Emergency contingency plans
Lack of pre-existing contingency plans for emergencies (e.g., pandemics), leading to a scramble and flawed early scheme design.
320 items
1 source
26 inquiries
Source spread
Where this theme appears
Emergency contingency plans has been flagged across 1 independent accountability source:
320 inquiry recs
This theme has been identified in one data source. As more data is added, cross-references may emerge.
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Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Inquiry Recommendations (320) — showing 50 strongest matches
COVID-M6.1 — Pandemic Planning for Adult Social Care
Recommendation: The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should each establish clear arrangements for pandemic planning in adult social care. Those arrangements should facilitate the production of pandemic plans for adult social care at the government, local …
Gov response: No formal government response published. The Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the Module 6 report of 20 October 2026 when the Executive Office's publications list was checked on 20 October 2026.
No response yet
88 — Evacuation routes that avoid distressing scenes
Recommendation: Routes for evacuation away from an accident should take into account the need to avoid distressing scenes (para 2.11).
Unknown
87 — Faster earthing and isolation of traction current
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to means of speeding up the process of earthing and isolation of traction current following an accident on an electrified section of line (para 2.15).
Unknown
82 — Review protocols between Railtrack, BTP and HMRI
Recommendation: Existing protocols between Railtrack, BTP and HMRI should be reviewed in the light of the above Recommendations (para 15.24).
Unknown
53 — Practical exercises to prove passenger evacuation standards
Recommendation: Standards for evacuation of passengers should be proved by practical exercises using typical groups of passengers and train crew, and repeated on a regular basis to be approved by HMRI (para 11.11).
Unknown
47 — Internal doors that open easily in a crash
Recommendation: The design of coaches should be such that internal doors can be easily opened in a crash situation, in darkness and irrespective of the attitude of the vehicle; and that hammers intended for breaking windows can be easily located in …
Unknown
44 — Review of internal safety features in passenger vehicles
Recommendation: A review should be carried out by ATOC, with input from all interested bodies, on the ways in which internal safety features may be modified and standardised to provide the best practicable means of emergency exit under accident conditions, including …
Unknown
14 — National procedures on failure of train-borne safety equipment
Recommendation: Clear procedures for steps to be taken on failure of any train-borne safety equipment should apply nationally, subject only to such company variation as is fully justified (para 15.11).
Unknown
4 — Driver training in abnormal situations
Recommendation: Driver training should include driving in abnormal situations permitted by the Rules and specifically driving with AWS isolated to the extent so permitted, including the use of simulators (para 16.4).
Unknown
106 — Emergency training part of the SMS
Recommendation: The operator’s system for emergency training and its enforcement should form part of its SMS (para 20.64).
Unknown
105 — UKOOA guidelines for emergency training
Recommendation: The UKOOA guidelines for offshore emergency safety training on installations should be a minimum requirement for survival, fire-fighting and other forms of training detailed therein for the relevant personnel employed offshore. Personnel who have not met the requirements of these …
Unknown
104 — Lists of personnel on board
Recommendation: Operators should maintain lists of personnel on board by alphabetical order and also by reference to the names of contractors whose personnel are represented on board. These lists should be updated for every movement of personnel and copied immediately to …
Unknown
103 — Reporting precautionary musters
Recommendation: The circumstances of all precautionary musters and evacuations should be reported by operators to the regulatory body (para 20.62).
Unknown
102 — One muster per tour of duty
Recommendation: All offshore staff should attend one muster per tour of duty (para 20.62).
Unknown
101 — UKOOA guidelines for drills and exercises
Recommendation: Offshore emergency drills and exercises should be carried out in accordance with the UKOOA guidelines for offshore emergency drills and exercises on installations (paras 20.61 and 20.64).
Unknown
100 — Drills and exercises part of the SMS
Recommendation: The operator’s system for emergency drills and exercises should form part of its SMS (paras 20.61 and 20.64).
Unknown
97 — Command organisation part of the SMS
Recommendation: The operator’s formal command organisation which is to function in the event of an emergency should form part of its SMS (para 20.59).
Unknown
77 — Helicopter flight following system
Recommendation: Operators should adopt a flight following system for determining at short notice the availability and capacity of helicopters in the event of an emergency. This system could be either a system operated by the individual operator or a North Sea-wide …
Unknown
76 — Immediate analysis without waiting for legislation
Recommendation: The regulatory body should ask operators which have not already done so to undertake an evacuation, escape and rescue analysis forthwith, without waiting for legislation. The timetable for completion of this analysis should be agreed between the regulatory body and …
Unknown
75 — Specific matters the analysis must cover
Recommendation: In particular the analysis should specify:- (i) The formal command structure for the control of an emergency affecting the installation; (ii) The likely availability and capacity of helicopters, whether in-field or otherwise, for the evacuation of personnel; (iii) The types, …
Unknown
74 — Content of the analysis
Recommendation: The analysis should specify the facilities and other arrangements which would be available for the evacuation, escape and rescue of personnel in the event of an emergency which makes it necessary or advisable in the interests of safety for personnel …
Unknown
73 — Evacuation, escape and rescue analysis
Recommendation: Operators should be required by regulation to submit to the regulatory body for its acceptance an evacuation, escape and rescue analysis in respect of each of its installations (para 20.9).
Unknown
72 — Shutdown in emergency on connected installation
Recommendation: Operators should be required by regulation to institute and review regularly a procedure for shutting down production on an installation in the event of an emergency on another installation which is connected to the first by a hydrocarbon pipeline where …
Unknown
71 — Review of pipeline emergency procedures
Recommendation: Operators should be required by regulation regularly to review pipeline emergency procedures and manuals. The review should ensure that the information contained in manuals is correct, that the procedures contained are agreed with those who are responsible for executing them …
Unknown
70 — Availability standards for protective systems
Recommendation: Where a regulation imposes a requirement for a major emergency or protective system, such as a fire deluge system, it should be required that the operator should set acceptance standards for its availability (para 19.199).
Unknown
69 — Immediate review of emergency systems
Recommendation: The regulatory body should ask operators which have not already done so to review forthwith the ability of emergency systems to withstand severe accident conditions (para 19.191).
Unknown
68 — Studies on emergency system vulnerability
Recommendation: Studies should be done to determine the vulnerability of emergency systems to severe accident conditions and to enhance their ability to survive such conditions (para 19.190).
Unknown
67 — Standardisation of status lights and alarms
Recommendation: The regulatory body should work with the industry to achieve standardisation of status lights and of alarm systems for emergencies (para 19.194).
Unknown
65 — Emergency systems in the Safety Case
Recommendation: The ability of emergency systems to survive severe accident conditions should be a feature of the Safety Case (para 19.189).
Unknown
64 — Survivability of emergency systems
Recommendation: The regulations and related guidance notes should promote an approach to emergency systems:- (i) which provides to a high degree the ability of these systems to survive severe accident conditions (paras 19.188-189); and (ii) which applies to communications systems the …
Unknown
63 — Radio Room in the TSR
Recommendation: It should be required by regulation that a Radio Room with facilities for external communications should be located in the TSR (para 19.179). On existing installations where the Radio Room is not in the TSR, these facilities should be in …
Unknown
62 — Facilities for control of emergencies
Recommendation: It should be required by regulation that there should be available within the TSR certain minimum specified facilities for the monitoring and control of an emergency under hostile outside conditions (paras 19.178 and 19.182). These facilities should be in the …
Unknown
61 — Studies on breathable air in the TSR
Recommendation: Studies should be carried out with the objective of assisting designers in predicting the breathability of air in a TSR where its external fire wall is subjected to a severe hydrocarbon fire (para 19.163).
Unknown
60 — Immediate assessment of smoke ingress
Recommendation: The regulatory body should ask operators which have not already done so to carry out forthwith an assessment of the risk of ingress of smoke or gas into the accommodation; and to fit smoke and gas detectors and implement ventilation …
Unknown
59 — Emergency lighting and signs
Recommendation: It should be required by regulation that escape routes are provided with adequate and reliable emergency lighting and with photoluminescent direction signs (para 19.175).
Unknown
58 — Escape routes to remain passable
Recommendation: The regulations and related guidance notes on escape routes should recognise that it may not be practicable to protect escape routes against all physical conditions; and accordingly should be based on the objective that they should remain passable (para 19.174).
Unknown
57 — Ventilation intakes and detectors
Recommendation: For the purpose of maintaining breathable air within the accommodation, it should be required by regulation that the ventilation air intakes should be provided with smoke and gas detectors and that on smoke or gas alarm the ventilation and dampers …
Unknown
55 — Regulations on accommodation and escape routes
Recommendation: Provisions should continue to be made by regulations supported by guidance notes as to the construction of the accommodation; and as to escape routes and embarkation points (para 19.166).
Unknown
51 — Fire water deluge survivability
Recommendation: The ability of the fire water deluge system, including the fire pump system, to survive severe accident conditions should be a feature of the Safety Case (para 19.100).
Unknown
48 — Vulnerability of emergency shutdown valves
Recommendation: Studies should be done to determine the vulnerability of ESVs to severe accident conditions and to enhance their ability to survive such conditions (para 19.43).
Unknown
47 — Emergency shutdown valve activation
Recommendation: The arrangements for the activation of the emergency shutdown valves (ESVs), and of SSIVs if fitted, on pipelines should be a feature of the Safety Case (para 19.42).
Unknown
45 — Studies on inventory and pipeline connections
Recommendation: Studies should be carried out with the following objectives:- (i) To explore the feasibility of dumping in an emergency large oil inventories, such as those in the separators, in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner, so as to minimise the …
Unknown
7 — Safety Case specification of TSR and escape
Recommendation: In connection with the above the Safety Case should specify the following:- In respect of the TSR- — its function — the conditions which constitute its integrity — the conditions for integrity of its supporting structure — the events in …
Unknown
6 — Temporary Safe Refuge as accommodation
Recommendation: The TSR should normally be the accommodation (paras 19.156 and 19.161). In the case of existing installations any requirement for the upgrading of the accommodation, escape routes and embarkation points should be determined on the basis of the Safety Case …
Unknown
5 — Design accidental events and acceptance standards
Recommendation: For the purposes of the demonstration referred to in para (iii) of recommendation 4, the accidental events are to be identified by the operator. A design accidental event is an event which will not cause the loss of any of …
Unknown
16 — Emergency checklists under the ISM Code
Recommendation: We recommend that the checklists provided for by the ISM Code should cover all reasonably foreseeable emergency procedures and that they should be readily available to the master or skipper at all times.
Unknown
9 — Statutory duty for Thames search and rescue
Recommendation: We maintain the recommendation made by the TSI that a statutory duty be imposed upon an appropriate entity or agency to assess and ensure the adequate provision and co-ordination of SAR facilities on the Thames.
Unknown
8 — Keep Thames search and rescue under review
Recommendation: We welcome the agreement by the RNLI to provide lifeboat cover on the Thames 24 hours a day 365 days of the year and recommend that the SAR requirements on the Thames be kept under continuous review.
Unknown
COVID-M5.11 — Data and Technology in Emergency Procurement
Recommendation: Within three years of the publication of this Report, the systems for the procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment should be digitalised and interoperable across the UK government and devolved administrations. As a minimum, these systems should be able to …
Gov response: No formal government response published. The Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the Module 5 report of 14 July 2026 when the Executive Office's publications list was checked on 25 September 2026.
No response yet
COVID-M5.9 — Commercial Framework for Emergency Procurement
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should collaborate to establish a UK-wide commercial framework agreement of pre-approved external specialists in the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment. The framework should be refreshed every three years.
Gov response: No formal government response published. The Northern Ireland Executive had not published a response to the Module 5 report of 14 July 2026 when the Executive Office's publications list was checked on 25 September 2026.
No response yet