Fifty-Third Report - Covid 19: supporting the vulnerable during lockdown
Select Committee
Public Accounts Committee
HC 938
21 April 2021
Government response
Treasury minutes: Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Fifty-third report from Session 2019-21 · published 2 Sep 2021
Recommendations & Conclusions
26 results
2
Recommendation
Accepted
DHSC and NHS Digital took too long to identify all clinically extremely vulnerable people.
Recommendation
DHSC and NHS Digital took too long to identify all clinically extremely vulnerable people. Individuals were not formally eligible for the central support of food boxes and medicines delivery offered through the shielding programme until they were on the Shielded …
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Government Response Summary
The government commits to learning lessons from identifying CEV people and improving national data use. Work is underway on a national GP dataset and digitising the health service with shared care records, which will be detailed in a forthcoming draft data strategy for health and social care.
HM Treasury
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3
Recommendation
Accepted
Huge local variation strongly suggests that GPs were inconsistent when judging who was clinically extremely...
Recommendation
Huge local variation strongly suggests that GPs were inconsistent when judging who was clinically extremely vulnerable and should therefore be advised to shield and be eligible for support. As well as NHS Digital using national data to identify clinically vulnerable …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees there was huge local variation and commits to conducting further analysis to understand the drivers and identify lessons for the future, with findings to be provided to the Committee by October 2021.
HM Treasury
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4
Recommendation
Accepted
Government chose a centrally-directed system to support clinically vulnerable people as it did not have...
Recommendation
Government chose a centrally-directed system to support clinically vulnerable people as it did not have confidence all local authorities and supermarkets could meet people’s needs, particularly for food. MHCLG spoke with some local authorities and supermarkets early on to assess …
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Government Response Summary
The government disagreed that a centrally-directed system was chosen due to lack of confidence in local authorities, highlighting councils as crucial partners. They stated that councils received funding, demonstrated good performance, and MHCLG continues to work closely with them and keep funding under review to ensure their capacity and resilience.
HM Treasury
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5
Recommendation
Rejected
MHCLG and DHSC do not know whether 800,000 clinically extremely vulnerable people slipped through the...
Recommendation
MHCLG and DHSC do not know whether 800,000 clinically extremely vulnerable people slipped through the net and missed out on much needed support. DHSC explains that it took a ‘multi-channel’ approach to engaging with those affected. Through this approach, it …
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Government Response Summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating that all reasonable steps were taken to alert CEV individuals and provide support, with local councils confirming through outcomes data that most needs were met.
HM Treasury
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6
Recommendation
Not Addressed
Missing or inaccurate telephone numbers in NHS patient records undermined government’s efforts to contact 375,000...
Recommendation
Missing or inaccurate telephone numbers in NHS patient records undermined government’s efforts to contact 375,000 people. The contact centre relied on telephone numbers in NHS patient records when calling people to check their needs. Over 20% of the 1.8 million …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response was boilerplate text related to other reports and did not address the recommendation about improving patient contact details in NHS records.
HM Treasury
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1
Conclusion
Acknowledged
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence...
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC), Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG), Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra), …
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Government Response Summary
The government provides background information on the shielding programme, including the number of people identified, the support provided, and the expenditure, and acknowledges the committee's process of taking evidence for its report.
HM Treasury
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7
Conclusion
Acknowledged
As its understanding of the disease has grown, DHSC has developed a new risk assessment...
Conclusion
As its understanding of the disease has grown, DHSC has developed a new risk assessment tool, QCovid, to identify people at risk based on wider factors which make them at more risk from COVID-19. DHSC described the tool as having …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the conclusion by describing how the QCovid tool improved the identification of clinically extremely vulnerable people through the introduction of non-clinical factors.
HM Treasury
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8
Conclusion
Accepted
DHSC told us it recognised that advising people to stay inside and away from society...
Conclusion
DHSC told us it recognised that advising people to stay inside and away from society does have risks as well as benefits. Of those surveyed, some 36% reported worsening mental health and wellbeing while shielding.14 Charities also told us of …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the difficulties faced by non-clinically vulnerable groups and highlights existing support services such as priority supermarket referrals and NHS Volunteer Responders, committing to consider future preparedness measures for such groups.
HM Treasury
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9
Conclusion
Accepted
The list of medical conditions that the chief medical officers developed to define clinically extremely...
Conclusion
The list of medical conditions that the chief medical officers developed to define clinically extremely vulnerable people was shared with NHS Digital on 18 March 2020. DHSC tasked NHS Digital to use patient data to identify those affected and create …
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Government Response Summary
The government disagrees with the conclusion that identification took too long but states it is committed to learning lessons and that work is already underway to develop a strategic national GP dataset, digitize the health service, and publish a data strategy.
HM Treasury
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10
Conclusion
Acknowledged
NHS Digital created the first iteration of the list of some 900,000 people within two...
Conclusion
NHS Digital created the first iteration of the list of some 900,000 people within two days using readily accessible data sources—hospital, maternity and prescribed medicines data. By 12 April 2020, three weeks after shielding began, a further 420,000 people had …
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Government Response Summary
The government disagreed with the conclusion that they took too long to identify vulnerable people, asserting they worked as quickly as possible. However, they committed to learning lessons to improve future use of national data for identifying at-risk groups.
HM Treasury
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11
Conclusion
Rejected
As well as NHS Digital using patient data to add people to the shielding list,...
Conclusion
As well as NHS Digital using patient data to add people to the shielding list, GPs and hospital doctors were asked to review the list and use their clinical judgement to add or remove people. GP and hospital doctors’ additions …
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Government Response Summary
The government explicitly disagrees with the conclusion that it took too long to identify CEV people, asserting that it worked as quickly as possible. While generally committed to learning lessons for future data use, it does not address the reported delays in people receiving shielding letters.
HM Treasury
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12
Conclusion
Accepted
DHSC acknowledged that there are advantages with NHS data systems—such as having large amounts of...
Conclusion
DHSC acknowledged that there are advantages with NHS data systems—such as having large amounts of data—and disadvantages, for example challenges in connecting and using legacy systems.24 We asked NHS Digital what would help to identify patients earlier. NHS Digital told …
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Government Response Summary
The government stated that work is already underway, with NHS Digital developing a national GP dataset for faster access to information and working on digitising health records and shared care. These developments will be outlined in a forthcoming data strategy for health and social care.
HM Treasury
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13
Conclusion
Accepted
NHSE&I asked GPs and hospital doctors to add or remove people from the list, based...
Conclusion
NHSE&I asked GPs and hospital doctors to add or remove people from the list, based on their clinical judgement, and as their patients’ conditions or treatments changed over time.26 However, the extent to which the list grew between 12 April …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees to provide a detailed explanation for the local variation in the shielded patient list growth and identify lessons for a consistent clinical approach, committing to send these findings to the Committee by October 2021.
HM Treasury
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14
Conclusion
Accepted
NHSE&I was not responsible for managing any local variations and did not challenge local clinical...
Conclusion
NHSE&I was not responsible for managing any local variations and did not challenge local clinical decisions.28 DHSC has told us that NHSE&I and NHS Digital considered that ultimately additions were a decision for local clinicians. It noted that the approach …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees to provide a detailed explanation for the local variation in the shielded patient list growth and identify lessons for a consistent clinical approach, committing to send these findings to the Committee by October 2021.
HM Treasury
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15
Conclusion
Accepted
NHS Digital told us that for the people whom it had identified and added centrally...
Conclusion
NHS Digital told us that for the people whom it had identified and added centrally to the list, in line with the clinical criteria set by the chief medical officers, there is very little variation by area.30 DHSC acknowledged that …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees to provide a detailed explanation for the local variation in the shielded patient list growth and identify lessons for a consistent clinical approach, committing to send these findings to the Committee by October 2021.
HM Treasury
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16
Conclusion
Accepted
We asked DHSC if it had created a postcode lottery of support, and if people...
Conclusion
We asked DHSC if it had created a postcode lottery of support, and if people with certain conditions in some areas, would have different support to people in other areas with the same conditions.32 DHSC told us that it did …
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Government Response Summary
The government disagreed that there was huge local variation, stating that most areas fell within expected distributions, while acknowledging six areas added more people than expected. They committed to conducting further analysis to understand this variation and identify lessons, with findings to be reported to the Committee by October 2021.
HM Treasury
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17
Recommendation
Accepted
Government quickly needed to ensure that those shielding had reliable access to food, medicines and...
Recommendation
Government quickly needed to ensure that those shielding had reliable access to food, medicines and care. It chose a national system of support run by central government.36 MHCLG considered that a centralised offer was more likely to guarantee delivery of …
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Government Response Summary
The government accepts the recommendation and states it has tested future delivery confidence with councils, finding them confident to rapidly stand up shielding support, and continues to work closely with them while keeping funding under review.
HM Treasury
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18
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Defra was chosen to lead on providing food to people shielding because, according to MHCLG,...
Conclusion
Defra was chosen to lead on providing food to people shielding because, according to MHCLG, it had the expertise and relationships with the food industry.42 Defra consulted with supermarkets and wholesalers, to understand their capacity to provide people with food, …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the committee's observations and clarifies that the central system was not chosen due to a lack of confidence in local authorities. It details ongoing local support, funding, and collaboration with councils for shielding support.
HM Treasury
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19
Conclusion
Acknowledged
In August 2020, the government conducted an early lessons learned review of the programme which...
Conclusion
In August 2020, the government conducted an early lessons learned review of the programme which noted that, should shielding be needed again, a local support model could improve flexibility and potentially be more cost-effective.46 MHCLG told us how it started …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the observation about moving to a locally-led model for shielding support, reinforcing that councils are crucial partners, have received funding, and are confident in providing support. It also confirms continued collaboration and funding review.
HM Treasury
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20
Conclusion
Accepted
This locally-led model focused on providing eligible people with priority access to book supermarket deliveries,...
Conclusion
This locally-led model focused on providing eligible people with priority access to book supermarket deliveries, rather than Government providing standard food parcels.48 Defra told us that almost everybody that signed up for food box support was matched and prioritised by …
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Government Response Summary
The government states it agrees with the recommendation (likely an implicit one regarding local authority capacity) and considers it implemented. MHCLG has tested future delivery confidence with councils and continues to work closely with them to ensure support for CEV individuals.
HM Treasury
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21
Conclusion
Rejected
Government used a range of ways to engage with clinically vulnerable people, to advise them...
Conclusion
Government used a range of ways to engage with clinically vulnerable people, to advise them to shield and how to register to access support.51 Government wanted all affected to register whether they needed support or not. NHSE&I and DHSC were …
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Government Response Summary
The government explicitly disagrees with the conclusion, stating it has taken all reasonable steps to alert CEV individuals to shielding guidance and support using a multi-channel approach, and defending its existing communication strategy.
HM Treasury
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22
Conclusion
Rejected
DHSC and MHCLG explained that for the 800,000 vulnerable people that the contact centre could...
Conclusion
DHSC and MHCLG explained that for the 800,000 vulnerable people that the contact centre could not reach, their contact details were passed to local authorities, as it was thought local authorities might be better placed to contact these people and …
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Government Response Summary
The government disagrees with the Committee’s conclusion and the associated recommendation, stating that all reasonable steps were taken to alert CEV individuals and intelligence from local councils provided assurance that most were able to remain self-sufficient.
HM Treasury
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23
Conclusion
Not Addressed
We asked MHCLG how many extra people took up the offer of support after being...
Conclusion
We asked MHCLG how many extra people took up the offer of support after being contacted by local authorities. MHCLG confirmed that it did not collect this information and explained that it is difficult to disentangle how many people registered …
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Government Response Summary
The government's response addressed a different recommendation regarding patient contact details and did not engage with the conclusion about MHCLG's lack of data on how many vulnerable people local authorities reached.
HM Treasury
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24
Conclusion
Accepted
The DWP contact centre relied on telephone numbers in NHS patient records to call clinically...
Conclusion
The DWP contact centre relied on telephone numbers in NHS patient records to call clinically vulnerable people who had not yet registered their needs. In some 375,000 cases out of the 800,000 people that the contact centre could not get …
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Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the issue of inaccurate contact details and states NHSX is leading a program to improve patient contact details and ensure the NHS Number is the primary identifier. DHSC and NHS Digital will report back with details of ongoing work and plans.
HM Treasury
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25
Conclusion
Rejected
MHCLG considered that it established a communication strategy that took all reasonable steps to reach...
Conclusion
MHCLG considered that it established a communication strategy that took all reasonable steps to reach people.58 DHSC explained how it used a ‘multi-channel’ approach to communicate with clinically vulnerable people: its preference was to contact people using letters first as …
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Government Response Summary
The government explicitly disagrees with the committee's conclusion, asserting that it took all reasonable steps to alert CEV individuals to guidance and support, and that some people chose not to register their needs.
HM Treasury
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26
Conclusion
Accepted
DHSC told us it is trying to improve contact information by asking clinically extremely vulnerable...
Conclusion
DHSC told us it is trying to improve contact information by asking clinically extremely vulnerable people to ensure their GP records are up to date and will continue to update the records as patients improve their record keeping with their …
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Government Response Summary
The government stated that during the shielding program, DHSC used letters to encourage CEV people to update their GP contact details to facilitate communication, aligning with the committee's observation.
HM Treasury
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