Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms

Science, Innovation and Technology Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 20 Nov 2024 Parliament page
Between 30 July and 7 August 2024, a wave of anti-immigration demonstrations and riots took place across the UK. Some targeted mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers, driven in part by false claims that spread on social media platforms relating to the killing of three children in Southport. Ofcom, the … Read more
14 Recommendations
23 Conclusions
1 Report
1 Oral session
8 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 12 events
17 Oct
2025
Report published
11 Jul
2025
Report published
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
25 Feb
2025
Oral evidence
25 Feb
2025
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 8, Palace of Westminster
Oral evidence sessions 1 session
25 Feb 2025
View on parliament.uk
Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms
Ali Law · Sky Chris Yiu · Meta Wifredo Fernandez · X (formerly known as Twitter)
Title HC No. Published Items Response
2nd Report – Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms HC 441 11 Jul 2025 37 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
7 results
Clear
1 Conclusion Acknowledged
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Uphold five core principles for social media regulation to ensure public safety and user control
In the course of this inquiry, we identified five key principles that we believe are crucial for regulation of social media and related technologies: 1) Public safety: Algorithmically accelerated misinformation is a danger that companies and government need to address—the … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's principles and the challenges of misinformation, outlining various legislative and non-legislative measures, including the Online Safety Act 2023 and ongoing media literacy efforts, to address these issues while balancing free expression.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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6 Conclusion Acknowledged
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media algorithms amplify harmful content, exposing users, particularly young people, to risks
Internet users are exposed to large volumes of harmful and misleading content which can deceive, damage mental health, normalise extremist views, undermine democracy, and fuel violence. We are concerned by the evidence that recommendation algorithms—integral to the advertisement- and engagement-driven … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledged the committee's concerns about harmful online content and algorithms, outlining existing legislative and non-legislative measures such as the Online Safety Act 2023 and efforts to enhance media literacy.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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13 Conclusion Acknowledged
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Regulating powerful global technology companies presents significant challenges for governments and Parliament.
The UK government—like its counterparts around the world—is facing the challenge of attempting to regulate hugely powerful technology companies that operate across the world, providing technologies that transform societies, with bigger budgets than many countries. It is essential that their … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's report, its examination of challenges, and the importance of public safety, accountability, and transparency, while also recognizing the challenges posed by misinformation.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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14 Conclusion Acknowledged
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Concerns regarding disjointed platform approaches and weakened content moderation policies.
We are concerned by disjointed approaches from platforms to false and harmful content; in particular by recent moves from X and Meta to water down their Terms of Service and approach to content moderation. While there are merits to crowd-sourcing … Read more
Government Response
The government shares the committee's concerns regarding amplified misleading content and agrees more evidence is needed, stating it is looking to build its evidence base and monitoring changes, while also mentioning a future framework for researchers to access online safety data.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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15 Recommendation Acknowledged
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Commission independent research into effective methods for platforms to address misinformation.
In line with our Principle 1 of tackling amplified misinformation, the government should compel platforms to put in place minimum standards for addressing the spread of misleading content online. More information is needed on the merits of different approaches to … Read more
Government Response
The government shares concerns about misleading content and agrees more evidence is needed to assess different approaches, stating it is looking to build its evidence base. It mentions past initiatives and a future framework under the Data (Use and Access) Act to enable independent researchers to access online safety data, but does not commit to commissioning the specific research project.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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22 Conclusion Acknowledged
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and their online spreading techniques.
Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the risk of foreign interference and states it is working to better understand indicators for platforms to detect it, while also continuing to engage with experts. They note existing Codes of Practice contain measures applicable to illegal foreign interference, but do not specifically commit to collaborating with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors as requested.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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32 Conclusion Acknowledged
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Google's monetisation of misinformation highlights systemic failures within the digital advertising industry.
In particular, we were concerned by evidence that Google may have helped to monetise misinformation relating to the attacks, contributing to the violence. This is unacceptable, and is just one example of a much wider problem with the digital advertising … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the concern about online misinformation and its potential for real-world impact, stating its commitment to a safer online world and urging providers to counter its spread. It highlights that the Online Safety Act takes a proportionate approach by focusing on illegal content and that which is harmful to children, without committing to new specific actions regarding monetization of other harmful content or transparency from platforms like Google.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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Government Response AI assessment · 36 of 14 classified
Accepted 10
Accepted in Part 1
Acknowledged 7
Deferred 4
Not Addressed 7
Rejected 7
Total 14 recs + 23 conclusions
Correspondence 8 letters
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to X, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to TikTok, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Google, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Meta, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from X, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April, 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from TikTok, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Google, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, April 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Meta, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 9 April 2025
Parliament page