Parliament

On Thursday 16 April 2026, the Covid-19 Inquiry published its fourth report, which focussed on the role of vaccines and therapeutics throughout the pandemic and put forward 5 recommendations for the Government to consider. Today, the Government published its response and set out the actions we are taking to address them.

Our thoughts remain with all those affected by the pandemic. We recognise the impact that these experiences have had on individuals and families, and the importance of ensuring that their experiences are heard and reflected in the lessons we learn from the Inquiry. I also want to recognise all those who served the public with dedication, compassion and courage in the most challenging of conditions.

Baroness Hallett’s Module 4 report recognises the remarkable success of the vaccines and therapeutics programmes. Effective vaccines were developed, authorised and deployed at exceptional speed, while still going through the robust clinical trial and safety process necessary for such interventions. Therapeutics were identified quickly to treat those who became seriously ill. The report sets out how vaccines protected many people against the most serious effects of COVID-19, saved lives, reduced pressure on healthcare systems and helped to ease the wider social and economic effects of the pandemic.

The report also highlights the factors that made this possible. This includes the UK’s world-leading position in biomedical sciences, the dedication of doctors, scientists and researchers supported by the UK’s academic institutions and research funders, the skills of those managing the programmes, and the staff and volunteers keeping the vaccination centres running. I also want to thank the public in coming forward to be vaccinated to protect those around them.

The government is also grateful to Baroness Hallet and the Covid-19 Inquiry team for identifying important lessons for the future in relation to planning and responding to future pandemics. This publication sets out our response to the Module 4 report and recommendations.

We recognise there is more to do, and we are continuing to learn from the Inquiry’s findings and address the issues identified. We must ensure that future vaccination and therapeutics programmes earn people’s trust, are accessible to everyone who needs them and are guided by the best available evidence, as these programmes were. We must continue and build on our work with communities to understand and address the barriers that influence vaccine uptake.

The Inquiry notes that safety monitoring must continue to evolve and proposes reform of the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme to ensure it is fair to those seriously harmed or bereaved following vaccination, and recognises the trauma and distress caused to families facing long waits for the processing of their claims. We take these concerns very seriously and will look further at what needs to be done to improve the scheme.

We must maintain investment in research, manufacturing capability, surveillance systems and health data infrastructure, forging closer relationships with key life science partners to support improvements.

Our focus is on practical action. There are four areas we need to address for vaccine uptake: clearer NHS organisation, more flexible services, better public information and joined-up digital records. We are also taking forward reforms to improve pandemic preparedness, health resilience and the UK’s life sciences capability. Our recently published Pandemic Preparedness Strategy aims to enhance our approach to future health emergencies and developing the underlying capabilities needed to respond rapidly.

Investment in research, surveillance and health data will further improve our ability to respond to emerging threats. This work also builds on the ambitions of the 10-Year Health Plan for England which sets out a long-term vision to make the NHS fit for the future, delivering better, faster care, with a workforce that is more empowered, flexible and fulfilled. It places prevention at the heart of NHS reform in England, including through improved vaccination programmes, greater use of new vaccine technologies, better use of high-quality and connected health data to support prevention and early intervention, and closer collaboration between the NHS, universities and industry.

The findings from Module 4 are ultimately about innovation, trust and preparedness. By learning the lessons set out in the report, we can boost our resilience, improve public confidence and ensure that the UK is better equipped for future health emergencies.

On Thursday 19 March 2026, the Covid-19 Inquiry published its third report, which focussed on the impact of the pandemic on the healthcare systems of the UK and put forward ten recommendations for the Government to consider. Today, the Government is publishing its response to the report, and setting out the actions we are taking to address its recommendations.

The COVID-19 pandemic was one of the most significant public health challenges in recent history, placing extraordinary demands on health and care services and affecting people and communities across the United Kingdom.

Many thousands lost loved ones, often in deeply distressing circumstances, and our thoughts remain with all those affected. We also continue to pay tribute to the health and social care workers across the country who served the public with extraordinary dedication, compassion, and courage in the most challenging of conditions.

The Government is grateful to Baroness Hallett and the UK Covid-19 Inquiry team for their continued efforts to ensure that we learn all the necessary lessons from this crisis, and we are grateful as well to all those front-line workers and bereaved families who shared often harrowing evidence of their experiences with the Inquiry.

The Module 3 report is a sobering and important account of the impact of the pandemic on healthcare systems across the UK. It recognises both the extraordinary efforts of frontline staff and the profound pressures under which they worked.

It also shows how the pandemic exposed significant vulnerabilities in our health and care systems, including longstanding weaknesses in staffing, capacity and infrastructure, and it sets out the consequences that these had for patient care during a national emergency.

It is vital that the lessons from those failings continue to be learned and embedded to strengthen the future resilience of our health and care systems.

In many areas, that action is already underway. Our 10 Year Health Plan sets out a long-term vision to make the NHS fit for the future, delivering better, faster care, with a workforce that is more empowered, flexible and fulfilled. We are also bringing forward legislation through the Health Bill which is integral to our modernisation agenda to improve patient care, system co-ordination and accountability.

Most importantly, alongside these reforms, our new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy shows how the UK will build on the specific lessons from COVID-19, and ensure we are better ready and able to deal with pandemics in the future.

Our response to the Module 3 report takes this work further and sets out the actions we are taking to strengthen preparedness for future health emergencies. These include improving infection prevention and control governance, strengthening visiting rights, modernising health data systems through the Single Patient Record and strengthening psychological, emotional and occupational health support for the health and care workforce.

We recognise that meaningful change will require partnership working across all the nations of the United Kingdom, the NHS, local government, and the wider health and care sector. We are committed to working closely with our partners to ensure that the lessons of this report are fully embedded at every level, and in every region. We will continue to work on these issues to turn the lessons identified in the report into lasting change and ensure the country is better prepared for future threats.

While the Module 3 report is focused on healthcare systems, teams across health and social care have worked together to strengthen joint working between the two systems, so that people experience more integrated and person-centred care.

The upcoming Module 6 report will consider social care in more detail, and those findings will be carefully taken into account as the Government develops its plans for a National Care Service, and ensures that the social care system in our country gives people the dignity, support and security they deserve.

We owe it to all those who suffered during the pandemic, and all those who served on the front-line of that health crisis, to ensure that the failings of the past have been properly acknowledged and addressed, and that a stronger, more resilient health and care system will be built for the future.

The Government is fully committed to supporting the work of the Covid-19 Inquiry and to learning lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

The Inquiry published its report on Module 5 (Procurement) in July. The Government will consider its findings and recommendations in detail and respond in due course.

The title and purposes of the specified events booked through Calder Conferences Limited are as follows:

(i) The Old Ship Hotel on 29 May 2025: “Covid 19 Inquiry - Listening Event”. This was part of the Covid-19 Inquiry’s public listening initiatives which enabled bereaved individuals to share their personal experiences and impacts of the pandemic, to be used as evidence for the Inquiry's investigations.

(ii) Westminster Chapel on 9 July 2025: “Infected Blood Inquiry Hearings.” The venue was required to conduct hearings for the Infected Blood Inquiry.

(iii) Leonardo Royal Hotel London Tower Bridge:

11 and 13 December 2024: Details regarding the specific purpose for these two bookings are not held centrally, as they occurred prior to the implementation of the updated guidance on external venue bookings which was issued on 4 April 2025.

16 July 2025: “Government Property Agency All-Staff Conference”.

The UK COVID-19 Inquiry is examining the UK’s response to and impact of the pandemic. The government is fully committed to supporting the work of the COVID-19 Inquiry and to learning lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

The government recognises the unprecedented and wholly exceptional circumstances of the pandemic. The Inquiry is therefore unprecedented in its scope, complexity and profile.

The independent UK COVID-19 Inquiry publishes its own running costs quarterly. The Chair is under a statutory obligation to avoid unnecessary costs in the Inquiry’s work - and she has been clear as to her intention to complete her work as quickly and efficiently as possible.

I would like to update the House on the costs to the UK Government associated with responding to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry.

Figures provided are based upon a selection of the most relevant departments and are not based on a complete set of departmental figures, and different departments organise their response teams in different ways, according to business need. As such, these are not precise figures for accounting purposes. Ensuring a comprehensive and timely response to the Inquiry requires significant input from a number of key government departments, including, but not limited to, the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, the UK Health Security Agency, the Home Office and HM Treasury, many of which are supported by the Government Legal Department. While every effort has been made to ensure a robust methodology, complexities remain in trying to quantify the time and costs dedicated to the Inquiry alone.

It should be noted that alongside full time resource within departments, Inquiry response teams draw on expertise from across their organisations. These costs, including those associated with staff taking time to provide written or oral evidence, are not included in the costs below.

Breakdown of Staff & Costs 2025/26

The government’s response to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry is led by Inquiry Response Units across departments. These associated staff costs for Q4 2025/26 are below and include retrospective adjustments for Q1-3.

Q4 number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: 111 Full Time Equivalents

Q4 cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £2,345,000 (including contingent labour costs)

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4), total cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £15,145,000 (including contingent labour costs, and retrospective adjustments for Q1-3).

Table: Breakdown of Staff & Costs 2025/26

<tbody>

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Quarter 4

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (including contingent labour costs)

£5,015,000

£4,299,000

£3,486,000

£2,345,000

£15,145,000

Number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (Full Time Equivalents)

248

207

167

111

N/A

</tbody>

Inquiry Response Unit Legal Costs 2025/26

Inquiry Response Units across government departments are supported by the Government Legal Department, co-partnering firms of solicitors, and legal counsel. These associated legal costs (excluding internal departmental advisory legal costs) for Q4 2025/26 are below and include retrospective adjustments for Q1-3.

Q4 legal costs: £1,226,000

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4), total legal costs: £16,346,000 (including retrospective adjustments for Q1-3)

Table: Inquiry Response Unit Legal Costs 2025/26

<tbody>

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Quarter 4

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Total legal costs

£4,993,000

£6,339,000

£3,788,000

£1,226,000

£16,346,000

</tbody>

The Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry has today published the Inquiry’s Module 5 report, which examined the procurement and distribution of key healthcare equipment and supplies, including personal protective equipment (PPE), ventilators, and testing equipment.

The Chair finds that the lack of preparation ahead of the Covid-19 pandemic meant that the UK’s stockpile of PPE was in a perilous condition, with shortages and expired stock. The Chair adds that there were no proper plans for the procurement and distribution of key healthcare equipment in an emergency. Health and social care workers were therefore left without adequate PPE to protect themselves, and those for whom they cared.

The Chair acknowledges the logistical challenges of simultaneously obtaining the same supplies as other governments across the world. Those involved in the emergency procurement of healthcare equipment had to act under pressure with extraordinary speed, and were confronted with unenviable choices.

The Inquiry identifies 11 recommendations to ensure that the UK is better prepared ahead of a future healthcare emergency.

I would like to thank Baroness Hallett and her team for their thorough work on this report. The Government will carefully consider the findings and recommendations of the report and respond in due course.

I have laid a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry operates independently from the Government. Therefore, Ministerial approval was not required for this contract.

The contract was procured and awarded in line with procurement rules, as well as Cabinet Office Commercial policies and procedures.

As set out by the Prime Minister in his Written Ministerial Statement of 16 April responding to the publication of Module 4 of the COVID-19 Inquiry, the Government is carefully considering the findings of the inquiry, including the recommendations on reform of the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme (VDPS), and will respond within six months of publication.

The Government is actively considering the recommendations of the inquiry on reform of the VDPS.

The government does not intend to introduce legislation to make Child’s Rights Impact Assessments a statutory requirement at this time.

The department is working closely with Cabinet Office and other government departments to strengthen the consideration of children and young people’s interests within overall risk planning, including in relation to pandemics and other emergencies.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

The UK COVID-19 Inquiry is examining the UK’s response to and impact of the pandemic. The government is fully committed to supporting the work of the COVID-19 Inquiry and to learning lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

The government recognises the unprecedented and wholly exceptional circumstances of the pandemic. The Inquiry is therefore unprecedented in its scope, complexity and profile.

The independent UK COVID-19 Inquiry publishes its own running costs quarterly. The Chair is under a statutory obligation to avoid unnecessary costs in the Inquiry’s work - and she has been clear as to her intention to complete her work as quickly and efficiently as possible.

I would like to update the House on the costs to the UK Government associated with responding to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry.

Figures provided are based upon a selection of the most relevant departments and are not based on a complete set of departmental figures, and different departments organise their response teams in different ways, according to business need. As such, these are not precise figures for accounting purposes. Ensuring a comprehensive and timely response to the Inquiry requires significant input from a number of key government departments, including, but not limited to, the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, the UK Health Security Agency, the Home Office and HM Treasury, many of which are supported by the Government Legal Department. While every effort has been made to ensure a robust methodology, complexities remain in trying to quantify the time and costs dedicated to the Inquiry alone.

It should be noted that alongside full time resource within departments, Inquiry response teams draw on expertise from across their organisations. These costs, including costs associated with staff taking time to provide written or oral evidence, are not included in the costs below.

Breakdown of Staff & Costs

The government’s response to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry is led by Inquiry Response Units across departments. These associated staff costs for Q3 2025/26 are below, and include retrospective adjustments for Q1-2.

Q3 number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: 167 Full Time Equivalents

Q3 cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £3,486,000 (including contingent labour costs)

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2 + Q3), total cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £12,800,000 (including contingent labour costs, and retrospective adjustments for Q1-2)

<tbody>

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (including contingent labour costs)

£5,015,000

£4,299,000

£3,486,000

£12,800,000

Number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (Full Time Equivalents)

248

207

167

N/A

</tbody>

Total Inquiry Response Unit Legal Costs

Inquiry Response Units across government departments are supported by the Government Legal Department, co-partnering firms of solicitors, and legal counsel. These associated legal costs (excluding internal departmental advisory legal costs) for Q3 2025/26 are below, and include retrospective adjustments for Q1-2.

Q3 legal costs: £3,633,000

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2 + Q3), total legal costs: £14,965,000 (including retrospective adjustments for Q1-2)

<tbody>

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Total legal costs

£5,034,000

£6,298,000

£3,633,000

£14,965,000

</tbody>

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

The Inquiry published its report relating to the development of COVID-19 vaccines and the implementation of the vaccine deployment programme on 16 April 2026. The Government will consider the findings and recommendations in detail and will respond within six months of publication, by 16 October 2026. The Government remains committed to learning the lessons needed from the COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future.

This government is committed to learning lessons from the Covid-19 schemes. Formal evaluations of the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) have been published. HM Treasury has participated in Module 9 hearings of the Covid-19 Inquiry, which examined the economic response to the pandemic.

Our deepest sympathies are with those who have experienced harm following vaccination, as well as their families.

The Government recognises that concerns have been raised in relation to the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme (VDPS), including during Module 4 of the COVID-19 inquiry. Following the publication of the COVID-19 Inquiry’s Module 4 report on vaccines and therapeutics on 16 April 2026, the Government will carefully consider its recommendations, including on the reform of the VDPS, and will respond formally in due course.

The Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry has today published the Inquiry’s Module 4 report, which examines the development and implementation of vaccines and therapeutics during the pandemic.

The Chair recognises that the UK authorised and deployed effective vaccines and treatments at unprecedented speed. These achievements reflect the strength of the UK’s world-leading life sciences sector, the universal public health system in each of the four nations which allowed whole population delivery of vaccines, and the extraordinary dedication of health and care staff. They also speak to the collective resolve of the public in coming forward to be vaccinated.

I would like to thank all those involved in this national effort – scientists, researchers, regulators, NHS and social care staff, volunteers, and all those who supported the rollout of vaccines and treatments at pace.

The Inquiry identifies the following areas for further work: strengthening manufacturing capability, sustaining investment in research and development, and developing the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme. It also notes disparities in vaccine uptake among certain communities and the risk of vaccine hesitancy, underlining the importance of building public confidence.

The Government remains committed to learning the lessons from the Inquiry and to strengthen our preparedness for the future.

I would like to thank Baroness Hallett and her team for their work on this report. The Government will consider its findings and recommendations, working closely with colleagues across the devolved governments, and respond in due course.

I have laid a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry publishes a quarterly financial report of its costs. The latest publication for Q3 2025/26 shows that the total cost from when the Inquiry was established on 28 June 2022 to 31 December 2025 was £204m.

Since the financial year 2023/24, the Government has published data on costs incurred by key government departments in responding to the Inquiry. These costs to 30 September 2025 total £111m and are in addition to the Inquiry’s own costs above. A further update to the data will be published in due course.

On Thursday 20 November 2025, the Covid-19 Inquiry published their second report, which examined core decision-making and political governance across the UK and put forward 19 recommendations for the Government to consider. Today, the Government published its response and set out the actions we are taking to address them.

The Covid-19 pandemic was a traumatic chapter in our country’s history. Families lost loved ones, businesses suffered or were forced to close, and many across the country were left with life-long health impacts. The government debt built up to cover the economic impact of the crisis is still being paid back today; the impact on NHS waiting lists remains a long-term challenge.

The Government welcomes the Inquiry’s Module 2 report and I want to express my gratitude to Baroness Hallett and her team for their rigorous examination of the issues it raises.

It is a sobering read. Responding to the pandemic was a highly significant logistical challenge to our system of government, and indeed to governments all around the world. However the Module 2 report nevertheless exposes several failures of the government at the time: a failure to respond quickly enough; to treat the impact on vulnerable people and children seriously enough; to provide clear, unequivocal public health messaging; and to turn scientific advice into coherent policy in a transparent, methodical way. There are many lessons to learn from the mistakes, failures – and successes – where they were made.

This government has already made significant changes to its crisis response structures in response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 report. Without effective governance, we cannot expect to respond to crises effectively. The Prime Minister, Cabinet and civil service must be structured, willing and able to make fast, evidence-based and compassionate decisions that will save lives and livelihoods, informed by the scientific evidence. In July 2025, we also published our Resilience Action Plan which explains this government's strategic approach to increasing the UK's resilience. Our response to the Module 2 report today builds on that.

We have already updated the UK Government’s crisis management doctrine, known as the Amber Book, which sets out the decision-making framework for responding to a crisis. This includes establishing the principles for a successful taskforce structure, to oversee the response to protracted whole-of-system crises, and has informed the development of internal risk-specific operational plans for catastrophic risks like pandemics.

The report also notes that clear and inclusive communication is integral to a successful government response to an emergency. The Government Communication Service (GCS) Crisis Communications Operating Model has been updated to clarify communications roles and responsibilities before, during, and in the aftermath of a crisis. We have issued new advice to help departments create robust communication plans for their specific risks, and our STOP model for crisis planning now mandates that all communications consider people with additional needs. This ensures that our messaging is accessible and inclusive by default, in line with the Equality Act 2010, the Public Sector Equality Duty, and the British Sign Language Act 2022.

As recommended by the Module 2 report, we are also working towards commencing the socio-economic duty under Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 in England. Additionally, in 2025, we published updated guidance for identifying and supporting vulnerable people during an emergency.

We have also worked closely with our counterparts in the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to draft our response to this report. Our shared aim is to ensure that intergovernmental machinery is configured to enable better coordination between governments while respecting the importance of local accountability. The devolved governments should be invited to COBR and taskforce meetings during an emergency where relevant. Furthermore, guidance has been updated to ensure the three Chief Scientific Advisers from the devolved governments are invited to SAGE meetings from the very outset of an emergency.

As the Government implements our response to the Module 2 report, our progress will be recorded and tracked transparently using our Covid-19 Inquiry dashboard. These may seem like technical changes, but in an increasingly disruptive global context, having processes in place to make the right marginal call in moments of volatility can have profound and long-lasting impacts.

Many will naturally want to put the difficulty of the Covid-19 behind us, but given the long-lasting impact on the British economy and public services, it is right for government to take these lessons seriously. And we owe it to those who died, suffered and struggled during the pandemic too. I am grateful to Baroness Hallett and her team for their rigorous examination of what went wrong, on the basis of which we are acting, to make sure this and future governments can do better next time.

I am today announcing the publication of the new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, outlining the UK Government’s plans for improving our pandemic preparedness capabilities between now and 2030.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the most significant crisis we have faced in generations. It touched every aspect of our lives, and its impacts continue to be felt across our communities. It showed that a future pandemic is one of the most profound threats to our society.

The UK is already a world-leader in life sciences. Building on our strengths and the huge amount of work that has taken place since the pandemic to improve preparedness, the 2025 UK Government Resilience Action Plan set out a new national approach to resilience based on continuous assessment of readiness and mobilising the whole of society.

This Strategy, which is backed by investment of around £1 billion for health protection during the current Spending Review period, is a demonstration of our resolve to protect the health of our nation, safeguard our economy, and minimise the unequal impacts that pandemics can bring. It sets out the improvements we will make to our health system response capabilities, and how they underpin a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. It builds on the lessons identified from the COVID-19 pandemic and is shaped by the findings of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry and indicative findings from Exercise Pegasus, the largest non-military exercise ever to take place in the UK. The Exercise tested the government’s ability to respond quickly and effectively during a prolonged crisis, with a full report to be published in Winter 2026.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the crucial importance of governments across the UK working together whilst also respecting and taking full account of devolved areas of responsibility.

In support of a joined-up approach to preparedness, all four nations endorse the principles of preparedness set out in the Strategy, while individual nations will have their own plans to implement their preparedness.

These principles include protecting those most at risk, with governments committing to tailoring their capabilities to protect all communities and aiming to deliver an effective and equitable response to pandemics.

The Strategy contains commitments across a number of areas that outline how the UK government will improve pandemic preparedness, many of which have been informed and shaped by the initial findings of Exercise Pegasus. They include to:

Take a dynamic approach to ensure access to vaccines and therapeutics, and address the perceived barriers to the development of novel vaccines and therapeutics for priority pathogens.

Develop the ability to rapidly develop diagnostics for a broad range of pathogens, with scaled up in-house capacity for laboratory testing and whole genome sequencing.

Develop UK manufacturing capacity for vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics.

Further strengthen surveillance systems to be comprehensive, activation-ready and drawing on diverse sample groups across settings and communities so we can detect threats, understand disease spread and enable the analytical capability to act effectively and equitably.

Replenish PPE stockpiles, refine plans for mobilising and distributing PPE, and prepare a cross-government model for procuring and prioritising the distribution of PPE to critical workers in a pandemic.

Strengthen government coordination mechanisms, drawing from early findings of Exercise Pegasus, including through regularly reviewing and exercising response plans. Guidance will be in put in place for local responders.

Publish evidence reviews on the effectiveness of community protection measures and build a suite of measures to support decision-making and prioritisation.

Expand communication channels for and improve our understanding of how to make communications relevant to different communities, and strengthen guidance provided to different sectors.

Review the data capabilities needed to support decision-making and evaluate the impacts of pandemic response measures, and enhance data sharing capabilities to enable faster, more transparent information sharing between organisations and with the public in a pandemic.

Co-develop an Adult Social Care Pandemic Action Plan to respond to future threats with sector partners. As part of this, we will focus on how best to support the wellbeing of those with care and support needs and how to improve the resilience and preparedness of the adult social care workforce.

Strengthen the flexibility and resilience of the healthcare workforce, improve the NHS’ baseline capabilities to manage infections, and develop plans to minimise the risk of cross-contamination across services and maintain continuity of routine care during pandemics.

By integrating our health, security and scientific capabilities, we will protect the NHS, safeguard our economy, and save lives.