UK Inquiry Tracker

Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic

Public Accounts Committee Closed Inquiry

Opened: 30 Apr 2021 Closed: 16 Nov 2021 Parliament page

By the end of March 2021, the NAO will have published 17 reports on the government’s response to COVID-19, and the Committee has conducted inquiries on almost all of them. Continuing on from our session on the NAO’s Covid cost tracker, the Committee will examine the key themes that have … Read more

27 Conclusions

1 Report

1 Oral session

7 Letters

1 Event

Activity timeline 11 events

23 Nov
2021

Correspondence

Correspondence Catherine Little, Director General, Public Spending Head of Government Finance Function, re The Boardman Review, dated 15 No…

16 Nov
2021

Correspondence

Correspondence from Simon Baugh, Chief Executive, Government Communication, re in relation to recommendation 4 of the Thirteenth Report of …

16 Nov
2021

Correspondence

Correspondence from Joanna Davinson, Executive Director, Central Digital and Data Office, re in relation to recommendation 2 of the Thirtee…

16 Nov
2021

Correspondence

Correspondence from Joanna Davinson, Executive Director, Central Digital and Data Office and Jennifer Rowland, Deputy Director, Efficiency …

16 Nov
2021

Correspondence

Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald KCB, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re an update on the Thirteenth Report…

8 Nov
2021

Report published

Treasury minutes: Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Thirteenth report from Session 2021-22

25 Jul
2021

Report published

Thirteenth Report - Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic

2 Jul
2021

Correspondence

Correspondence from the Cabinet Office, dated 24 June 2021 regarding the publication of Government contracts

30 Jun
2021

Correspondence

Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald KCB, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re PAC hearing – Initial lessons lear…

10 Jun
2021

Oral evidence

Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic

10 Jun
2021

Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Grimond Room, Portcullis House

Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic

Oral evidence sessions 1 session

10 Jun 2021

View on parliament.uk

Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic

Alex Chisholm · Cabinet Office James Bowler CB · HM Treasury Simon Case · Cabinet Office Sir Chris Wormald · Department of Health and Social Care Sir Tom Scholar · HM Treasury

Reports 1 report · click to expand

Title	HC No.	Published	Items	Response
Thirteenth Report - Initial lessons from the government’s respon…	HC 175	25 Jul 2021	27	Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

27 results

2 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Government’s ability to make well-informed decisions and address issues as they arise during the pandemic...

Government’s ability to make well-informed decisions and address issues as they arise during the pandemic has been hampered by slow progress in addressing longstanding issues with data and legacy IT. We have repeatedly highlighted longstanding data issues within government, including … Read more

Government Response

2: PAC conclusion: Government’s ability to make well-informed decisions and address issues as they arise during the pandemic has been hampered by slow progress in addressing longstanding issues with data … Read more

HM Treasury

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3 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Government risks undermining public trust and accountability for the pandemic response because of departments’ repeated...

Government risks undermining public trust and accountability for the pandemic response because of departments’ repeated failure to provide a full rationale for key decisions. We recognise that the pandemic has required departments to work at speed in difficult circumstances. But, … Read more

Government Response

3: PAC conclusion: Government risks undermining public trust and accountability for the pandemic response because of departments’ repeated failure to provide a full rationale for key decisions. 3: PAC recommendation: … Read more

HM Treasury

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4 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

A lack of clarity, timeliness and the volume of government communications has, at times, hindered...

A lack of clarity, timeliness and the volume of government communications has, at times, hindered the public’s understanding of guidelines and ability to comply with them. Government published a large amount of guidance during the early stages of the pandemic. … Read more

Government Response

4: PAC conclusion: A lack of clarity, timeliness and the volume of government communications has, at times, hindered the public’s understanding of guidelines and ability to comply with them. 4: … Read more

HM Treasury

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5 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Government has yet to improve its approach to managing risk or set out which trade-offs...

Government has yet to improve its approach to managing risk or set out which trade-offs it intends to make in future emergencies. The pandemic has highlighted the importance of carrying out robust risk planning and being clear about risk appetite … Read more

Government Response

1. The BBC appears complacent about the threat it faces from declining audiences. Each year people spend less time watching BBC TV and 200,000 more households choose to opt out … Read more

HM Treasury

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6 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have...

Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have been under constant pressure during the pandemic, to ensure its resilience going forward. The pandemic has compounded pre-existing challenges in the health and social care … Read more Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have been under constant pressure during the pandemic, to ensure its resilience going forward. The pandemic has compounded pre-existing challenges in the health and social care sectors. In February 2020, the NHS had about 40,000 nursing vacancies and 9,000 vacancies for medical staff, while patient waiting times were continuing to slip and the number of patients on waiting lists for non-urgent treatment was rising. Longstanding staffing issues and backlogs, arising from failures in workforce planning and recruitment, have exacerbated the impact of the pandemic not only on the public, but also on the health workforce. NHS and frontline workers, already under pressure before the pandemic, have had to deal with the mental and physical strain of the response and are now tackling backlogs whilst carrying high numbers of vacancies. The NHS estimated in December 2020 that it had nearly 89,000 full-time equivalent vacancies across secondary care settings in 8 Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic England. We are concerned about the impact of the pandemic on the mental health of key workers and burnout levels, which may result in more individuals leaving the medical profession and even higher vacancies rates going forward. This makes the publication of the long overdue NHS People Plan even more urgent. Recommendation: The Department should write to us by 31 October 2021 setting out what it is doing to provide mental health and emotional support to NHS staff, what metrics it is using to track the effectiveness of the measures adopted, and how it is performing against those metrics. It should also write to us by 31 December 2021 to provide an update on the substantive long-term NHS workforce plan to ensure the resilience of the health and social care workforce. Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 9 1 Lessons from the government’ Show less

Government Response

6: PAC conclusion: Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have been under constant pressure during the pandemic, to ensure its resilience going … Read more

HM Treasury

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1 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence...

On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health & Social Care (the Department) and HM Treasury on initial lessons from the government’s response to the … Read more

Government Response

Introduction from the Committee The scale and nature of the COVID-19 pandemic and the government’s response are unprecedented in recent history. By the end of March 2021, the estimated lifetime … Read more

HM Treasury

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7 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

We asked the Department how much PPE it expected to need over the next 12...

We asked the Department how much PPE it expected to need over the next 12 months. The Department estimated that it will require around 11.7 billion items of PPE from 1 June 2021 to 31 May 2022, although it noted … Read more We asked the Department how much PPE it expected to need over the next 12 months. The Department estimated that it will require around 11.7 billion items of PPE from 1 June 2021 to 31 May 2022, although it noted that this estimate was highly uncertain. As of 17 May, the amount of PPE that the Department had ordered was 2.7 times this estimated requirement. It explained that it had purchased PPE on the basis of reasonable worst-case 7 Letter from the Department of Health & Social Care, 22 June 2021 8 Q 62; Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment, para 14 9 Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of personal protective equipment 10 Qq 56, 59, 61; Letter from the Department of Health & Social Care, 22 June 2021 11 Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of personal protective equipment, para 8 12 Letter from the Department of Health & Social Care, 22 June 2021 Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 11 scenarios, and that it was in the “lucky position” that these had not materialised, so it expected to have more PPE than it needed. Excess stock was especially high for certain types of PPE. The Department told us that it aims to hold safety stock of at least four months’ supply at peak usage. Based on the figures that the Department provided us, as of 7 June, it was holding an estimated 13 years’ worth of stock of eye protectors (after recycling 22 million items to make food containers); over 6 years’ stock of hand hygiene products; and over five years’ stock of gowns and clinical waste bags.13 In its written evidence to us, the Department told us that, as of May 2021, storing its central stock of PPE had cost the Department approximately £6.7 million a week, down from £11.7 million a week in January 2021.14 Support for the health and social care workforce Show less

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8 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

We have repeatedly highlighted the longstanding funding and workforce challenges facing the health and social...

We have repeatedly highlighted the longstanding funding and workforce challenges facing the health and social care sectors. In 2018 we examined the adult social care workforce in England and reported that levels of unmet social care need were high and … Read more

Government Response

6: PAC conclusion: Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have been under constant pressure during the pandemic, to ensure its resilience going … Read more

HM Treasury

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9 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

The pandemic placed great stress on some health and social care workers already under pressure.

The pandemic placed great stress on some health and social care workers already under pressure. In our report Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak, we found that thanks to the commitment of thousands of staff and … Read more The pandemic placed great stress on some health and social care workers already under pressure. In our report Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak, we found that thanks to the commitment of thousands of staff and volunteers and by postponing a large amount of planned work, the NHS was severely stretched but able to meet overall demand for COVID-19 treatment during the pandemic’s April 2020 peak. We warned that staff in the health and social care sector could not be expected to be ready to cope with future peaks and also deal with the enormous backlogs that had built up. In May 2020, about 45% of doctors responding to a survey by the British Medical Association reported suffering from depression, anxiety, stress, burnout, emotional distress or other mental health conditions relating to or made worse by their work.18 We received written evidence from Dr James Gilleen, University of Roehampton, who carried out a study on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on NHS healthcare workers. The study, based on a survey with 2,775 respondents, found that the number of workers with the most 13 Qq 1, 3, 46; Letter from the Department of Health & Social Care, 22 June 2021 14 Q 1; Letter from the Department of Health & Social Care, 9 June 2021 15 Committee of Public Accounts, The adult social care workforce in England, HC 690, Session 2017–19, 9 May 2018, paras 4, 7, 20 16 C&AG’s Report, NHS financial management and sustainability, Session 2019–20, HC 44, 5 February 2020, paras 8, 19 and Figure 3 17 British Medical Association (Ev ILG004); NHS Vacancy Statistics, England, April 2015 - December 2020 18 Qq 80–82; C&AG’s Report, para 39; Committee of Public Accounts, Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak, Fourteenth Report of Session 2019–21, HC 405, 29 July 2020 12 Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic severe levels of stress, anxiety and depression quadrupled in April 2020 compared to pre- COVID-19 levels. This was Show less

Government Response

6: PAC conclusion: Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have been under constant pressure during the pandemic, to ensure its resilience going … Read more

HM Treasury

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10 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

In our July 2020 report on Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19...

In our July 2020 report on Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak, we recommended that the Department and NHS England and NHS Improvement (NHSE&I) should identify and agree with relevant professional bodies specific actions to support … Read more

Government Response

6: PAC conclusion: Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have been under constant pressure during the pandemic, to ensure its resilience going … Read more

HM Treasury

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11 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

The Department has yet to publish a long-term plan to improve the resilience of the...

The Department has yet to publish a long-term plan to improve the resilience of the health and social care workforce. Our NHS nursing workforce report, published in September 2020, noted that there had been further delay to the overdue NHS … Read more The Department has yet to publish a long-term plan to improve the resilience of the health and social care workforce. Our NHS nursing workforce report, published in September 2020, noted that there had been further delay to the overdue NHS People Plan, which was originally due to be published in 2019 and still had not been published. We also found that there was a risk that the NHS was focusing on short-term pressures at the expense of the necessary long-term strategy. We recommended that NHSE&I and Health Education England prioritise publication of the substantive long-term workforce plan as soon as possible utilising the NHS’s existing long-term funding allocations.23 In its response, the government noted that the NHS People Plan was an ongoing programme of work and that in July 2020, NHSE&I and Health Education England published the next stage of this programme, We are the NHS: People Plan 2020/21 – action for us all. This set out the national and local steps that needed to be taken for the rest of 2020–21 to support staff in the NHS and help manage the pressures of COVID-19 through the winter of 2020– 21.24 We asked the Department if it was formulating a plan in terms of numbers of people 19 COVIDA Study (Ev ILG012) 20 Committee of Public Accounts, Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak, Fourteenth Report of Session 2019–21, HC 405, 29 July 2020 21 HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes: Government responses to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth reports and the Nineteenth report from Session 2019–21, CP 316, November 2020 22 Qq 80–83 23 Committee of Public Accounts, NHS nursing workforce, HC 408, Session 2019–21, 23 September 2020, para 1 24 HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes: Government responses to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Eighteenth and the Twentieth to the Twenty-Fourth reports from Session 2019–21, CP 363, January 2021 Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 13 needed to cre Show less

Government Response

6: PAC conclusion: Government needs to do more to support the health and social care workforce, who have been under constant pressure during the pandemic, to ensure its resilience going … Read more

HM Treasury

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12 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

We have repeatedly highlighted longstanding issues with the quality of data held by government and...

We have repeatedly highlighted longstanding issues with the quality of data held by government and with its ability to use data effectively to support policy interventions. In our 2019 report Challenges in using data across government, we noted the lack … Read more

Government Response

HM Treasury

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13 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

The pandemic has again highlighted the role of high-quality data in enabling effective service delivery,...

The pandemic has again highlighted the role of high-quality data in enabling effective service delivery, monitoring and improvement. For example, due to missing or inaccurate telephone numbers within NHS patient records, the shielding programme was unable to follow-up letters to … Read more

Government Response

HM Treasury

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14 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

All of the witnesses highlighted the importance of data in responding to the pandemic and...

All of the witnesses highlighted the importance of data in responding to the pandemic and acknowledged a key lesson from the last year was the need to improve the quality of data available to citizens and to government, including the … Read more

Government Response

HM Treasury

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15 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

The NAO found that the pandemic had disproportionately impacted specific groups of people.

The NAO found that the pandemic had disproportionately impacted specific groups of people. For example, disrupted schooling is likely to have longer-term adverse effects on children from disadvantaged backgrounds. The Education Endowment Foundation predicted that schools closures in the 2019/20 … Read more

HM Treasury

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16 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

In responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, government departments and public bodies have needed to procure...

In responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, government departments and public bodies have needed to procure enormous volumes of goods, services and works with extreme urgency. Our report on Government procurement and supply of PPE found that, by the end of … Read more

HM Treasury

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17 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Our February 2021 report found that for fast procurements where there is no competition, it...

Our February 2021 report found that for fast procurements where there is no competition, it is important that awarding bodies document why they have chosen a supplier and how any associated risks from a lack of competition have been identified … Read more Our February 2021 report found that for fast procurements where there is no competition, it is important that awarding bodies document why they have chosen a supplier and how any associated risks from a lack of competition have been identified and managed, and that transparency also helps to ensure accountability for procurement decisions, particularly when no competition is involved. We have regularly highlighted instances of poor record keeping and late publication of contracts. For example, of the 1,644 contracts awarded across government up to the end of July 2020 with a value above 31 Qq 16, 35, 37, 45, 89 32 Q 35 33 C&AG’s Report, para 36 34 Qq 75, 78–79 35 Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment, para 2; C&AG’s report, Investigation into government procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic, Session 2019–21, HC 959, 26 November 2020, paras 10, 11 36 Committee of Public Accounts, Fifth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts, HC 222, Session 2019–21, 24 May 2021 16 Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic £25,000, 75% were not published on Contracts Finder within the government’s 90-day target and 55% had not had their details published by 10 November 2020.37 We asked the witnesses how government can be more transparent about its contracts and the awarding of contracts while still working at pace. The Cabinet Office accepted that proper record keeping of how government had taken decision was “important for public confidence and trust and for being able to demonstrate good value for money over time”. It explained that government had accelerated efforts to publish its contracts in a “very timely way” and acknowledged that most, but not all, contracts had yet been published. In its letter to us after our evidence session, the Cabinet Office stated that it had now published all of its contracts awarded under emergency procurement regulations, but Show less

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18 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

We received written evidence from the Royal Statistical Society, from Northumbria University on behalf of...

We received written evidence from the Royal Statistical Society, from Northumbria University on behalf of the Observatory for Monitoring Data-Driven Approaches to COVID-19, and from Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society. This emphasised the need for government to … Read more

Government Response

HM Treasury

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19 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Our previous work has shown a mixed picture in terms of the views of end...

Our previous work has shown a mixed picture in terms of the views of end users regarding the satisfaction and success of programmes introduced in response to the pandemic. Gathering feedback from end users and frontline workers is vital for … Read more

HM Treasury

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20 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

We have previously highlighted the danger that reluctance to evaluate COVID-19 measures will result in...

We have previously highlighted the danger that reluctance to evaluate COVID-19 measures will result in departments learning lessons too late and embedding problems of design, delivery and effectiveness of response schemes which will need to adapt over time.43 HM Treasury … Read more

HM Treasury

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21 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Government published a large amount of guidance during the early stages of the pandemic.

Government published a large amount of guidance during the early stages of the pandemic. The NAO found that effective communication and public engagement are crucial to ensuring that COVID-19 response programmes succeed. Some departments, such as HM Revenue & Customs, … Read more

Government Response

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22 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Written evidence from Birmingham City University, which analysed a large body of government’s and public...

Written evidence from Birmingham City University, which analysed a large body of government’s and public health bodies’ Twitter messages relating to COVID-19, identified a wide range of language-related issues in communications. These included: messages without specific content; a lack of … Read more

Government Response

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23 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

We asked the Cabinet Office about recent communications about travel in and out of local...

We asked the Cabinet Office about recent communications about travel in and out of local areas. On 14 May 2021, the GOV.UK website advised the public against travel out of areas with high levels of the delta variant of the … Read more

Government Response

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24 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

The pandemic has highlighted the importance of carrying out robust risk planning and being clear...

The pandemic has highlighted the importance of carrying out robust risk planning and being clear about risk appetite and risk tolerance. Our previous work, including on support for children’s education during the pandemic and on the Bounce Bank Loans Scheme, … Read more

Government Response

5: PAC conclusion: Government has yet to improve its approach to managing risk or set out which trade-offs it intends to make in future emergencies. 5: PAC recommendation: The Cabinet … Read more

HM Treasury

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25 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

Our recent report on fraud and error highlighted that the taxpayer is expected to lose...

Our recent report on fraud and error highlighted that the taxpayer is expected to lose billions of pounds from the increased risk of fraud and error in the government’s COVID-19 schemes. It found that the cost of fraud and error … Read more Our recent report on fraud and error highlighted that the taxpayer is expected to lose billions of pounds from the increased risk of fraud and error in the government’s COVID-19 schemes. It found that the cost of fraud and error within the tax and benefits system is fairly well understood by government, and HMRC and DWP have well- established approach to tackle and address fraud and error in their areas. But for many areas of spend outside the tax and benefits system there is still no formal measurement and limited capability to tackle fraud and error, risking large amounts of fraud and error being unidentified or untackled.53 We therefore asked HM Treasury what it was doing to ensure that Departments pay greater attention to identifying and addressing fraud and error and complied fully with requirements set out in Managing Public Money. HM Treasury and 50 Qq 4–6 51 C&AG’s Report, paras 5–11; Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Support for children’s education, Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme, HC 687, Session 2019–21, 16 December 2020, para 1; C&AG’s Report, para 6 52 Qq 21, 41; C&AG’s Report, paras 7–8 53 Committee of Public Accounts, Fraud and Error, HC 253, Session 2021–22, 30 June 2021 Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 19 the Cabinet Office explained that, as well as departments with established counter-fraud capabilities, such as the Department for Work & Pensions and HM Revenue & Customs, other departments such as the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs had to deal with increased fraud risks. It told us that government was supporting those departments with additional resource and capability, strengthening the counter-fraud and finance functions, and reminding accounting officers of their responsibilities with regard to fraud and error.54 Show less

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26 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

The NAO found that government had made other trade-offs during the pandemic, for example paying...

The NAO found that government had made other trade-offs during the pandemic, for example paying higher prices for goods than it would have paid before the pandemic.55 It also had to balance the risks to the economy of enacting lockdowns … Read more

Government Response

5: PAC conclusion: Government has yet to improve its approach to managing risk or set out which trade-offs it intends to make in future emergencies. 5: PAC recommendation: The Cabinet … Read more

HM Treasury

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27 Conclusion

Thirteenth Report - Initial lesson…

In May 2021, the government published the Boardman review into government procurement during the COVID-19...

In May 2021, the government published the Boardman review into government procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It aimed to understand what lessons the government could learn from the procurement of PPE, ventilators, vaccines, test and trace and food parcels for … Read more In May 2021, the government published the Boardman review into government procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic. It aimed to understand what lessons the government could learn from the procurement of PPE, ventilators, vaccines, test and trace and food parcels for the clinically extremely vulnerable to be better equipped to meet any future similar challenge. It made 28 recommendations across five broad themes of preparedness and strategy, organisational structures, resourcing, purchasing, and governance and regulation.57 The Cabinet Office wrote to us in May and informed us that the Prime Minister had agreed to accept all of the review’s recommendations.58 The Cabinet Office acknowledged that it needed to strengthen its risk management capability and to improve its ability to monitor risks that affect multiple departments and told us that it was developing a plan to make the risk management function “a very strong profession across Government as a whole, with additional expertise, capabilities, training and accreditation”.59 It had also introduced a quarterly review of the risks that can affect the performance or reputation of the civil service as a whole, as part of the work of the Civil Service Board. In their letter to us after our evidence session, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury told us that the Risk Management Centre of Excellence, which is part of the Government Finance Function, had produced guidance on managing risks during the COVID-19 response and recovery; had worked with the commercial, grant and counter- fraud functions to embed risk management and control within their guidance; and had published guidance on risk appetite, which was currently being refreshed. They also stated that enhanced requirements for identifying and managing risks had been embedded within the Spending Review, upcoming Outcome Delivery Plans, and disclosures in annual reports and accounts.60 54 Qq 40–41 55 C&AG’s Report, para 9 56 Qq 20, 32 57 Boardman Review of Government Pr Show less

Government Response

5: PAC conclusion: Government has yet to improve its approach to managing risk or set out which trade-offs it intends to make in future emergencies. 5: PAC recommendation: The Cabinet … Read more

HM Treasury

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Correspondence 7 letters

23 Nov 2021 Correspondence Catherine Little, Director General, Public Spending Head of Government Finance Function, re The Boardman Review, dated 15 November 2021

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16 Nov 2021 Correspondence from Simon Baugh, Chief Executive, Government Communication, re in relation to recommendation 4 of the Thirteenth Report of the 2021-22 Session of the Public Accounts Committee, on ‘Initial Lessons from the Government’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic’, dated 29 October 2021

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16 Nov 2021 Correspondence from Joanna Davinson, Executive Director, Central Digital and Data Office, re in relation to recommendation 2 of the Thirteenth Report of the 2021-22 Session of the Public Accounts Committee, on ‘Initial Lessons from the Government’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 28 October 2021

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16 Nov 2021 Correspondence from Joanna Davinson, Executive Director, Central Digital and Data Office and Jennifer Rowland, Deputy Director, Efficiency and Cabinet Office HM Treasury, re in relation to recommendation 2 of the Thirteenth Report of the 2021-22 Session of the Public Accounts Committee, on ‘Initial Lessons from the Government’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, dated 4 November 2021

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16 Nov 2021 Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald KCB, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re an update on the Thirteenth Report of Session 2021-22, Initial Lessons, dated 2 November 2021

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2 Jul 2021 Correspondence from the Cabinet Office, dated 24 June 2021 regarding the publication of Government contracts

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30 Jun 2021 Correspondence from Sir Chris Wormald KCB, Permanent Secretary, Department of Health and Social Care, re PAC hearing – Initial lessons learnt, dated 22 June 2021

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