2nd Report – Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms

Select Committee

Science, Innovation and Technology Committee HC 441 11 July 2025

Report Status Government responded

Conclusions & Recommendations 37 items (14 recs)

Source View on Parliament website

Government Response (AI assessment · 36 of 37 classified)

Accepted 10

Accepted in Part 1

Deferred 4

Not Addressed 7

Rejected 7

Recommendations

14 results

8

Urge government to define social media companies' responsibility as publishers or platforms

Recommendation

Social media companies have often argued that they are not publishers but platforms, abdicating responsibility for the content they put online. We believe that these services, with sophisticated recommendation algorithms that directly amplify and push content to users, are not … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

9 Deferred

Commission independent research into social media algorithms amplifying harmful content with full data access

Recommendation

There is a shortfall in data needed to accurately analyse the scale of the problem and identify policy solutions. In line with our Principle 4, the government should commission a large-scale research project into how far social media recommendation systems … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government states that Ofcom, as the independent online safety regulator, is best placed to judge and undertake research into content recommender systems, rather than the government commissioning a project directly. It also points to the Data (Use and Access) Act, which will create a future framework for independent researchers to access online safety data.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

10 Deferred

Publish government conclusions on harm promoted by platform recommendation systems.

Recommendation

Based on the research described above, the government should publish conclusions on the level and nature of harm that these platforms promote through their recommendation systems. Following our Principle 3, if significant harm is found, the responsible online services should … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government redirects the recommendation to Ofcom, stating it is best placed to consider it, oversee risk assessments, and guide platforms on addressing harms from recommendation systems. It notes that Ofcom already possesses the power to impose fines of up to £18 million or 10% of worldwide revenue for non-compliance.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

11 Accepted

Compel social media platforms to embed tools for deprioritising fact-checked misleading content.

Recommendation

Following our Principles 2 and 3, the government should compel social media platforms to embed tools within their systems that identify and algorithmically deprioritise fact-checked misleading content, or content that cites unreliable sources, where it has the potential to cause … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the issue and urges providers to counter misinformation, but does not commit to compelling platforms to embed new tools. It notes that the Online Safety Act (OSA) focuses on illegal or child-harming content and that most major platforms already employ fact-checking and algorithmic deprioritisation, which the government supports.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

15 Acknowledged

Commission independent research into effective methods for platforms to address misinformation.

Recommendation

In line with our Principle 1 of tackling amplified misinformation, the government should compel platforms to put in place minimum standards for addressing the spread of misleading content online. More information is needed on the merits of different approaches to … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government shares concerns about misleading content and agrees more evidence is needed to assess different approaches, stating it is looking to build its evidence base. It mentions past initiatives and a future framework under the Data (Use and Access) Act to enable independent researchers to access online safety data, but does not commit to commissioning the specific research project.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

18 Rejected

Submit annual report to Parliament on the state of online misinformation trends.

Recommendation

The broad scale—and serious impact—of misinformation online requires greater transparency and accountability from the government. In line with our Principle 1, the government should submit an annual report to Parliament on the state of misinformation online, tracking trends and issues … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government rejects the recommendation for an annual report on misinformation, citing national security concerns that such a report would expose vulnerabilities and hinder operations. They state they already provide updates through existing parliamentary channels.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

19 Accepted

Introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments on harmful misinformation.

Recommendation

In line with Principle 5, transparency, the government should introduce duties for platforms to undertake risk assessments and reporting requirements on legal but harmful content, such as potentially harmful misinformation, with a focus on the role of recommendation algorithms in … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government states the Online Safety Act (OSA) already introduces duties for platforms, compelling Ofcom to require transparency reports on safety-related issues, including information on the dissemination of content and how algorithms function. The OSA also empowers adult users regarding certain legal but harmful content.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

23 Not Addressed

Clarify government departmental ownership for tracking and countering online foreign influence operations.

Recommendation

Responsibility for tracking foreign disinformation campaigns appears to be split between several departments, including DSIT. This suggests that the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 characterisation of countering Russian influence operations as a “hot potato”, passed between different bodies, has not … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government response cuts off mid-sentence and does not address the recommendation to clarify departmental ownership of tracking and countering online narrative operations.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

24 Not Addressed

Place the National Security Online Information Team on statutory footing and under ISC remit.

Recommendation

The NSOIT is an important tool in protecting citizens from disinformation and needs appropriate scrutiny. Government should place NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee, to ensure that our Principle … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government response cuts off mid-sentence and does not address the recommendation to put the NSOIT on a statutory footing and bring it under the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

27 Accepted

Pass legislation requiring generative AI platforms to conduct risk assessments and implement user safeguards.

Recommendation

To protect citizens from the AI-exacerbated spread of misinformation and harm, the government should pass legislation that covers generative AI platforms, bringing them in line with other online services that pose a high risk of producing or spreading illegal or … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government believes the Online Safety Act takes a proportionate approach by focusing on illegal or harmful content to children, requiring services to undertake risk assessments, and holding Category 1 services to account over the enforcement of their terms of service.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

28 Deferred

Require generative AI providers to share internal data with independent online safety researchers.

Recommendation

Principle 5 is crucial for addressing potential harms from generative AI, as there is currently a serious shortfall in transparency and oversight of the platforms and systems that allow users to create AI-generated content. The government should require providers of … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government states that provisions in the Data (Use and Access) Act empower the DSIT Secretary of State to create a future framework for independent researchers to access online safety data, which will provide a legislative footing for their research once implemented. This defers the specific requirement for generative AI providers to share data now.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

29 Accepted

Mandate generative AI platforms to automatically label AI-generated media with metadata and watermarks.

Recommendation

To effectively tackle amplified misinformation as per Principle 1, the government should work with relevant experts and platforms to develop technology that automatically detects AI-generated media, meeting mis/ disinformation at its source. It should mandate all generative AI platforms, and … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government responds by highlighting its past initiative, the Deepfake Detection Challenge, which brought together experts to develop solutions for detecting synthetic media. However, it does not commit to working with platforms to develop new detection technology or mandating automatic labelling of AI-generated media with metadata and watermarks.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

34 Rejected

Establish new arms-length body or extend Ofcom's powers to regulate digital advertising supply chain.

Recommendation

Tackling online harm means addressing the principles that incentivise and monetise its spread. In line with Principle 3, responsibility, the government should create a new arms-length body—not funded by industry—to regulate and scrutinise the process of digital advertising, covering the … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government rejects the recommendation to create a new arms-length body or extend Ofcom's powers to specifically regulate the monetization of harmful and misleading content. It explains that the Online Safety Act focuses on systems and processes for illegal and child-harmful content, and extending Ofcom's remit to broader 'harmful content' would require difficult definitions and could have negative implications, instead highlighting existing industry-led schemes.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

36 Deferred

Mandate ‘Know Your Customer’ checks and platform data disclosure for digital advertising supply chain transparency.

Recommendation

The internet, and social media, could not operate without digital advertising. Given its implications for public safety, as per Principle 5, there needs to be heightened transparency in the market processes of online advertising. Government should mandate ‘Know Your Customer’ … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges concerns regarding trust and transparency in online advertising and commits to exploring options for 'Know Your Customer' checks, alongside other interventions, through its continued work with the Online Advertising Taskforce. However, it does not commit to mandating these checks or to ensuring platforms disclose full ad campaign data and allow independent third-party audits, as recommended.

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

Conclusions (23) Observations and findings — click to expand

1 Conclusion Acknowledged

In the course of this inquiry, we identified five key principles that we believe are crucial for regulation of social media and related technologies: 1) Public safety: Algorithmically accelerated misinformation is a danger that companies and government need to address—the government and platform companies should work together to protect the …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the committee's principles and the challenges of misinformation, outlining various legislative and non-legislative measures, including the Online Safety Act 2023 and ongoing media literacy efforts, to address these issues while balancing free expression.

2 Conclusion Accepted

We launched this inquiry in the wake of the riots that followed the horrific attack in Southport in 2024. We received overwhelming evidence that online activity, including social media recommendation algorithms amplifying harmful and misleading content, played a key part in driving the unrest and violence. Social media companies’ responses …

Government Response Summary

The government agrees with the committee's findings, acknowledging that it is appropriate for providers to receive clear guidance on how to respond to crises that could lead to the rapid spread of illegal content online.

3 Conclusion Rejected

The Online Safety Act was not designed to tackle misinformation—we heard that even if it had been fully implemented, it would have made little difference to the spread of misleading content that drove violence and hate in summer 2024. Therefore, the Act fails to keep UK citizens safe from a …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the potential impact of online misinformation but defends the Online Safety Act's proportionate approach, stating it focuses on illegal content and content harmful to children while balancing freedom of expression, and explains how providers are required to tackle such content.

4 Conclusion Accepted in Part

We welcome Ofcom’s consultation on a ‘crisis response protocol’ for companies to follow in response to events such as the 2024 unrest. The protocol should directly address misinformation by including all online services at risk of contributing to the spread of false or harmful information, including large online social media, …

Government Response Summary

The government agrees with the need for a crisis response protocol and states that Ofcom, as the independent regulator, is best placed to consider the recommendation, confirming that its consultation will include proposals for such a protocol covering real-time monitoring, law enforcement engagement, and operational differences for high-risk providers.

5 Conclusion Accepted

Social media and other online platforms have huge power and reach into our lives, with positive and negative impacts. They can democratise knowledge and access to the public sphere, and help to build social connections and global communities. Generative AI provides further opportunities in terms of productivity, creativity and content …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the challenges and the need for regulation, stating it is already addressing the issues through the regulatory provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 and ongoing efforts to enhance media literacy.

6 Conclusion Acknowledged

Internet users are exposed to large volumes of harmful and misleading content which can deceive, damage mental health, normalise extremist views, undermine democracy, and fuel violence. We are concerned by the evidence that recommendation algorithms—integral to the advertisement- and engagement-driven business models of social media companies—play a role in this. …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledged the committee's concerns about harmful online content and algorithms, outlining existing legislative and non-legislative measures such as the Online Safety Act 2023 and efforts to enhance media literacy.

7 Conclusion Accepted

The technology used by social media companies should be transparent, explainable and accessible to public authorities, as stated in our Principle

Government Response Summary

The government states that the Online Safety Act (OSA) will deliver greater transparency and accountability through Ofcom's duties, mandatory annual transparency reports, and user empowerment features, thereby addressing the committee's principle.

12 Conclusion Accepted

As per Principle 4, users should have more control over the content that is pushed to them online. Government should mandate all online services with a content recommendation algorithm to give the user a ‘right to reset’, which would delete all data stored by their recommendation algorithm, in the manner …

Government Response Summary

The government states that while there is no specific 'right to reset' legislation, existing powers and protections under the Online Safety Act (OSA) and UK GDPR, such as the right to erasure and user control features, collectively achieve the committee's objective.

13 Conclusion Acknowledged

The UK government—like its counterparts around the world—is facing the challenge of attempting to regulate hugely powerful technology companies that operate across the world, providing technologies that transform societies, with bigger budgets than many countries. It is essential that their impact on our society be understood, effectively scrutinised and, where …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the committee's report, its examination of challenges, and the importance of public safety, accountability, and transparency, while also recognizing the challenges posed by misinformation.

14 Conclusion Acknowledged

We are concerned by disjointed approaches from platforms to false and harmful content; in particular by recent moves from X and Meta to water down their Terms of Service and approach to content moderation. While there are merits to crowd-sourcing models of context provision and fact-checking—as part of a wider …

Government Response Summary

The government shares the committee's concerns regarding amplified misleading content and agrees more evidence is needed, stating it is looking to build its evidence base and monitoring changes, while also mentioning a future framework for researchers to access online safety data.

16 Conclusion Accepted

The Online Safety Act will lead to some improvements, but is designed only to protect users from harm that is illegal or affects children. The decision not to include measures related to the algorithmic amplification of “legal but harmful” content, such as misinformation, means that full enforcement of the Act …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the committee's concern but defends the Online Safety Act's proportionate approach, which focuses on illegal content and content harmful to children. It highlights that the OSA holds Category 1 services accountable for their terms of service, mentions its media literacy strategy, and notes platforms already employ fact-checking and algorithmic deprioritisation.

17 Conclusion Accepted

It is vital that platforms are held responsible for the algorithmic spread of misleading or deceptive content that can radicalise and harm users. The few measures in the Act that address misinformation fall short. The False Communications offence is vaguely worded and will be difficult to implement; the advisory committee …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the importance of countering misinformation, but defends the Online Safety Act's proportionate approach which targets illegal content and content harmful to children. It emphasizes that Category 1 services are accountable for their terms of service, references its media literacy strategy, and notes platforms' existing fact-checking and algorithmic deprioritisation efforts.

20 Conclusion Rejected

To ensure true responsibility from platform companies, as per Principle 3, Ofcom and DSIT should confirm that services are required to act on all risks identified in risk assessments, regardless of whether they are included in Ofcom’s Codes of Practice. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)

Government Response Summary

The government rejects the recommendation to require services to act on all identified risks regardless of Codes of Practice, stating it is not possible within the Online Safety Act framework. They clarify that compliance is achieved by adopting measures in the Codes and believe existing guidance ensures significant unmanaged risks are addressed.

21 Conclusion Rejected

The Online Safety Act does not do enough to address the risks posed by small platforms due to its exclusive focus on size. Ofcom should create an additional category to cover ‘small but risky’ platforms, based on analysis of the role that harmful smaller platforms can play in the online …

Government Response Summary

The government rejects the recommendation to create a new category for 'small but risky' platforms, stating they disagree that the Online Safety Act (OSA) is insufficient. They assert that the OSA's main measures already apply to such services, and a dedicated taskforce is actively driving compliance among high-risk smaller services.

22 Conclusion Acknowledged

Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of such an influence operation is deeply concerning. In order to …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the risk of foreign interference and states it is working to better understand indicators for platforms to detect it, while also continuing to engage with experts. They note existing Codes of Practice contain measures applicable to illegal foreign interference, but do not specifically commit to collaborating with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors as requested.

25 Conclusion Not Addressed

The Online Safety Act does not protect users from the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation, or provide effective transparency for the systems that produce them. It fails to address the issue of tech companies rolling out experimental features that can feed false or harmful information to their enormous audiences, further threatening …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the potential harm of online misinformation but states the Online Safety Act (OSA) takes a proportionate approach by focusing on content that is illegal or harmful to children. It reaffirms that for other legal content, platforms decide what is permitted, and the OSA empowers adult users to make informed choices rather than addressing the commodification of synthetic mis/disinformation or requiring transparency for its production systems.

26 Conclusion Not Addressed

We are concerned at what appears to be contradiction and confusion between regulators and government over the capabilities, limitations and principles behind the Online Safety Act. We expect senior Ofcom officials and ministers to be fully aligned in their understanding of the Act—particularly in relation to critical issues such as …

Government Response Summary

The response text is truncated and does not engage with the substance of the conclusion.

30 Conclusion Not Addressed

Advertising is crucial to major social media companies, which depend on recommending engaging content to increase time spent on their platforms and draw attention to adverts. Their recommendation algorithms do not effectively differentiate between harmless and harmful engaging content, which can result in promotion of misleading, damaging, or hateful material. …

Government Response Summary

The government reaffirms its commitment to a safer online world and urges providers to counter mis- and disinformation, but reiterates the Online Safety Act's focus on illegal content and content harmful to children. It does not address the committee's conclusion about recommendation algorithms incentivising harmful content due to advertising, instead referencing existing industry self-regulation like the IAB UK's Gold Standard.

31 Conclusion Not Addressed

The global digital advertising market is overcomplicated, opaque and under-regulated, operating through an enormous, automated and inaccessible supply chain. This directly leads to the production, viral spread and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, often without advertisers’ knowledge. Platforms and advertisers appear to be either unable or unwilling to address …

Government Response Summary

The government reiterates its commitment to a safer online world and the Online Safety Act's focus on illegal and child-harming content. It does not directly address the conclusion regarding the opaque and under-regulated digital advertising market's role in the production and monetisation of harmful and deceptive content, instead referring to industry self-regulation via the IAB UK's Gold Standard.

32 Conclusion Acknowledged

In particular, we were concerned by evidence that Google may have helped to monetise misinformation relating to the attacks, contributing to the violence. This is unacceptable, and is just one example of a much wider problem with the digital advertising industry. We are concerned that Google was seemingly unaware of …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the concern about online misinformation and its potential for real-world impact, stating its commitment to a safer online world and urging providers to counter its spread. It highlights that the Online Safety Act takes a proportionate approach by focusing on illegal content and that which is harmful to children, without committing to new specific actions regarding monetization of other harmful content or transparency from platforms like Google.

33 Conclusion Not Addressed

There is a regulatory gap around digital advertising, as much of the regulation and interventions have been industry-led and focused on tackling harmful advertising content, as opposed to the monetisation of harmful content through advertising. We are not convinced that the digital advertising industry is able, or willing, to effectively …

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges its commitment to a safer online world and that the Online Safety Act addresses illegal misinformation and content harmful to children. However, it does not directly address the committee's specific concern about a regulatory gap for the broader monetization of harmful content or its skepticism regarding the sufficiency of industry self-regulation, instead pointing to existing legislation and industry-led initiatives.

35 Conclusion Rejected

To tackle the incentive behind amplified misinformation—namely, the monetisation of harmful content—there should be clear and enforceable standards for digital advertising market processes, as well as advertising content. Following our Principles 1, 3 and 5, government should ask the Advertising Standards Authority to establish comprehensive guidelines for 59 all actors …

Government Response Summary

The government rejects the recommendation to ask the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) to establish comprehensive guidelines for the digital advertising ecosystem. It states that setting standards for processes in the digital ecosystem falls outside the ASA's remit, instead highlighting the industry-led 'Gold Standard' scheme.

37 Conclusion Rejected

There are insufficient disincentives for bad practice in the digital advertising market. Bad actors can exploit the ecosystem, monetising harmful content through major platforms. Following Principle 3, Ofcom should be empowered to give penalty notices to platforms when they allow harmful content to be monetised through their services. These penalties …

Government Response Summary

The government rejects the recommendation to empower Ofcom to issue penalty notices specifically for platforms monetizing harmful content. It clarifies that the Online Safety Act enables Ofcom to take enforcement action for failures in systems and processes related to illegal content and content harmful to children, but not for individual pieces of content or for broader 'harmful content' as this would require new definitions and have wider implications.