Recommendation AG-6: MASTS Documentation and Training Clarity
From The Anthony Grainger Inquiry Report into the Death of Anthony Grainger, published 11 July 2019.
Recommendation
All documents and training relating to Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) should: clearly differentiate between MASTS as an operational method of supporting surveillance (and delivering a standard range of tactical options), and the additional tactical options of 'intervention' and 'interception' that MASTS trained authorised firearms officers (AFOs) can deliver; make clear that a MASTS deployment authorisation should not be taken to imply that 'intervention' or 'interception' are preauthorised or preferred tactical outcomes; note that decisive action by MASTS officers is a high-risk option and explain what factors lead to higher risks (for example, the presence of a subject inside a stationary vehicle); and make clear that the reasons for any strategic or tactical command decision in a firearms operation (including any decision to authorise such an operation) must be recorded at the time the decision is made unless it is impracticable to do so, in which case such reasons, together with a full explanation for not recording them at the time, must be recorded as soon as possible.
In brief (written by this site)
In June 2020, Kit Malthouse, Minister of State, stated that implementing the recommendation was complex and required reviewing national armed policing policy and training, leading the National Police Chiefs' Council to take the lead with input from the College of Policing and Greater Manchester Police (Kit Malthouse, Jun 2020). Relaying the addressee's position in May 2020, the Home Office explained that a joint review of training guidance addressed parts of the recommendation, though "certain aspects require further work" against a provisional completion target of 31 July 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020).
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 26 Sep 2026. The record below is the sources' own words.
About this summary
This recommendation applies across many organisations. The record reflects central policy activity; adoption in individual organisations may vary.
Government response
28. This recommendation is complex and has required a review of Authorised Professional Practice (APP), the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC) and associated policy and doctrine. NPCC have decided to take responsibility, given the important national implications and dependencies. 29. The College of Policing and NPCC's review of the relevant Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) module of the NPFTC and the guidance therein specifically addresses some of the above recommendations, but certain aspects require further work. The NPFTC was amended in 2015 to clarify that MASTS should be understood as an operational platform from which a number of options can be delivered rather than as a tactic. The outcome of decisive armed intervention (using firearms to challenge a subject) should not be taken as inevitable or pre-authorised. 30. These actions will ensure that there is a greater differentiation, and recognition of the higher risks, between the deployment of MASTS as support to surveillance and as an additional tactic of decisive armed intervention and interception. The provisional target is to complete work by 31 July 2020.
How this response relates to the recommendation
Site note: These are the Home Office's words, from the government's response of 19 May 2020, which sets out "the actions committed to by the organisations to whom Anthony Grainger Inquiry recommendations were addressed". This recommendation is addressed to the National Police Chiefs' Council; the passage is the Home Office's account of a review by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs' Council, not that body's own statement.
Delivery
Home Office states no delivery position (9 June 2020)
The implementation of the recommendation on Mobile Armed Support To Surveillance (MASTS) was complex and required a review of national armed policing policy and training. Hence it was considered right for NPCC to take the lead, with input from the College of Policing and Greater Manchester Police.
Earlier statement on delivery (1)
Home Office (19 May 2020)
29. The College of Policing and NPCC’s review of the relevant Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) module of the NPFTC and the guidance therein specifically addresses some of the above recommendations, but certain aspects require further work. The NPFTC was amended in 2015 to clarify that MASTS should be understood as an operational platform from which a number of options can be delivered rather than as a tactic. The outcome of decisive armed intervention (using firearms to challenge a subject) should not be taken as inevitable or pre-authorised.
30. These actions will ensure that there is a greater differentiation, and recognition of the higher risks, between the deployment of MASTS as support to surveillance and as an additional tactic of decisive armed intervention and interception. The provisional target is to complete work by 31 July 2020.
From: Government response to the Anthony Grainger public inquiry (accessible version)
Site note: These are the Home Office's words, from the government's response of 19 May 2020, which sets out "the actions committed to by the organisations to whom Anthony Grainger Inquiry recommendations were addressed". This recommendation is addressed to the National Police Chiefs' Council; the passage is the Home Office's account of a review by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs' Council, not that body's own statement.
Source
Responsible bodies
Themes and tags
Who has spoken
- Home Office
Response, delivery statement