Venkata Kagga
PFD Report
Partially Responded
Ref: 2018-0068
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Critical safety features for button batteries in household devices are lacking, and national safety alerts are not effectively sustained. Hospital policies for paediatric assessment and compliance were not followed, exacerbated by poor information sharing across services.
View full coroner's concerns
The button battery was likely to have come a remote control: Button batteries once ingested can lead to catastrophic consequences for a child: are used with increasing frequency in every day household devices which are often easily accessible by children: The remote control had no safety feature to prevent a child having easy access to the battery without the parents knowledge. Risks of button batteries to small children are not widely understood. Whilst there are precautions in place for children's toys similar precautions are not in place for commonly used household devices, which can easily be accessed by small children: NHS England issued a safety alert across the NHS in December 2014 relating to button batteries. During the inquest it was clear that the impact of that alert had lessened over time across the Trusts involved: The Trusts involved in the inquest had taken steps to highlight and reinforce the safety alert amongst their workforce but no such national work had taken place: day from July The from They
3. NWAS had a policy in place in relation to children under 5 that was not followed. Work had carried out within NWAS subsequent to the death to reinforce the importance of young children been seen by paediatricians. Similar work had not occurred nationally: The Hospital's POAU did not follow their system on 6th July and the Doctor on 6"h July did not undertake an examination. This was not picked up by the Trust until an internal investigation post death: There was not at the time an audit system in place to ensure that systems in the POAU were being complied with It is unclear if other POAUs will have audit systems to allow them to pick up on noncompliance with a recognised system.
5. The importance of carrying out a full assessment ofa child or documenting fully why it was not carried out on 6"h was not recognised by the medical staff involved_ NWAS staff partly based decision making on 9"h July on subjective assessment, which was not value checked with those who knew Venkata. The risks around subjective assessments particularly with young children with no basis on which to make a value comparison did not appear to be fully understood The 111 service obtained detailed accounts of the history of illness. However systems for sharing information across the NHS are such that this information was not shared beyond the OOH GP service.
3. NWAS had a policy in place in relation to children under 5 that was not followed. Work had carried out within NWAS subsequent to the death to reinforce the importance of young children been seen by paediatricians. Similar work had not occurred nationally: The Hospital's POAU did not follow their system on 6th July and the Doctor on 6"h July did not undertake an examination. This was not picked up by the Trust until an internal investigation post death: There was not at the time an audit system in place to ensure that systems in the POAU were being complied with It is unclear if other POAUs will have audit systems to allow them to pick up on noncompliance with a recognised system.
5. The importance of carrying out a full assessment ofa child or documenting fully why it was not carried out on 6"h was not recognised by the medical staff involved_ NWAS staff partly based decision making on 9"h July on subjective assessment, which was not value checked with those who knew Venkata. The risks around subjective assessments particularly with young children with no basis on which to make a value comparison did not appear to be fully understood The 111 service obtained detailed accounts of the history of illness. However systems for sharing information across the NHS are such that this information was not shared beyond the OOH GP service.
Responses
Action Planned
HSIB has launched a scoping exercise, including collecting further details about the incident and conducting a short literature review, to examine whether the case meets their criteria for investigation. (AI summary)
HSIB has launched a scoping exercise, including collecting further details about the incident and conducting a short literature review, to examine whether the case meets their criteria for investigation. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Ms Mutch,
Thank you for contacting the HSIB regarding the tragic death of Venkata Naga Lakshyasri Kagga. The concerns you have raised are profound; we offer our sincere condolences to the family.
The HSIB was established to investigate a range of systemic safety issues that cut across organisational boundaries. We undertake up to 30 investigations a year and focus on those with the most potential for new learning that have taken place since our inception on 1 April 2017.
Upon receiving your Regulation 28 letter dated 8 March 2018, we reviewed the content of your report in detail. We have also sought advice from a prominent subject matter expert and NHS Improvement. To fully examine whether the case meets our criteria for investigation, we have launched a scoping exercise, which will involve collecting further details about the incident and conducting a short literature review. We intend to keep you informed as our information gathering proceeds.
Thank you again for contacting us.
Thank you for contacting the HSIB regarding the tragic death of Venkata Naga Lakshyasri Kagga. The concerns you have raised are profound; we offer our sincere condolences to the family.
The HSIB was established to investigate a range of systemic safety issues that cut across organisational boundaries. We undertake up to 30 investigations a year and focus on those with the most potential for new learning that have taken place since our inception on 1 April 2017.
Upon receiving your Regulation 28 letter dated 8 March 2018, we reviewed the content of your report in detail. We have also sought advice from a prominent subject matter expert and NHS Improvement. To fully examine whether the case meets our criteria for investigation, we have launched a scoping exercise, which will involve collecting further details about the incident and conducting a short literature review. We intend to keep you informed as our information gathering proceeds.
Thank you again for contacting us.
Sent To
- The Royal Society for Prevention of Accidents
- Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch
- Department of Health and Social Care
- NHS England
Response Status
Linked responses
1 of 5
56-Day Deadline
11 Aug 2018
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 14"h July 2017 | commenced an investigation into the death of Venkata Lakshyasri KAGGA. The investigation concluded on the 28th February2018 and the conclusion was one of: Narrative: Died on 9th July 2017 from the recognised complications of an accidental ingestion of a button battery to 30th June 2017. She had been unwell in the intervening period and was seen on 4 occasions by doctors and on one occasion by ambulance staff but the presence of the battery was not established until post mortem_ The medical cause of death was; la) Haemorrhagic shock due to massive hematemesis; 1b) Oesophageal arterial fistula on a background ofan aberrant right subclavian artery; 1c) Oesophageal erosion from swallowed battery
Circumstances of the Death
On 30th June 2017 at 01:14 hours, Venkata Kagga'$ parents were concerned about her health and called the 111 service: The call was referred to the out of hours service and advice was to her parents: On 1st July 2017 her parents remained concerned about her and a further call was made to the 111 service. She was referred to the out of hours GP service: On Ist July 2017at 13.36 she saw a GP who examined her and referred her to the paediatric assessment unit (POAU) at Wythenshawe Hospital At the unit she was examined by a paediatrician who diagnosed tonsillitis and discharged with antibiotics: On 6th July 2017 her parents took her to see a GP concerned about health: The GP Naga prior given examined her and was concerned about the seven history of temperature. She referred her to the POAU at Wythenshawe hospital: At 17.20 Venkata and her family arrived at the POAU. The booking in process was not followed. Observations were not taken: The medical records were not completed: Venkata was not examined: The Doctor spoke with Venkata's father and decided to issue a further prescription for antibiotics without examining Venkata. The documentation stated that she could not get the antibiotics the GP. This is not what was recorded in the GP letter. Venkata and her family returned home: On gth July 2017 at 09.44,her father called 999.He called because his daughter had reported being unable to see. An ambulance was dispatched: The crew arrived at 09.54 hours. Venkata was lying on a mattress with her mother. The crew carried out a limited assessment of Venkata. North West Ambulance Service (NWAS} policy requires all under 5's to be taken to hospital for specialist assessment: This did not happen: At 18.13 on 9th 2017 a 999 call was made. At 18.18 North West Ambulance Service staff were at the scene: Venkata was making no respiratory effort and there was no palpable pulse. She was transferred to Stepping Hill Hospital where attempts to resuscitate her were unsuccessful, Post mortem examination showed that a button battery was lodged in her esophagus and had eroded the oesophageal wall causing an oesophageal arterial fistula leading to her death_
Action Should Be Taken
In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe you have the power to take such action:
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.