Sean Heeney
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2023-0250Deceased
All 1 response received
· Deadline: 8 Sep 2023
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Bridgewood House lacked a clear plan for safely extricating medically unwell or uncooperative residents from its first floor, compounded by the building's layout, leading to dangerous delays.
View full coroner's concerns
Witnesses described the difficulties in extricating Mr Heeney from Bridgewood House. Those difficulties included:
1. The layout of the building. Witnesses described inter alia: (i) the corridors as being narrow and with 90 degree angle turns; (ii) the stairs as being narrow and steep; and (iii) Mr Heeney’s bedroom as being small and with little space to manoeuvre.
2. Mr Heeney was very seriously unwell. He was described as non-compliant and agitated. When given Naloxone he became increasingly agitated.
3. Mr Heeney was described as heavy and therefore required more than one person to safely move him. The evidence suggested a lack of a clear or settled plan amongst the EMAS personnel and police officers as to how Mr Heeney was to be extricated. This caused a delay in removing Mr Heeney to hospital. Whilst I recognise that any extrication is unlikely to be something done by the Approved Premises staff on their own or at all, I am concerned that Bridgewood House did not and still does not have a plan on how to extricate from the first-floor of the building a person who is unable and/or unwilling to leave in the case of a medical emergency. In this respect, I note the following:
1. The layout of the building and the restrictions which that creates was and remains a known issue: a former manager of Bridgewood House described how it did not take “any residents with mobility issues, because of the stairs”.
2. HMPPS have identified a requirement for Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans. I was referred to the ‘Approved Premises Safe Working Practice Document’ for Bridgewood House which provides: “Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEP) must be put in place for any building user who would encounter a problem and need assistance in exiting the building in an emergency. Staff must be aware of individual residents and colleagues who are on PEEP. Separate PEEP forms are for both staff and residents.”
3. HMPPS have properly identified that individuals recently released from prison have a heightened risk of accidental overdose as they may have lost tolerance to drugs which they had previously used. This is reflected in the induction paperwork provided to residents at Approved Premises.
4. It is to be anticipated that residents within Approved Premises may be more reluctant to cooperate with emergency service personnel, in particular the police. This may make extrication more difficult.
5. It is to be anticipated that residents who have overdosed may be administered Naloxone. This is reflected in HMPPS’ roll-out of Naloxone to all Approved Premises since Mr Heeney’s death. As witnesses explained, a known side-effect of Naloxone is increased agitation.
1. The layout of the building. Witnesses described inter alia: (i) the corridors as being narrow and with 90 degree angle turns; (ii) the stairs as being narrow and steep; and (iii) Mr Heeney’s bedroom as being small and with little space to manoeuvre.
2. Mr Heeney was very seriously unwell. He was described as non-compliant and agitated. When given Naloxone he became increasingly agitated.
3. Mr Heeney was described as heavy and therefore required more than one person to safely move him. The evidence suggested a lack of a clear or settled plan amongst the EMAS personnel and police officers as to how Mr Heeney was to be extricated. This caused a delay in removing Mr Heeney to hospital. Whilst I recognise that any extrication is unlikely to be something done by the Approved Premises staff on their own or at all, I am concerned that Bridgewood House did not and still does not have a plan on how to extricate from the first-floor of the building a person who is unable and/or unwilling to leave in the case of a medical emergency. In this respect, I note the following:
1. The layout of the building and the restrictions which that creates was and remains a known issue: a former manager of Bridgewood House described how it did not take “any residents with mobility issues, because of the stairs”.
2. HMPPS have identified a requirement for Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans. I was referred to the ‘Approved Premises Safe Working Practice Document’ for Bridgewood House which provides: “Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEP) must be put in place for any building user who would encounter a problem and need assistance in exiting the building in an emergency. Staff must be aware of individual residents and colleagues who are on PEEP. Separate PEEP forms are for both staff and residents.”
3. HMPPS have properly identified that individuals recently released from prison have a heightened risk of accidental overdose as they may have lost tolerance to drugs which they had previously used. This is reflected in the induction paperwork provided to residents at Approved Premises.
4. It is to be anticipated that residents within Approved Premises may be more reluctant to cooperate with emergency service personnel, in particular the police. This may make extrication more difficult.
5. It is to be anticipated that residents who have overdosed may be administered Naloxone. This is reflected in HMPPS’ roll-out of Naloxone to all Approved Premises since Mr Heeney’s death. As witnesses explained, a known side-effect of Naloxone is increased agitation.
Responses
Action Planned
Bridgewood House Approved Premises is consulting with the local emergency services on the preparation of a plan to deal with evacuation from the building in a medical emergency. A clearly recorded understanding between the agencies involved in such a procedure should ensure a successful evacuation should a similar situation arise in the future. (AI summary)
Bridgewood House Approved Premises is consulting with the local emergency services on the preparation of a plan to deal with evacuation from the building in a medical emergency. A clearly recorded understanding between the agencies involved in such a procedure should ensure a successful evacuation should a similar situation arise in the future. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Mr Dixey, Inquest into the death of Sean Anthony Heeney Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report, issued following the Inquest into the death of Sean Heeney, addressed to His Majesty’s Prison & Probation Service (HMPPS). I am replying as the Director General Operations of HMPPS. I know that you will share a copy of this response with the family, and I would first like to express my sincere condolences for their loss. A death in these circumstances is a tragedy and the implementation of learning from this is my absolute priority. You have raised an area of concern in the following terms: Whilst I recognise that any extrication is unlikely to be something done by the Approved Premises staff on their own or at all, I am concerned that Bridgewood House did not and still does not have a plan on how to extricate from the first-floor of the building a person who is unable and/or unwilling to leave in the case of a medical emergency. In response, please be assured that Bridgewood House Approved Premises is consulting with the local emergency services on the preparation of a plan to deal with evacuation from the building in a medical emergency. As you helpfully identified the extrication itself is something that would not be undertaken by the Approved Premises staff but it is accepted that a clearly recorded understanding between the agencies involved in such a procedure should ensure a successful evacuation should a similar situation arise in the future. Thank you for bringing this matter of concern to my attention. Please be assured that learning from the circumstances of this tragic death will be applied across the wider Approved Premises estate.
Sent To
- HM Prison and Probation Service
Response Status
Linked responses
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56-Day Deadline
8 Sep 2023
All responses received
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Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 2nd October 2019 an investigation was commenced into the death of Sean Anthony Heeney, aged 34. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 13th July 2023. The conclusion of the inquest was a narrative conclusion: Sean Heeney was found unconscious at Bridgewood House on 22nd September 2019 and passed away on 26th September 2019 at Northampton General Hospital. The initial call to 999 on 22nd September was incorrectly categorised, an admitted failure on EMAS’ behalf, which made a material contribution to his death. Ambulance staff that attended did not properly appreciate the seriousness and urgency of Sean Heeney’s condition and, as such, it was not escalated appropriately. The lack of proper monitoring by the ambulance staff made a contribution to his death. This was a drug-related death. The medical cause of death was: 1a Hypoxic brain injury 1b Cardiac arrest 1c Aspiration pneumonia 1d Use of heroin and cocaine
Circumstances of the Death
At the time of his death, Mr Heeney was a resident at Bridgewood House Approved 9th Premises in Northampton. He had been released from prison on licence on September 2019. Mr Heeney had a history of drug and alcohol misuse. At or around 06.00 on 22nd September Mr Heeney was found unresponsive on the floor of his first-floor bedroom. Shortly thereafter the residential worker who discovered Mr Heeney called 999. At 06.35 a technician-led ambulance crew arrived at Bridgewood House. Mr Heeney was found to have a Glasgow Coma Scale (“GCS”) of 4 and with oxygen saturation levels of 28%. At 06.44 an ambulance technician called for paramedic assistance. At 06.51 a paramedic-led ambulance crew arrived at Bridgewood House. At 07.25 the East Midlands Ambulance Service (“EMAS”) requested assistance from Northamptonshire Police in order to extricate Mr Heeney from his bedroom. At 07.36 two police officers arrived at Bridgewood House. They themselves requested additional support, with further officers arriving at 07.47. At or around 07.52 Mr Heeney was handcuffed to the rear by the police officers. They lifted Mr Heeney to his feet which caused postural hypotension which led to cardiac arrest. Advanced life support was commenced. A doctor attended and was able to intubate Mr Heeney with an endotracheal tube at or around 08.25. A return of spontaneous circulation was achieved at 08.36. Mr Heeney was eventually removed from his bedroom by means of a scoop stretcher. At 08.59 he departed from Bridgewood House to Northampton General Hospital. By the time that Mr Heeney arrived at Northampton General Hospital he was very unwell: his breathing was being managed by a ventilator. His oxygen saturations and blood pressure were very low. He was unconscious with a GCS of 3. Arterial blood gas measurements suggested a prolonged period of cardiac arrest. On 26th September 2019 Mr Heeney died.
Copies Sent To
2. East Midlands Ambulance Service
3. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.