Parliament

The Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry has today published the Inquiry’s Module 4 report, which examines the development and implementation of vaccines and therapeutics during the pandemic.

The Chair recognises that the UK authorised and deployed effective vaccines and treatments at unprecedented speed. These achievements reflect the strength of the UK’s world-leading life sciences sector, the universal public health system in each of the four nations which allowed whole population delivery of vaccines, and the extraordinary dedication of health and care staff. They also speak to the collective resolve of the public in coming forward to be vaccinated.

I would like to thank all those involved in this national effort – scientists, researchers, regulators, NHS and social care staff, volunteers, and all those who supported the rollout of vaccines and treatments at pace.

The Inquiry identifies the following areas for further work: strengthening manufacturing capability, sustaining investment in research and development, and developing the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme. It also notes disparities in vaccine uptake among certain communities and the risk of vaccine hesitancy, underlining the importance of building public confidence.

The Government remains committed to learning the lessons from the Inquiry and to strengthen our preparedness for the future.

I would like to thank Baroness Hallett and her team for their work on this report. The Government will consider its findings and recommendations, working closely with colleagues across the devolved governments, and respond in due course.

I have laid a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry publishes a quarterly financial report of its costs. The latest publication for Q3 2025/26 shows that the total cost from when the Inquiry was established on 28 June 2022 to 31 December 2025 was £204m.

Since the financial year 2023/24, the Government has published data on costs incurred by key government departments in responding to the Inquiry. These costs to 30 September 2025 total £111m and are in addition to the Inquiry’s own costs above. A further update to the data will be published in due course.

My Right Honourable Friend, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Minister for Intergovernmental Relations and Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister at the Cabinet Office, the Rt Hon. Darren Jones MP, has today made the following statement:

On Thursday 20 November 2025, the Covid-19 Inquiry published their second report, which examined core decision-making and political governance across the UK and put forward 19 recommendations for the Government to consider. Today, the Government published its response and set out the actions we are taking to address them.

The Covid-19 pandemic was a traumatic chapter in our country’s history. Families lost loved ones, businesses suffered or were forced to close, and many across the country were left with life-long health impacts. The government debt built up to cover the economic impact of the crisis is still being paid back today; the impact on NHS waiting lists remains a long-term challenge.

The Government welcomes the Inquiry’s Module 2 report and I want to express my gratitude to Baroness Hallett and her team for their rigorous examination of the issues it raises.

It is a sobering read. Responding to the pandemic was a highly significant logistical challenge to our system of government, and indeed to governments all around the world. However the Module 2 report nevertheless exposes several failures of the government at the time: a failure to respond quickly enough; to treat the impact on vulnerable people and children seriously enough; to provide clear, unequivocal public health messaging; and to turn scientific advice into coherent policy in a transparent, methodical way. There are many lessons to learn from the mistakes, failures – and successes – where they were made.

This government has already made significant changes to its crisis response structures in response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 report. Without effective governance, we cannot expect to respond to crises effectively. The Prime Minister, Cabinet and civil service must be structured, willing and able to make fast, evidence-based and compassionate decisions that will save lives and livelihoods, informed by the scientific evidence. In July 2025, we also published our Resilience Action Plan which explains this government's strategic approach to increasing the UK's resilience. Our response to the Module 2 report today builds on that.

We have already updated the UK Government’s crisis management doctrine, known as the Amber Book, which sets out the decision-making framework for responding to a crisis. This includes establishing the principles for a successful taskforce structure, to oversee the response to protracted whole-of-system crises, and has informed the development of internal risk-specific operational plans for catastrophic risks like pandemics.

The report also notes that clear and inclusive communication is integral to a successful government response to an emergency. The Government Communication Service (GCS) Crisis Communications Operating Model has been updated to clarify communications roles and responsibilities before, during, and in the aftermath of a crisis. We have issued new advice to help departments create robust communication plans for their specific risks, and our STOP model for crisis planning now mandates that all communications consider people with additional needs. This ensures that our messaging is accessible and inclusive by default, in line with the Equality Act 2010, the Public Sector Equality Duty, and the British Sign Language Act 2022.

As recommended by the Module 2 report, we are also working towards commencing the socio-economic duty under Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 in England. Additionally, in 2025, we published updated guidance for identifying and supporting vulnerable people during an emergency.

We have also worked closely with our counterparts in the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to draft our response to this report. Our shared aim is to ensure that intergovernmental machinery is configured to enable better coordination between governments while respecting the importance of local accountability. The devolved governments should be invited to COBR and taskforce meetings during an emergency where relevant. Furthermore, guidance has been updated to ensure the three Chief Scientific Advisers from the devolved governments are invited to SAGE meetings from the very outset of an emergency.

As the Government implements our response to the Module 2 report, our progress will be recorded and tracked transparently using our Covid-19 Inquiry dashboard. These may seem like technical changes, but in an increasingly disruptive global context, having processes in place to make the right marginal call in moments of volatility can have profound and long-lasting impacts.

Many will naturally want to put the difficulty of the Covid-19 behind us, but given the long-lasting impact on the British economy and public services, it is right for government to take these lessons seriously. And we owe it to those who died, suffered and struggled during the pandemic too. I am grateful to Baroness Hallett and her team for their rigorous examination of what went wrong, on the basis of which we are acting, to make sure this and future governments can do better next time.

On Thursday 20 November 2025, the Covid-19 Inquiry published their second report, which examined core decision-making and political governance across the UK and put forward 19 recommendations for the Government to consider. Today, the Government published its response and set out the actions we are taking to address them.

The Covid-19 pandemic was a traumatic chapter in our country’s history. Families lost loved ones, businesses suffered or were forced to close, and many across the country were left with life-long health impacts. The government debt built up to cover the economic impact of the crisis is still being paid back today; the impact on NHS waiting lists remains a long-term challenge.

The Government welcomes the Inquiry’s Module 2 report and I want to express my gratitude to Baroness Hallett and her team for their rigorous examination of the issues it raises.

It is a sobering read. Responding to the pandemic was a highly significant logistical challenge to our system of government, and indeed to governments all around the world. However the Module 2 report nevertheless exposes several failures of the government at the time: a failure to respond quickly enough; to treat the impact on vulnerable people and children seriously enough; to provide clear, unequivocal public health messaging; and to turn scientific advice into coherent policy in a transparent, methodical way. There are many lessons to learn from the mistakes, failures – and successes – where they were made.

This government has already made significant changes to its crisis response structures in response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 report. Without effective governance, we cannot expect to respond to crises effectively. The Prime Minister, Cabinet and civil service must be structured, willing and able to make fast, evidence-based and compassionate decisions that will save lives and livelihoods, informed by the scientific evidence. In July 2025, we also published our Resilience Action Plan which explains this government's strategic approach to increasing the UK's resilience. Our response to the Module 2 report today builds on that.

We have already updated the UK Government’s crisis management doctrine, known as the Amber Book, which sets out the decision-making framework for responding to a crisis. This includes establishing the principles for a successful taskforce structure, to oversee the response to protracted whole-of-system crises, and has informed the development of internal risk-specific operational plans for catastrophic risks like pandemics.

The report also notes that clear and inclusive communication is integral to a successful government response to an emergency. The Government Communication Service (GCS) Crisis Communications Operating Model has been updated to clarify communications roles and responsibilities before, during, and in the aftermath of a crisis. We have issued new advice to help departments create robust communication plans for their specific risks, and our STOP model for crisis planning now mandates that all communications consider people with additional needs. This ensures that our messaging is accessible and inclusive by default, in line with the Equality Act 2010, the Public Sector Equality Duty, and the British Sign Language Act 2022.

As recommended by the Module 2 report, we are also working towards commencing the socio-economic duty under Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 in England. Additionally, in 2025, we published updated guidance for identifying and supporting vulnerable people during an emergency.

We have also worked closely with our counterparts in the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to draft our response to this report. Our shared aim is to ensure that intergovernmental machinery is configured to enable better coordination between governments while respecting the importance of local accountability. The devolved governments should be invited to COBR and taskforce meetings during an emergency where relevant. Furthermore, guidance has been updated to ensure the three Chief Scientific Advisers from the devolved governments are invited to SAGE meetings from the very outset of an emergency.

As the Government implements our response to the Module 2 report, our progress will be recorded and tracked transparently using our Covid-19 Inquiry dashboard. These may seem like technical changes, but in an increasingly disruptive global context, having processes in place to make the right marginal call in moments of volatility can have profound and long-lasting impacts.

Many will naturally want to put the difficulty of the Covid-19 behind us, but given the long-lasting impact on the British economy and public services, it is right for government to take these lessons seriously. And we owe it to those who died, suffered and struggled during the pandemic too. I am grateful to Baroness Hallett and her team for their rigorous examination of what went wrong, on the basis of which we are acting, to make sure this and future governments can do better next time.

My Honourable Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Public Health and Prevention (Sharon Hodgson MP) has made the following statement:

I am today announcing the publication of the new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, outlining the UK Government’s plans for improving our pandemic preparedness capabilities between now and 2030.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the most significant crisis we have faced in generations. It touched every aspect of our lives, and its impacts continue to be felt across our communities. It showed that a future pandemic is one of the most profound threats to our society.

The UK is already a world-leader in life sciences. Building on our strengths and the huge amount of work that has taken place since the pandemic to improve preparedness, the 2025 UK Government Resilience Action Plan set out a new national approach to resilience based on continuous assessment of readiness and mobilising the whole of society.

This Strategy, which is backed by investment of around £1 billion for health protection during the current Spending Review period, is a demonstration of our resolve to protect the health of our nation, safeguard our economy, and minimise the unequal impacts that pandemics can bring. It sets out the improvements we will make to our health system response capabilities, and how they underpin a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. It builds on the lessons identified from the COVID-19 pandemic and is shaped by the findings of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry and indicative findings from Exercise Pegasus, the largest non-military exercise ever to take place in the UK. The Exercise tested the government’s ability to respond quickly and effectively during a prolonged crisis, with a full report to be published in Winter 2026.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the crucial importance of governments across the UK working together whilst also respecting and taking full account of devolved areas of responsibility.

In support of a joined-up approach to preparedness, all four nations endorse the principles of preparedness set out in the Strategy, while individual nations will have their own plans to implement their preparedness.

These principles include protecting those most at risk, with governments committing to tailoring their capabilities to protect all communities and aiming to deliver an effective and equitable response to pandemics.

The Strategy contains commitments across a number of areas that outline how the UK government will improve pandemic preparedness, many of which have been informed and shaped by the initial findings of Exercise Pegasus. They include to:

Take a dynamic approach to ensure access to vaccines and therapeutics, and address the perceived barriers to the development of novel vaccines and therapeutics for priority pathogens.

Develop the ability to rapidly develop diagnostics for a broad range of pathogens, with scaled up in-house capacity for laboratory testing and whole genome sequencing.

Develop UK manufacturing capacity for vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics.

Further strengthen surveillance systems to be comprehensive, activation-ready and drawing on diverse sample groups across settings and communities so we can detect threats, understand disease spread and enable the analytical capability to act effectively and equitably.

Replenish PPE stockpiles, refine plans for mobilising and distributing PPE, and prepare a cross-government model for procuring and prioritising the distribution of PPE to critical workers in a pandemic.

Strengthen government coordination mechanisms, drawing from early findings of Exercise Pegasus, including through regularly reviewing and exercising response plans. Guidance will be in put in place for local responders.

Publish evidence reviews on the effectiveness of community protection measures and build a suite of measures to support decision-making and prioritisation.

Expand communication channels for and improve our understanding of how to make communications relevant to different communities, and strengthen guidance provided to different sectors.

Review the data capabilities needed to support decision-making and evaluate the impacts of pandemic response measures, and enhance data sharing capabilities to enable faster, more transparent information sharing between organisations and with the public in a pandemic.

Co-develop an Adult Social Care Pandemic Action Plan to respond to future threats with sector partners. As part of this, we will focus on how best to support the wellbeing of those with care and support needs and how to improve the resilience and preparedness of the adult social care workforce.

Strengthen the flexibility and resilience of the healthcare workforce, improve the NHS’ baseline capabilities to manage infections, and develop plans to minimise the risk of cross-contamination across services and maintain continuity of routine care during pandemics.

By integrating our health, security and scientific capabilities, we will protect the NHS, safeguard our economy, and save lives.

I am today announcing the publication of the new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, outlining the UK Government’s plans for improving our pandemic preparedness capabilities between now and 2030.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the most significant crisis we have faced in generations. It touched every aspect of our lives, and its impacts continue to be felt across our communities. It showed that a future pandemic is one of the most profound threats to our society.

The UK is already a world-leader in life sciences. Building on our strengths and the huge amount of work that has taken place since the pandemic to improve preparedness, the 2025 UK Government Resilience Action Plan set out a new national approach to resilience based on continuous assessment of readiness and mobilising the whole of society.

This Strategy, which is backed by investment of around £1 billion for health protection during the current Spending Review period, is a demonstration of our resolve to protect the health of our nation, safeguard our economy, and minimise the unequal impacts that pandemics can bring. It sets out the improvements we will make to our health system response capabilities, and how they underpin a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. It builds on the lessons identified from the COVID-19 pandemic and is shaped by the findings of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry and indicative findings from Exercise Pegasus, the largest non-military exercise ever to take place in the UK. The Exercise tested the government’s ability to respond quickly and effectively during a prolonged crisis, with a full report to be published in Winter 2026.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the crucial importance of governments across the UK working together whilst also respecting and taking full account of devolved areas of responsibility.

In support of a joined-up approach to preparedness, all four nations endorse the principles of preparedness set out in the Strategy, while individual nations will have their own plans to implement their preparedness.

These principles include protecting those most at risk, with governments committing to tailoring their capabilities to protect all communities and aiming to deliver an effective and equitable response to pandemics.

The Strategy contains commitments across a number of areas that outline how the UK government will improve pandemic preparedness, many of which have been informed and shaped by the initial findings of Exercise Pegasus. They include to:

Take a dynamic approach to ensure access to vaccines and therapeutics, and address the perceived barriers to the development of novel vaccines and therapeutics for priority pathogens.

Develop the ability to rapidly develop diagnostics for a broad range of pathogens, with scaled up in-house capacity for laboratory testing and whole genome sequencing.

Develop UK manufacturing capacity for vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics.

Further strengthen surveillance systems to be comprehensive, activation-ready and drawing on diverse sample groups across settings and communities so we can detect threats, understand disease spread and enable the analytical capability to act effectively and equitably.

Replenish PPE stockpiles, refine plans for mobilising and distributing PPE, and prepare a cross-government model for procuring and prioritising the distribution of PPE to critical workers in a pandemic.

Strengthen government coordination mechanisms, drawing from early findings of Exercise Pegasus, including through regularly reviewing and exercising response plans. Guidance will be in put in place for local responders.

Publish evidence reviews on the effectiveness of community protection measures and build a suite of measures to support decision-making and prioritisation.

Expand communication channels for and improve our understanding of how to make communications relevant to different communities, and strengthen guidance provided to different sectors.

Review the data capabilities needed to support decision-making and evaluate the impacts of pandemic response measures, and enhance data sharing capabilities to enable faster, more transparent information sharing between organisations and with the public in a pandemic.

Co-develop an Adult Social Care Pandemic Action Plan to respond to future threats with sector partners. As part of this, we will focus on how best to support the wellbeing of those with care and support needs and how to improve the resilience and preparedness of the adult social care workforce.

Strengthen the flexibility and resilience of the healthcare workforce, improve the NHS’ baseline capabilities to manage infections, and develop plans to minimise the risk of cross-contamination across services and maintain continuity of routine care during pandemics.

By integrating our health, security and scientific capabilities, we will protect the NHS, safeguard our economy, and save lives.

The Government recognises that the pandemic had a profound and lasting impact across society, and its effects were felt particularly acutely within the health and social care system. We are deeply grateful to everyone across health and social care in the four nations who contributed to the country's response.

The Government is committed to learning the lessons of the COVID-19 Inquiry and we are investing in and reforming the health service to ensure it is fit for the future and available for people when they need it. We will consider the inquiry’s findings and recommendations carefully and respond in full in due course.

The health and wellbeing of all National Health Service staff is a top priority, and we want to ensure that there is better support for staff in the future.

NHS England offers a range of health and wellbeing resources, as well as the National Staff Mental Health Treatment Service to provide support for those with more complex mental health needs.

The 10-Year Health Plan announced the introduction of Staff Treatment Hubs that will focus on mental health and musculoskeletal issues, the two main reasons for sickness absence in the NHS. In addition, a series of staff standards for modern employment will be launched in April 2026. These will tackle the issues that really matter to staff such as support to work healthily and flexibly, and tackling violence, racism, and sexual harassment in the workplace.

The UK National Security Strategy is clear that we need to increase our preparations for potential threats, from future pandemics to energy and supply chain disruption.

The UK's alliances and partnerships are critical to our safety and our collective security is a source of significant strength. But it must be delivered in the right way, mitigating against areas of over-dependence and moving instead towards interdependence.

We are embedding lessons from COVID-19, including those of the COVID-19 Inquiry. The largest ever national pandemic response exercise was conducted last year, testing coordination efforts across all regions and nations of the UK and we published the new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy in March 2026, alongside £1 billion of investment in health protection.

The Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry has today published the Inquiry’s Module 3 report, which examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on healthcare systems in the four nations of the UK.

The Chair emphasises “the unbearable stress and distress to patients, their loved ones and the healthcare workers looking after them”. She pays tribute to the extraordinary efforts of all those working in the healthcare systems across the UK. I too recognise the loss and pain people experienced during the pandemic, and the extraordinary efforts of health workers across the four nations. The disruption and effects of Covid-19 on our society were profound, and its effects were particularly felt through the health and social care system.

The Chair has found that the UK entered the pandemic ill-prepared and with highly stretched healthcare systems, and that the impact of the pandemic on the healthcare systems of the UK was devastating. The Chair concludes that the UK needs better pre-pandemic planning. She recommends measures to strengthen national preparedness for future pandemics, with clear accountability for the provision of guidance on infection prevention and control, an ethical framework for resource allocation, improved data systems for risk stratification, and tested plans to rapidly scale hospital and urgent and emergency care capacity. She also recommends measures to protect patients and health workers, including guidance on visiting restrictions, standardised advance care planning, transparent reporting of health worker deaths, better preparation for FFP3 mask fit-testing, and psychological and emotional support for healthcare staff.

This Government is committed to learning the lessons from the Inquiry and ensuring the NHS and the social care sector are prepared for a future pandemic. We will work with our colleagues in the devolved governments as we carefully consider the recommendations in the report. It is clear that the NHS and the social care sector remain under pressure across the UK, and in many cases healthcare services are still recovering from the pandemic. This Government is committed to investment and reform to build a health service in England that is fit for the future and there for people when they need it.

I would like to thank Baroness Hallett and her team for their thorough work on this report. The Government will carefully consider all the findings and recommendations of the report and respond in due course.

I have laid a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.

The UK COVID-19 Inquiry is an independent statutory inquiry. As an independent body, it is responsible for determining its own scope, lines of investigation, and the evidence it seeks. Decisions about whether to include examination of specific scientific or technical matters, such as the evidence base relating to spike proteins or lipid nanoparticles, fall within the inquiry’s discretion.

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has not received any specific correspondence or instruction from the inquiry relating to spike proteins or lipid nanoparticles.

The Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry has today published the Inquiry’s Module 3 report, which examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on healthcare systems in the four nations of the UK.

The Chair emphasises “the unbearable stress and distress to patients, their loved ones and the healthcare workers looking after them”. She pays tribute to the extraordinary efforts of all those working in the healthcare systems across the UK. I too recognise the loss and pain people experienced during the pandemic, and the extraordinary efforts of health workers across the four nations. The disruption and effects of Covid-19 on our society were profound, and its effects were particularly felt through the health and social care system.

The Chair has found that the UK entered the pandemic ill-prepared and with highly stretched healthcare systems, and that the impact of the pandemic on the healthcare systems of the UK was devastating. The Chair concludes that the UK needs better pre-pandemic planning. She recommends measures to strengthen national preparedness for future pandemics, with clear accountability for the provision of guidance on infection prevention and control, an ethical framework for resource allocation, improved data systems for risk stratification, and tested plans to rapidly scale hospital and urgent and emergency care capacity. She also recommends measures to protect patients and health workers, including guidance on visiting restrictions, standardised advance care planning, transparent reporting of health worker deaths, better preparation for FFP3 mask fit-testing, and psychological and emotional support for healthcare staff.

This Government is committed to learning the lessons from the Inquiry and ensuring the NHS and the social care sector are prepared for a future pandemic. We will work with our colleagues in the devolved governments as we carefully consider the recommendations in the report. It is clear that the NHS and the social care sector remain under pressure across the UK, and in many cases healthcare services are still recovering from the pandemic. This Government is committed to investment and reform to build a health service in England that is fit for the future and there for people when they need it.

I would like to thank Baroness Hallett and her team for their thorough work on this report. The Government will carefully consider all the findings and recommendations of the report and respond in due course.

I have laid a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.

The government will consider the report’s findings and recommendations and will provide a full response to the report in due course.

The Government welcomes the COVID-19 Inquiry’s investigations and is committed to learning lessons from the pandemic, including those relating to the potential impact on children’s mental health and wellbeing. We continue to respond openly and transparently to the inquiry’s requests and reports, and will be paying close attention to the Module 8 report, Children and Young People, and the Module 10 report, Impact on Society, which will cover mental health and wellbeing. Whilst we wait for these reports, the Department is already embedding mental health considerations into pandemic preparedness planning.

In 2019, the UK Chief Medical Officers published a commentary on the findings of a systematic review on screen-based activities and children’s mental health. They found an association between screen-based activities and mental health but could not establish causality. The commentary can be accessed at the following link:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c5b1510e5274a316cee5be8/UK_CMO_commentary_on_screentime_and_social_media_map_of_reviews.pdf

On 2 March 2026, the Government published a consultation on how to ensure children have a healthy relationship with devices, introduce rapid trials on measures to reduce screentime and limit access at night, and produce evidence-informed screentime guidance for parents of children aged five to 16 years old. The consultation can be accessed at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/growing-up-in-the-online-world-a-national-consultation

Ensuring the United Kingdom is prepared for a future pandemic is a top priority for the Government, and we are embedding lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic in our approach to pandemic preparedness. We aim to have flexible, adaptable, and scalable capabilities that can respond to any infectious disease or other threat, rather than relying on plans for specific threats.

The Government is committed to learning the lessons from the UK COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future. On 16 January 2025, the Government published its response to the inquiry’s module one report on resilience and preparedness. A copy of the response is attached. The Department has committed, as part of this response, to publishing a new pandemic preparedness strategy that will show how we are embedding our new approach to pandemic preparedness.

In the 2024 Autumn budget, my Rt. Hon. Friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced that £460 million of investment has been allocated to strengthen the UK’s pandemic preparedness and health protection, including replenishing personal protective equipment, vaccine, and medicines stockpiles.

In autumn 2025, the Department and the UK Health Security Agency conducted Exercise Pegasus, a national exercise on the UK’s preparedness for a pandemic. It tested our ability to respond to a pandemic, involving all regions and nations of the UK and thousands of participants. The exercise has provided valuable experience which is being used to inform our strategy and planning. The Government has committed to communicating the findings through the post-exercise report this winter.

An established clinical countermeasures programme is a core component of our pandemic preparedness and set of response capabilities. These countermeasures include personal protective equipment and hygiene consumables, as well as vaccines and therapeutics, such as influenza antivirals and antibiotics.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry is independent of government. The systematic evidence review on the impact of the pandemic on mental health, commissioned by the UK Covid-19 Inquiry to support its investigation into the impact of the pandemic on society, will be published on the Inquiry's website during hearings for Module 10, to be held between 16th February 2026 and 5th March 2026.

The CCLL23A10 contract with Burges Salmon LLP was procured under Public Contract Regulations 2015. The KPI referenced refers to the contract's Social Value KPI. A Social Value KPI was included in the contract as per para 4.6 of the 'Guide to using the Social Value Model'.

As per the ‘Social Value Model’, Social Value KPIs must be informed by the themes and policy outcomes chosen for the procurement. In the case of the procurement of the CCLL23A10 contract with Burges Salmon LLP, the Social Value KPI was informed by theme 3 ‘Fighting Climate Change’ and the ‘Effective stewardship of the environment’ policy outcome. Working in soft copy (where possible) and choosing travel by rail (where the most time efficient method of transportation) were the measurables chosen to encourage minimised environmental impact and demonstrate that the supplier can provide social value under this contract.

Our thoughts are with the families of those who lost loved ones and those who continue to suffer because of the pandemic.

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry was established in 2022 under the Inquiries Act. The Government is fully committed to supporting the work of the Inquiry and to learning lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

Module 2 of the Inquiry investigated matters including decision-making relating to lockdowns. The Inquiry published its report in November last year - the Government will consider the Inquiry’s findings and recommendations carefully before responding in full. Module 4 of the Inquiry is investigating a range of issues relating to the development of Covid-19 vaccines and the implementation of the vaccine rollout programme - the Inquiry is expected to publish its report in April 2026.

My Right Honourable friend, the Paymaster General and Minister for the Cabinet Office, the Rt Hon. Nick Thomas-Symonds, has today made the following statement:

The UK COVID-19 Inquiry is examining the UK’s response to and impact of the pandemic. The government is fully committed to supporting the work of the COVID-19 Inquiry and to learning lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

The government recognises the unprecedented and wholly exceptional circumstances of the pandemic. The Inquiry is therefore unprecedented in its scope, complexity and profile.

The independent UK COVID-19 Inquiry publishes its own running costs quarterly. The Chair is under a statutory obligation to avoid unnecessary costs in the Inquiry’s work - and she has been clear as to her intention to complete her work as quickly and efficiently as possible.

I would like to update the House on the costs to the UK Government associated with responding to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry.

Figures provided are based upon a selection of the most relevant departments and are not based on a complete set of departmental figures and are not precise figures for accounting purposes. Ensuring a comprehensive and timely response to the Inquiry requires significant input from a number of key government departments, including, but not limited to, the Cabinet Office, the Department for Health and Social Care, the UK Health Security Agency, the Home Office and HM Treasury, many of which are supported by the Government Legal Department. While every effort has been made to ensure a robust methodology, complexities remain in trying to quantify the time and costs dedicated to the Inquiry alone.

It should be noted that alongside full time resource within departments, Inquiry response teams draw on expertise from across their organisations. These costs, including costs associated with staff taking time to provide written or oral evidence, are not included in the costs below.

Breakdown of Staff & Costs

The government’s response to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry is led by Inquiry Response Units across departments. These associated staff costs for Q2 2025/26 are below.

Q2 number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: 207 Full Time Equivalents

Q2 cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £4,310,000 (including contingent labour costs)

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2), total cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £9,314,000 (including contingent labour costs)

<tbody>

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (including contingent labour costs)

£5,004,000

£4,310,000

£9,314,000

Number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (Full Time Equivalents)

248

207

N/A

</tbody>

Total Inquiry Response Unit Legal Costs

Inquiry Response Units across government departments are supported by the Government Legal Department, co-partnering firms of solicitors, and legal counsel. These associated legal costs (excluding internal departmental advisory legal costs) for Q2 2025/26 are below.

Q2 legal costs: £6,186,000

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2), total legal costs: £11,380,000

<tbody>

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Total legal costs

£5,194,000

£6,186,000

£11,380,000

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The UK COVID-19 Inquiry is examining the UK’s response to and impact of the pandemic. The government is fully committed to supporting the work of the COVID-19 Inquiry and to learning lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

The government recognises the unprecedented and wholly exceptional circumstances of the pandemic. The Inquiry is therefore unprecedented in its scope, complexity and profile.

The independent UK COVID-19 Inquiry publishes its own running costs quarterly. The Chair is under a statutory obligation to avoid unnecessary costs in the Inquiry’s work - and she has been clear as to her intention to complete her work as quickly and efficiently as possible.

I would like to update the House on the costs to the UK Government associated with responding to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry.

Figures provided are based upon a selection of the most relevant departments and are not based on a complete set of departmental figures and are not precise figures for accounting purposes. Ensuring a comprehensive and timely response to the Inquiry requires significant input from a number of key government departments, including, but not limited to, the Cabinet Office, the Department for Health and Social Care, the UK Health Security Agency, the Home Office and HM Treasury, many of which are supported by the Government Legal Department. While every effort has been made to ensure a robust methodology, complexities remain in trying to quantify the time and costs dedicated to the Inquiry alone.

It should be noted that alongside full time resource within departments, Inquiry response teams draw on expertise from across their organisations. These costs, including costs associated with staff taking time to provide written or oral evidence, are not included in the costs below.

Breakdown of Staff & Costs

The government’s response to the UK COVID-19 Inquiry is led by Inquiry Response Units across departments. These associated staff costs for Q2 2025/26 are below.

Q2 number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: 207 Full Time Equivalents

Q2 cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £4,310,000 (including contingent labour costs)

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2), total cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff: £9,314,000 (including contingent labour costs)

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Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Cost of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (including contingent labour costs)

£5,004,000

£4,310,000

£9,314,000

Number of UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response Unit staff (Full Time Equivalents)

248

207

N/A

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Total Inquiry Response Unit Legal Costs

Inquiry Response Units across government departments are supported by the Government Legal Department, co-partnering firms of solicitors, and legal counsel. These associated legal costs (excluding internal departmental advisory legal costs) for Q2 2025/26 are below.

Q2 legal costs: £6,186,000

Financial year 2025/26 (Q1 + Q2), total legal costs: £11,380,000

<tbody>

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Cumulative Total for 2025/26

Total legal costs

£5,194,000

£6,186,000

£11,380,000

</tbody>

Ensuring the United Kingdom is prepared for a future pandemic is a top priority for the Government, and we are embedding lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic within our pandemic preparedness. We aim to have flexible, adaptable, and scalable capabilities that can respond to any infectious disease or other threat, along all routes of transmission, rather than relying on plans for specific threats.

The Government is committed to learning the lessons from the United Kingdom COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future. On 16 January 2025, the Government published its response to the inquiry’s module one report on resilience and preparedness. The Department has committed, as part of this response, to publishing a new pandemic preparedness strategy that will show how we are embedding our new approach to pandemic preparedness. The response is published online and is available at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-government-response-to-the-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report/uk-government-response-to-the-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report-html

In Autumn 2025, the Department and the UK Health Security Agency conducted Exercise PEGASUS, a national exercise on the UK’s preparedness for a pandemic, which concluded live participation on 5 November. It aimed to test our ability to respond to a pandemic, involving all regions and nations of the UK, as well as thousands of participants. The exercise has provided valuable experience which is being used to inform our strategy and planning.

Exercises like this are an essential and valuable tool to test our preparedness, capabilities, and response arrangements in the context of a pandemic. Future domestic and international exercises to test our preparedness and defences to biological threats, including pandemics, should factor in findings and lessons from a variety of sources to inform their design. This was an important part of the design of Exercise PEGASUS, the tier one pandemic preparedness exercise, where a variety of lessons, including from previous pandemic exercises such as Exercise CYGNUS, as well as recommendations from the COVID-19 Inquiry, were factored into the exercise’s design and planning.

The Government welcomes the inquiry’s investigations, including the recent Module 2 report. The Government thanks Baroness Hallett and her team for their thorough work on these serious issues. We will consider the findings and recommendations in detail and respond in due course. The Government remains committed to learning the lessons needed from the COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future.

The Government will also provide regular progress updates on commitments made following reports. The first progress update, on the Inquiry’s Module 1 report on resilience and preparedness, was published 8 July 2025, and is available at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-government-response-to-the-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report/uk-government-uk-covid-19-inquiry-response-module-1-implementation-update

It included an update on the Department’s commitments, such as the intention to publish a health and care pandemic preparedness strategy. The next update is scheduled for January 2026.