Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms

Science, Innovation and Technology Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 20 Nov 2024 Parliament page
Between 30 July and 7 August 2024, a wave of anti-immigration demonstrations and riots took place across the UK. Some targeted mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers, driven in part by false claims that spread on social media platforms relating to the killing of three children in Southport. Ofcom, the … Read more
14 Recommendations
23 Conclusions
1 Report
1 Oral session
8 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 12 events
17 Oct
2025
Report published
11 Jul
2025
Report published
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
25 Feb
2025
Oral evidence
25 Feb
2025
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 8, Palace of Westminster
Oral evidence sessions 1 session
25 Feb 2025
View on parliament.uk
Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms
Ali Law · Sky Chris Yiu · Meta Wifredo Fernandez · X (formerly known as Twitter)
Title HC No. Published Items Response
2nd Report – Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms HC 441 11 Jul 2025 37 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
8 results
Clear
8 Recommendation
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Urge government to define social media companies' responsibility as publishers or platforms
Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not … Read more
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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23 Recommendation Not Addressed
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Clarify government departmental ownership for tracking and countering online foreign influence operations.
Responsibility for tracking foreign disinformation campaigns appears to be split between several departments, including DSIT. This suggests that the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 characterisation of countering Russian influence operations as a “hot potato”, passed between different bodies, has not … Read more
Government Response
The government response cuts off mid-sentence and does not address the recommendation to clarify departmental ownership of tracking and countering online narrative operations.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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24 Recommendation Not Addressed
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Place the National Security Online Information Team on statutory footing and under ISC remit.
The NSOIT is an important tool in protecting citizens from disinformation and needs appropriate scrutiny. Government should place NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee, to ensure that our Principle … Read more
Government Response
The government response cuts off mid-sentence and does not address the recommendation to put the NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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25 Conclusion Not Addressed
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Online Safety Act fails to protect users from synthetic disinformation and harmful experimental features.
The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the potential harm of online misinformation but states the Online Safety Act (OSA) takes a proportionate approach by focusing on content that is illegal or harmful to children. It reaffirms that for other legal content, platforms decide what is permitted, and the OSA empowers adult users to make informed choices rather than addressing the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation or requiring transparency for its production systems.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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26 Conclusion Not Addressed
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Concerns regarding regulatory and government contradiction and Ofcom's complacency on online safety.
We are concerned at what appears to be contradiction and confusion between regulators and government over the capabilities, limitations and principles behind the Online Safety Act. We expect senior Ofcom officials and ministers to be fully aligned in their understanding … Read more
Government Response
The response text is truncated and does not engage with the substance of the conclusion.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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30 Conclusion Not Addressed
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media algorithms fail to differentiate harmful from harmless content, spreading misinformation.
Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which … Read more
Government Response
The government reaffirms its commitment to a safer online world and urges providers to counter mis- and disinformation, but reiterates the Online Safety Act's focus on illegal content and content harmful to children. It does not address the committee's conclusion about recommendation algorithms incentivising harmful content due to advertising, instead referencing existing industry self-regulation like the IAB UK's Gold Standard.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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31 Conclusion Not Addressed
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Under-regulated digital advertising market incentivises and monetises harmful content, often without advertisers' knowledge.
The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and … Read more
Government Response
The government reiterates its commitment to a safer online world and the Online Safety Act's focus on illegal and child-harming content. It does not directly address the conclusion regarding the opaque and under-regulated digital advertising market's role in the production and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, instead referring to industry self-regulation via the IAB UK's Gold Standard.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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33 Conclusion Not Addressed
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Significant regulatory gap in digital advertising allows harmful content monetisation; self-regulation is insufficient.
There is a regulatory gap around digital advertising, as much of the regulation and interventions have been industry-led and focused on tackling harmful advertising content, as opposed to the monetisation of harmful content through advertising. We are not convinced that … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges its commitment to a safer online world and that the Online Safety Act addresses illegal misinformation and content harmful to children. However, it does not directly address the committee's specific concern about a regulatory gap for the broader monetization of harmful content or its skepticism regarding the sufficiency of industry self-regulation, instead pointing to existing legislation and industry-led initiatives.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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Government Response AI assessment · 36 of 14 classified
Accepted 10
Accepted in Part 1
Acknowledged 7
Deferred 4
Not Addressed 7
Rejected 7
Total 14 recs + 23 conclusions
Correspondence 8 letters
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to X, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to TikTok, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Google, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Meta, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from X, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April, 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from TikTok, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Google, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, April 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Meta, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 9 April 2025
Parliament page