Simplify Emergency Preparedness Structures
Recommendation
The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each simplify and reduce the number of structures with responsibility for preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies. The core structures should be: a single Cabinet-level or …
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The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each simplify and reduce the number of structures with responsibility for preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies. The core structures should be: a single Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee (including the senior minister responsible for health and social care) responsible for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience for each government, which meets regularly and is chaired by the leader or deputy leader of the relevant government; and a single cross-departmental group of senior officials in each government (which reports regularly to the Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee) to oversee and implement policy on civil emergency preparedness and resilience. This should be put in place within 12 months of the publication of this Report.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation in its response published 16 January 2025, agreeing that clear governance is needed to build resilience across the UK (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The Prime Minister established the National Security Council (Resilience) as a single Cabinet-level committee in July 2024, chaired by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, with the Health Secretary as a standing member (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- A Resilience Steering Board was created at Director level, meeting monthly, with senior officials from devolved governments attending (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as CLOSED, confirming governance for catastrophic risks had been refreshed with co-chaired risk boards and increased meeting frequency (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Cabinet Office Leadership for Emergencies
Recommendation
The UK government should: abolish the lead government department model for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience; and require the Cabinet Office to lead on preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across UK government departments, including monitoring …
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The UK government should: abolish the lead government department model for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience; and require the Cabinet Office to lead on preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across UK government departments, including monitoring the preparedness and resilience of other departments, supporting departments to correct problems, and escalating issues to the UK Cabinet-level ministerial committee and group of senior officials.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation with modification in its response published 16 January 2025, retaining the Lead Government Department model but expanding the Cabinet Office role for catastrophic risks (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The government stated the Lead Government Department model "remains essential because departments with day-to-day responsibility are best positioned to manage risks" (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The Amber Book was published in April 2025, embedding the Cabinet Office leadership role, and central operational plans for each catastrophic risk were created (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS, with Lead Government Department Expectations guidance due by end of 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Improved Risk Assessment Approach
Recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should work together on developing a new approach to risk assessment that moves away from a reliance on single reasonable worst-case scenarios towards an approach that: assesses a wider range of scenarios representative of …
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The UK government and devolved administrations should work together on developing a new approach to risk assessment that moves away from a reliance on single reasonable worst-case scenarios towards an approach that: assesses a wider range of scenarios representative of the different risks and the range of each kind of risk; considers the prevention and mitigation of an emergency in addition to dealing with its consequences; provides a full analysis of the ways in which the combined impacts of different risks may complicate or worsen an emergency; assesses long-term risks in addition to short-term risks and considers how they may interact with each other; undertakes an assessment of the impact of each risk on vulnerable people; and takes into account the capacity and capabilities of the UK.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation in its response published 16 January 2025, agreeing with the need to improve risk assessment beyond single reasonable worst-case scenarios (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The National Risk Register was updated in January 2025 with a dynamic assessment model enabling more frequent risk evaluations (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- A Risk Vulnerability Tool was developed for analysing societal vulnerabilities and disproportionate impacts, and a Risk and Insight Navigator platform was in testing (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The first-ever public analysis of 26 chronic risks was published in July 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS, with an NSRA methodology review beginning late 2025 and a pilot of alternative risk assessment approaches with the Royal Academy of Engineering (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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UK-wide Civil Emergency Strategy
Recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should together introduce a UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy (which includes pandemics) to prevent each emergency and also to reduce, control and mitigate its effects. The strategy should: be adaptable; include sections dedicated to …
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The UK government and devolved administrations should together introduce a UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy (which includes pandemics) to prevent each emergency and also to reduce, control and mitigate its effects. The strategy should: be adaptable; include sections dedicated to each potential whole-system civil emergency; consider a wide range of potential scenarios for each type of emergency; identify the key issues and set out a range of potential responses; identify how the strategy is to be applied to ensure that any potential responses are proportionate; include an assessment of the potential health, social and economic impacts; and include an assessment of the infrastructure, technology and skills the UK needs to respond effectively.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation with modification in its response published 16 January 2025, rejecting a single unified UK strategy as "unwieldy" but committing to a common strategic approach through coordinated sector-specific strategies (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The Autumn 2024 budget announced £460 million for pandemic preparedness (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The Resilience Action Plan was published on 8 July 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS, with a pandemic preparedness strategy targeted for autumn 2025 and a DHSC respiratory response plan due summer 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Pandemic Data Systems and Research
Recommendation
The UK government, working with the devolved administrations, should establish mechanisms for the timely collection, analysis, secure sharing and use of reliable data for informing emergency responses, in advance of future pandemics. Data systems should be tested in pandemic exercises. …
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The UK government, working with the devolved administrations, should establish mechanisms for the timely collection, analysis, secure sharing and use of reliable data for informing emergency responses, in advance of future pandemics. Data systems should be tested in pandemic exercises. The UK government should also commission a wider range of research projects ready to commence in the event of a future pandemic, including projects to: understand the prevalence of a new virus; measure the effectiveness of a range of different public health measures; and identify which groups of vulnerable people are hardest hit by the pandemic and why.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation in its response published 16 January 2025, agreeing that data and research are crucial to pandemic preparedness (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The National Situation Centre, established in 2021, had mapped and ingested over 700 datasets covering 85% of NSRA risks (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The Biothreats Radar was launched on the National Situation Centre platform for human, plant and animal health scanning (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The NHS Research Secure Data Environment had 504 projects delivered, in progress or in pipeline as of March 2025, and NHS DigiTrials had 1.35 million citizens consented into 7 clinical trials as of May 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS, with data-sharing MOUs with devolved governments agreed but pending signing (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Triennial Pandemic Exercises
Recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should together hold a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years. The exercise should: test the UK-wide, cross-government, national and local response to a pandemic at all stages, from the initial outbreak …
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The UK government and devolved administrations should together hold a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years. The exercise should: test the UK-wide, cross-government, national and local response to a pandemic at all stages, from the initial outbreak to multiple waves over a number of years; include a broad range of those involved in pandemic preparedness and response; and consider how a broad range of vulnerable people will be helped in the event of a pandemic.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation in its response published 16 January 2025, programming a Tier 1 ministerial-level pandemic exercise for 2025 (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- Exercise PEGASUS was scheduled for September–November 2025, involving all four nations (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- A National Exercising Programme was established with annual Tier 1 exercises planned for 2026–2030 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- No published report on the completion or findings of Exercise PEGASUS has been identified as of March 2026.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Publish Exercise Reports and Lessons
Recommendation
For all civil emergency exercises, the governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each (unless there are reasons of national security for not doing so): publish an exercise report summarising the findings, lessons and recommendations, within three …
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For all civil emergency exercises, the governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each (unless there are reasons of national security for not doing so): publish an exercise report summarising the findings, lessons and recommendations, within three months of the conclusion of the exercise; publish an action plan setting out the specific steps that will be taken in response to the report's findings, and by which entity, within six months of the conclusion of the exercise; and keep exercise reports, action plans, and emergency plans and guidance from across the UK in a single, UK-wide online archive, accessible to all involved in emergency preparedness, resilience and response.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation in its response published 16 January 2025, committing to publish findings from Tier 1 exercises unless there are justifiable national security reasons not to (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The UK Resilience Academy was launched in April 2025 with an Exercising Hub (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- A cross-government Lessons Management framework was under development, with guidance recommending publication within 3 months but acknowledging governance may extend timelines to approximately 12 months (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS, with a UK-wide online repository for exercise information still to be created (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Triennial Parliamentary Resilience Reports
Recommendation
The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each produce and publish reports to their respective legislatures at least every three years on whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. The reports should include as a minimum: the …
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The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each produce and publish reports to their respective legislatures at least every three years on whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. The reports should include as a minimum: the risks that each government has identified are likely to result in whole-system civil emergencies; the recommendations that have been made to each government to mitigate those risks, and whether these recommendations have been accepted or rejected; a cost–benefit analysis setting out the economic and social costs of accepting the risks as against taking action to mitigate the risks; who may be vulnerable to the risks and what steps are being taken to mitigate those risks; a plan setting out the timescales for implementing the recommendations that have been accepted; and an update on the progress that has been made on implementing previously accepted recommendations.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation in its response published 16 January 2025, committing to annual statements to Parliament on civil contingency risk (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster delivered the 2025 Annual Statement to Parliament on risk and resilience on 8 July 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The UK Biological Security Strategy implementation report was published in July 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as CLOSED, with annual Parliamentary statements on risk and resilience confirmed as ongoing (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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External Red Teams for Resilience
Recommendation
The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each introduce the use of red teams in the Civil Service to scrutinise and challenge the principles, evidence, policies and advice relating to preparedness for and resilience to whole-system …
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The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each introduce the use of red teams in the Civil Service to scrutinise and challenge the principles, evidence, policies and advice relating to preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies. The red teams should be brought in from outside of government and the Civil Service.
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Published evidence summary
- The government accepted this recommendation in its response published 16 January 2025, agreeing that red teams are an effective means to scrutinise and challenge emergency preparedness (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- Five of eight planned expert advisory groups had been established, with the remaining three expected by early 2026 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The Crisis Management Excellence Programme had trained over 2,100 civil servants, with ministerial training initiated in July 2025 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS, with a red teaming pilot planned for the 2025/26 Capabilities Assessment and broader red teaming capability development due autumn 2026 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Independent Statutory Resilience Body
Recommendation
The UK government should, in consultation with the devolved administrations, create a statutory independent body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. The new body should be given responsibility for: providing independent, strategic advice to the UK government and devolved …
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The UK government should, in consultation with the devolved administrations, create a statutory independent body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. The new body should be given responsibility for: providing independent, strategic advice to the UK government and devolved administrations on their planning for, preparedness for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies; consulting with the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector at a national and local level and directors of public health on the protection of vulnerable people; assessing the state of planning for, preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across the UK; and making recommendations on the capacity and capabilities required. As an interim measure, the new body should be established on a non-statutory basis within 12 months of this Report.
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Published evidence summary
- The government rejected the creation of a new statutory independent body as recommended, instead proposing an alternative approach through strengthened existing advisory mechanisms (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- The government stated it "will always remain responsible and accountable for policy and resource allocation" and determined an independent statutory body was unnecessary given existing expert advisory structures (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 Report, Cabinet Office, 16 January 2025).
- As an alternative, the UK Resilience Academy will convene expert panels chaired by external figures to scrutinise whole-system risk preparedness, with findings to be published alongside government responses (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
- The July 2025 implementation update marked this recommendation as IN PROGRESS, with a pilot process running in the second half of 2025 and panel operations commencing from April 2026 (Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025).
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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NI CMO Independence
Recommendation
The Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should reconstitute the role of the Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland as an independent advisory role. The Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland should not have managerial responsibilities within the Department of Health …
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The Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should reconstitute the role of the Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland as an independent advisory role. The Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland should not have managerial responsibilities within the Department of Health (Northern Ireland).
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Published evidence summary
- This recommendation is addressed to the Department of Health (Northern Ireland), not the UK government.
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that this recommendation is not for it to respond to (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- No published response from the Northern Ireland Department of Health has been identified.
Department of Health NI
(Primary)
Northern Ireland Executive
(Primary)
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Devolved Nations SAGE Attendance
Recommendation
The Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should invite the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to nominate a small number of representatives to attend meetings of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) from the outset of any future …
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The Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should invite the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to nominate a small number of representatives to attend meetings of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) from the outset of any future emergency. The status of those representatives as either 'participant' or 'observer' should depend upon their expertise and should be a matter for SAGE to determine.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that GO-Science has already made the required changes to address this recommendation (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- According to the response, the three Chief Scientific Advisers of the devolved governments will be invited to SAGE from the outset of any future emergency, with participant or observer status decided by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser.
- Chief Medical Officers and Chief Veterinary Officers of the devolved governments will also be invited where relevant.
- These arrangements have not yet been tested in a real emergency activation since the policy change. No independent verification of the operational readiness of these arrangements has been published.
Government Office for Science
(Primary)
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UK-wide Expert Register
Recommendation
The Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should develop and maintain a register of experts across the four nations of the UK who would be willing to participate in scientific advisory groups, covering a broad range of potential civil emergencies.
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The Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should develop and maintain a register of experts across the four nations of the UK who would be willing to participate in scientific advisory groups, covering a broad range of potential civil emergencies.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that GO-Science already maintains an expert register for SAGE (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- GO-Science committed to refreshing expert selection processes during 2026, including practical steps to support greater diversity.
- The response describes open calls for applications as a 'longer-term ambition' rather than a current commitment, citing resource implications and the need for flexible selection processes.
- No independent assessment of the current register's breadth or diversity has been published.
Government Office for Science
(Primary)
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Publish Technical Advice During Emergencies
Recommendation
During a whole-system civil emergency, the UK government and devolved administrations should each routinely publish technical advice on scientific, economic and social matters at the earliest opportunity, as well as the minutes of expert advisory groups – except where there …
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During a whole-system civil emergency, the UK government and devolved administrations should each routinely publish technical advice on scientific, economic and social matters at the earliest opportunity, as well as the minutes of expert advisory groups – except where there are good reasons that prevent publication, such as commercial confidentiality, personal safety or national security, or because legal advice privilege applies.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it agrees with the importance of publishing technical advice during emergencies (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The Amber Book was updated in April 2025 and sets out a national framework for crisis response, including provisions for scientific and technical advice (Managing Crisis in Central Government, Cabinet Office, April 2025).
- GO-Science and Cabinet Office published updated SAGE guidance in 2024 stating that SAGE papers and minutes will be published 'as and when appropriate' in future emergencies.
- The GOV.UK/PREPARE website provides public-facing emergency preparedness guidance.
- The response notes that full disclosure may not always be appropriate, leaving discretion with the government of the day.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Advisory Group Terms of Appointment
Recommendation
The Government Office for Science (GO-Science), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should each develop standard terms of appointment for all participants in scientific advisory groups. These terms should include: clarity around the …
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The Government Office for Science (GO-Science), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should each develop standard terms of appointment for all participants in scientific advisory groups. These terms should include: clarity around the nature of an individual's role and the extent of their responsibility, as well as the likely time commitment; payment where their time commitment means that they have to spend time away from their substantive role; access to support services; and access to advice on personal and online security, with procedures for escalating specific concerns.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that GO-Science already provides support to SAGE participants including guidance documents, wellbeing services, and security advice (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- GO-Science committed to reviewing and updating terms, conditions and support for participants by 2027.
- The response states GO-Science will develop guidance on compensation for participants whose time commitment results in significant absence from substantive roles.
- The 2027 deadline has not yet passed; no updated terms have been published.
Government Office for Science
(Primary)
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Enact Socio-economic Duty
Recommendation
The UK government should bring into force in England section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, implementing the socio-economic duty. The Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision within section 75 of the Northern Ireland …
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The UK government should bring into force in England section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, implementing the socio-economic duty. The Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision within section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it is working toward commencement of the socio-economic duty under section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The response states that statutory guidance is being drafted and engagement with listed public bodies is underway.
- Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 remains uncommenced in England as of March 2026, though it has been commenced in Scotland (since April 2018) and Wales (since March 2021).
- No commencement date or draft statutory guidance has been published.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Statutory Child Rights Impact Assessments
Recommendation
The UK government should introduce legislation to place child rights impact assessments on a statutory footing in England. The Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision.
Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it does not intend to introduce legislation to make child rights impact assessments (CRIAs) a statutory requirement at this time (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The response states the government considers that mandating CRIAs risks making them a 'mechanical recitation of points' rather than a meaningful tool.
- The government indicated it will consider findings from the Module 8 report (on children and young people) when published.
- The Department for Education is working with Cabinet Office to incorporate children's interests into crisis planning.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Vulnerable People Framework
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should each agree a framework that identifies people who would be most at risk of becoming infected by and dying from a disease and those who are most likely …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should each agree a framework that identifies people who would be most at risk of becoming infected by and dying from a disease and those who are most likely to be negatively impacted by any steps taken to respond to a future pandemic. The framework should set out the specific steps that could be taken to mitigate the risks to these people. Equality impact assessments should form part of this framework.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it agrees with the importance of identifying and protecting those most at risk (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- DHSC published a Pandemic Preparedness Strategy on 25 March 2026, which includes commitments on vulnerability frameworks.
- Cabinet Office published updated guidance on identifying vulnerable people in emergencies in April 2025 (Identifying and supporting persons who are vulnerable in an emergency, Cabinet Office, April 2025).
- The UK Government Resilience Action Plan was published in July 2025.
- The National Situation Centre has created a Risk Vulnerability Tool to estimate vulnerable populations.
- NHS England's Core20PLUS5 framework is in use to address healthcare inequalities.
- DHSC has committed to reviewing existing guidance to identify gaps, but this review is still underway.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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NI Emergency Powers Review
Recommendation
The Northern Ireland Executive and UK government (in consultation with the Irish government where necessary) should review the structures and delegated powers of government in Northern Ireland to consider: the empowerment of the First Minister and deputy First Minister jointly …
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The Northern Ireland Executive and UK government (in consultation with the Irish government where necessary) should review the structures and delegated powers of government in Northern Ireland to consider: the empowerment of the First Minister and deputy First Minister jointly to direct the work of other ministers and departments during an emergency; the empowerment of the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service in relation to the allocation of civil servants to departments or to civil contingency structures during an emergency; and how decisions that would usually be subject to ministerial approval would be taken should an emergency occur during the suspension of power-sharing arrangements.
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Published evidence summary
- This recommendation is primarily addressed to the Northern Ireland Executive and UK government jointly.
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it believes the Northern Ireland Executive and parties should consider how necessary changes should be made (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The response notes the Assembly and Executive Review Committee is currently considering whether the institutions require wider reform.
- The UK government stated it will stand ready to discuss proposals for changes to the Strand One institutions.
- No specific legislative or structural changes have been announced.
Northern Ireland Executive
(Primary)
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Pandemic Decision-Making Framework
Recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies how decision-making will work in a future pandemic. This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how …
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The UK government and devolved administrations should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies how decision-making will work in a future pandemic. This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how the UK government and devolved administrations will transition from managing a pandemic through COBR to managing it through separate arrangements in each nation when it becomes clear that the emergency will be longer-term.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it has developed risk-specific operational plans for pandemics including a Concept of Operations setting out decision-making arrangements (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- DHSC published a Pandemic Preparedness Strategy on 25 March 2026.
- The Amber Book, updated April 2025, provides a default model recommending two Cabinet committees (Strategy and Operations) for pandemic response (Managing Crisis in Central Government, Cabinet Office, April 2025).
- The response states COBR would be used for initial response, with transition to a taskforce model for enduring response.
- Devolved governments would be invited to participate in COBR and taskforce meetings.
- The Minister for Women and Equalities will be engaged in decision-making on vulnerable groups.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Leadership Succession Arrangements
Recommendation
The UK government and the devolved administrations should each establish formal arrangements for covering the roles of Prime Minister and First Minister (and in Northern Ireland, deputy First Minister) as applicable during a whole-system civil emergency, should the incumbent be …
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The UK government and the devolved administrations should each establish formal arrangements for covering the roles of Prime Minister and First Minister (and in Northern Ireland, deputy First Minister) as applicable during a whole-system civil emergency, should the incumbent be unable to undertake their duties for any reason.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it accepts the recommendation and the Prime Minister will put in place appropriate arrangements (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- No details were provided on the specific form these contingency arrangements will take.
- No published documentation of formal succession or deputisation arrangements for the Prime Minister during emergencies has been identified.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Central Emergency Taskforces
Recommendation
The response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, coordination of a single data picture and …
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The response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, coordination of a single data picture and facilitation of decision-making processes.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it has revised crisis management governance processes (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The Amber Book, updated April 2025, sets out principles for establishing and running a taskforce for protracted crises (Managing Crisis in Central Government, Cabinet Office, April 2025).
- Operational plans for a pandemic taskforce have been drafted within the Cabinet Office Pandemic Concept of Operations.
- Exercise Pegasus (Autumn 2025) tested key elements of a taskforce model, including devolved government liaison officers.
- The Pandemic Concept of Operations has not been published; Exercise Pegasus post-exercise report is expected Winter 2026.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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NI Executive Confidentiality Duty
Recommendation
The Executive Office should amend the Ministerial Code to impose a duty of confidentiality on ministers that prohibits the disclosure of the individual views of ministers expressed during meetings of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.
Published evidence summary
- This recommendation is addressed to the Northern Ireland Executive Office, not the UK government.
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that this recommendation is not for it to respond to (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- No published response from the Northern Ireland Executive Office has been identified.
The Executive Office
(Primary)
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Accessible Emergency Communications
Recommendation
The UK government and the devolved administrations should each develop action plans for how government communications will be made more accessible during a pandemic. As a minimum, these should include making provision for the translation of government press conferences into …
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The UK government and the devolved administrations should each develop action plans for how government communications will be made more accessible during a pandemic. As a minimum, these should include making provision for the translation of government press conferences into British Sign Language (and Irish Sign Language in Northern Ireland) and the translation of key announcements into the most frequently spoken languages in the UK.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it has implemented measures to improve crisis communications (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The GCS Crisis Communications Operating Model was updated in 2023 (Crisis Communications Operating Model, Government Communication Service, 2023).
- New crisis communication planning guidance was issued to departments in 2024 (Crisis Comms Planning Guide, Government Communication Service, 2024).
- A BSL interpretation protocol has been established in accordance with the BSL Act 2022.
- A central New Media Unit was launched in the Cabinet Office.
- Communication teams participated in Exercise Pegasus (September-October 2025).
- No independent assessment of the accessibility or effectiveness of these measures has been published.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Parliamentary Scrutiny of Emergency Powers
Recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that the draft affirmative procedure is the standard process for enacting substantial and wide-ranging powers in a civil emergency, such as a pandemic, under primary public health legislation. Any departure from this …
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The UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that the draft affirmative procedure is the standard process for enacting substantial and wide-ranging powers in a civil emergency, such as a pandemic, under primary public health legislation. Any departure from this procedure should be the exception, with clear criteria and safeguards in place to prevent the bypassing of parliamentary scrutiny.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it agrees the legislative response to emergencies should be subject to parliamentary oversight (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The 2025 Guide to Making Legislation includes a Delegated Powers Toolkit setting out considerations for delegated powers (Guide to Making Legislation, Cabinet Office, 2025).
- The response does not commit to making the draft affirmative procedure the standard process, stating that different emergencies may require different legislative approaches on a case-by-case basis.
- No specific commitment to mandatory sunset clauses or bimonthly ministerial reporting has been made.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Civil Contingencies Act Review
Recommendation
The UK government should undertake a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to assess its potential role in managing future civil emergencies, including pandemics, and whether it could be employed as an interim emergency framework until more specific legislation …
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The UK government should undertake a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to assess its potential role in managing future civil emergencies, including pandemics, and whether it could be employed as an interim emergency framework until more specific legislation with appropriate parliamentary safeguards is passed.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it agrees the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 should be reviewed (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The next Post Implementation Review of the CCA 2004 Regulations is due to be laid in Parliament by March 2027.
- The government stated it will use this review to explore the applicability of Part 2 emergency powers to pandemics, including potential adjustments to safeguards such as the triple lock test.
- The review has not yet been completed or published.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Public Emergency Information Portal
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should develop an online portal for use in future civil emergencies, where members of the public can access information on the legal restrictions that apply in their area and …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should develop an online portal for use in future civil emergencies, where members of the public can access information on the legal restrictions that apply in their area and any associated guidance.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it agrees with the aim of making restrictions and guidance accessible but does not agree with the proposed approach of a single online portal (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The response cites information ownership constraints: different communication channels are owned by different bodies, and devolved governments have specific responsibilities.
- The government points to GOV.UK, GOV.UK/Prepare, and the Resilience Direct platform as existing tools.
- Work with devolved governments on crisis communications coordination is planned for 2026, including co-producing shared principles for aligning communications.
- No single repository for restrictions and guidance has been developed.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Devolved Nations COBR Attendance
Recommendation
The UK government should invite the devolved administrations, as a matter of standard practice, to nominate relevant ministers and officials to attend COBR meetings in the event of relevant whole-system civil emergencies that have the potential to have UK-wide effects.
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The UK government should invite the devolved administrations, as a matter of standard practice, to nominate relevant ministers and officials to attend COBR meetings in the event of relevant whole-system civil emergencies that have the potential to have UK-wide effects.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it agrees devolved government representatives should be invited to COBR (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- The Amber Book, updated April 2025, states devolved government ministers and officials are invited to relevant meetings including COBR (Managing Crisis in Central Government, Cabinet Office, April 2025).
- The response states invitations remain on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the Chair, rather than as a matter of standard practice as the Inquiry recommended.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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Four Nations Pandemic Structure
Recommendation
While intergovernmental relations should be facilitated through COBR in the initial months of any future pandemic, the UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that a specific four-nations structure, concerning pandemic response, is stood up at the same time as …
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While intergovernmental relations should be facilitated through COBR in the initial months of any future pandemic, the UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that a specific four-nations structure, concerning pandemic response, is stood up at the same time as the transition away from COBR to nation-specific decision-making structures. This should meet regularly during a pandemic and be attended by all heads of government.
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Published evidence summary
- The UK government stated in its Module 2 response (25 March 2026) that it agrees a clear four-nations structure is needed during the transition from COBR to enduring pandemic response (UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report, CP 1534, 25 March 2026).
- A review of intergovernmental relations was published jointly by the UK and devolved governments in 2022, establishing structures and ways of working adopted by all four governments.
- Cabinet Office collaborated with devolved governments on operational planning for the COBR-to-taskforce transition in preparation for Exercise Pegasus.
- Devolved government ministers and officials will be invited to COBR and taskforce Cabinet Committee meetings.
- The Exercise Pegasus post-exercise report, expected Winter 2026, has not yet been published.
Cabinet Office
(Primary)
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IPC Structures and Transmission Risk
Recommendation
The UK government must ensure that there is a body (equivalent to the UK Infection Prevention and Control Cell) in place ready to be convened at the outset of any future pandemic, to consider and draft infection prevention and control …
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The UK government must ensure that there is a body (equivalent to the UK Infection Prevention and Control Cell) in place ready to be convened at the outset of any future pandemic, to consider and draft infection prevention and control guidance for healthcare settings. This body must: have clear lines of responsibility and a clear, pre-defined role and remit during a pandemic; have multidisciplinary membership, including experts in the science of viral transmission as well as those with clinical expertise; ensure that its guidance accounts for the risk of all plausible routes of transmission until sufficient evidence emerges to rule out specific routes; and ensure that guidance clearly explains the underlying rationale for the precautions recommended. Separately, the Department of Health and Social Care, NHS National Services Scotland, Public Health Wales and the Public Health Agency (Northern Ireland) should review the national infection prevention and control manuals and any future guidance to ensure that the approach to identifying risk of transmission is not confined solely to specific procedures. Emphasis should be placed on a combination of risk factors, such as rates of transmissibility, environment, setting and procedure.
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Visiting Restrictions Guidance
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should publish guidance for the implementation of visiting restrictions in hospitals in the event of a future pandemic. The guidance should identify the circumstances in which visiting restrictions should …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should publish guidance for the implementation of visiting restrictions in hospitals in the event of a future pandemic. The guidance should identify the circumstances in which visiting restrictions should be introduced, escalated, decreased and removed alongside the measures and exemptions at each level. The guidance should be led by the following core principles: 1. Measures applied should be the least restrictive possible, both in terms of severity and the length of time for which they apply. 2. Restrictions should be decided upon and applied at the most local level possible. 3. Unless restrictions are applied at a specified level, trusts and health boards should take decisions on the severity of restrictions based on local risk assessments. 4. Communications with the public must clearly explain the measures in place and the reasons why restrictions apply. The guidance should be reviewed every three years in line with the Inquiry's Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4).
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Fit-Testing Preparedness
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with employers, including health boards and trusts, to review the availability of qualified fit testers and take steps to increase the number of fit testers accordingly. Availability …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with employers, including health boards and trusts, to review the availability of qualified fit testers and take steps to increase the number of fit testers accordingly. Availability should be reviewed every three years in line with the Inquiry's Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4). The Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland should update their guidance to employers to emphasise the need to ensure that sufficient fit-testing capacity is available.
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Data Systems for High-Risk Individuals
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive must ensure that health data and digital systems have the capability to identify individuals at high risk of morbidity or mortality from a pandemic disease quickly and accurately in …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive must ensure that health data and digital systems have the capability to identify individuals at high risk of morbidity or mortality from a pandemic disease quickly and accurately in a future pandemic. This should include action to improve health data systems and patient record-keeping by: improving patient data by enabling more granular diagnostic coding; ensuring that care records are compatible across primary and secondary care; and enabling secure data-sharing and linkage across multiple health datasets and systems for identifying individuals at high risk.
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Scale Up Urgent and Emergency Care
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, in conjunction with organisations responsible for delivering services, should plan for surge capacity in urgent and emergency care during a pandemic. Plans must ensure that there is sufficient workforce …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, in conjunction with organisations responsible for delivering services, should plan for surge capacity in urgent and emergency care during a pandemic. Plans must ensure that there is sufficient workforce capacity and the ability to surge, including the number and type of staff required, recruitment and training provision. This should be completed as part of the whole-system civil emergency strategy recommended in the Inquiry's Module 1 Report (Recommendation 4). Plans should be published and subject to review every three years.
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Scale Up Hospital Capacity
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with trusts and health boards to ensure that pandemic plans include practical steps to rapidly scale up hospital capacity to treat acutely unwell patients. This should include …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with trusts and health boards to ensure that pandemic plans include practical steps to rapidly scale up hospital capacity to treat acutely unwell patients. This should include critical care services that can deliver multiple levels and types of organ support. It should also cover necessary equipment, supplies, space and staff, including redeployment and training. All trusts and health boards must keep an easily accessible, up-to-date record of the information needed to implement these plans in the hospital sites they operate. This should include technical aspects of critical care expansion such as power, ventilation, oxygen and waste management systems. Plans for expanding capacity should be published, subject to review every three years and tested as part of the pandemic response exercises recommended in the Inquiry's Module 1 Report (Recommendation 6).
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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ICU Resource Allocation Framework
Recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should publish a UK-wide framework setting out ethical and operational principles to guide the allocation of adult intensive care resources in the extreme event that they are saturated during a pandemic. That framework must: …
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The UK government and devolved administrations should publish a UK-wide framework setting out ethical and operational principles to guide the allocation of adult intensive care resources in the extreme event that they are saturated during a pandemic. That framework must: be informed by comprehensive engagement with the public and developed in conjunction with professionals across healthcare, law and ethics, as well as with regulators of healthcare professionals; set out clearly established triggers for its use, based at least in part on a UK-wide system that measures critical care capacity strain and facilitates mutual aid (such as the CRITCON tool used in England); establish clinicians' legal and professional duties in applying the framework, which should be clearly explained to clinicians through guidance; and be regularly reviewed with reference to contemporary patient data during a pandemic, and any future use of it must be evaluated and reported on publicly. A plan and timeline for completing this work should be published within six months of this Report. Application of the framework should be tested as part of the pandemic response exercises recommended in the Inquiry's Module 1 Report (Recommendation 6).
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Recording Healthcare Worker Deaths
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with their respective public health agencies and healthcare employers to develop nation-specific mechanisms to collect, analyse and publish data systematically on the deaths of healthcare workers in …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with their respective public health agencies and healthcare employers to develop nation-specific mechanisms to collect, analyse and publish data systematically on the deaths of healthcare workers in the event of a pandemic outbreak. The UK Statistics Authority should work with data providers to ensure that the data are comparable across the four nations of the UK.
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Standardised Advance Care Planning
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with trusts and health boards, should establish and promote one standardised process across the UK (such as ReSPECT, the Recommended Summary Plan for Emergency Care and Treatment) for …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with trusts and health boards, should establish and promote one standardised process across the UK (such as ReSPECT, the Recommended Summary Plan for Emergency Care and Treatment) for clinicians to ascertain and record their patients' wishes and preferences for future care and treatment in order to inform individualised decision-making, including Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR) notices.
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Healthcare Worker Support
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with healthcare employers and professional bodies, should put in place plans to deliver effective support for healthcare workers at scale from the outset of a pandemic. Plans should …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, working with healthcare employers and professional bodies, should put in place plans to deliver effective support for healthcare workers at scale from the outset of a pandemic. Plans should cover the nature and level of support that will be provided during and after a pandemic. All four governments should develop a programme of peer support visits that can, from the outset of a pandemic, be targeted towards areas of acute hospitals under considerable strain. The purpose of the visits should be to support front-line staff, collect insights on the pressures that healthcare workers are facing and understand what further support they might need.
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Published evidence summary
- The Module 3 report was published on 19 March 2026.
- No formal government response to Module 3 recommendations has been published as of March 2026.
- The report was published less than 2 weeks ago at the time of this assessment.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Establish Pharmaceutical Expert Advisory Panel
Recommendation
The UK government should establish a standing pharmaceutical expert advisory panel, in consultation with the Department of Health and Social Care and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. The panel should include ministers, civil servants and representatives from industry …
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The UK government should establish a standing pharmaceutical expert advisory panel, in consultation with the Department of Health and Social Care and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. The panel should include ministers, civil servants and representatives from industry and academia, and be led by an independent Chair with experience of working in a relevant industry. The panel's role should be to: oversee the UK's preparedness to develop, procure and manufacture pharmaceuticals (vaccines and therapeutics) in the event of a pandemic or health emergency, assisting with cross-government strategy development; ensure that the UK government and devolved administrations, their agencies, industry and academia are aligned around shared goals in developing vaccines and therapeutics for pandemic diseases; oversee strong links between government and the pharmaceutical industry; advise the UK government on how to incentivise pharmaceutical companies to invest in manufacturing facilities and research in the UK; and advise the UK government on its research investments, with a view to ensuring a diverse portfolio of pharmaceutical research in the UK. During a pandemic, the panel should form the basis of specialist taskforces, which would be responsible for securing and developing medical interventions and leading on their procurement on behalf of the four nations of the UK. They should have sufficient autonomy, delegation and direct access to senior ministers, similar to that which worked well in the Covid-19 pandemic.
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Published evidence summary
No formal government response has been recorded for this recommendation. No independent verification has been carried out.
Department of Health and Social Care
(Primary)
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Formalise Community Vaccine Equity Networks
Recommendation
The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should maintain networks with local communities to produce targeted vaccination strategies and communications. To achieve this: The Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should establish local community …
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The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should maintain networks with local communities to produce targeted vaccination strategies and communications. To achieve this: The Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should establish local community networks, mirroring the approach being taken by the UK Health Security Agency. All four governments should work with their network to identify specific and measurable actions to improve vaccine uptake and reduce inequalities and consult with these networks on communications campaigns and delivery approaches. All four governments should publish a report annually on progress against these actions.
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Published evidence summary
Government response: No Published Response. Status: Pending. No independent verification has been carried out.
UK Health Security Agency
(Primary)
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Improve Vaccine Uptake Monitoring and Evaluation
Recommendation
Each of the four UK public health or health security agencies should work together to: maintain accurate, UK-wide insight into the state of vaccine uptake and hesitancy; and understand the measures proven to be effective in increasing uptake across the …
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Each of the four UK public health or health security agencies should work together to: maintain accurate, UK-wide insight into the state of vaccine uptake and hesitancy; and understand the measures proven to be effective in increasing uptake across the four nations of the UK. There should be collaboration and some standardisation in the agreed approach across the four nations for monitoring and publishing routine vaccine uptake and vaccine confidence levels in order to better understand regional variations and patterns. Each nation should set and regularly review its minimum acceptable standards of vaccine uptake, which would trigger targeted uptake campaigns if not reached. The effectiveness of vaccine uptake campaigns should be evaluated against clear, standardised measures. This includes retrospective analysis of the Covid-19 uptake campaigns, as well as evaluation of routine vaccination uptake campaigns.
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Published evidence summary
Government response: No Published Response. Status: Pending. No independent verification has been carried out.
UK Health Security Agency
(Primary)
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Proportionate Access to Linked Healthcare Records
Recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should work together, with their respective health delivery services, to facilitate and coordinate regulatory bodies' access to healthcare records in order to make the post-authorisation safety monitoring of new vaccines and therapeutics more efficient. …
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The UK government and devolved administrations should work together, with their respective health delivery services, to facilitate and coordinate regulatory bodies' access to healthcare records in order to make the post-authorisation safety monitoring of new vaccines and therapeutics more efficient. In particular, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency should be granted specific and proportionate access to comprehensive and comparable data from across the four nations of the UK, including linked primary and secondary healthcare data records. This should include data on vaccines and therapeutics administration. This improved linkage must be accompanied by strong safeguards for patient confidentiality, which the Information Commissioner's Office should work with the four governments to ensure.
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Published evidence summary
Government response: No Published Response. Status: Pending. No independent verification has been carried out.
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
(Primary)
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Reform Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme
Recommendation
The UK government must reform the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme as soon as possible. The reform should include as a minimum: increasing the £120,000 payment, at least in line with inflation to date; subsequently applying annual increases in line with …
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The UK government must reform the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme as soon as possible. The reform should include as a minimum: increasing the £120,000 payment, at least in line with inflation to date; subsequently applying annual increases in line with inflation; introducing multiple levels of payment, commensurate with the degree of injury suffered; and any transitional arrangements necessary to provide for fairness between applicants to the existing scheme and applicants to the revised scheme.
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Published evidence summary
No formal government response has been recorded for this recommendation. No independent verification has been carried out.
Department for Work and Pensions
(Primary)
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