Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms

Science, Innovation and Technology Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 20 Nov 2024 Parliament page
Between 30 July and 7 August 2024, a wave of anti-immigration demonstrations and riots took place across the UK. Some targeted mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers, driven in part by false claims that spread on social media platforms relating to the killing of three children in Southport. Ofcom, the … Read more
14 Recommendations
23 Conclusions
1 Report
1 Oral session
8 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 12 events
17 Oct
2025
Report published
11 Jul
2025
Report published
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
2 May
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
29 Apr
2025
Correspondence
25 Feb
2025
Oral evidence
25 Feb
2025
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 8, Palace of Westminster
Oral evidence sessions 1 session
25 Feb 2025
View on parliament.uk
Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms
Ali Law · Sky Chris Yiu · Meta Wifredo Fernandez · X (formerly known as Twitter)
Title HC No. Published Items Response
2nd Report – Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms HC 441 11 Jul 2025 37 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
10 results
Clear
2 Conclusion Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media business models amplify harmful content, endangering public safety during unrest
We launched this inquiry in the wake of the riots that followed the horrific attack in Southport in 2024. We received overwhelming evidence that online activity, including social media recommendation algorithms amplifying harmful and misleading content, played a key part … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the committee's findings, acknowledging that it is appropriate for providers to receive clear guidance on how to respond to crises that could lead to the rapid spread of illegal content online.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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5 Conclusion Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Regulate online technologies based on defined principles to protect and empower citizens
Social media and other online platforms have huge power and reach into our lives, with positive and negative impacts. They can democratise knowledge and access to the public sphere, and help to build social connections and global communities. Generative AI … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the challenges and the need for regulation, stating it is already addressing the issues through the regulatory provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 and ongoing efforts to enhance media literacy.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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7 Conclusion Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Social media technology is insufficiently transparent and accessible to public authorities
The technology used by social media companies should be transparent, explainable and accessible to public authorities, as stated in our Principle
Government Response
The government states that the Online Safety Act (OSA) will deliver greater transparency and accountability through Ofcom's duties, mandatory annual transparency reports, and user empowerment features, thereby addressing the committee's principle.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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11 Recommendation Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Compel social media platforms to embed tools for deprioritising fact-checked misleading content.
Following our Principles 2 and 3, the government should compel social media platforms to embed tools within their systems that identify and algorithmically deprioritise fact-checked misleading content, or content that cites unreliable sources, where it has the potential to cause … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the issue and urges providers to counter misinformation, but does not commit to compelling platforms to embed new tools. It notes that the Online Safety Act (OSA) focuses on illegal or child-harming content and that most major platforms already employ fact-checking and algorithmic deprioritisation, which the government supports.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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12 Conclusion Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Mandate online services to give users a 'right to reset' recommendation data.
As per Principle 4, users should have more control over the content that is pushed to them online. Government should mandate all online services with a content recommendation algorithm to give the user a ‘right to reset’, which would delete … Read more
Government Response
The government states that while there is no specific 'right to reset' legislation, existing powers and protections under the Online Safety Act (OSA) and UK GDPR, such as the right to erasure and user control features, collectively achieve the committee's objective.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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16 Conclusion Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Online Safety Act scope insufficient for 'legal but harmful' content and misinformation.
The Online Safety Act will lead to some improvements, but is designed only to protect users from harm that is illegal or affects children. The decision not to include measures related to the algorithmic amplification of “legal but harmful” content, … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's concern but defends the Online Safety Act's proportionate approach, which focuses on illegal content and content harmful to children. It highlights that the OSA holds Category 1 services accountable for their terms of service, mentions its media literacy strategy, and notes platforms already employ fact-checking and algorithmic deprioritisation.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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17 Conclusion Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Online Safety Act measures are insufficient to address algorithmic misinformation spread effectively.
It is vital that platforms are held responsible for the algorithmic spread of misleading or deceptive content that can radicalise and harm users. The few measures in the Act that address misinformation fall short. The False Communications offence is vaguely … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the importance of countering misinformation, but defends the Online Safety Act's proportionate approach which targets illegal content and content harmful to children. It emphasizes that Category 1 services are accountable for their terms of service, references its media literacy strategy, and notes platforms' existing fact-checking and algorithmic deprioritisation efforts.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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19 Recommendation Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments on harmful misinformation.
In line with Principle 5, transparency, the government should introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments and reporting requirements on legal but harmful content, such as potentially harmful misinformation, with a focus on the role of recommendation algorithms in … Read more
Government Response
The government states the Online Safety Act (OSA) already introduces duties for platforms, compelling Ofcom to require transparency reports on safety-related issues, including information on the dissemination of content and how algorithms function. The OSA also empowers adult users regarding certain legal but harmful content.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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27 Recommendation Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Pass legislation requiring generative AI platforms to conduct risk assessments and implement user safeguards.
To protect citizens from the AI-exacerbated spread of misinformation and harm, the government should pass legislation that covers generative AI platforms, bringing them in line with other online services that pose a high risk of producing or spreading illegal or … Read more
Government Response
The government believes the Online Safety Act takes a proportionate approach by focusing on illegal or harmful content to children, requiring services to undertake risk assessments, and holding Category 1 services to account over the enforcement of their terms of service.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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29 Recommendation Accepted
2nd Report – Social media, misinfo…
Mandate generative AI platforms to automatically label AI-generated media with metadata and watermarks.
To effectively tackle amplified misinformation as per Principle 1, the government should work with relevant experts and platforms to develop technology that automatically detects AI-generated media, meeting mis/ disinformation at its source. It should mandate all generative AI platforms, and … Read more
Government Response
The government responds by highlighting its past initiative, the Deepfake Detection Challenge, which brought together experts to develop solutions for detecting synthetic media. However, it does not commit to working with platforms to develop new detection technology or mandating automatic labelling of AI-generated media with metadata and watermarks.
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
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Government Response AI assessment · 36 of 14 classified
Accepted 10
Accepted in Part 1
Acknowledged 7
Deferred 4
Not Addressed 7
Rejected 7
Total 14 recs + 23 conclusions
Correspondence 8 letters
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to X, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to TikTok, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Google, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
2 May 2025 Correspondence from Chair to Meta, in relation to follow-ups from the 25 February oral evidence session, dated 20 March 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from X, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April, 2025
Parliament page
29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from TikTok, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 10 April 2025
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29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Google, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, April 2025
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29 Apr 2025 Correspondence from Meta, Follow-ups from 25 February oral evidence session, 9 April 2025
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