Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms

Science, Innovation and Technology Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 20 Nov 2024 Closed: 17 Oct 2025 Parliament page
Between 30 July and 7 August 2024, a wave of anti-immigration demonstrations and riots took place across the UK. Some targeted mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers, driven in part by false claims that spread on social media platforms relating to the killing of three children in Southport. Ofcom, the … Read more
14 Recommendations
23 Conclusions
1 Report
1 Oral session
8 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 11 events
17 Oct
2025
Report published
11 Jul
2025
Report published
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
25 Feb
2025
Oral evidence
Oral evidence sessions 1 session
25 Feb 2025
View on parliament.uk
Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms
Ali Law · Sky Chris Yiu · Meta Wifredo Fernandez · X (formerly known as Twitter)
Recommendations & Conclusions
37 results
1 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Uphold five core principles for social media regulation to ensure public safety and user control
In the course of this inquiry, we identified five key principles that we believe are crucial for regulation of social media and related technologies: 1) Public safety: Algorithmically accelerated misinformation is a danger that companies and government need to address—the … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
2 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media business models amplify harmful content, endangering public safety during unrest
We launched this inquiry in the wake of the riots that followed the horrific attack in Southport in 2024. We received overwhelming evidence that online activity, including social media recommendation algorithms amplifying harmful and misleading content, played a key part … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
3 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Online Safety Act fails to adequately tackle misinformation and pervasive online harm
The Online Safety Act was not designed to tackle misinformation—we heard that even if it had been fully implemented, it would have made little difference to the spread of misleading content that drove violence and hate in summer 2024. Therefore, … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
4 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Mandate Ofcom's crisis protocol to hold all online services accountable for misinformation spread
We welcome Ofcom’s consultation on a ‘crisis response protocol’ for companies to follow in response to events such as the 2024 unrest. The protocol should directly address misinformation by including all online services at risk of contributing to the spread … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
5 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Regulate online technologies based on defined principles to protect and empower citizens
Social media and other online platforms have huge power and reach into our lives, with positive and negative impacts. They can democratise knowledge and access to the public sphere, and help to build social connections and global communities. Generative AI … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
6 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media algorithms amplify harmful content, exposing users, particularly young people, to risks
Internet users are exposed to large volumes of harmful and misleading content which can deceive, damage mental health, normalise extremist views, undermine democracy, and fuel violence. We are concerned by the evidence that recommendation algorithms—integral to the advertisement- and engagement-driven … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
7 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media technology is insufficiently transparent and accessible to public authorities
The technology used by social media companies should be transparent, explainable and accessible to public authorities, as stated in our Principle
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
8 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Urge government to define social media companies' responsibility as publishers or platforms
Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
9 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Commission independent research into social media algorithms amplifying harmful content with full data access
There is a shortfall in data needed to accurately analyse the scale of the problem and identify policy solutions. In line with our Principle 4, the government should commission a large-scale research project into how far social media recommendation systems … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
10 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Publish government conclusions on harm promoted by platform recommendation systems.
Based on the research described above, the government should publish conclusions on the level and nature of harm that these platforms promote through their recommendation systems. Following our Principle 3, if significant harm is found, the responsible online services should … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
11 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Compel social media platforms to embed tools for deprioritising fact-checked misleading content.
Following our Principles 2 and 3, the government should compel social media platforms to embed tools within their systems that identify and algorithmically deprioritise fact-checked misleading content, or content that cites unreliable sources, where it has the potential to cause … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
12 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Mandate online services to give users a 'right to reset' recommendation data.
As per Principle 4, users should have more control over the content that is pushed to them online. Government should mandate all online services with a content recommendation algorithm to give the user a ‘right to reset’, which would delete … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
13 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Regulating powerful global technology companies presents significant challenges for governments and Parliament.
The UK government—like its counterparts around the world—is facing the challenge of attempting to regulate hugely powerful technology companies that operate across the world, providing technologies that transform societies, with bigger budgets than many countries. It is essential that their … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
14 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Concerns regarding disjointed platform approaches and weakened content moderation policies.
We are concerned by disjointed approaches from platforms to false and harmful content; in particular by recent moves from X and Meta to water down their Terms of Service and approach to content moderation. While there are merits to crowd-sourcing … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
15 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Commission independent research into effective methods for platforms to address misinformation.
In line with our Principle 1 of tackling amplified misinformation, the government should compel platforms to put in place minimum standards for addressing the spread of misleading content online. More information is needed on the merits of different approaches to … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
16 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Online Safety Act scope insufficient for 'legal but harmful' content and misinformation.
The Online Safety Act will lead to some improvements, but is designed only to protect users from harm that is illegal or affects children. The decision not to include measures related to the algorithmic amplification of “legal but harmful” content, … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
17 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Online Safety Act measures are insufficient to address algorithmic misinformation spread effectively.
It is vital that platforms are held responsible for the algorithmic spread of misleading or deceptive content that can radicalise and harm users. The few measures in the Act that address misinformation fall short. The False Communications offence is vaguely … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
18 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Submit annual report to Parliament on the state of online misinformation trends.
The broad scale—and serious impact—of misinformation online requires greater transparency and accountability from the government. In line with our Principle 1, the government should submit an annual report to Parliament on the state of misinformation online, tracking trends and issues … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
19 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments on harmful misinformation.
In line with Principle 5, transparency, the government should introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments and reporting requirements on legal but harmful content, such as potentially harmful misinformation, with a focus on the role of recommendation algorithms in … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
20 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Confirm that platform services are required to act on all risks identified in assessments.
To ensure true responsibility from platform companies, as per Principle 3, Ofcom and DSIT should confirm that services are required to act on all risks identified in risk assessments, regardless of whether they are included in Ofcom’s Codes of Practice. … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
21 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Create an additional regulatory category for 'small but risky' platforms, based on their online harms.
The Online Safety Act does not do enough to address the risks posed by small platforms due to its exclusive focus on size. Ofcom should create an additional category to cover ‘small but risky’ platforms, based on analysis of the … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
22 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and their online spreading techniques.
Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
23 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Clarify government departmental ownership for tracking and countering online foreign influence operations.
Responsibility for tracking foreign disinformation campaigns appears to be split between several departments, including DSIT. This suggests that the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 characterisation of countering Russian influence operations as a “hot potato”, passed between different bodies, has not … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
24 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Place the National Security Online Information Team on statutory footing and under ISC remit.
The NSOIT is an important tool in protecting citizens from disinformation and needs appropriate scrutiny. Government should place NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee, to ensure that our Principle … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
25 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Online Safety Act fails to protect users from synthetic disinformation and harmful experimental features.
The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
26 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Concerns regarding regulatory and government contradiction and Ofcom's complacency on online safety.
We are concerned at what appears to be contradiction and confusion between regulators and government over the capabilities, limitations and principles behind the Online Safety Act. We expect senior Ofcom officials and ministers to be fully aligned in their understanding … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
27 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Pass legislation requiring generative AI platforms to conduct risk assessments and implement user safeguards.
To protect citizens from the AI-exacerbated spread of misinformation and harm, the government should pass legislation that covers generative AI platforms, bringing them in line with other online services that pose a high risk of producing or spreading illegal or … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
28 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Require generative AI providers to share internal data with independent online safety researchers.
Principle 5 is crucial for addressing potential harms from generative AI, as there is currently a serious shortfall in transparency and oversight of the platforms and systems that allow users to create AI-generated content. The government should require providers of … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
29 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Mandate generative AI platforms to automatically label AI-generated media with metadata and watermarks.
To effectively tackle amplified misinformation as per Principle 1, the government should work with relevant experts and platforms to develop technology that automatically detects AI-generated media, meeting mis/ disinformation at its source. It should mandate all generative AI platforms, and … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
30 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media algorithms fail to differentiate harmful from harmless content, spreading misinformation.
Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
31 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Under-regulated digital advertising market incentivises and monetises harmful content, often without advertisers' knowledge.
The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
32 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Google's monetisation of misinformation highlights systemic failures within the digital advertising industry.
In particular, we were concerned by evidence that Google may have helped to monetise misinformation relating to the attacks, contributing to the violence. This is unacceptable, and is just one example of a much wider problem with the digital advertising … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
33 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Significant regulatory gap in digital advertising allows harmful content monetisation; self-regulation is insufficient.
There is a regulatory gap around digital advertising, as much of the regulation and interventions have been industry-led and focused on tackling harmful advertising content, as opposed to the monetisation of harmful content through advertising. We are not convinced that … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
34 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Establish new arms-length body or extend Ofcom's powers to regulate digital advertising supply chain.
Tackling online harm means addressing the principles that incentivise and monetise its spread. In line with Principle 3, responsibility, the government should create a new arms-length body—not funded by industry—to regulate and scrutinise the process of digital advertising, covering the … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
35 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Mandate the Advertising Standards Authority to establish comprehensive digital advertising ecosystem guidelines for all actors.
To tackle the incentive behind amplified misinformation—namely, the monetisation of harmful content—there should be clear and enforceable standards for digital advertising market processes, as well as advertising content. Following our Principles 1, 3 and 5, government should ask the Advertising … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
36 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Mandate ‘Know Your Customer’ checks and platform data disclosure for digital advertising supply chain transparency.
The internet, and social media, could not operate without digital advertising. Given its implications for public safety, as per Principle 5, there needs to be heightened transparency in the market processes of online advertising. Government should mandate ‘Know Your Customer’ … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
37 Conclusion
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Empower Ofcom to issue penalty notices to platforms for monetising harmful content on their services.
There are insufficient disincentives for bad practice in the digital advertising market. Bad actors can exploit the ecosystem, monetising harmful content through major platforms. Following Principle 3, Ofcom should be empowered to give penalty notices to platforms when they allow … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
View details
Correspondence 8 letters
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to X, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to TikTok, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Meta, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Google, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from X, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April, 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Meta, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 9 April 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Google, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, April 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from TikTok, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April 2025
Parliament page