Daniel Morgan Independent Panel

The Panel has received advice from an independent forensic science expert it consulted, Dr Kathryn Mashiter that useful work could still be carried out on this document. It therefore recommends that the Metropolitan Police considers the operational benefits of submitting the diary for a forensic handwriting analysis in order to ascertain whether the entries were made by Daniel Morgan, as well as ESDA testing to ascertain if there is evidence of writing by someone other than Daniel Morgan.

It is recommended that the Metropolitan Police introduce systems to ensure that the management arrangements which applied during the Abelard Two Investigation can never be replicated in any future investigation, and that proper management arrangements, in compliance with the Association of Chief Police Officers' Murder Manual, exist on all occasions.

The HOLMES system is both an investigative tool and a quality assurance mechanism, but it requires significant resources if it is to be used properly. The Panel recommends that the Metropolitan Police conduct an investigation into the adequacy of resources for administering HOLMES in major crime investigations carried out by the Metropolitan Police.

It is recommended that the Crown Prosecution Service's additional guidance should be amended to include a requirement that the Prosecutor should consider whether the information was disclosed with a view to one or both parties securing future profit from the use of that material. Moreover, the additional guidance should also be amended to note that the advantage to the parties disclosing the document(s) may not be purely financial but, as in the case of former DCS David Cook and Michael Sullivan, could be reputational and could have improved their employability in the future.

Guidance should be issued by the Metropolitan Police to enable officers to determine whether it is appropriate, necessary and lawful to disclose investigative material to journalists. That guidance should include a requirement to record by whom, to whom and when any such evidence was disclosed, who authorised the disclosure, the reasons for the disclosure of the material, and the express conditions upon which the information is disclosed.

The Panel is concerned that the policies and procedures relating to the use of informants by law enforcement agencies still allow scope for corrupt practices, and it recommends that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner takes this into consideration during inspections.

The Metropolitan Police must ensure that the necessary resources are allocated to the task of tackling corrupt behaviour among its officers. Without proper resources there can be no effective fight against corruption. Since the Independent Office for Police Conduct has responsibility for investigating such matters, it must also be properly resourced to do so.

It is recommended that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services conduct a thematic investigation of the operation of the practices and procedures introduced following the adoption of the Code of Ethics in 2014 to determine whether sufficient resources are available to ensure appropriate protection of those police officers and police staff who wish to draw alleged wrongdoing to the attention of their organisations.

Security clearance processes for police officers and police staff are fundamental to any anti-corruption strategy. Regular updating of the security status of each individual is essential to identify any concerns and to enable action to be taken in respect of such concerns. Notwithstanding the assurance received by the Panel from the Metropolitan Police in December 2020, the Metropolitan Police should remain vigilant at all times to ensure not only that it vets its employees in accordance with its new measures, but also that it has adequate and effective processes to establish whether its staff are currently engaged in crime.

Prior to the establishment of any future non-statutory inquiries or panel, there should be an honest and full discussion between the relevant police force(s) and the sponsoring Government department, to enable a realistic, informed assessment of the nature and volume of documentation in all its forms, and of the scope and depth of the work required. Framework procedures, capable of being customised, for the disclosure of material to such panels should be available, so as to avoid excessive delays in reaching agreement for access to material. Deadlines should only be established when the relevant inquiry or panel has had the opportunity to review the programme of work it is required to do. Any such deadline should be supported with an analysis explaining how the projected deadline has been identified, and why that is a reasonable time within which the work should be completed.

Arrangements must be made in future to ensure that any Panel has timely access to the material required to do its work. Organisations that promise to make 'exceptional and full disclosure' should be prepared to do so both within the letter and the spirit of such a promise.

In order to avoid most of the delays and difficulties inherent in this case, and in so many other unsolved cases, there is a need for a review of the processes for archiving historic material with a view to creating a system which can produce national and local documents as required.

It is recommended that, whenever a major incident remains under investigation or inquiry, documents should be retained in digitised form, subject to appropriate security measures and made available to those who subsequently and justifiably require access to them.