Bichard Inquiry

Completed
Chair Sir Michael Bichard Civil servant
Established 13 Jan 2004
Final Report 22 Jun 2004
Commissioned by Home Office

The Bichard Inquiry examined the circumstances surrounding the Soham murders of Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells in 2002, focusing on the effectiveness of intelligence-based record keeping by Humberside Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary, and vetting practices for those working with children. The Inquiry made 31 recommendations, leading to major reforms including the creation of the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) and the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006.

Evidence & Impact
The Bichard Inquiry was established following the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham in 2002. The inquiry examined child protection procedures, police intelligence systems, and vetting arrangements, particularly focusing on how Ian Huntley had obtained employment in schools despite previous allegations. Sir Michael Bichard's report, published in June 2004, made 31 recommendations aimed at strengthening safeguarding systems.

The government accepted all 31 recommendations on the day of publication. The most substantial legislative response was the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which established new vetting and barring arrangements through the Independent Safeguarding Authority (later merged into the Disclosure and Barring Service). However, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 explicitly scaled back one key element - the universal registration scheme with cards or licences that Bichard had recommended.

Significant progress is documented in police information systems. The Police National Database launched in 2011, replacing earlier limited systems and achieving cross-force intelligence sharing. The Management of Police Information Code of Practice (2005) and accompanying ACPO Guidance (2006) established national standards for information management. By 2024, the PND required replacement, with a transformation programme approved.

Safeguarding practices in schools and children's services show evidence of reform. 'Working Together to Safeguard Children' guidance was revised in 2006 to require police notification of suspected offences against children. The Integrated Children's System was implemented across England, requiring recording of non-referral decisions. Safer recruitment training and requirements for trained interview panel members became embedded in statutory guidance.

However, gaps remain in the published evidence. No documentation has been identified regarding a review of police IT procurement to ensure national solutions (R3). While robust identity verification methods were adopted for DBS checks, fingerprints were not implemented as Bichard recommended, with no further published evidence on this since 2006. The evidence suggests that while substantial structural reforms occurred, some specific recommendations lack documented follow-through.
Reforms Attributed to This Inquiry
- The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 established the Independent Safeguarding Authority (later merged into the Disclosure and Barring Service) to vet individuals working with children and vulnerable adults
- The Police National Database (PND) launched in 2011, enabling cross-force intelligence sharing for the first time
- The Management of Police Information (MOPI) Code of Practice (2005) and ACPO Guidance (2006) established national standards for police information management
- 'Working Together to Safeguard Children' guidance revised in 2006 to require police notification when criminal offences against children are suspected
- The Integrated Children's System implemented across England by 2006, requiring recording of decisions not to refer cases to police
- Safer recruitment training for school leaders and requirement for trained panel members on school interview panels embedded in statutory guidance 'Keeping Children Safe in Education'
- Transfer of responsibility for inputting court results onto the Police National Computer substantially completed through HMCTS reforms
- Digital identity verification for DBS checks introduced in 2025 using UK passports
Reforms Reversed or Weakened
- The universal registration scheme with a card or licence for all working with children or vulnerable adults was explicitly scaled back by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 as disproportionate, retaining only an enhanced checking system
Unfinished Business
- No published evidence has been identified of a formal review of police IT procurement to ensure national solutions for national problems (R3)
- While other identity verification methods were adopted, fingerprints were not implemented as a general means of verifying identity for DBS checks, with no further published evidence on this recommendation since 2006 (R25)
Generated 18 Mar 2026 using claude-opus-4. Assessment is indicative, not authoritative.
Key Legislation
Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 PRIMARY
Established the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA) to vet individuals working with children and vulnerable adults.
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (DBS)
Merged the ISA with the Criminal Records Bureau to form the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS).
Implementation Reviewed By
HMIC (Bichard Inquiry Recommendations Progress Report) (Jun 2008)
Final progress report on implementation of all 31 recommendations. Concluded that substantial progress had been made, particularly on the new vetting and barring scheme and police intelligence-sharing systems, though full implementation of the Police National Database was still pending.
Influence & Connections
Influenced by Laming Inquiry
The Every Child Matters framework introduced after the Laming Inquiry was the policy context within which the Bichard Inquiry's recommendations on child safeguarding were developed.
Influenced by Waterhouse Inquiry
The Waterhouse Inquiry's findings on failures in vetting and the protection of children in institutional care informed the Bichard Inquiry's recommendations on the vetting and barring scheme.
5 months Duration
£3.7m Total Cost
Government Response

Total Recommendations 31
Data last updated: 1 Feb 2025 · Source
Data verified: 23 Mar 2026 (import)
Blanket response: Government responded with a single statement accepting all 31 recommendations. Individual per-recommendation responses were not published separately.
How to read this

Government Response tracks what the government said it would do (accepted, rejected, etc.).

Full methodology

Title Volume Publication Date Recs Links
The Bichard Inquiry Report Final Report 22 Jun 2004 31
16 Dec 2003
Inquiry Announced
05 Jan 2004
Inquiry Established
22 Jun 2004
Final Report Published

Recommendations (31)

R1
Accepted
National IT system for police intelligence
Recommendation

A national IT system for England and Wales to support police intelligence should be introduced as a matter of urgency. The Home Office should take the lead and report by December 2004 with clear targets for implementation.

Published evidence summary
The Police National Database (PND) was launched in June 2011 to provide cross-force intelligence sharing, replacing the earlier IMPACT Nominal Index which had limited deployment (Gov.uk progress, 2011, 2007). However, an HMIC inspection in 2015 identified continuing gaps in police information management, and by January 2024, a PND 1.5 transformation programme was approved to replace the obsolete PND technology (Gov.uk progress, 2015, 2024).
Home Office (Primary)
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R2
Accepted
PLX system introduction
Recommendation

The PLX system, which flags that intelligence is held about someone by particular police forces, should be introduced in England and Wales by 2005.

Published evidence summary
The IMPACT Nominal Index (INI) was deployed to child abuse investigation units by December 2005, and the Police National Database (PND) was subsequently launched in June 2011 to achieve full cross-force intelligence sharing (Gov.uk progress, 2007, 2011). This replaced the more limited INI system, but the full implementation of a national system was significantly delayed beyond the 2005 target. No further published evidence has been identified since 2011.
Home Office (Primary)
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R3
Accepted
Police IT procurement review
Recommendation

The procurement of IT systems by the police should be reviewed to ensure that, wherever possible, national solutions are delivered to national problems.

Published evidence summary
While the government accepted this recommendation, a parliamentary debate on Bichard implementation in February 2007 noted no specific evidence of a formal review of police IT procurement to ensure national solutions for national problems (Gov.uk progress, 2007-02-07). No further published evidence regarding a dedicated review of police IT procurement to deliver national solutions has been identified since 2007.
Home Office (Primary)
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R4
Accepted
PNC investment
Recommendation

Investment should be made available by Government to secure the PNC's medium and long-term future, given its importance to intelligence-led policing and to the criminal justice system as a whole. I note that PITO has begun this work.

Published evidence summary
The government committed investment to secure the Police National Computer's (PNC) future, as confirmed in a parliamentary debate in February 2007 (Gov.uk progress, 2007-02-07). More recently, the PND 1.5 transformation programme was approved with a £639 million benefits case by January 2024, confirming ongoing government commitment to national police IT infrastructure and the PNC's continued operation as a core policing system (Gov.uk progress, 2024-01-01).
Home Office (Primary)
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R5
Accepted
PNC Code of Practice implementation
Recommendation

The new Code of Practice, made under the Police Reform Act 2002, dealing with the quality and timeliness of PNC data input, should be implemented as soon as possible.

Published evidence summary
The Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information (MOPI) was published in July 2005 under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by the Police Reform Act 2002 (Gov.uk progress, 2005-07-01). This code covered record creation, review, retention, deletion, and information sharing, superseding existing guidance as recommended. Accompanying guidance on the MOPI Code of Practice was published by ACPO in March 2006, providing practical implementation details for police forces (Gov.uk progress, 2006-03-01).
Home Office (Primary)
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R6
Accepted
PNC data quality inspection
Recommendation

The quality and timeliness of PNC data input should be routinely inspected as part of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) and the Baseline Assessments, which are being developed by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).

Published evidence summary
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) incorporated police data quality into its PEEL inspections, which succeeded the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) (Gov.uk progress, 2015-01-01). In January 2015, HMIC conducted a 'Building the Picture' inspection, which specifically examined police information management practices across 14 forces, finding varying levels of alignment with the national framework.
HMICFRS (Primary)
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R7
Accepted
Court results PNC transfer
Recommendation

The transfer of responsibility for inputting court results onto the PNC should be reaffirmed by the Court Service and the Home Office and, if possible, accelerated ahead of the 2006 target. At the least, that deadline must be met.

Published evidence summary
While a parliamentary debate in February 2007 noted significant delays in transferring responsibility for inputting court results onto the PNC, with the Metropolitan Police taking 185 days for 75% of results against a 10-day target (Gov.uk progress, 2007-02-07), the transfer was substantially completed by January 2018 through HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) reforms (Gov.uk progress, 2018-01-01). Court results are now routinely uploaded to the PNC via integrated criminal justice systems.
Home Office (Primary)
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R8
Accepted
Information management Code of Practice
Recommendation
A Code of Practice should be produced covering record creation, review, retention, deletion and information sharing. This should be made under the Police Reform Act 2002 and needs to be clear, concise and practical. It should supersede existing guidance. Read more
Published evidence summary
The Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information (MOPI) was published in July 2005, directly implementing the requirement for a clear, concise, and practical code (Gov.uk progress, 2005-07-01). This code, made under the Police Reform Act 2002 (via the Police Act 1996), covers record creation, review, retention, deletion, and information sharing, and superseded existing guidance as recommended.
Home Office (Primary)
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R9
Accepted
Key principles of information management
Recommendation

The Code of Practice must clearly set out the key principles of good information management (capture, review, retention, deletion and sharing), having regard to policing purposes, the rights of the individual and the law.

Published evidence summary
The MOPI Code of Practice, published in July 2005, established key principles for information management, including capture, review, retention, deletion, and sharing, with due regard to policing purposes, individual rights, and the law. This was further supported by ACPO Guidance on the MOPI Code in 2006, which provided detailed implementation guidance. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006.
Home Office (Primary)
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R10
Accepted
Information management standards
Recommendation
The Code of Practice must set out the standards to be met in terms of systems (including IT), accountability, training, resources and audit. These standards should be capable of being monitored both within police forces and by HMIC and should … Read more
Published evidence summary
ACPO Guidance was published in March 2006 alongside the MOPI Code of Practice, establishing detailed standards for information management systems, accountability, training, resources, and audit (Gov.uk progress, 2006). These standards are monitored by HMICFRS through PEEL inspections, as confirmed by the 2015 'Building the Picture' inspection (Gov.uk progress, 2015). No further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Home Office (Primary)
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R11
Accepted
Sexual offences intelligence retention
Recommendation

The Code of Practice should have particular regard to the factors to be considered when reviewing the retention or deletion of intelligence in cases of sexual offences.

Published evidence summary
The MOPI Code of Practice, published in July 2005, specifically addressed the retention and deletion of intelligence in cases of sexual offences (Gov.uk progress, 2005). National retention schedules for police records now include specific provisions for sexual offences intelligence. No further published evidence has been identified since 2005.
Home Office (Primary)
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R12
Accepted
Police notification of child offences
Recommendation
The Government should reaffirm the guidance in Working Together to Safeguard Children so that the police are notified as soon as possible when a criminal offence has been committed, or is suspected of having been committed, against a child – … Read more
Published evidence summary
The 'Working Together to Safeguard Children' guidance was revised in June 2006 to mandate police notification as soon as possible when a criminal offence is committed or suspected against a child, unless exceptional reasons exist (Gov.uk progress, 2006). This requirement is now embedded as core safeguarding practice across local authorities and police forces in England. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006.
DfES (Primary)
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R13
Accepted
Criteria for police notification
Recommendation
National guidance should be produced to inform the decision as to whether or not to notify the police. This guidance could usefully draw upon the criteria included in a local protocol being developed by Sheffield Social Services and brought to … Read more
Published evidence summary
National guidance on criteria for police notification was produced in June 2006 as part of the 'Working Together' framework and associated multi-agency safeguarding guidance (Gov.uk progress, 2006). Local Safeguarding Children Boards subsequently developed local protocols informed by these national criteria. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006.
DfES (Primary)
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R14
Accepted
Recording non-referral decisions
Recommendation

The Integrated Children's System should record those cases where a decision is taken not to refer to the police.

Published evidence summary
The Integrated Children's System (ICS) was implemented across England in June 2006, incorporating the recording of decisions not to refer cases to the police (Gov.uk progress, 2006). The requirement to record and audit these non-referral decisions is embedded in safeguarding practice and 'Working Together' guidance. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006.
DfES (Primary)
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R15
Accepted
Inspection of non-referral decisions
Recommendation

The Commission for Social Care Inspection should, as part of any social services inspection, review whether decisions not to inform the police have been properly taken.

Published evidence summary
The Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) incorporated the review of non-referral decisions into its social services inspections in June 2006 (Gov.uk progress, 2006). CSCI was later replaced by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and Ofsted, which continue to inspect safeguarding arrangements. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006 regarding specific CSCI actions.
DfES (Primary)
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R16
Accepted
Interview training for headteachers
Recommendation

Head teachers and school governors should receive training on how to ensure that interviews to appoint staff reflect the importance of safeguarding children.

Published evidence summary
Safer recruitment training for headteachers and school governors was implemented in June 2006 through the DfE's Safer Recruitment initiative (Gov.uk progress, 2006). This training is now embedded in statutory guidance, 'Keeping Children Safe in Education'. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006.
DfES (Primary)
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R17
Accepted
Trained panel member requirement
Recommendation

From a date to be agreed, no interview panel to appoint staff working in schools should be convened without at least one member being properly trained.

Published evidence summary
A requirement for at least one properly trained member on school interview panels for staff appointments was implemented in June 2006 (Gov.uk progress, 2006). This requirement is now embedded in statutory guidance, 'Keeping Children Safe in Education'. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006.
DfES (Primary)
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R18
Accepted
Inspection of school recruitment
Recommendation

The relevant inspection bodies should, as part of their inspection, review the existence and effectiveness of a school's selection and recruitment arrangements.

Published evidence summary
Ofsted incorporated the review of school selection and recruitment arrangements into its inspection framework in June 2006 (Gov.uk progress, 2006). The current Education Inspection Framework includes the assessment of safeguarding arrangements, encompassing recruitment practices. No further published evidence has been identified since 2006 regarding specific Ofsted actions.
DfES (Primary)
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R19
Accepted
Registration scheme for working with children
Recommendation
New arrangements should be introduced requiring those who wish to work with children, or vulnerable adults, to be registered. This register – perhaps supported by a card or licence – would confirm that there is no known reason why an … Read more
Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 established a framework for vetting, leading to the operational Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) system (Gov.uk progress, 2006, 2026). However, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 explicitly scaled back the universal registration scheme with a card or licence, which the recommendation had called for, deeming it disproportionate (Gov.uk progress, 2012).
DfES (Primary)
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R20
Accepted
Standards for police vetting checks
Recommendation
HMIC should develop, with ACPO and the CRB, the standards to be observed by police forces in carrying out vetting checks. These should cover the intelligence databases to be searched, the robustness of procedures, guidance, training, supervision and audit. Read more
Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 established the legislative framework for comprehensive vetting and barring checks for those working with children and vulnerable adults (Gov.uk progress, 2006). The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) has continued to enhance these checks, introducing digital identity verification using UK passports by February 2025 and automating Standard and Enhanced checks as part of its 2020-2025 strategy (Gov.uk progress, 2025).
HMICFRS (Primary)
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R21
Accepted
Enhanced Disclosure for school staff
Recommendation

All posts, including those in schools, that involve working with children, and vulnerable adults, should be subject to the Enhanced Disclosure regime.

Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which received Royal Assent in November 2006, ensured that all posts involving work with children and vulnerable adults, including in schools, are subject to the Enhanced Disclosure regime (Gov.uk progress, 2006). No further published evidence has been identified since 2006.
Home Office (Primary)
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R22
Accepted
Identity checking responsibilities
Recommendation

The Registered Bodies' precise responsibilities for checking identities need to be clarified urgently.

Published evidence summary
The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) introduced digital identity verification using UK passports by February 2025 (Gov.uk progress, 2025). This action clarified Registered Bodies' responsibilities for checking identities, aligning with the DBS's 2020-2025 strategy.
Home Office (Primary)
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R23
Accepted
Database access for identity verification
Recommendation

Registered Bodies, or the CRB, should be able to check passports and driving licences presented as proof of identity against the Passport Service and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) databases.

Published evidence summary
The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS), which replaced the CRB, introduced digital identity verification using UK passports by February 2025, confirming its ability to check identity documents against official databases such as the Passport Service (Gov.uk progress, 2025-02-01). This aligns with the recommendation for Registered Bodies to access Passport Service and DVLA databases for identity verification.
Home Office (Primary)
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R24
Accepted
Photograph requirement for identity documents
Recommendation

There should be an expectation that documents produced to confirm identity should, wherever possible, include a photograph.

Published evidence summary
The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) introduced digital identity verification using UK passports by February 2025, which inherently includes a photograph, aligning with the expectation that identity documents should, wherever possible, include a photograph (Gov.uk progress, 2025-02-01). This reflects the expectation for photographic identity for verification purposes.
Home Office (Primary)
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R25
Accepted
Fingerprints for identity verification
Recommendation

Fingerprints should be used as a means of verifying identity.

Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, implemented robust identity verification methods for DBS checks (Gov.uk progress, 2006-11-08). However, the Act did not adopt fingerprints as a general means of verifying identity for these checks, indicating a partial implementation of this specific recommendation.
Home Office (Primary)
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R26
Accepted
Address verification guidance
Recommendation

Guidance should be issued to Registered Bodies on how to verify that applicants have given a full and accurate account of their current and past addresses.

Published evidence summary
The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) completed its 2020-2025 strategy by February 2025, which included the automation of Standard and Enhanced checks and the implementation of robust address verification procedures (Gov.uk progress, 2025-02-01). This indicates that guidance or established procedures are in place for Registered Bodies to verify applicant addresses.
Home Office (Primary)
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R27
Accepted
Information verification confirmation
Recommendation

Registered Bodies should be required to confirm that they have checked the information on the 'Police Check Form' in accordance with CRB guidance.

Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, led to the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) replacing the CRB (Gov.uk progress, 2006-11-08). The DBS now requires Registered Bodies to confirm that they have checked the information on the Police Check Form in accordance with its guidance.
Home Office (Primary)
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R28
Accepted
Broader consent on Police Check Form
Recommendation

The consents that applicants currently give on the 'Police Check Form' should be sufficiently broad to enable the requisite checks to be undertaken.

Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, led to the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) ensuring that its application forms incorporate consents sufficiently broad to enable all requisite background checks (Gov.uk progress, 2006-11-08). This directly addresses the recommendation for broader consent on the Police Check Form.
Home Office (Primary)
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R29
Accepted
Incomplete applications returned to Registered Body
Recommendation

Incomplete or withdrawn applications should in future be returned to the Registered Body, and not to the applicant.

Published evidence summary
Following the Royal Assent of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 on 8 November 2006, the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) established operational procedures (Gov.uk progress, 2006-11-08). These procedures ensure that incomplete or withdrawn applications are returned to the Registered Body, rather than directly to the applicant, as recommended.
Home Office (Primary)
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R30
Accepted
Overseas applicant checking
Recommendation

Proposals should be brought forward as soon as possible to improve the checking of people from overseas who want to work with children and vulnerable adults.

Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, led to the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) establishing procedures and guidance for checking people from overseas (Gov.uk progress, 2006-11-08). These measures were put in place to improve the vetting of individuals who wish to work with children and vulnerable adults.
Home Office (Primary)
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R31
Accepted
Additional database access for CRB
Recommendation
As a priority, legislation should be brought forward to enable the CRB to access the following additional databases for the purpose of vetting: Her Majesty's Customs & Excise; National Criminal Intelligence Service; National Crime Squad; British Transport Police; and the … Read more
Published evidence summary
The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which received Royal Assent on 8 November 2006, provided the necessary legislative framework to enable the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) to access relevant databases for vetting purposes (Gov.uk progress, 2006-11-08). This legislation facilitated access to additional databases as a priority for safeguarding checks.
Home Office (Primary)
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