22 Accepted in Part

The Department also confirmed that there had been an outage earlier this year, which was...

Conclusion
The Department also confirmed that there had been an outage earlier this year, which was due to a problem with network availability and the ‘wider PNC ecosystem’ in its Hendon data centre, affecting the ability of the police to access the PNC.42 It said it was investing significantly in this ecosystem to make sure the issue with not being able to access the PNC was unlikely to happen again.43 The Department’s former CDDTO (who is now Executive Director of the Government’s Central Digital and Data Office) stressed that the PNC had consistently met its service levels, but acknowledged also that outage at some point is “an inevitability in a legacy system.”44 While ideally all infrastructure and software would be kept at a supported level, she said that the challenge with the PNC was that it was so old that some components would go out of support in the next five years. The former CDDTO acknowledged that there have been cases where government has been over-optimistic about when new technologies would come on stream, and had therefore neglected to invest in legacy systems and created a backlog of problems. But she said that had not happened with the PNC, which had been maintained and supported throughout its life.45 36 C&AG’s Report, paras 15, 3.7 37 C&AG’s Report, para 15 38 Q 2 39 Qq 92, 93 40 Q 7 41 Q 2 42 Q 6 43 Q 8 44 Q 10 45 Q 11 The National Law Enforcement Data Programme 15
Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the implicit recommendation regarding PNC resilience, acknowledging that while some software will be unsupported by 2024, mitigation activities like upskilling internal teams and engaging partners are in place, considering this an acceptable risk.
Government Response
Accepted in Part
HM Government Accepted in Part
4.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: August 2022 4.2 The Police National Computer (PNC) is a critical national infrastructure, and it is vital that it be constantly available to policing and other users to support law enforcement activities. 4.3 The majority of the hardware and software for PNC will be fully supported through to December 2025. Elements of the software provided by Software AG will go out of support at the end of 2024, however with the mitigation activity outlined below this is deemed to be an acceptable element of risk as Software AG is a highly stable element of the PNC. Risk mitigation activity includes the department: • upskilling internal teams and providing appropriate knowledge transfer from Software AG so that it will be able to manage any issues that may occur post December 2024. • engaging other partners who provide PNC services to ascertain the level of support it can provide post December 2024. • entering into commercial negotiations with Software AG to determine what levels of support can be made available post December 2024. 4.4 Nonetheless, the department does have a mitigation option to move PNC to a new platform and extend the life of the PNC should this prove necessary as an alternative approach to continuing with NLEDP. The programme is developing these contingency plans in parallel. A detailed assessment of re-platforming the PNC to extend it beyond December 2025 has recently completed and is currently being reviewed. Based on the department’s analysis and assessment of findings and recommendations of the assessment, the department will formulate an action plan in Half 1 of 2022 (on or before 30 June 2022), which will determine whether and when to trigger the mitigation option. 4.5 As the PNC re-platforming mitigation option is highly resource intensive and PNC intrusive, it is not possible to deliver both the NLEDP programme and the mitigation option in parallel, nor within the same SR settlement. Should the decision be taken to initiate the mitigation option, it would be necessary to pause the delivery of NLEDP until the PNC re-platforming activities have completed. Current estimates suggest NLEDP would be postponed for a further 2 to 3-year period. If the mitigation option is initiated, it is expected that the current SR settlement would be sufficient to cover the delivery of either re-platforming or NLEDP, but not both. 4.6 As an added complexity, in the event of initiating the mitigation option, doing so would change the current NLEDP delivery approach and so there’s no guarantee that work performed to date on NLEDP could be fully reused once PNC has been re platformed. This would likely therefore lead to a significant delay in delivering NLEDP and a significant increase in longer term delivery costs. 4.7 The department will provide a further progress update in April 2022.
Addressee Bodies
HM Treasury
Timeline
Recommendation age 4.6 yrs
Report published 08 Dec 2021