met.
Government Response
The government partially agrees, highlighting existing sanctions against the Wagner Group and its former leader, and recent designations of 13 individuals and businesses. It notes the limitations of its sanctions regime and will consider the committee's provided analysis for further action.
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22 Conclusion Acknowledged
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Significant opportunity exists to disrupt the Wagner Network amid its uncertain future.
There is an opportunity to disrupt the Wagner Network at a time when its future is uncertain.
Government Response
The government agrees there is an opportunity to tackle Wagner and describes existing efforts such as coordinated action with partners, declassification and sharing of intelligence, and stepped-up communications to expose the group's activities.
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23 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Seize opportunity to deter countries from engaging with Wagner Network using international cooperation.
We recommend that the Government seizes this opportunity and works with international partners to deter countries from engaging with the Wagner Network, using a carrot and stick approach.
Government Response
The government agrees on the need to tackle Wagner with coordinated action and a mix of incentives, outlining existing approaches including declassification of intelligence and increased communication efforts to expose the group's activities.
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24 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Declassify and share intelligence on Wagner Network's destabilising effects with engaging countries.
As the Government improves its intelligence on the network, it should declassify it strategically and share it with countries that are considering engaging with the Wagner Network, to demonstrate the organisation’s destabilising effects, following the lead of the United States … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees on the potential value of declassification and sharing intelligence but notes it's not always possible due to risks. It states that it has already stepped up communication channels to expose Wagner's activities to demonstrate its destabilising effects.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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25 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Offer customised packages of military, aid, and trade support to priority countries.
The Government should offer a genuinely compelling alternative to priority countries in need of investment and security partnership, in collaboration with partners. Priority countries are especially likely to be neighbouring countries to those where the Wagner Network is engaged. A … Read more
Government Response
The government describes its existing approach to offering security and development support to partner countries, noting it provides long-term diplomatic, defence, and development support tailored to individual African countries, with a focus on states like Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Ghana.
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26 Recommendation Not Addressed
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Set out factors for determining priority countries for UK security partnerships.
In its response to this report, the Government should set out the factors it will assess in determining whether countries are priorities for UK security partnerships. These factors should include (but not be limited to): (Paragraph 71) (a) the UK’s … Read more
Government Response
The government describes its existing security partnerships and support for African countries but does not explicitly set out the specific factors it assesses when determining priority countries for UK security partnerships as requested.
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27 Recommendation Rejected
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Revive commitments to 50% ODA for fragile states and 0.7% GNI for ODA.
The Government should revive its previous commitment to channel 50% of Official Development Assistance to fragile and conflict-affected countries and regions. The Government should also revive its 2019 manifesto commitment to spending 0.7% of the UK’s Gross National Income on … Read more
Government Response
The government has no plans to reintroduce the commitment to channel 50% of ODA to fragile and conflict-affected states. It remains committed to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA once specific fiscal tests are met, which are currently not satisfied.
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28 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation, meeting legal criteria.
As a ‘stick’, the Government should proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation, recognising that—while there are risks of doing so—there are also risks of failing to do so, when the Network appears to meet the legal criteria. (Paragraph … Read more
Government Response
The government accepted the recommendation and laid a draft proscription order which came into force on 15 September, officially adding the Wagner Group to the list of proscribed terrorist organisations and making support for it a criminal offence.
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29 Conclusion Acknowledged
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Wagner Network effectively reconfigures and its activities will continue due to value.
The last decade has shown that the Wagner Network is highly effective at reconfiguring itself. We expect its activities to continue in some form, as they are too valuable, especially financially, to the Russian state to be lost. The question … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the committee's assessment of the Wagner Network's adaptability and destabilizing impact, noting the broader trend of Russia using Private Military Security Companies as proxies. It commits to paying close attention to the network's evolution and exploiting opportunities to apply further pressure.
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30 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Restrict flow of arms to Wagner Network and share intelligence with host governments.
We recommend that the UK Government takes advantage of the current uncertainty and seeks to disrupt the Wagner Network. In particular, at a moment when its usual supply channels from the Russian Ministry of Defence are in doubt, the Government … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees to disrupt the Wagner Network, stating it has increased efforts in communications, assessment, and policy coordination, and will consider further sanctions designations and continue work with partners to improve sanctions enforcement and counter illicit finance.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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31 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Government under-estimated Wagner Network, lacking strategy, leadership, and joined-up working.
For nearly 10 years, the Government has under-played and under-estimated the Wagner Network’s activities, as well as the security implications of its significant expansion. The Government has not told us anything specific that it is doing to challenge the network’s … Read more
Government Response
The government states it has a dedicated team coordinating its response to the Wagner Group and Russian PMSCs, implying the structural issue raised by the committee is being addressed. It also commits to continuing bilateral and multilateral work, dedicating new resources, and working with allies.
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32 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Government lacks knowledge and policy on other malign Private Military Companies.
The Wagner Network is merely the best-known and documented example of a PMC acting deniably on behalf of a state to further its interests and enrich its elites, at the expense of local citizens’ safety and stability in the long … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the concern, outlining its new four-strand approach to countering state threats from organisations like the Wagner Group, which includes building deeper understanding, increasing resilience, deepening cooperation, and using full powers to contest malign PMSC activities.
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33 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Assign clear responsibility for Wagner Network and establish cross-government lead on PMCs.
The Government should take a more strategic and coherent approach to addressing the challenges of this network and other proxy ‘PMCs’ by: (Paragraph 84) (a) assigning clear responsibility for the Wagner Network and adjacent ‘PMCs’ to a senior official in … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees, stating that a dedicated team led by a senior official in the HMG Russia Unit coordinates the cross-government response to Wagner and Russian PMSCs, working with the FCDO's Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation (OCSM) to monitor and address these challenges.
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34 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Government remains complacent regarding states' malign use of Private Military Companies.
The Government appears remarkably complacent about the growing practice of states using PMCs for malign purposes. Although the expansion of the Wagner Network and the harm it has caused appears to have led to some re-examination of the Government’s approach … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the observation, detailing its new four-strand approach to countering state threats from organisations like Wagner, which involves building deeper understanding of PMSCs, increasing resilience, deepening cooperation, and using the full range of powers available.
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35 Conclusion Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Voluntary model of Private Military Company regulation remains ineffective and detrimental.
The Government continues to rely on a largely voluntary model of PMC regulation. Our predecessor committee conducted a detailed report into the subject of PMCs in 2002. Even then, the risks of a voluntary model were clear, in that it … Read more
Government Response
The government defends its voluntary model of PMC regulation by citing its leading role in developing and implementing international initiatives like the Montreux Document and the Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights, providing examples of their effectiveness and the UK's global promotion efforts.
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36 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Improve understanding of Private Military Companies and provide information on new state threat approach.
The Government should improve its understanding of other PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSCs) connected in particular to Russia and China, and from all states. This is likely to be a growth industry, with more Governments seeking to create PMCs … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, providing details on its new four-strand approach to countering state threats, which includes building a deeper understanding of PMSC activity and capability, increasing resilience, deepening cooperation, and using full powers to contest malign operations, specifically agreeing on the importance of tracking Russian and Chinese PMSCs.
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37 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Set out steps to strengthen international legal framework governing PMCs and accountability.
In its response, the Government should set out the steps that it will take to strengthen the international legal framework governing PMCs’ activities, drawing on the UK’s deep legal expertise. Its response should address the following aspects: (Paragraph 88) 58 … Read more
Government Response
The government partially accepts the recommendation, agreeing on the need for clarification on definitions and actively participating in UN discussions to develop a workable framework, though rejecting the UN Mercenaries Convention in its current form. It fully agrees on improving accountability for Wagner fighters, supporting ICC investigations with £2.5 million funding, and promoting state accountability through continued engagement with the Montreux Document and IGWG discussions.
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38 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network using support to Ukraine's Prosecutor General.
The UK Government should use its significant support to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Ukraine to identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network. A prosecution in this theatre would serve to help deter the sense of impunity abroad.
Government Response
The government agrees on holding Wagner accountable, detailing its support for the International Criminal Court and the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group in Ukraine, including £2.5 million for domestic investigations. It commits to continuing support for prosecuting atrocity crimes by Wagner fighters in Ukraine.
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39 Recommendation Accepted
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: th…
Provide evidence base for effectiveness of voluntary Private Military Company regulation model.
The Government should provide the evidence base that leads it to believe in the effectiveness of its mostly voluntary model of PMC regulation. (Paragraph 90) Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed 59
Government Response
The government provides an evidence base by detailing its leading role in developing and implementing international voluntary initiatives like the Montreux Document and Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights, citing their effectiveness and the UK's global promotion efforts, including specific training funding.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 39 of 19 classified
Accepted 23
Accepted in Part 7
Acknowledged 4
Not Addressed 3
Rejected 2
Total 19 recs + 20 conclusions
Correspondence 1 letter
15 Mar 2023 Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023
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