George Elliott

PFD Report All Responded Ref: 2022-0309
Date of Report 4 October 2022
Coroner Robert Sowersby
Coroner Area Avon
Response Deadline ✓ from report 29 November 2022
All 1 response received · Deadline: 29 Nov 2022
Response Status
Responses 1 of 1
56-Day Deadline 29 Nov 2022
All responses received
About PFD responses

Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.

Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

Coroner’s Concerns
and My concerns are about the quality (or otherwise) of the Patient Safety Investigation (“PSI”) which took place after Mr ELLIOTT’s death.

In Mr ELLIOTT’s case the investigation (and accompanying report) overlooked obvious failings in his care. As a result important learning opportunities (and therefore important opportunities to improve patient safety in the future) were also missed.

I am concerned that if this investigation (and report) is in any way representative of the quality and rigour of such investigations within the Trust, then the Trust may be missing vital opportunities to learn from its mistakes, and to make its patients (now and in the future) safer as a result of that learning.

To give a little more detail:

• The stated remit of the Patient Safety Investigation was to “review the care episode… [and] to understand the events and identify opportunities to learn and to improve patient safety” (see page 4 of the resulting report)
• Given that this was a case where a patient suffered a fatal injury as the result of an inpatient fall, one of the first and most obvious points to investigate would have been the adequacy (or otherwise) of his falls risk assessment/s, and the extent of the nursing staff’s compliance with any relevant Trust protocols / procedures
• Notwithstanding that background, the PSI report failed to identify the (very obvious) fact that although a falls risk assessment had been performed, it had not been performed properly
• There were also numerous other failings in the approach that had been taken to the assessment of Mr ELLIOT’s falls risk, and/or the way that risk had been managed while he was an inpatient, but none of these were identified by the PSI / present in the report.
• For example:
- Para.6.13 of the Trust’s then-current Falls Prevention Policy stipulates that Mr ELLIOTT’s family should have been made aware of the outcome of his falls risk assessment. That did not happen, but the fact that it did not happen is not mentioned in the PSI report.
- There is no indication that Mr ELLIOTT’s falls risk was ever re-assessed (after 30 August 2021). According to the Trust’s policy it should have been reassessed after he moved to the Cardiology ward, and again after his fall on 4 September, but no such reassessment took place, and the PSI report makes no mention of these oversights/omissions.
- After Mr ELLIOTT’s fall on 4 September, he continues to be described as at “low risk” of falls in the Daily Intentional Rounding documentation within his medical records. This is an alarming error, but one which has been overlooked entirely by the PSI report.
• I asked Nurse (one of the PSI-report authors, who gave evidence at the inquest) about the fact that none of these errors had been identified in the report and she had no explanation for why that was the case. As stated above, if PSI reports overlook clear / obvious failings, then learning opportunities are missed, patient safety is compromised, and there is a risk of future deaths.

In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken.
Responses
North Bristol NHS Trust
4 Oct 2022
Response received
View full response
Dear Mr Sowersby,

Re: Regulation 28 following the Inquest into the Death of Mr George Elliot

I write further to the Regulation 28, dated 04th October 2022, issued as a result of the inquest into the death of Mr Elliot. Quality of the Patient Safety Investigation: The Regulation 28 raised concerns about the quality of the investigation report and supporting process following Mr Elliot’s fall in hospital. Furthermore, it raised concerns that if this report were representative of the wider quality of such reports it may indicate that North Bristol NHS Trust may miss opportunities to learn, which may contribute to further deaths. We recognise the investigation in the case of Mr George Elliott missed key elements and that the process of approval did not identify these. Accuracy in our investigations is very important to us to provide insights for learning. A key driver for North Bristol NHS Trust is being open and honest with patients and families following an incident. To achieve this, it is essential that we understand the facts of what has happened. Therefore, we take this Regulation 28 report very seriously as it tells us that on this occasion, we have not achieved the degree of understanding that we strive for. The Patient Safety Incident Investigation relating to Mr Elliott was commissioned early under the new PSIRF framework and was completed at during a period in which North Bristol NHS Trust was experiencing extreme pressures relating to the covid pandemic. This was a particularly challenging time for both clinical and nursing staff. It is likely to be due to the pressures at this challenging time that this investigation missed key elements. Trust Headquarters Gate 3 Level 2, Brunel Building Southmead Hospital Westbury-on-Trym Bristol BS10 5NB

A University of Bristol Teaching Trust. A University of the West of England Teaching Trust. We would like to assure you that this is not reflective of the standard and quality of patient safety investigations at the Trust and of the rigour placed on conducting such investigations, as well as the process for approving and learning from them. The Trust has extensive governance relating to Patient Safety Incident Investigations. When a Patient Safety Incident Investigation is commissioned, the responsible Clinical Division allocate an investigation team/panel. The process of investigation is supported by the Clinical Division, with oversight through the Patient Safety Group and then ultimately being received and approved through the Patient Safety Committee. The Patient Safety Committee in February 2022 that approved this report was chaired by the Director of Nursing and Quality. As further assurance, the Trust recently had an audit into its PSIRF conducted by KPMG. This audit looked at the processes and controls over learning from incidents that are part of PSIRF. This audit returned a finding of significant assurance in relation to the PSIRF policy and procedure framework, the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan (PSIRP), the supporting investigation templates as well as the key guidance documents and educational materials available. The audit identified minor improvements; however, these did not relate to the investigation process. Prior to rolling out PSIRF at the Trust in June 2021, key staff involved in undertaking investigations received training on this new investigation process from Baby Lifeline/Cranfield University as well as ongoing coaching and training provided through the Trust’s Patient Safety Team. Key national changes – Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF): North Bristol NHS Trust has been one of the national early adopters for the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) which we have previously written to the Coroner about to update about changes that are likely to be seen in inquests. I have attached a copy of this letter for ease of reference. PSIRF replaces the Serious Incident Framework and represents comprehensive changes to the way in which NHS organisations respond to patient safety incidents, including what and how to investigate. In August this year, the final PSIRF documentation was published by NHS England, with all NHS Trusts now transitioning to PSIRF. We in NBT are using the newly published documentation to conduct a gap analysis about the end-state framework documentation. The core reason for the gap analysis is to ensure that, as an early adopter, we are now working in full alignment with the final guidelines that other (non-early adopter) organisations are starting to transition to. This is a process being adopted by all other early adopters. There are key points during the pathway of investigation that we have and continue to strengthen. For clarity, we have set out the key points below:-

A University of Bristol Teaching Trust. A University of the West of England Teaching Trust. Identification and commissioning of an investigation: Patient safety incidents are routinely reviewed, with automatic flagging in our electronic system set for types of incidents and harm levels. A Patient Safety Incident Investigation will be commissioned for any incident in which we believe that a death was more likely than not due to a problem with care (as per the Learning from Deaths processes). This was the case for Mr Elliot, with the incident report for his fall triggering a PSII. The investigation was assigned an investigation team. Investigation process and support: Supporting high quality investigations is a key objective for North Bristol NHS Trust. PSIRF continues to change the way that the NHS should consider and support patient safety investigations, with a key principle of moving away from the Serious Incident Framework to PSIRF, being to do fewer investigations but to do them better, focussing on Patient Safety Incident Investigations requiring expert, professional investigation knowledge and skills, supported by the required time to conduct them. This represents a significant change for the NHS, and North Bristol NHS Trust as part thereof, as many NHS organisations rely on investigations being carried out by staff members, often clinicians, that already have a fulltime role – therefore doing the investigation in addition to their existing role. Over the past 4 years, the governance teams within our divisions have undergone significant investment, part of which has been to ensure governance teams are better resourced to support and undertake investigations in relation to patient safety incidents. To continue to strengthen our approach, we are also reassessing our approach to how we support detailed, high-quality investigations, and considering establishing new posts that focus entirely on investigations. This is in line with the recently published national PSIRF guidelines. Oversight: Oversight of investigations is a key area that we have and continue to focus on. With PSIRF, the way this works will be significantly different, both at organisational and system levels. The new national PSIRF “Oversight roles and responsibilities specification” published in August 2022 states “Oversight of patient safety incident response has traditionally included activity to hold provider organisations to account for the quality of their patient safety incident investigation reports. Oversight under PSIRF focuses on engagement and empowerment rather than the more traditional command and control”. At NBT we have developed and are implementing a process in which the central Patient Safety Team routinely review the progress of investigations. This process focuses on the timeliness, but also the rigour being applied to the actual investigation process. Any concerns and feedback will be communicated with the respective Division and, where necessary, escalated to the Chief

A University of Bristol Teaching Trust. A University of the West of England Teaching Trust. Medical and Nursing Officers through the established weekly meetings that oversee patient safety learning and investigations. Falls Policy: Whereas the Regulation 28 does not note the Falls Policy as the reason for the Regulation 28, it raised specific points about it that I would like to take this opportunity to address. The Falls Policy referenced is no longer in place, it was replaced with an updated policy in December 2021 that maps to the NICE Guidelines relating to falls. A routine review of this policy is due to be presented to the Patient Safety Committee in December 2022. Next Steps Carrying out robust patient safety incident investigations is a key tenet in our learning systems and culture. As noted above, we accept that the George Elliott investigation missed some key elements, but do not consider this is reflective of the standard of our Patient Safety Incident Investigations at the Trust. We are presently conducting a gap analysis using the recently published PSIRF national guidance. As part of this, we are re-focusing on how we support expert investigations being conducted by scoping the structure and capacity within our central and divisional teams. The findings of the gap analysis, as well as any associated improvements to strengthen our systems and processes will report through our Patient Safety Committee and Quality Committee, with oversight from our Chief Nursing Officer and Chief Medical Officer. I hope you will take some assurance from this letter setting out our response in relation to the concerning points you made in your Regulation 28 report.
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 13 September 2021 an investigation commenced into the death of Mr George Michael ELLIOTT, aged 81. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 20 September 2022.

The medical cause of death was:

1a) Traumatic brain injury 1b) Fall in hospital
2) Coronary artery disease

The conclusion was that this was an accidental death, and the brief circumstances of the death were recorded as follows:

On 4 September 2021 George Michael Elliott was an inpatient at Southmead Hospital, receiving investigation and treatment for an underlying cardiac condition, when he fell, sustaining a serious brain injury. Unfortunately his condition deteriorated some days later, and on 9 September 2021 he died in hospital as a result of the injury sustained in the fall.
Circumstances of the Death
At the time of his death Mr ELLIOTT was in hospital for investigation / treatment of an underlying cardiac condition. His underlying cardiac condition was treatable, but he suffered a fatal brain injury when he had an inpatient fall.

Mr ELLIOTT had been admitted to Southmead Hospital on 29 August 2021.

On 31 August 2021, while he was on the Acute Medical Unit, Mr ELLIOTT’s falls risk was assessed by a member of the nursing staff, who completed online documentation using the Trust’s “Lorenzo” system.

That online documentation included a list of risk factors that had to be considered, the very first of which was whether the patient was aged 65 or over.

To reiterate, Mr ELLIOTT was 81 years old at the time (a fact that was recorded on the Lorenzo system).

The nurse recorded that Mr ELLIOTT had no risk factors (in respect of his risk of falls), despite his age.

The risk assessment was not only in error, but the error was obvious (and on an objectively verifiable basis – not simply on a subjective assessment of how the patient presented).

On 1 September 2021 Mr ELLIOTT was transferred to Cardiology ward 27a. In the early hours of 4 September 2021 he fell while trying to use the en-suite bathroom in his room, suffering a serious head injury which ultimately proved fatal.

There was uncontentious evidence that Mr ELLIOTT’s underlying cardiac condition was treatable, and that if not for his fall (and head injury), he would have survived the inpatient admission and could have received treatment for his heart while in the community.

Mr ELLIOTT’s brain injury led to a deterioration in his condition on 7 September, and he sadly died on 9 September 2021.
Inquest Conclusion
On 4 September 2021 George Michael Elliott was an inpatient at Southmead Hospital, receiving investigation and treatment for an underlying cardiac condition, when he fell, sustaining a serious brain injury. Unfortunately his condition deteriorated some days later, and on 9 September 2021 he died in hospital as a result of the injury sustained in the fall.
Related Inquiry Recommendations

Public inquiry recommendations addressing similar themes

Standard form for derogations from guidance
Scottish Hospitals Inquiry
No open learning culture
Documentation of technical adviser advice
Scottish Hospitals Inquiry
No open learning culture
Training on normalcy bias
Cranston Inquiry
No open learning culture
London Fire Brigade to establish lessons learned process
Grenfell Tower Inquiry
No open learning culture
Ensure Home Office staff presence and visibility in IRCs
Brook House Inquiry
No open learning culture
Robust debrief systems for multi-agency exercises
Manchester Arena Inquiry
No open learning culture
National systems to record lessons from exercises
Manchester Arena Inquiry
No open learning culture
Obtain comprehensive accounts from commanders
Manchester Arena Inquiry
No open learning culture
Address BTP systemic failings from Volume 1
Manchester Arena Inquiry
No open learning culture
Review international practice on medics with firearms officers
Manchester Arena Inquiry
No open learning culture

Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.