22 Acknowledged

Collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and their online spreading techniques.

Conclusion
Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of such an influence operation is deeply concerning. In order to tackle amplified disinformation, identified by Principle 1, the government and Ofcom should collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and the techniques and behaviours they use to spread adversarial and deceptive narratives online. (Recommendation, Paragraph 58)
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the risk of foreign interference and states it is working to better understand indicators for platforms to detect it, while also continuing to engage with experts. They note existing Codes of Practice contain measures applicable to illegal foreign interference, but do not specifically commit to collaborating with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors as requested.
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government Acknowledged
We recognise the risk that foreign interference in the UK can pose, both to society as a whole and individuals. Our analysis published at the end of 2024 highlighted a variety of ways in which these risks can manifest. It is often challenging for providers of regulated services to identify individual items of content, in real-time, as foreign interference, as potential perpetrators can make attribution more difficult. We are working to better understand indicators that platforms could use to detect likely foreign interference. Analysis of large-scale large data sets and use of proactive technology to detect patterns associated with some forms of foreign interference behaviour could be effective, but platforms will need to take care only to act in cases where they have reasonable grounds to infer it has happened, or else risk unjustified restrictions of free expression. Our existing Codes of Practice contain several cross-cutting measures that are designed to apply across all illegal harms, and will help mitigate risks of foreign interference. Our ‘first-edition’ Codes include requirements for service providers to do a thorough risk assessment and put in place appropriate governance arrangements, have a content moderation function to review and assess suspected illegal content, allow for swift take down, appropriately resource and train their content moderation teams, operate easy to use reporting and complaints systems, and have clear internal policies for operating notable user or paid-for verification schemes. All these measures should be applied to illegal foreign interference, when services identify it. We will also continue to engage with experts to improve our understanding of how foreign interference can manifest online and appropriate responses to it.
Addressee Bodies
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Timeline
Recommendation age 0.9 yr
Report published 11 Jul 2025