Recommendation BAHA-40: Battlegroup Detention Officer
From The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry - Volume III, published 8 September 2011.
Recommendation
Each Battlegroup should have a “Detention Officer” being a commissioned officer within Battlegroup Headquarters. The role should encompass coordination and management of CPERS; acting as a focus on CPERS matters during mission specific training; ensuring that Military Annual Training Test (MATT 7) and other training relevant to CPERS inculcates the vital messages about the correct handling of CPERS; assisting the Commanding Officer during operations by monitoring compliance with timescales, record keeping and other CPERS handling standards; acting as a clear point of contact with Brigade on CPERS matters and liaising as necessary with the Military Provost Staff (MPS); ensuring that the responsibility for CPERS does not ‘fall between the cracks’ of other Battlegroup level officers.
In brief (written by this site)
The Inquiry recommended that each battlegroup appoint a commissioned detention officer for captured personnel. In March 2014, Mark Francois, Minister for the Armed Forces, stated that the Ministry of Defence had "taken action to consider and address all the accepted recommendations in the report" (Mr Mark Francois, Mar 2014). In December 2014, Sir Thayne Forbes, Chairman of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, noted in the inquiry's report that this recommendation might well have formed part of its own recommendations (Sir Thayne Forbes, Dec 2014).
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 12 Oct 2026. The record below is the sources' own words.
About this summary
This recommendation applies across many organisations. The record reflects central policy activity; adoption in individual organisations may vary.
Government response
I can inform this House that I am accepting in principle all of his recommendations with one reservation.
How this response relates to the recommendation
Site note: The words are the Secretary of State for Defence's statement to the House of Commons of 8 September 2011 as the Ministry of Defence published it on GOV.UK, which is the page the site cites. The Official Report of the statement as delivered (HC Deb vol 532, col 571) differs slightly in wording: it reads "I can inform the House that I am accepting in principle all his recommendations with one reservation."
Blanket government agreement does not establish acceptance or delivery by each addressee. Some response passages cover groups of recommendations.
Scope of the government response
The Secretary of State for Defence accepted all of the report's 73 recommendations in principle together, in one sentence of his statement to the House of Commons on 8 September 2011, with one reservation: the recommendation on tactical questioning (BAHA-23), which he said he could not accept. That sentence is not a response to any one recommendation alone, and the Ministry of Defence published no response to each recommendation. A written ministerial statement of 27 March 2014 said the Ministry of Defence had taken action to consider and address all the accepted recommendations, and said of recommendation 44 that the existing inspection regime did not require further amendment.
Delivery
Ministry of Defence says completed (27 March 2014)
I am pleased to announce that the Ministry of Defence has now taken action to consider and address all the accepted recommendations in the report.
From: Baha Mousa Report, Mr Mark Francois, Minister for the Armed Forces
What other bodies have found
In their own words. These do not change the delivery statement above.
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk (17 December 2014)
Sir William made a total of 73 Recommendations. Initially, the Ministry of Defence (“MoD”) decided to implement all but one of them (i.e. Recommendation 23, dealing with the interrogation technique known as “harshing). Of those, Recommendations 5, 7 (in part, viz. deprivation of food and drink), 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 36, 40, 42, 43, 44, 57, 59, 62, 66, 67 might well have formed part of the recommendations at the conclusion of the Al-Sweady Report.
From: The Report of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, Part 5, Chapter 2: Recommendations, Sir Thayne Forbes, Chairman, The Al-Sweady Inquiry
Site note: This is the Al-Sweady Inquiry's report (Sir Thayne Forbes, 17 December 2014), Part 5, Chapter 2, not a statement by the Ministry of Defence. The Inquiry is reporting what it decided and what the Ministry told it; it sets no delivery status for any recommendation.
Site note: Paragraph 5.101 gives this passage once, for 28 of the recommendations together (5, 7 in part, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 36, 40, 42, 43, 44, 57, 59, 62, 66 and 67). The same words are recorded on each of them except BAHA-23 and BAHA-29, which carry the report's own passages about them. The next paragraph, 5.102, says the Inquiry would not re-consider "that which has already been considered and implemented, or is being implemented", without saying which recommendations are which.
Source
Responsible bodies
Themes and tags
Who has spoken
- Ministry of Defence
Response, delivery statement - assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
Finding