Parliament

The Government is fully committed to supporting the work of the Covid-19 Inquiry and to learning lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

The Inquiry published its report on Module 5 (Procurement) in July. The Government will consider its findings and recommendations in detail and respond in due course.

The title and purposes of the specified events booked through Calder Conferences Limited are as follows:

(i) The Old Ship Hotel on 29 May 2025: “Covid 19 Inquiry - Listening Event”. This was part of the Covid-19 Inquiry’s public listening initiatives which enabled bereaved individuals to share their personal experiences and impacts of the pandemic, to be used as evidence for the Inquiry's investigations.

(ii) Westminster Chapel on 9 July 2025: “Infected Blood Inquiry Hearings.” The venue was required to conduct hearings for the Infected Blood Inquiry.

(iii) Leonardo Royal Hotel London Tower Bridge:

11 and 13 December 2024: Details regarding the specific purpose for these two bookings are not held centrally, as they occurred prior to the implementation of the updated guidance on external venue bookings which was issued on 4 April 2025.

16 July 2025: “Government Property Agency All-Staff Conference”.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry operates independently from the Government. Therefore, Ministerial approval was not required for this contract.

The contract was procured and awarded in line with procurement rules, as well as Cabinet Office Commercial policies and procedures.

As set out by the Prime Minister in his Written Ministerial Statement of 16 April responding to the publication of Module 4 of the COVID-19 Inquiry, the Government is carefully considering the findings of the inquiry, including the recommendations on reform of the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme (VDPS), and will respond within six months of publication.

The Government is actively considering the recommendations of the inquiry on reform of the VDPS.

The government does not intend to introduce legislation to make Child’s Rights Impact Assessments a statutory requirement at this time.

The department is working closely with Cabinet Office and other government departments to strengthen the consideration of children and young people’s interests within overall risk planning, including in relation to pandemics and other emergencies.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

The Inquiry published its report relating to the development of COVID-19 vaccines and the implementation of the vaccine deployment programme on 16 April 2026. The Government will consider the findings and recommendations in detail and will respond within six months of publication, by 16 October 2026. The Government remains committed to learning the lessons needed from the COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future.

This government is committed to learning lessons from the Covid-19 schemes. Formal evaluations of the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) have been published. HM Treasury has participated in Module 9 hearings of the Covid-19 Inquiry, which examined the economic response to the pandemic.

Our deepest sympathies are with those who have experienced harm following vaccination, as well as their families.

The Government recognises that concerns have been raised in relation to the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme (VDPS), including during Module 4 of the COVID-19 inquiry. Following the publication of the COVID-19 Inquiry’s Module 4 report on vaccines and therapeutics on 16 April 2026, the Government will carefully consider its recommendations, including on the reform of the VDPS, and will respond formally in due course.

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry publishes a quarterly financial report of its costs. The latest publication for Q3 2025/26 shows that the total cost from when the Inquiry was established on 28 June 2022 to 31 December 2025 was £204m.

Since the financial year 2023/24, the Government has published data on costs incurred by key government departments in responding to the Inquiry. These costs to 30 September 2025 total £111m and are in addition to the Inquiry’s own costs above. A further update to the data will be published in due course.

The UK National Security Strategy is clear that we need to increase our preparations for potential threats, from future pandemics to energy and supply chain disruption.

The UK's alliances and partnerships are critical to our safety and our collective security is a source of significant strength. But it must be delivered in the right way, mitigating against areas of over-dependence and moving instead towards interdependence.

We are embedding lessons from COVID-19, including those of the COVID-19 Inquiry. The largest ever national pandemic response exercise was conducted last year, testing coordination efforts across all regions and nations of the UK and we published the new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy in March 2026, alongside £1 billion of investment in health protection.

The UK COVID-19 Inquiry is an independent statutory inquiry. As an independent body, it is responsible for determining its own scope, lines of investigation, and the evidence it seeks. Decisions about whether to include examination of specific scientific or technical matters, such as the evidence base relating to spike proteins or lipid nanoparticles, fall within the inquiry’s discretion.

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has not received any specific correspondence or instruction from the inquiry relating to spike proteins or lipid nanoparticles.

The Government welcomes the COVID-19 Inquiry’s investigations and is committed to learning lessons from the pandemic, including those relating to the potential impact on children’s mental health and wellbeing. We continue to respond openly and transparently to the inquiry’s requests and reports, and will be paying close attention to the Module 8 report, Children and Young People, and the Module 10 report, Impact on Society, which will cover mental health and wellbeing. Whilst we wait for these reports, the Department is already embedding mental health considerations into pandemic preparedness planning.

In 2019, the UK Chief Medical Officers published a commentary on the findings of a systematic review on screen-based activities and children’s mental health. They found an association between screen-based activities and mental health but could not establish causality. The commentary can be accessed at the following link:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c5b1510e5274a316cee5be8/UK_CMO_commentary_on_screentime_and_social_media_map_of_reviews.pdf

On 2 March 2026, the Government published a consultation on how to ensure children have a healthy relationship with devices, introduce rapid trials on measures to reduce screentime and limit access at night, and produce evidence-informed screentime guidance for parents of children aged five to 16 years old. The consultation can be accessed at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/growing-up-in-the-online-world-a-national-consultation

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry is independent of government. The systematic evidence review on the impact of the pandemic on mental health, commissioned by the UK Covid-19 Inquiry to support its investigation into the impact of the pandemic on society, will be published on the Inquiry's website during hearings for Module 10, to be held between 16th February 2026 and 5th March 2026.

The CCLL23A10 contract with Burges Salmon LLP was procured under Public Contract Regulations 2015. The KPI referenced refers to the contract's Social Value KPI. A Social Value KPI was included in the contract as per para 4.6 of the 'Guide to using the Social Value Model'.

As per the ‘Social Value Model’, Social Value KPIs must be informed by the themes and policy outcomes chosen for the procurement. In the case of the procurement of the CCLL23A10 contract with Burges Salmon LLP, the Social Value KPI was informed by theme 3 ‘Fighting Climate Change’ and the ‘Effective stewardship of the environment’ policy outcome. Working in soft copy (where possible) and choosing travel by rail (where the most time efficient method of transportation) were the measurables chosen to encourage minimised environmental impact and demonstrate that the supplier can provide social value under this contract.

Our thoughts are with the families of those who lost loved ones and those who continue to suffer because of the pandemic.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry was established in 2022 under the Inquiries Act. The Government is fully committed to supporting the work of the Inquiry and to learning lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

Module 2 of the Inquiry investigated matters including decision-making relating to lockdowns. The Inquiry published its report in November last year - the Government will consider the Inquiry’s findings and recommendations carefully before responding in full. Module 4 of the Inquiry is investigating a range of issues relating to the development of Covid-19 vaccines and the implementation of the vaccine rollout programme - the Inquiry is expected to publish its report in April 2026.

Ensuring the United Kingdom is prepared for a future pandemic is a top priority for the Government, and we are embedding lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic within our pandemic preparedness. We aim to have flexible, adaptable, and scalable capabilities that can respond to any infectious disease or other threat, along all routes of transmission, rather than relying on plans for specific threats.

The Government is committed to learning the lessons from the United Kingdom COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future. On 16 January 2025, the Government published its response to the inquiry’s module one report on resilience and preparedness. The Department has committed, as part of this response, to publishing a new pandemic preparedness strategy that will show how we are embedding our new approach to pandemic preparedness. The response is published online and is available at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-government-response-to-the-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report/uk-government-response-to-the-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report-html

In Autumn 2025, the Department and the UK Health Security Agency conducted Exercise PEGASUS, a national exercise on the UK’s preparedness for a pandemic, which concluded live participation on 5 November. It aimed to test our ability to respond to a pandemic, involving all regions and nations of the UK, as well as thousands of participants. The exercise has provided valuable experience which is being used to inform our strategy and planning.

Exercises like this are an essential and valuable tool to test our preparedness, capabilities, and response arrangements in the context of a pandemic. Future domestic and international exercises to test our preparedness and defences to biological threats, including pandemics, should factor in findings and lessons from a variety of sources to inform their design. This was an important part of the design of Exercise PEGASUS, the tier one pandemic preparedness exercise, where a variety of lessons, including from previous pandemic exercises such as Exercise CYGNUS, as well as recommendations from the COVID-19 Inquiry, were factored into the exercise’s design and planning.

The Government welcomes the inquiry’s investigations, including the recent Module 2 report. The Government thanks Baroness Hallett and her team for their thorough work on these serious issues. We will consider the findings and recommendations in detail and respond in due course. The Government remains committed to learning the lessons needed from the COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future.

The Government will also provide regular progress updates on commitments made following reports. The first progress update, on the Inquiry’s Module 1 report on resilience and preparedness, was published 8 July 2025, and is available at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-government-response-to-the-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report/uk-government-uk-covid-19-inquiry-response-module-1-implementation-update

It included an update on the Department’s commitments, such as the intention to publish a health and care pandemic preparedness strategy. The next update is scheduled for January 2026.