Second Report - The Security of 5G

The government acknowledges the committee's observation that it has balanced technical and geopolitical considerations when formulating its 5G policy, stating its approach was evidence-based and informed by comprehensive security assessments.

The government acknowledges the committee's findings on Huawei's risks, stating that its unique insight and technical analysis have informed its risk mitigation position. It adds that it will continue working with alternative vendors like Nokia and Ericsson.

The government acknowledges the committee's confidence in GCHQ and NCSC, stating it appreciates the recognition and has carefully risk-managed Huawei's presence since 2003 through robust oversight mechanisms like HCSEC.

The government welcomes the committee’s conclusions and recognition of its response to the changed context, confirming that US sanctions altered the risk associated with Huawei's presence, making an updated government position necessary.

The government confirms that the UK's most sensitive information is protected independently of public networks, and GCHQ has categorically confirmed that high-risk vendor decisions do not affect intelligence sharing. It also notes that equipment from high-risk vendors is banned near particularly sensitive sites.

The government reaffirms the robustness of the Five Eyes relationship and its ongoing cooperation with allies, stating that while approaches may differ, the partnership is strong. It indicates that decisive action was taken based on UK circumstances and expert analysis.

The government emphasizes the special and enduring relationship with the US, stating it has been in close touch on telecoms security and continues to work closely to increase global standards and promote diversification.

The government acknowledges the importance of working closely with allies and sharing experiences to raise cyber security standards, stating it is already doing so and will continue to engage. It does not explicitly address the recommendation to have considered alliance damage earlier.

The government acknowledges the need to protect national security while remaining open to investment, stating that risks associated with Huawei have been carefully managed through detailed formal oversight by HCSEC since 2010.

The government states that decisions are made to satisfy robust legal, regulatory, and national security requirements, highlighting the new National Security Investment Bill as an important addition to existing tools for ensuring evidence-based risk assessment.

The government agrees on the importance of working with allies on network security and industrial capacity, stating it will continue to work closely and internationally to address challenges and forge consensus on standards. However, it does not commit to specifically setting out the role of a D10 alliance or quickly formulating joint 5G policy.

The government acknowledges the importance of liberal democracies working together and states it will consider how to best advance this through current or new groupings, without committing to a specific D10 alliance.