18
Acknowledged
Following our session on 13 May 2021, the Department told the Transport Committee that negotiations...
Conclusion
Following our session on 13 May 2021, the Department told the Transport Committee that negotiations with all train operators have concluded around terminating the underlying franchise agreements, which is necessary to enable the transition of operators 37 Qq 19, 31 38 C&AG’s report, pp 8, 15 39 Committee of Public Accounts, Rail franchising in the UK, Twenty-Fifth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 689, April 2018 40 C&AG’s report, p20 41 Qq 22, 31, 38 42 C&AG’s report, p19 43 Q 42 Overview of the English rail system 13 from ERMAs to the National Rail contracts.44 It will be agreeing these new contracts over this year45 and told us that these new arrangements will work on the basis of annual business planning by operators with quarterly reviews by the Department against specific targets. It also said that the new contracts will use a similar fee-based approach in place on the EMRAs.46 The Department acknowledged that oversight and management of these contracts will require significant Departmental resource, but felt that it would not be a step change from the intensive management required for awarding and managing franchise contracts.47
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the Committee's observations on the transition to National Rail Contracts (NRCs). It details that NRCs require operators to deliver against annual business plans with revenue and cost risk largely with the Department, and performance is incentivised through fees and contractual commitments to specific activities.
Government Response
Acknowledged
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
4.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2021 4.2 National Rail Contracts (NRCs) require train operators to deliver against annually-agreed business plans (ABPs) and performance targets. This allows these contracts to evolve as the industry recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic and reforms are implemented. Each year, the department will specify its objectives and negotiate updated business plans to help deliver those. 4.3 Revenue and cost risk sit with the department, subject to stringent tests of the efficiency of costs and revenue collection. Having limited financial risk allows operators to focus on operational areas within their control to drive improvements. The government will benefit from post-COVID-19 pandemic revenue recovery and cost savings from efficiency improvements. Annual budgets set caps for cost reimbursement to operators – NRCs require evidence and mitigating action before those caps can be increased. 4.4 The performance-based fee directly incentivises improved performance, with flexibility to switch from qualitative to quantified measures as circumstances permit. Fees are reduced if performance is poor; the department can require operators to develop and implement improvement plans. 4.5 ABPs will include commitments to specific activities, outputs and timescales, with operators contractually obliged to meet those commitments and the department can require remedial plans where they are not met. Where appropriate, the department can agree ‘Industry Change Projects’ with operators to further incentivise delivery of reforms that expose the operator to significant additional risk. 4.6 NRC rollout is ongoing, with three now in place (South Western, TransPenine Express and c2c). Before NRCs are agreed, a full business case is approved to ensure the contract is designed to incentivise improved performance, including Williams/Shapps Plan for Rail reforms.
Source
Committee
Public Accounts Committee
Report
Tenth Report - Overview of the English rail system
07 Jul 2021
HC 170
Addressee Bodies
HM Treasury
Timeline
Recommendation age
5.1 yrs
Report published
07 Jul 2021