Recommendation ANG-11: Strengthen information-sharing practices
From Angiolini Inquiry Part 1 Report, published 29 February 2024.
Recommendation
By December 2024, the College of Policing, in collaboration with force vetting and recruitment units, should ensure that information-sharing practices, including data retention policies, are strengthened in order to prevent those who commit sexually motivated crimes against women and those otherwise unsuitable for policing from remaining in, or moving across, the policing profession. In particular, there should be a focus on the following information: a. Previous failures to achieve vetting should be recorded by all forces and flagged to recruiting forces. This should also trigger a re-vet with the current or recruiting force. b. A shared agreement should be made about the quality, relevant and necessary content, and sources of information that will be provided in a reference for a future force, also known as a 'shared referencing protocol', with directed questions that must be answered (for example, regarding any past disciplinary or honesty/integrity issues). Information to be shared as part of the protocol should be covered within the relevant forces' fair processing notices. The protocol should apply to all transfers and applications to police forces from individuals in the uniformed services, including: the Ministry of Defence (including the Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, as well as their respective reserve forces); fire and rescue services; HM Prison and Probation Service; other police forces; and relevant government agencies, such as Border Force or Immigration Enforcement. This is to improve forces' access to – and ability to use – the totality of information they hold about officers in order to prevent, detect and deal with those likely to commit offences. c. As per Recommendation 8(b), there should be expanded access to and use of the Police National Database, including as a tool for revealing relevant uninvestigated adverse information about officers. d. Any adverse information or intelligence (developed or otherwise) should be passed by the current Professional Standards Directorate to the receiving Professional Standards Directorate for any officers transferring. No decisions on their appointment should be made until that intelligence has been reviewed, recorded and closed and the vetting units have had time to consider it. If the recruiting force identifies adverse information as a result of the vetting process, this should be shared with the current force for consideration and potential action.
In brief (written by this site)
The Inquiry asked the College of Policing to strengthen police information-sharing and vetting practices. In October 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that intelligence-sharing between professional standards directorates had been addressed through the Authorised Professional Practice on Vetting, while force migration to the CoreVet platform was continuing, a national shared referencing protocol was targeted for early 2027, and continuous integrity screening remained subject to funding (Cabinet Office, Oct 2026). Previously, in December 2025, the Angiolini Inquiry found that progress on three of the four sub-recommendations depended on external organisations or IT systems, risking delays of up to two years (Rt Hon. Lady Elish Angiolini LT DBE PC KC, Dec 2025).
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 16 Oct 2026. The record below is the sources' own words.
About this summary
This recommendation applies across many organisations. The record reflects central policy activity; adoption in individual organisations may vary.
Government response
The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and College of Policing has at the same time committed to addressing the remaining recommendations in Lady Angiolini's report concerning police culture and increasing the robustness of police vetting.
Earlier statement from Home Office (1)
However, the report today highlights the need for further action and the government, in tandem with policing partners, will thoroughly consider the recommendations made by Lady Elish and respond in full in due course.
Delivery
Cabinet Office says in progress (5 October 2026)
The long-term solution is the migration of all forces to cloud based vetting management software platform CoreVet. This will enable national visibility of previous vetting applications and outcomes. Forces already on the platform will upgrade over the next six to eight months and Corevet continues to engage with forces not yet on the platform.
Work is underway to develop a national shared referencing protocol that extends beyond traditional employment references to include vetting considerations and relevant misconduct intelligence. The Home Office remains actively involved in the programme, with implementation of key information sharing arrangements targeted by early 2027.
Implementation relies on the delivery of a Continuous Integrity Screening tool, subject to funding.
This sub recommendation has been addressed through the Authorised Professional Practice on Vetting
From: Angiolini Inquiry Recommendations Dashboard, October 2026 (data file)
Site note: The dashboard reports recommendation 11 by its sub-recommendations, a to d. Each paragraph is one sub-recommendation's cell, in that order. The dashboard gives the recommendation itself the status "See sub-recommendations" and the sub-recommendations as in progress on a, b and c and completed on d; the site records it as completed only when every sub-recommendation is.
What other bodies have found
In their own words. These do not change the delivery statement above.
Angiolini Inquiry (2 December 2025)
1.37 Summary of progress: While progress is being made, three out of the four sub-recommendations for Recommendation 11 are dependent on the implementation of the right IT systems or external organisations, potentially causing a delay of six months to two years until successful implementation.
Responsible bodies
Themes and tags
Who has spoken
- Home Office
Response - Cabinet Office
Delivery statement - Angiolini Inquiry
Finding