Richard Hunt
PFD Report
Partially Responded
Ref: 2025-0498
113 days overdue · 2 responses outstanding
Response Status
Responses
1 of 3
56-Day Deadline
3 Dec 2025
113 days past deadline — 2 responses outstanding
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Coroner’s Concerns
On both occasions prior to setting fire to his cell, it is designed to trigger an alarm on a control panel which is housed in the Wing Office situated on each wing. The triggering of that alarm should not only display a light but also sound a buzzer to alert staff of a fault. On the 19th March when Mr Hunt set fire to his cell on K Wing and on 11th July when he set fire to his cell on I wing this buzzer did not sound. On 19th March 2025, Mr Hunt himself raised the alarm by sounding his cell bell and was discovered. He required CPR and was hospitalised for 3 days. The aspirating fire alarm system did not sound an alarm in the K Wing office. On 11th July the detection of Mr Hunt having set fire to his cell was fortuitous as an OSG was conducting an ACCT check on another prisoner in a nearby cell and smelt smoke. The alarm indication of a fault had been triggered 2 hours before this discovery and Mr Hunt’s cell had been smouldering for around this period of time undetected. Again, no buzzer was sounded. Following the fire on the 19th March 2025, investigation revealed that the aspirating fire detection system buzzer with the Wing Office had been ‘disabled’ and it was believed to have been deliberately silenced for 12 months prior to the incident. Following the fire and Mr Hunt’s death on the 11th July 2025, the aspirating fire detection system was inspected and reviewed across the HMP Stocken Estate by ADT alarms, who are contracted to maintain the system. That inspection revealed that the reason the alarm o I wing, which was triggered but did not sound the buzzer, was because the control panel in the Wing Office (and in which the buzzer was housed) had been deliberately tampered with, by the insertion of a rubber glove between the connectors thereby disabling the buzzer. Further inspection of the aspirating fire detection system panels across the HMP Stocken Estate found for example the control panel on L Wing had been vandalised and that control panel units in other Wings including segregation had been deliberately forced open to gain access. I further understand that the aspirating fire detection system fault panels on the Wings do not link with the main Control Room, meaning there is no central oversight of faults (whether deliberate covering or indicating a fire) for action to be immediately taken. Whilst HMP Stocken may have a system of maintenance of the aspirating fire detection system within the prison, that maintenance system is futile if staff are going to deliberately tamper with that system to disable the buzzer which is deigned to alert them as to risk. This is not an isolated occurrence and is systemic across the HMP Stocken Estate.
Responses
The Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate (CPFSI) has already taken enforcement action by issuing a Prohibition Notice and a Directive Notice due to defects in the fire alarm system. CPFSI inspectors are actively working with HMPPS and MOJ Property Services to implement a range of improvements and will continue to take enforcement action proportional to the risk.
AI summary
View full response
1of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Inspectorate RESPONSE TO REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS RECEIVED FROM HM CORONER FOR RUTLAND & NORTH LEICESTERSHIRE. FIRE FATALITY AT HM PRISON STOCKEN ON 11th JULY 2025. CPFSI LOCATION NUMBER: INSPECTING OFFICERS: RESPONSE CREATED BY: Justin Ashburn Designation: Custodial Team Leader. RESPONSE SUBMITTED BY: Signature Name: Designation: Chief Inspector Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Date: CONTENTS PAGE
2of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Description Page Number Contents Page 2 Glossary of Terms 2-3 References 3 Terms of Reference 4 Methodology 4 Executive Summary 5-6 Background [Cell fire – K Wing. 19th March 2025] 7-8 Introduction [Fatal cell fire – I Wing. 11th July 2025] 8-10 11th July 2025. Initial post fire visit. 10-11 16th July 2025. Post fire inspection. 11-13 Post inspection actions taken by CPFSI. 13-16 Prevention of future fire deaths in custodial settings. 16-17 Appendix A – Exhibits List 18 Crown Premises’ Fire Inspectors, collectively known as the Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Inspectorate (CPFSI), are appointed by the Secretary of State responsible for Government fire policy under Article 25 (1) (e) of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Order). They are appointed to enforce the requirements of the Order in properties owned or occupied by the Crown, of which HMP Stocken is one. Glossary of terms ACCT – Assessment, Care in Custody & Teamwork. AFC – Accommodation Fabric Check APOM – Area Property Operations Manager [MOJ Property Services] ASD – Aspirating Smoke Detection CCTV - Closed Circuit Television CPFSI – Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Inspectorate CPIN – Crown Premises Incident Notification CPR – Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation DI – Detective Inspector
3of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE EMAS – East Midlands Ambulance Service FM – Facilities Management FIO – Fire Investigation Officer FRS – Fire and Rescue Service HSE – Health and Safety Executive HSF&L – Health, Safety Fire & Litigation LFRS – Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service HM – His Majesty’s HMP – His Majesty’s Prison HMPPS – His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service H, S ,F & L – Health, Safety, Fire & Litigation. MOJ – Ministry of Justice MOU – Memorandum of Understanding OSG – Operational Service Grade PPO – Prisons and Probation Ombudsman RPE – Respiratory Protection Equipment RPOM – Regional Property Operations Manager [MOJ Property Services] SAD – Stand-alone detector [aka Domestic Smoke Detector – DSD] SOCO – Scenes of Crime Officers WRDP – Work-Related-Death-Protocol References. Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Order) Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS. (8th October 2025) Work-related Deaths: A protocol for liaison (England and Wales) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING between PRISONS AND PROBATION OMBUDSMAN and CROWN PREMISES’ INSPECTION GROUP The investigation of deaths in custody [December 2015] MOJ Technical Specification FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS: STD/E/SPEC/014. Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate Enforcement Policy Statement January 2019 [National Fire Chiefs Council] CFOA Fire Safety Guidance Audit Form 8211 Version 42 on website as at 110825 Terms of Reference.
4of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI received a Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS by e-mail from HM Coroner for Rutland and North Leicestershire on 9th October 2025. Section 3 of the report states that on 16th July 2025, HM Coroner commenced an investigation into the death of Richard Charles Hunt. Section 6 of the report states that HM Coroner is of the opinion that CPFSI has the power to take such action to prevent future deaths. Section 7 of the report states that CPFSI is under a duty to respond to the report by 3rd December 2025. Methodology The methodology applied to compile this response has been to: Carry out an initial post fire visit to quickly gather vital information to establish and understand the facts of the fire event that occurred on 11th July 2025 in preparation for a post fire inspection. Carry out a post fire inspection for the purpose of identifying any failures of the general fire precautions and the associated failures of fire safety management or general maintenance which may have contributed to the fire in cell 30 on I Wing on 11th July 2025. Having identified failures in respect of compliance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, take the appropriate regulatory action. To liaise and exchange information with Leicestershire Police and the Health and Safety Executive over investigating the incident under the Work-Related Deaths: A Protocol for Liaison, to consider whether there was evidence for proceedings in relation to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Liaise with Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service and the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, for the purpose of ensuring that full information from their investigations was available for compiling this response. Compile all evidence from CPFSI’s post fire actions and inspections to provide a response to the Regulation 28 Report issued by HM Coroner for Rutland and North Leicestershire. Executive Summary.
5of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Richard Charles Hunt was pronounced dead at approximately 14:32 hours on 11th July 2025 following a fire in cell 30 on I Wing at HMP Stocken on the 11th July 2025. Mr. Hunt had previously set a fire in his cell on K Wing on 19th March 2025 following which he had been hospitalized and then subsequently returned to HMP Stocken. On 31st March 2025, CPFSI conducted a post-fire inspection at HM Prison Stocken, whereupon it served a 28-day action plan notice on the Governing Governor. On 24th April 2025, an action plan was provided by the Governor, detailing the actions already taken and planned action to comply with the Notice. At HMP Stocken I and K wing and the Segregation Unit are all furnished with in-cell aspirating smoke detection systems [ASD]. These systems use a fan to draw air from the cell through an air sampling point (often referred to as a “pepper pot”) in the cell wall or ceiling, along a sampling pipe to the fire detector from where it is discharged to atmosphere through an exhaust pipe. Aspirating fire detection systems can be vulnerable to tampering, obstruction and damage by prisoners, as well as being subject to environmental contamination. Consequently, the air being drawn from the cell towards the detector head can often be restricted, or even totally blocked. In such circumstances, there is real potential - in the event of a cell fire - for a significant delay in the time taken for smoke to travel from the cell via the pipework towards the detector head, or for the detector head to not detect smoke and raise the alarm at all. As a result, prison staff may not be alerted to the incident and therefore, unable to respond and deal with a cell fire in sufficient time before the conditions inside the cell become untenable for the occupant. During both fire events in March and July 2025, the in-cell air sampling point had been taped over in Mr Hunt’s cell. This blockage had resulted in a low air flow fault being displayed at the fire alarm panel in the respective wing offices [on K and I Wing]. In both instances, this fault should have been accompanied by a local, clear audible fault alert at the fire alarm panel in the wing office. The consequence of the blocked air sampling points was that both of the fires set by Mr Hunt were not detected by the in-cell ASD system and relied on Mr Hunt activating his cell call facility [in March ‘25], and prison staff noticing smoke emitting from Mr. Hunt’s cell [in July ‘25] to alert staff to each incident. CPFSI inspectors had established that the fire alarm panel in I Wing did have a local, audible fault alert facility [buzzer], but this was not easily heard at normal working and ambient conditions. Despite the fire alarm panel having the facility to display a visual indication of a fault, an additional clear audible alert [buzzer] could have alerted prison staff to the fault in Mr. Hunt’s cell prior to the fire being set, or at least during the incipient stages of the fire before it became harmful.
6of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI inspectors also established that there was a link from the wing fire alarm panels which could relay an alert of a fire situation back to the main fire panel in the prison control room. This link did not include the facility to communicate an individual low air flow fault with the in-cell ASD systems on the wings. Had this facility been available, prison control room staff may have had the opportunity to advise wing staff of the fault and investigate the cause. For context, MOJ Technical Specification FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS: STD/E/SPEC/014 states the following: Paragraph 6.12 in Section 6 Local Control Panels: In the event of any alarm, pre-warning or fault signal being received, a local audible alarm shall be raised at the control panel as well as the visual display describing the occurrence. Paragraph 7.05 in Section 7 Central Indicator Panel of MOJ Technical Specification 014 states: The [Central Indicator] panel shall monitor the incoming circuits and display any alarms or faults raised by the local control panels. Following the post fire inspection on 16th July 2025, CPFSI took enforcement action by serving 28-day action plan notices to each of the Governing Governor, MOJ Property Service, Amey FM and HMPPS Director General Operations. Action plans were subsequently provided by the respective duty holders, which set out the actions already taken and those which were planned to comply with each Notice. On 9th August 2025, Amey FM provided an action plan which recorded a glove being found lodged in the back of the alarm panel in I wing. CPFSI received a copy of an Engineer Call Out Report which recorded that that a glove had been “stuffed” inside the front door of the panel to muffle the buzzer noise. CPFSI enacted its MOU with the PPO and has furnished the PPO inspector with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI has invoked the WRDP with Leicestershire Police and has liaised with its investigators and provided them with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI continues to monitor progress with the actions being taken to comply with each Notice served and intends to conduct a follow up visit to HMP Stocken during January 2026. Background. [cell fire - K Wing. 19 th March 2025] On 19th March 2025, LFRS notified CPFSI of their attendance at a fire in cell 69* on K wing at HM Prison Stocken. An emergency call to the FRS was recorded at 04:45 hours. The
7of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE notification [CPIN] recorded the following information: Cell Fire - Cell 69 on Kilo Wing. Prisoner was inside but removed by prison staff. Fire service attended and dealt with fire using 2 Breathing Apparatus, 1 hose reel jet and 1 main jet outside. Ambulance service was requested by the prison staff for the prisoner who was in the cell, prisoner was conveyed to Peterborough Hospital due to potentially life threatening injuries due to being in the smoke for apprx 5 minutes.
*Later confirmed by the prison’s fire advisor to be Cell 98 on K Wing. Initial enquiries were made by the regional CPFSI inspector, [MB] to the prison’s fire advisor which provided the following significant findings: The occupant of cell 98 [now known to be Mr. Hunt] had covered over the air sampling point for the in-cell ASD system and consequently, the fire alarm system did not activate and alert staff to the fire. It was believed that Mr Hunt had set two fires [under the bed and under the desk] using a vape device. The covering of the air sampling point should have resulted in an audible fault alert being provided at the fire alarm panel on K Wing. The prison’s fire advisor informed MB that the fire alarm panel in K Wing had displayed a fault some 40 minutes prior to the alarm being raised by the prisoner, who had used their cell call facility to alert staff to the fire. Further enquiries revealed that the audible fault alert facility had been switched off for at least 12 months. No water was applied to the fire in cell 98 for approximately 14 minutes, with a damaged power cable for the Mobile 8 water misting equipment cited for the delay in commencing fire- fighting action. Mr. Hunt was removed from the cell 17 minutes after staff had been alerted to the fire. He was unconscious and remained unresponsive for 20 minutes having been given 1st aid and CPR. Mr Hunt was conscious by the time he was transferred to Peterborough Hospital by ambulance. Mr Hunt remained in hospital until 21st March 2025 when he returned to HMP Stocken. Full details of these initial enquiries are documented in the Note for File created by inspector, [CPFSI Exhibit No: 1] Following these enquires, it was decided that on 31st March 2025, a post-fire inspection would be undertaken by two CPFSI inspectors, r [MB] and [PW]. Details of the lines of enquiry made and inspection findings are documented in the Note for File created by MB and PW. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 1] On 4th April 2025, a single enforcement outcome of a 28-day action plan notice [CPFSI Exhibit No: 2] was served to Governor Lund for the failures of fire safety judged to have been under his control, namely: The disablement of the audible fault warning facility on the fire alarm system in K Wing. Ineffective measures were in place to deter prisoners from tampering with fire detectors. E.g. use of sanctions
8of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE The reporting by staff of faults associated with the automatic fire detection and warning system in K Wing. Selection of inappropriate fire-fighting media for dealing with cell fires. The numbers of prison staff who were not in date with their RPE and Cell Fire Response refresher training. The need to revisit the cell fire response drills to factor in the time required for staff to view the fire alarm panel in the office on K Wing to specify the specific location of a cell fire. On 24th April 2025 Governor responded by e-mail to the 28-day Notice, providing an action plan detailing the measures to be implemented and necessary steps to comply with the 28-day notice. A copy of the fire safety action plan is provided at [CPFSI Exhibit No: 3] Row 1 of the action plan recorded that on 25th March 2025, remedial action was taken by the APOM [ ] and the AMEY FM maintenance team to reinstate the ASD local alert audible systems on the Segregation Unit and I and K Wing. This was taken as the Governor’s written assurance that this work had been completed. The remaining actions were considered to be appropriate proposed courses of action and a Satisfactory Action Plan letter [CPFSI Exhibit No: 4] was issued to confirm this on 7th May
2025. Introduction. [fatal cell fire - I Wing. 11 th July 2025] Richard Charles Hunt was pronounced dead at approximately 14:32 hours on 11th July 2025 following a cell fire at HMP Stocken on the 11th July 2025. At 06:33 hours on 11th July 2025, CPFSI received a CPIN from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service. The notification stated that on 11th July 2025 at 04:18 hours the Service received an emergency call from the prison. The CPIN included the details of the incident stop message as follows: “Cell fire with prisoner still in cell, cell 30 India wing. Cell was inundated by Prison staff for approx. 20mins prior to Fire Service arrival. 2 breathing apparatus and one hose reel used. Prisoner removed from cell unconscious, not breathing and defibrillator used. EMAS and Helimed attended to work on the casualty. Corridor was heavily smoke logged which was removed by prison extraction system. One male casualty transferred to Peterborough hospital not breathing for himself. Police put a scene preservation on the cell and took over the incident. Tier two Fire investigation to be carried out”. Initial actions taken by the CPFSI Custodial Team Leader, [JA] were as follows: Advising the CPFSI team of the incident details and requesting inspector availability to liaise with the FIO from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service and Leicestershire Police, and to attend the fire scene to gather information in preparation for a post-fire inspection. Contacting the HMPPS National Fire Safety Advisors to inform them of the incident and request a tele-call to agree the next steps. Established contact with the FIO from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service, [VH], who advised me of the following:
9of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE o A Tier 1 Fire Investigation had already been completed. o A Tier 2 Investigation was being completed later that morning. VH was meeting with SOCO in approx. 45 minutes. o The ASD air sampling point in the fire cell had both been covered/taped over. [photographs of this had already been taken] o Clothing/blankets had been piled up behind the door. [photographs of this had already been taken] o VH had yet to establish what had alerted prison staff to the fire. o VH confirmed that automatic fire detection was present in the cell corridor outside cell [insert number] but that there was no SAD installed outside the cell doors. o JA asked VH if he could examine the air leakage paths [air gaps] around the cell door to see if there was a possibility that the detection in the cell corridor had detected the fire and alerted staff. o JA asked VH if he could examine the fire alarm panel to confirm if there were any faults displayed and to take photographs of this. o VH advised that he intended examine the incident CCTV footage. JA explained to VH the purpose of the cell call system and asked if he could identify if the footage showed whether the cell call lamp illuminated at any point prior to the Mr. Hunt’s release from the cell. JA advised VH that there would be a CPFSI presence on site that morning and would confirm the attending inspectors in due course. VH agreed to call JA back once he has completed the Fire Investigation. JA held a conference call via Teams with CPFSI inspectors and agreed that [MM] and [AH] would attend the prison on 11th July 2025 and commence an initial information gathering exercise, with a view to returning and carrying out a themed fire safety inspection focussed around the cell fire on I Wing. JA contacted the prison to confirm the arrangements for the arrival of the two inspectors at HMP Stocken and ensured that they were furnished with the necessary resources to conduct their work. MM and AH attended the prison on 11th July 2025 with a member from each of the HMPPS National Fire Safety Advisors team and the prison’s HSF&L Team to quickly establish the facts of the fire event. Three CPFSI inspectors MM, AH and [PW] made a further visit on 16th July 2025 to undertake a post fire inspection. The two senior advisors from the HMPPS National Fire Safety Advisors team also attended on 16th July 2025. As a fire death occurring in Crown premises, the fire safety inspection was undertaken by inspectors of the Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Inspectorate, who are the fire safety enforcing authority. [Ref: Article 25 (1) (e) The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005] 11th July 2025. Initial post fire visit. Key outcomes from the visit conducted by MM and AH were:
10of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE An OSG working on I Wing on 11th July 2025 stated that she was alerted to the fire in cell 30 at approximately 04:17 hours by smelling smoke whilst she was carrying out an ACCT check on the occupant of cell 21 (adjacent to cell 30). The ACCT for the prisoner in cell 21 included hourly observations. There was no CCTV footage of these observations being carried out prior to the OSG entering the wing at 04:17 hours. However, observations of cell 21 had been recorded for 02:04, 02:59, 03:53, 04:53, 05:25 and 06: 40 hours on 11th July 2025 Interrogation of the fire alarm panel by one of the HMPPS National Fire Advisors on I Wing revealed a fault was present in cell 30 at 10:22:54 on 10th July 2025 and again at 02:42:52 hours on the 11th July 2025. It was confirmed that remedial works to the fire alarm panels for Segregation, I and K Wings had been carried out by ADT [fire alarm engineers] in March 2025 following the issuing of the 28-day action plan notice by CPFSI and was also confirmed by the APOM Simon Oates that this work was carried out on the 25th March 2025. Mr Hunt was not on an ACCT at the time of the fire on 11th July 2025. The last recorded ACCT for Mr Hunt was opened on 19th March 2025 and closed on 1st April 2025. Mr Hunt had used multiple clear bin bags which appeared to have been weaved together to seal the door and prevent smoke from entering the corridor. The prison’s fire advisor had conducted a review of the fire risk assessment for I Wing on 3rd July 2025 in which he identified that the audible fault warning facility on the fire alarm panel was not operating. The advisor reported this fault to AMEY on 3rd July 2025. Despite a works order being raised by the Amey FM team on 10th July 2025, there was no evidence available to confirm that these remedial works had been carried out to reinstate the audible fault alert. The door to the local [GENT] fire alarm panel on I Wing [for the in-cell ASD system] had a key in it with the door found open, which gave access to the main control panel, circuit boards, power supply units etc. Records of AFCs carried out by prison staff recorded the residential spur being checked, but the records did not include an individual entry for each cell. A separate aspirating check sheet formed part of the AFC record. Records of checks carried out on 10th July 2025 had been logged as completed, with no additional comments or issues recorded. The air sampling point in cell 30 had been taped over and appeared to have been painted over as well. MM requested that the WRDP be invoked and provided the attending Detective Inspector from Leicestershire Police [ ] with his contact details. No regulatory action was taken by CPFSI during this initial visit.
11of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE A more complete account of this visit is provided in the note for file [CPFSI Exhibit No: 5] composed by MM. 16th July 2025. Post fire inspection. Key outcomes from the post fire inspection conducted by PW, MM and AH were: An ADT fire alarm engineer is present on site 2 to 4 days a week and carries out re- active repairs to the fire alarm systems. Test records and service sheets did not provide an accurate picture of the planned and reactive work undertaken on the fire alarm systems in the residential wings. For example: o The records of the remedial works completed on the ASD systems by ADT on 10th July 2025 did not identify any works being completed on I Wing. o Test records and service certificates provided by ADT did not record any faults identified with the fire alarm systems. Works to repair a detector in cell 5 on I Wing were completed on 3rd July 2025. No other remedial or preventative works on I Wing were recorded. A reactive works order dated 14th July 2025 had been raised for ADT, which recorded a fault with the alarm panel for I Wing, with the fault alert facility [buzzer] not working and requiring replacing. A single tender procurement action [aka a green route action] to repair the fault alert facility [buzzer] on I Wing had already been raised. The ADT engineer interrogated the fire alarm panel for I Wing and advised that the panel only had capacity to hold 255 faults in its memory. Consequently, no faults could be seen for the period between 10th and 11th July 2025. The detector for cell 30 [the fire cell] was still showing as being in fault on the fire alarm panel in I Wing. The fault alert facility [buzzer] could be heard if one stood close to the panel and placed their ear to it. Under normal working and ambient conditions, prison staff would not be able to hear this alert. The ADT engineer stated that the fault alert facility was integral to the alarm panel but was very quiet. The engineer also advised that critical fire alerts are relayed to the prison control room, but that the fault alerts were not relayed. Inspectors observed a practical test of the ASD system on I Wing, in which the air sampling point in cell 50 was blocked to create a fault. A fault was displayed on the fire alarm panel in the wing office, but the fault alert was very quiet. Further practical tests were carried out in cells on K Wing and Segregation Unit, with all of these detectors failing to register a low air flow fault and raise an alert on the
12of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE respective fire alarm panel. The RPOM stated that the action to provide new fire alarm panels for I, K Wing and Segregation, raised following a review of the fire risk assessment by the prison HSF&L advisor, was sat with MOJ Property Services for approval. Records of AFCs carried out on I Wing on 10th July 2025 [day prior to the fire] included a check of the in-cell air sampling point for the ASD system. No issues were recorded. A review of the CCTV footage of the incident in cell 30 on 11th July 2025 is recorded in the Note for File [CPFSI Exhibit No: 6] composed by PW. Key events in the footage are: o 04:18 hours [approx.] – OSG is observed walking back and forth on the corridor and using her radio (smoke is seen escaping from cell 30). o 04:22 hours [approx.] – inundation of the cell 30 commences using water misting equipment. o 04:51 hours [approx.]– Mr. Hunt is removed from the cell by fire-fighters from LFRS. This was approximately 33 minutes after the fire was discovered and 29 minutes after inundation of the cell commenced. During the inspection debrief Governor stated that he had not been made aware of the failure of the audible fault warning facility on the fire alarm panel in I Wing which had been identified by the prison’s fire advisor following his review of the fire risk assessment for I Wing on 3rd July 2025. Three enforcement outcomes resulted from the post fire inspection on 16th July 2025 as follows: Governor
- 28 day action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 7] for the following key failures: o Implementing regular checks by wing staff of the fire alarm panel on I Wing to identify and report faults for repair, until such time as a new panel is installed or the fault alert facility is reinstated. o Implementing effective measures to deter prisoners from tampering with fire detectors. o Revisit staff training & drills. CCTV footage of incident on 11th July 2025 revealed that several staff had not followed the procedures and instructions for dealing with cell fires, particularly the correct use of RPE hoods. MOJ Property Services – 28 day action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 8] for the following key failures: o The fire alarm panels for I, K and the Segregation wings did not have the facility to communicate faults to the Control Room. o The fault alert facility on the fire alarm panel for I Wing was not in effective working order.
13of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE o Limited supply of spare components available for the ASD systems. No plan in place for longer term replenishment once current stock depleted. o Inadequate monitoring of the performance of the facilities management provider. Specifically, ensuring accurate record keeping to provide necessary assurances of safety and timely completion of remedial works. AMEY Facilities Management – 28 day action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 9] for the following key failures: o Practical tests of the ASD systems on K Wing and Segregation Unit failed to register a low air flow fault and raise an alert on the respective fire alarm panel. A wider review and adjustment of the system settings is required. o Inadequate monitoring of own compliance. Specifically, ensuring accurate record keeping to provide necessary assurances of safety and timely completion of remedial works. Post inspection actions taken by CPFSI. On 22nd July 2025, the above action plan notices were served by email to the respective duty holders. A response from each of the duty holders – in the form of an action plan setting out the proposed actions to address the risks set out in the schedule to each Notice - was expected on or before 19th August 2025. On 9th August 2025 an action plan c/w supporting documents [CPFSI Exhibit No: 10] was received from AMEY FM. Analysis of this action plan revealed in [Row 2 Column D] that the fault alert buzzer on the I Wing fire alarm panel was working correctly, but the replacement of the alarm panel was going ahead as planned. This action also recorded that a glove was found lodged in the back of the fire alarm panel. This had not previously been identified by the ADT engineer, nor had CPFSI inspectors been made aware of this during their visits. At the time of receiving this action plan it could not be determined whether the presence of the glove had a negative effect on the audibility of the fault alert facility [buzzer]. On 12th August 2025 a further, updated action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 11] was provided by AMEY FM. Analysis of this action plan update revealed that the entry which had previously recorded the presence of the glove inside the fire alarm panel on I Wing, had been removed. The entry confirmed that the fault alert on the fire alarm panel in I Wing was functioning.
14of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Having reviewed the completed and proposed actions in the action plan, a Satisfactory Action Plan letter was issued on 14th August 2025. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 12] The supporting e-mail advised that CPFSI would be undertaking a follow up visit at a later date. On 19th August 2025 an action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 13] was received from Governor Truman. Having reviewed the completed and proposed actions in the action plan, a Satisfactory Action Plan letter was issued later on 19th August 2025. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 14] The supporting e-mail to Governor advised that CPFSI would be undertaking a follow up visit during the early part of 2026, to check on progress against the action plan which should provide sufficient time to allow the actions to become embedded in the day-to-day operations of the prison. On 27th August 2025 CPFSI e-mailed the Chief Property Officer to chase the required response from MOJ Property Services. On 28th August 2025 an action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 15] was received from MOJ Property Services. The review of the action plan provided by MOJ Property Services confirmed that they had submitted funding bids to HMPPS Estates for the replacement of the fire alarm panels on I, K Wings and Segregation and the longer term planning for the replacement of spare components for the ASD systems. As HMPPS Estates falls under the control of the Director General for Operations at HMPPS, a 28-day action plan notice was served to the Director General [as a fire safety duty holder] on 2nd September 2025. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 16] On 1st September 2025 CPFSI requested further confirmations from MOJ Property Services regarding the replacement of the fire alarm panel on I Wing and the provision of documentary evidence to support the repairs of faults to the fire alarm systems by ADT. On 3rd September 2025 CPFSI received copies of service and fault reports from ADT and confirmation that a replacement fire alarm panel had been installed on I Wing, with the fault alert facility operating and alarm panel door secured. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 17] On 3rd September 2025 a Satisfactory Action Plan letter was issued to MOJ Property Services. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 18] On 13th October 2025 CPFSI e-mailed the HMPPS Director General for Operations requesting a response to the 28-day action plan notice served on 2nd September 2025. On 24th October 2025 CPFSI an action plan was received from the HMPPS Director General for Operations. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 19] The action plan provided by HMPPS Director General for Operations stated that main fire alarm panel in the Central Control Room at HMP Stocken receives critical alerts for fire incidents and system faults.
15of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI sought confirmation from the RPOM [MOJ Property Services] that a fault alert is indeed relayed to the main fire alarm panel in the Central Control Room from the ASD systems for I, K Wings and Segregation at HMP Stocken. CPFSI also sought confirmation that the Amey FM team and MOJ Property Services team [APOM/RPOM] at HMP Stocken are aware of the arrangements to request spare components for the ASD systems from the national stock of spares held at the HMPPS National Distribution Centre. On 5th November 2025 CPFSI received an electronic copy of the modification certificate from Amey FM following the installation of the new fire alarm panel in I Wing. The associated Engineer Call Out Report recorded that the Gent Fire Alarm panel had sustained damage to the front door of the panel and that a glove had been “stuffed” inside the front door to muffle the buzzer noise. [CPFSI – Exhibit No: 20]. On 11th November 2025 CPFSI responded to the action plan provided by the HMPPS Director General for Operations by requesting further clarity regarding the ability of the fire alarm system to relay a low air flow fault from a detector in an individual cell back to the Main Control Panel in the Central Control Room. The response from the HMPPS Director General for Operations regarding the failure of the automatic fire detection system to provide sufficiently robust protection stated that the main fire alarm panel in the Central Control Room received critical alerts for fire incidents and system faults. CPFSI approached the on-site MOJ Property Services and Amey FM teams on this matter and they confirmed the following: 'I, K & Seg wings all have aspirating units that report back to the gent panel in the local wing office. This then relays the information to the static 900 panel which links back to comms. The only information reported back from this is related to a live fire activation in the wing, it doesn't provide a specific location, ie. the alert would only provide information for the building such as 'I Wing'. If there are faults on the wing, the local gent panel in the office would contain specific information around the fault, but none of this information is relayed to comms.' This information appeared to contradict HMPPS’ response and CPFSI’s inspectors findings following the post-fire inspection at HM Prison Stocken on 16th July 2025. CPFSI wrote to the HMPPS Director General for Operations requesting clarification of the term “critical alert”, particularly in the context of relaying a low air flow fault from a detector in an individual cell back to the Main Control Panel in the Central Control Room. Currently, a satisfactory action plan letter has not been issued to HMPPS Director General for Operations, following the outcomes of the above, ongoing enquiries. Prevention of future fire deaths in custodial settings.
16of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI has enacted its MOU with the PPO and has furnished the PPO inspector with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI has invoked the WRDP with Leicestershire Police and has liaised with its investigators and provided them with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI continues to make itself available to both agencies to support their respective enquiries and investigations. CPFSI continues to monitor progress with the actions being taken to comply with each Notice served and will be conducting a follow up visit to HMP Stocken in January 2026. Should inspectors find that the planned actions set out by the fire safety duty holders in their respective fire safety action plan have not been completed satisfactorily, they will apply the principles of the Regulators Code and Enforcement Management Model* and consider formal enforcement action where it is judged to be the appropriate next step. Crown bodies must comply with the provisions of the Order**, but they cannot be subject to prosecution**. Non-Crown Responsible Persons and others with duties under the Order in Crown premises can be prosecuted. Where CPFSI considers that continued non-compliance (of safety critical aspects of fire safety) will have a major impact on safety and the likelihood of fire on the premises remains high, it can issue an Enforcement Notice. CPFSI has reviewed its business processes for inspecting residential wings in prisons. Specifically, by creating a revised aide memoire which provides inspectors with specific, detailed lines of enquiry to confirm that fire detection and warning systems can always provide effective detection performance. This is supported by: the provision of systems and components that are in accordance with the recommendations of relevant British Standards and expectations of MOJs own Technical Specifications; robust day-to-day management systems to deter tampering with life safety equipment and monitoring arrangements which ensure that specialist planned maintenance and remedial works are completed in a competent and timely fashion. In accordance with its enforcement policy, CPFSI will continue to take consistent and transparent enforcement action which is proportional to the risk.
*The process of auditing and inspecting premises, assessing risks and making enforcement decisions where appropriate will embody the principles, expectations and methodology of the Enforcement Management Model (EMM) produced by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which is considered national best practice. NFCC has adapted and summarised this model for use by Fire & Rescue Authorities. CPFSI also uses this model.
** The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Article 49 Application to the Crown and to the Houses of Parliament
17of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE APPENDIX A. Exhibits List: (In attached ZIP file)
1. 25-03-25 NFF HMP Stocken LOC.28956 cell fire K-wing 19-03-25 MB-PW
2. 4-04-25 28DAP HMP Stocken LOC.28959-HMPPS Gov
3. 24-04-25 Response to Inspection and Action Plan STOCKEN
4. 7-05-25 SAT Action Plan HMP Stocken LOC.2859-HMPPS Gov
5. MM-Note for Case-HMP Stocken fatality 11-07-25 Mr R Hunt
6. 08-08-25 – NFF – HMP Stocken PFI LOC.28959
7. 22-07-25 28DAP – HMP Stocken – HMPPS GG
8. 22-07-25 28-day - MOJ PD
9. 22-07-25 28-day - Amey
10. AMEY&MOJ Action Plan & sup docs. [zip file]
11. Stocken CPFSI 28 Day Action PLAN 12.8.25
12. 14-08-25 Sat AP – HMP Stocken - Amey
13. HMPPS Response to Inspection Letter – Stocken 12-08-25
14. 19-08-25 Sat AP – HMP Stocken – HMPPS GG
15. SKI_Action_Plan_MOJ_ In progress
16. 02-09-25 28DAP – HMP Stocken – HMPPS DG
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17. 3-09-25 Copies of service and fault reports [zip files]
18. 3-09-25 Satisfactory Action Plan [MOJ Property Services]
19. HMP STOCKEN CPFSI (28 DAP) ACTION PLAN LOC-28959
20. DGS030335 (3)
2of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Description Page Number Contents Page 2 Glossary of Terms 2-3 References 3 Terms of Reference 4 Methodology 4 Executive Summary 5-6 Background [Cell fire – K Wing. 19th March 2025] 7-8 Introduction [Fatal cell fire – I Wing. 11th July 2025] 8-10 11th July 2025. Initial post fire visit. 10-11 16th July 2025. Post fire inspection. 11-13 Post inspection actions taken by CPFSI. 13-16 Prevention of future fire deaths in custodial settings. 16-17 Appendix A – Exhibits List 18 Crown Premises’ Fire Inspectors, collectively known as the Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Inspectorate (CPFSI), are appointed by the Secretary of State responsible for Government fire policy under Article 25 (1) (e) of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Order). They are appointed to enforce the requirements of the Order in properties owned or occupied by the Crown, of which HMP Stocken is one. Glossary of terms ACCT – Assessment, Care in Custody & Teamwork. AFC – Accommodation Fabric Check APOM – Area Property Operations Manager [MOJ Property Services] ASD – Aspirating Smoke Detection CCTV - Closed Circuit Television CPFSI – Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Inspectorate CPIN – Crown Premises Incident Notification CPR – Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation DI – Detective Inspector
3of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE EMAS – East Midlands Ambulance Service FM – Facilities Management FIO – Fire Investigation Officer FRS – Fire and Rescue Service HSE – Health and Safety Executive HSF&L – Health, Safety Fire & Litigation LFRS – Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service HM – His Majesty’s HMP – His Majesty’s Prison HMPPS – His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service H, S ,F & L – Health, Safety, Fire & Litigation. MOJ – Ministry of Justice MOU – Memorandum of Understanding OSG – Operational Service Grade PPO – Prisons and Probation Ombudsman RPE – Respiratory Protection Equipment RPOM – Regional Property Operations Manager [MOJ Property Services] SAD – Stand-alone detector [aka Domestic Smoke Detector – DSD] SOCO – Scenes of Crime Officers WRDP – Work-Related-Death-Protocol References. Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Order) Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS. (8th October 2025) Work-related Deaths: A protocol for liaison (England and Wales) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING between PRISONS AND PROBATION OMBUDSMAN and CROWN PREMISES’ INSPECTION GROUP The investigation of deaths in custody [December 2015] MOJ Technical Specification FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS: STD/E/SPEC/014. Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate Enforcement Policy Statement January 2019 [National Fire Chiefs Council] CFOA Fire Safety Guidance Audit Form 8211 Version 42 on website as at 110825 Terms of Reference.
4of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI received a Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS by e-mail from HM Coroner for Rutland and North Leicestershire on 9th October 2025. Section 3 of the report states that on 16th July 2025, HM Coroner commenced an investigation into the death of Richard Charles Hunt. Section 6 of the report states that HM Coroner is of the opinion that CPFSI has the power to take such action to prevent future deaths. Section 7 of the report states that CPFSI is under a duty to respond to the report by 3rd December 2025. Methodology The methodology applied to compile this response has been to: Carry out an initial post fire visit to quickly gather vital information to establish and understand the facts of the fire event that occurred on 11th July 2025 in preparation for a post fire inspection. Carry out a post fire inspection for the purpose of identifying any failures of the general fire precautions and the associated failures of fire safety management or general maintenance which may have contributed to the fire in cell 30 on I Wing on 11th July 2025. Having identified failures in respect of compliance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, take the appropriate regulatory action. To liaise and exchange information with Leicestershire Police and the Health and Safety Executive over investigating the incident under the Work-Related Deaths: A Protocol for Liaison, to consider whether there was evidence for proceedings in relation to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Liaise with Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service and the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, for the purpose of ensuring that full information from their investigations was available for compiling this response. Compile all evidence from CPFSI’s post fire actions and inspections to provide a response to the Regulation 28 Report issued by HM Coroner for Rutland and North Leicestershire. Executive Summary.
5of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Richard Charles Hunt was pronounced dead at approximately 14:32 hours on 11th July 2025 following a fire in cell 30 on I Wing at HMP Stocken on the 11th July 2025. Mr. Hunt had previously set a fire in his cell on K Wing on 19th March 2025 following which he had been hospitalized and then subsequently returned to HMP Stocken. On 31st March 2025, CPFSI conducted a post-fire inspection at HM Prison Stocken, whereupon it served a 28-day action plan notice on the Governing Governor. On 24th April 2025, an action plan was provided by the Governor, detailing the actions already taken and planned action to comply with the Notice. At HMP Stocken I and K wing and the Segregation Unit are all furnished with in-cell aspirating smoke detection systems [ASD]. These systems use a fan to draw air from the cell through an air sampling point (often referred to as a “pepper pot”) in the cell wall or ceiling, along a sampling pipe to the fire detector from where it is discharged to atmosphere through an exhaust pipe. Aspirating fire detection systems can be vulnerable to tampering, obstruction and damage by prisoners, as well as being subject to environmental contamination. Consequently, the air being drawn from the cell towards the detector head can often be restricted, or even totally blocked. In such circumstances, there is real potential - in the event of a cell fire - for a significant delay in the time taken for smoke to travel from the cell via the pipework towards the detector head, or for the detector head to not detect smoke and raise the alarm at all. As a result, prison staff may not be alerted to the incident and therefore, unable to respond and deal with a cell fire in sufficient time before the conditions inside the cell become untenable for the occupant. During both fire events in March and July 2025, the in-cell air sampling point had been taped over in Mr Hunt’s cell. This blockage had resulted in a low air flow fault being displayed at the fire alarm panel in the respective wing offices [on K and I Wing]. In both instances, this fault should have been accompanied by a local, clear audible fault alert at the fire alarm panel in the wing office. The consequence of the blocked air sampling points was that both of the fires set by Mr Hunt were not detected by the in-cell ASD system and relied on Mr Hunt activating his cell call facility [in March ‘25], and prison staff noticing smoke emitting from Mr. Hunt’s cell [in July ‘25] to alert staff to each incident. CPFSI inspectors had established that the fire alarm panel in I Wing did have a local, audible fault alert facility [buzzer], but this was not easily heard at normal working and ambient conditions. Despite the fire alarm panel having the facility to display a visual indication of a fault, an additional clear audible alert [buzzer] could have alerted prison staff to the fault in Mr. Hunt’s cell prior to the fire being set, or at least during the incipient stages of the fire before it became harmful.
6of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI inspectors also established that there was a link from the wing fire alarm panels which could relay an alert of a fire situation back to the main fire panel in the prison control room. This link did not include the facility to communicate an individual low air flow fault with the in-cell ASD systems on the wings. Had this facility been available, prison control room staff may have had the opportunity to advise wing staff of the fault and investigate the cause. For context, MOJ Technical Specification FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS: STD/E/SPEC/014 states the following: Paragraph 6.12 in Section 6 Local Control Panels: In the event of any alarm, pre-warning or fault signal being received, a local audible alarm shall be raised at the control panel as well as the visual display describing the occurrence. Paragraph 7.05 in Section 7 Central Indicator Panel of MOJ Technical Specification 014 states: The [Central Indicator] panel shall monitor the incoming circuits and display any alarms or faults raised by the local control panels. Following the post fire inspection on 16th July 2025, CPFSI took enforcement action by serving 28-day action plan notices to each of the Governing Governor, MOJ Property Service, Amey FM and HMPPS Director General Operations. Action plans were subsequently provided by the respective duty holders, which set out the actions already taken and those which were planned to comply with each Notice. On 9th August 2025, Amey FM provided an action plan which recorded a glove being found lodged in the back of the alarm panel in I wing. CPFSI received a copy of an Engineer Call Out Report which recorded that that a glove had been “stuffed” inside the front door of the panel to muffle the buzzer noise. CPFSI enacted its MOU with the PPO and has furnished the PPO inspector with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI has invoked the WRDP with Leicestershire Police and has liaised with its investigators and provided them with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI continues to monitor progress with the actions being taken to comply with each Notice served and intends to conduct a follow up visit to HMP Stocken during January 2026. Background. [cell fire - K Wing. 19 th March 2025] On 19th March 2025, LFRS notified CPFSI of their attendance at a fire in cell 69* on K wing at HM Prison Stocken. An emergency call to the FRS was recorded at 04:45 hours. The
7of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE notification [CPIN] recorded the following information: Cell Fire - Cell 69 on Kilo Wing. Prisoner was inside but removed by prison staff. Fire service attended and dealt with fire using 2 Breathing Apparatus, 1 hose reel jet and 1 main jet outside. Ambulance service was requested by the prison staff for the prisoner who was in the cell, prisoner was conveyed to Peterborough Hospital due to potentially life threatening injuries due to being in the smoke for apprx 5 minutes.
*Later confirmed by the prison’s fire advisor to be Cell 98 on K Wing. Initial enquiries were made by the regional CPFSI inspector, [MB] to the prison’s fire advisor which provided the following significant findings: The occupant of cell 98 [now known to be Mr. Hunt] had covered over the air sampling point for the in-cell ASD system and consequently, the fire alarm system did not activate and alert staff to the fire. It was believed that Mr Hunt had set two fires [under the bed and under the desk] using a vape device. The covering of the air sampling point should have resulted in an audible fault alert being provided at the fire alarm panel on K Wing. The prison’s fire advisor informed MB that the fire alarm panel in K Wing had displayed a fault some 40 minutes prior to the alarm being raised by the prisoner, who had used their cell call facility to alert staff to the fire. Further enquiries revealed that the audible fault alert facility had been switched off for at least 12 months. No water was applied to the fire in cell 98 for approximately 14 minutes, with a damaged power cable for the Mobile 8 water misting equipment cited for the delay in commencing fire- fighting action. Mr. Hunt was removed from the cell 17 minutes after staff had been alerted to the fire. He was unconscious and remained unresponsive for 20 minutes having been given 1st aid and CPR. Mr Hunt was conscious by the time he was transferred to Peterborough Hospital by ambulance. Mr Hunt remained in hospital until 21st March 2025 when he returned to HMP Stocken. Full details of these initial enquiries are documented in the Note for File created by inspector, [CPFSI Exhibit No: 1] Following these enquires, it was decided that on 31st March 2025, a post-fire inspection would be undertaken by two CPFSI inspectors, r [MB] and [PW]. Details of the lines of enquiry made and inspection findings are documented in the Note for File created by MB and PW. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 1] On 4th April 2025, a single enforcement outcome of a 28-day action plan notice [CPFSI Exhibit No: 2] was served to Governor Lund for the failures of fire safety judged to have been under his control, namely: The disablement of the audible fault warning facility on the fire alarm system in K Wing. Ineffective measures were in place to deter prisoners from tampering with fire detectors. E.g. use of sanctions
8of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE The reporting by staff of faults associated with the automatic fire detection and warning system in K Wing. Selection of inappropriate fire-fighting media for dealing with cell fires. The numbers of prison staff who were not in date with their RPE and Cell Fire Response refresher training. The need to revisit the cell fire response drills to factor in the time required for staff to view the fire alarm panel in the office on K Wing to specify the specific location of a cell fire. On 24th April 2025 Governor responded by e-mail to the 28-day Notice, providing an action plan detailing the measures to be implemented and necessary steps to comply with the 28-day notice. A copy of the fire safety action plan is provided at [CPFSI Exhibit No: 3] Row 1 of the action plan recorded that on 25th March 2025, remedial action was taken by the APOM [ ] and the AMEY FM maintenance team to reinstate the ASD local alert audible systems on the Segregation Unit and I and K Wing. This was taken as the Governor’s written assurance that this work had been completed. The remaining actions were considered to be appropriate proposed courses of action and a Satisfactory Action Plan letter [CPFSI Exhibit No: 4] was issued to confirm this on 7th May
2025. Introduction. [fatal cell fire - I Wing. 11 th July 2025] Richard Charles Hunt was pronounced dead at approximately 14:32 hours on 11th July 2025 following a cell fire at HMP Stocken on the 11th July 2025. At 06:33 hours on 11th July 2025, CPFSI received a CPIN from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service. The notification stated that on 11th July 2025 at 04:18 hours the Service received an emergency call from the prison. The CPIN included the details of the incident stop message as follows: “Cell fire with prisoner still in cell, cell 30 India wing. Cell was inundated by Prison staff for approx. 20mins prior to Fire Service arrival. 2 breathing apparatus and one hose reel used. Prisoner removed from cell unconscious, not breathing and defibrillator used. EMAS and Helimed attended to work on the casualty. Corridor was heavily smoke logged which was removed by prison extraction system. One male casualty transferred to Peterborough hospital not breathing for himself. Police put a scene preservation on the cell and took over the incident. Tier two Fire investigation to be carried out”. Initial actions taken by the CPFSI Custodial Team Leader, [JA] were as follows: Advising the CPFSI team of the incident details and requesting inspector availability to liaise with the FIO from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service and Leicestershire Police, and to attend the fire scene to gather information in preparation for a post-fire inspection. Contacting the HMPPS National Fire Safety Advisors to inform them of the incident and request a tele-call to agree the next steps. Established contact with the FIO from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service, [VH], who advised me of the following:
9of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE o A Tier 1 Fire Investigation had already been completed. o A Tier 2 Investigation was being completed later that morning. VH was meeting with SOCO in approx. 45 minutes. o The ASD air sampling point in the fire cell had both been covered/taped over. [photographs of this had already been taken] o Clothing/blankets had been piled up behind the door. [photographs of this had already been taken] o VH had yet to establish what had alerted prison staff to the fire. o VH confirmed that automatic fire detection was present in the cell corridor outside cell [insert number] but that there was no SAD installed outside the cell doors. o JA asked VH if he could examine the air leakage paths [air gaps] around the cell door to see if there was a possibility that the detection in the cell corridor had detected the fire and alerted staff. o JA asked VH if he could examine the fire alarm panel to confirm if there were any faults displayed and to take photographs of this. o VH advised that he intended examine the incident CCTV footage. JA explained to VH the purpose of the cell call system and asked if he could identify if the footage showed whether the cell call lamp illuminated at any point prior to the Mr. Hunt’s release from the cell. JA advised VH that there would be a CPFSI presence on site that morning and would confirm the attending inspectors in due course. VH agreed to call JA back once he has completed the Fire Investigation. JA held a conference call via Teams with CPFSI inspectors and agreed that [MM] and [AH] would attend the prison on 11th July 2025 and commence an initial information gathering exercise, with a view to returning and carrying out a themed fire safety inspection focussed around the cell fire on I Wing. JA contacted the prison to confirm the arrangements for the arrival of the two inspectors at HMP Stocken and ensured that they were furnished with the necessary resources to conduct their work. MM and AH attended the prison on 11th July 2025 with a member from each of the HMPPS National Fire Safety Advisors team and the prison’s HSF&L Team to quickly establish the facts of the fire event. Three CPFSI inspectors MM, AH and [PW] made a further visit on 16th July 2025 to undertake a post fire inspection. The two senior advisors from the HMPPS National Fire Safety Advisors team also attended on 16th July 2025. As a fire death occurring in Crown premises, the fire safety inspection was undertaken by inspectors of the Crown Premises’ Fire Safety Inspectorate, who are the fire safety enforcing authority. [Ref: Article 25 (1) (e) The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005] 11th July 2025. Initial post fire visit. Key outcomes from the visit conducted by MM and AH were:
10of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE An OSG working on I Wing on 11th July 2025 stated that she was alerted to the fire in cell 30 at approximately 04:17 hours by smelling smoke whilst she was carrying out an ACCT check on the occupant of cell 21 (adjacent to cell 30). The ACCT for the prisoner in cell 21 included hourly observations. There was no CCTV footage of these observations being carried out prior to the OSG entering the wing at 04:17 hours. However, observations of cell 21 had been recorded for 02:04, 02:59, 03:53, 04:53, 05:25 and 06: 40 hours on 11th July 2025 Interrogation of the fire alarm panel by one of the HMPPS National Fire Advisors on I Wing revealed a fault was present in cell 30 at 10:22:54 on 10th July 2025 and again at 02:42:52 hours on the 11th July 2025. It was confirmed that remedial works to the fire alarm panels for Segregation, I and K Wings had been carried out by ADT [fire alarm engineers] in March 2025 following the issuing of the 28-day action plan notice by CPFSI and was also confirmed by the APOM Simon Oates that this work was carried out on the 25th March 2025. Mr Hunt was not on an ACCT at the time of the fire on 11th July 2025. The last recorded ACCT for Mr Hunt was opened on 19th March 2025 and closed on 1st April 2025. Mr Hunt had used multiple clear bin bags which appeared to have been weaved together to seal the door and prevent smoke from entering the corridor. The prison’s fire advisor had conducted a review of the fire risk assessment for I Wing on 3rd July 2025 in which he identified that the audible fault warning facility on the fire alarm panel was not operating. The advisor reported this fault to AMEY on 3rd July 2025. Despite a works order being raised by the Amey FM team on 10th July 2025, there was no evidence available to confirm that these remedial works had been carried out to reinstate the audible fault alert. The door to the local [GENT] fire alarm panel on I Wing [for the in-cell ASD system] had a key in it with the door found open, which gave access to the main control panel, circuit boards, power supply units etc. Records of AFCs carried out by prison staff recorded the residential spur being checked, but the records did not include an individual entry for each cell. A separate aspirating check sheet formed part of the AFC record. Records of checks carried out on 10th July 2025 had been logged as completed, with no additional comments or issues recorded. The air sampling point in cell 30 had been taped over and appeared to have been painted over as well. MM requested that the WRDP be invoked and provided the attending Detective Inspector from Leicestershire Police [ ] with his contact details. No regulatory action was taken by CPFSI during this initial visit.
11of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE A more complete account of this visit is provided in the note for file [CPFSI Exhibit No: 5] composed by MM. 16th July 2025. Post fire inspection. Key outcomes from the post fire inspection conducted by PW, MM and AH were: An ADT fire alarm engineer is present on site 2 to 4 days a week and carries out re- active repairs to the fire alarm systems. Test records and service sheets did not provide an accurate picture of the planned and reactive work undertaken on the fire alarm systems in the residential wings. For example: o The records of the remedial works completed on the ASD systems by ADT on 10th July 2025 did not identify any works being completed on I Wing. o Test records and service certificates provided by ADT did not record any faults identified with the fire alarm systems. Works to repair a detector in cell 5 on I Wing were completed on 3rd July 2025. No other remedial or preventative works on I Wing were recorded. A reactive works order dated 14th July 2025 had been raised for ADT, which recorded a fault with the alarm panel for I Wing, with the fault alert facility [buzzer] not working and requiring replacing. A single tender procurement action [aka a green route action] to repair the fault alert facility [buzzer] on I Wing had already been raised. The ADT engineer interrogated the fire alarm panel for I Wing and advised that the panel only had capacity to hold 255 faults in its memory. Consequently, no faults could be seen for the period between 10th and 11th July 2025. The detector for cell 30 [the fire cell] was still showing as being in fault on the fire alarm panel in I Wing. The fault alert facility [buzzer] could be heard if one stood close to the panel and placed their ear to it. Under normal working and ambient conditions, prison staff would not be able to hear this alert. The ADT engineer stated that the fault alert facility was integral to the alarm panel but was very quiet. The engineer also advised that critical fire alerts are relayed to the prison control room, but that the fault alerts were not relayed. Inspectors observed a practical test of the ASD system on I Wing, in which the air sampling point in cell 50 was blocked to create a fault. A fault was displayed on the fire alarm panel in the wing office, but the fault alert was very quiet. Further practical tests were carried out in cells on K Wing and Segregation Unit, with all of these detectors failing to register a low air flow fault and raise an alert on the
12of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE respective fire alarm panel. The RPOM stated that the action to provide new fire alarm panels for I, K Wing and Segregation, raised following a review of the fire risk assessment by the prison HSF&L advisor, was sat with MOJ Property Services for approval. Records of AFCs carried out on I Wing on 10th July 2025 [day prior to the fire] included a check of the in-cell air sampling point for the ASD system. No issues were recorded. A review of the CCTV footage of the incident in cell 30 on 11th July 2025 is recorded in the Note for File [CPFSI Exhibit No: 6] composed by PW. Key events in the footage are: o 04:18 hours [approx.] – OSG is observed walking back and forth on the corridor and using her radio (smoke is seen escaping from cell 30). o 04:22 hours [approx.] – inundation of the cell 30 commences using water misting equipment. o 04:51 hours [approx.]– Mr. Hunt is removed from the cell by fire-fighters from LFRS. This was approximately 33 minutes after the fire was discovered and 29 minutes after inundation of the cell commenced. During the inspection debrief Governor stated that he had not been made aware of the failure of the audible fault warning facility on the fire alarm panel in I Wing which had been identified by the prison’s fire advisor following his review of the fire risk assessment for I Wing on 3rd July 2025. Three enforcement outcomes resulted from the post fire inspection on 16th July 2025 as follows: Governor
- 28 day action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 7] for the following key failures: o Implementing regular checks by wing staff of the fire alarm panel on I Wing to identify and report faults for repair, until such time as a new panel is installed or the fault alert facility is reinstated. o Implementing effective measures to deter prisoners from tampering with fire detectors. o Revisit staff training & drills. CCTV footage of incident on 11th July 2025 revealed that several staff had not followed the procedures and instructions for dealing with cell fires, particularly the correct use of RPE hoods. MOJ Property Services – 28 day action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 8] for the following key failures: o The fire alarm panels for I, K and the Segregation wings did not have the facility to communicate faults to the Control Room. o The fault alert facility on the fire alarm panel for I Wing was not in effective working order.
13of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE o Limited supply of spare components available for the ASD systems. No plan in place for longer term replenishment once current stock depleted. o Inadequate monitoring of the performance of the facilities management provider. Specifically, ensuring accurate record keeping to provide necessary assurances of safety and timely completion of remedial works. AMEY Facilities Management – 28 day action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 9] for the following key failures: o Practical tests of the ASD systems on K Wing and Segregation Unit failed to register a low air flow fault and raise an alert on the respective fire alarm panel. A wider review and adjustment of the system settings is required. o Inadequate monitoring of own compliance. Specifically, ensuring accurate record keeping to provide necessary assurances of safety and timely completion of remedial works. Post inspection actions taken by CPFSI. On 22nd July 2025, the above action plan notices were served by email to the respective duty holders. A response from each of the duty holders – in the form of an action plan setting out the proposed actions to address the risks set out in the schedule to each Notice - was expected on or before 19th August 2025. On 9th August 2025 an action plan c/w supporting documents [CPFSI Exhibit No: 10] was received from AMEY FM. Analysis of this action plan revealed in [Row 2 Column D] that the fault alert buzzer on the I Wing fire alarm panel was working correctly, but the replacement of the alarm panel was going ahead as planned. This action also recorded that a glove was found lodged in the back of the fire alarm panel. This had not previously been identified by the ADT engineer, nor had CPFSI inspectors been made aware of this during their visits. At the time of receiving this action plan it could not be determined whether the presence of the glove had a negative effect on the audibility of the fault alert facility [buzzer]. On 12th August 2025 a further, updated action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 11] was provided by AMEY FM. Analysis of this action plan update revealed that the entry which had previously recorded the presence of the glove inside the fire alarm panel on I Wing, had been removed. The entry confirmed that the fault alert on the fire alarm panel in I Wing was functioning.
14of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Having reviewed the completed and proposed actions in the action plan, a Satisfactory Action Plan letter was issued on 14th August 2025. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 12] The supporting e-mail advised that CPFSI would be undertaking a follow up visit at a later date. On 19th August 2025 an action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 13] was received from Governor Truman. Having reviewed the completed and proposed actions in the action plan, a Satisfactory Action Plan letter was issued later on 19th August 2025. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 14] The supporting e-mail to Governor advised that CPFSI would be undertaking a follow up visit during the early part of 2026, to check on progress against the action plan which should provide sufficient time to allow the actions to become embedded in the day-to-day operations of the prison. On 27th August 2025 CPFSI e-mailed the Chief Property Officer to chase the required response from MOJ Property Services. On 28th August 2025 an action plan [CPFSI Exhibit No: 15] was received from MOJ Property Services. The review of the action plan provided by MOJ Property Services confirmed that they had submitted funding bids to HMPPS Estates for the replacement of the fire alarm panels on I, K Wings and Segregation and the longer term planning for the replacement of spare components for the ASD systems. As HMPPS Estates falls under the control of the Director General for Operations at HMPPS, a 28-day action plan notice was served to the Director General [as a fire safety duty holder] on 2nd September 2025. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 16] On 1st September 2025 CPFSI requested further confirmations from MOJ Property Services regarding the replacement of the fire alarm panel on I Wing and the provision of documentary evidence to support the repairs of faults to the fire alarm systems by ADT. On 3rd September 2025 CPFSI received copies of service and fault reports from ADT and confirmation that a replacement fire alarm panel had been installed on I Wing, with the fault alert facility operating and alarm panel door secured. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 17] On 3rd September 2025 a Satisfactory Action Plan letter was issued to MOJ Property Services. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 18] On 13th October 2025 CPFSI e-mailed the HMPPS Director General for Operations requesting a response to the 28-day action plan notice served on 2nd September 2025. On 24th October 2025 CPFSI an action plan was received from the HMPPS Director General for Operations. [CPFSI Exhibit No: 19] The action plan provided by HMPPS Director General for Operations stated that main fire alarm panel in the Central Control Room at HMP Stocken receives critical alerts for fire incidents and system faults.
15of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI sought confirmation from the RPOM [MOJ Property Services] that a fault alert is indeed relayed to the main fire alarm panel in the Central Control Room from the ASD systems for I, K Wings and Segregation at HMP Stocken. CPFSI also sought confirmation that the Amey FM team and MOJ Property Services team [APOM/RPOM] at HMP Stocken are aware of the arrangements to request spare components for the ASD systems from the national stock of spares held at the HMPPS National Distribution Centre. On 5th November 2025 CPFSI received an electronic copy of the modification certificate from Amey FM following the installation of the new fire alarm panel in I Wing. The associated Engineer Call Out Report recorded that the Gent Fire Alarm panel had sustained damage to the front door of the panel and that a glove had been “stuffed” inside the front door to muffle the buzzer noise. [CPFSI – Exhibit No: 20]. On 11th November 2025 CPFSI responded to the action plan provided by the HMPPS Director General for Operations by requesting further clarity regarding the ability of the fire alarm system to relay a low air flow fault from a detector in an individual cell back to the Main Control Panel in the Central Control Room. The response from the HMPPS Director General for Operations regarding the failure of the automatic fire detection system to provide sufficiently robust protection stated that the main fire alarm panel in the Central Control Room received critical alerts for fire incidents and system faults. CPFSI approached the on-site MOJ Property Services and Amey FM teams on this matter and they confirmed the following: 'I, K & Seg wings all have aspirating units that report back to the gent panel in the local wing office. This then relays the information to the static 900 panel which links back to comms. The only information reported back from this is related to a live fire activation in the wing, it doesn't provide a specific location, ie. the alert would only provide information for the building such as 'I Wing'. If there are faults on the wing, the local gent panel in the office would contain specific information around the fault, but none of this information is relayed to comms.' This information appeared to contradict HMPPS’ response and CPFSI’s inspectors findings following the post-fire inspection at HM Prison Stocken on 16th July 2025. CPFSI wrote to the HMPPS Director General for Operations requesting clarification of the term “critical alert”, particularly in the context of relaying a low air flow fault from a detector in an individual cell back to the Main Control Panel in the Central Control Room. Currently, a satisfactory action plan letter has not been issued to HMPPS Director General for Operations, following the outcomes of the above, ongoing enquiries. Prevention of future fire deaths in custodial settings.
16of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE CPFSI has enacted its MOU with the PPO and has furnished the PPO inspector with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI has invoked the WRDP with Leicestershire Police and has liaised with its investigators and provided them with the relevant CPFSI information and documents to support their investigation. CPFSI continues to make itself available to both agencies to support their respective enquiries and investigations. CPFSI continues to monitor progress with the actions being taken to comply with each Notice served and will be conducting a follow up visit to HMP Stocken in January 2026. Should inspectors find that the planned actions set out by the fire safety duty holders in their respective fire safety action plan have not been completed satisfactorily, they will apply the principles of the Regulators Code and Enforcement Management Model* and consider formal enforcement action where it is judged to be the appropriate next step. Crown bodies must comply with the provisions of the Order**, but they cannot be subject to prosecution**. Non-Crown Responsible Persons and others with duties under the Order in Crown premises can be prosecuted. Where CPFSI considers that continued non-compliance (of safety critical aspects of fire safety) will have a major impact on safety and the likelihood of fire on the premises remains high, it can issue an Enforcement Notice. CPFSI has reviewed its business processes for inspecting residential wings in prisons. Specifically, by creating a revised aide memoire which provides inspectors with specific, detailed lines of enquiry to confirm that fire detection and warning systems can always provide effective detection performance. This is supported by: the provision of systems and components that are in accordance with the recommendations of relevant British Standards and expectations of MOJs own Technical Specifications; robust day-to-day management systems to deter tampering with life safety equipment and monitoring arrangements which ensure that specialist planned maintenance and remedial works are completed in a competent and timely fashion. In accordance with its enforcement policy, CPFSI will continue to take consistent and transparent enforcement action which is proportional to the risk.
*The process of auditing and inspecting premises, assessing risks and making enforcement decisions where appropriate will embody the principles, expectations and methodology of the Enforcement Management Model (EMM) produced by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which is considered national best practice. NFCC has adapted and summarised this model for use by Fire & Rescue Authorities. CPFSI also uses this model.
** The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Article 49 Application to the Crown and to the Houses of Parliament
17of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE APPENDIX A. Exhibits List: (In attached ZIP file)
1. 25-03-25 NFF HMP Stocken LOC.28956 cell fire K-wing 19-03-25 MB-PW
2. 4-04-25 28DAP HMP Stocken LOC.28959-HMPPS Gov
3. 24-04-25 Response to Inspection and Action Plan STOCKEN
4. 7-05-25 SAT Action Plan HMP Stocken LOC.2859-HMPPS Gov
5. MM-Note for Case-HMP Stocken fatality 11-07-25 Mr R Hunt
6. 08-08-25 – NFF – HMP Stocken PFI LOC.28959
7. 22-07-25 28DAP – HMP Stocken – HMPPS GG
8. 22-07-25 28-day - MOJ PD
9. 22-07-25 28-day - Amey
10. AMEY&MOJ Action Plan & sup docs. [zip file]
11. Stocken CPFSI 28 Day Action PLAN 12.8.25
12. 14-08-25 Sat AP – HMP Stocken - Amey
13. HMPPS Response to Inspection Letter – Stocken 12-08-25
14. 19-08-25 Sat AP – HMP Stocken – HMPPS GG
15. SKI_Action_Plan_MOJ_ In progress
16. 02-09-25 28DAP – HMP Stocken – HMPPS DG
18of18 OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
17. 3-09-25 Copies of service and fault reports [zip files]
18. 3-09-25 Satisfactory Action Plan [MOJ Property Services]
19. HMP STOCKEN CPFSI (28 DAP) ACTION PLAN LOC-28959
20. DGS030335 (3)
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 16 July 2025 I commenced an investigation into the death of Richard Charles HUNT aged 42. The investigation has not yet concluded and the inquest has not been heard and is unlikely to be concluded until next year.
Circumstances of the Death
Mr Hunt was a serving prisoner at HMP Stocken. On the 11th July 2025 Mr Hunt, who was housed in a single occupancy cell on I wing, and set fire to his cell. Emergency services were called, and Mr Hunt was conveyed to hospital but died later that day. A Forensic Post Mortem provides the cause of death as :- 1a. Smoke Inhalation. This was not the first time Mr Hunt had set fire to a cell whilst a serving prisoner at HMP Stocken. He had done so 4 months earlier on 19th March 2025 in similar circumstances, when housed in a single occupancy cell on K wing.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.