Emergency contingency plans
Lack of pre-existing contingency plans for emergencies (e.g., pandemics), leading to a scramble and flawed early scheme design.
244 items
1 source
19 inquiries
Source spread
Where this theme appears
Emergency contingency plans has been flagged across 1 independent accountability source:
244 inquiry recs
This theme has been identified in one data source. As more data is added, cross-references may emerge.
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Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Inquiry Recommendations (244) — showing 50 strongest matches
COVID-M5.11 — Data and Technology in Emergency Procurement
Recommendation: Within three years of the publication of this Report, the systems for the procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment should be digitalised and interoperable across the UK government and devolved administrations. As a minimum, these systems should be able to …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.9 — Commercial Framework for Emergency Procurement
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should collaborate to establish a UK-wide commercial framework agreement of pre-approved external specialists in the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment. The framework should be refreshed every three years.
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.7 — Trade and Industry in the Civil Emergency Strategy
Recommendation: The UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy, which the Inquiry has recommended should be developed by the UK government and devolved administrations (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4), should include specific objectives for international trade and domestic industry during …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.6 — Blueprints for Critical Care Medical Technology
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should jointly commission a group of experts to develop blueprints for rapidly scalable critical care medical technology, aligned with the range and severity of pandemic risks identified in the National Security Risk Assessment, within …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.5 — Emergency Healthcare Equipment Plan
Recommendation: UK regulators, including the Health and Safety Executive, the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland, the Office for Product Safety and Standards and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, should establish an emergency healthcare equipment cross-regulator plan for …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.4 — Emergency Healthcare Equipment Regulations
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should publish simplified regulations for emergency healthcare equipment that are aligned with and cover the range and severity of pandemic risks identified in the National Security Risk Assessment. The simplified regulations should: establish the …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.3 — Emergency Procurement and Distribution Systems
Recommendation: The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, within 12 months of the publication of this Report, should each have ready systems for the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment. These new systems must: integrate procurement …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.2 — Pandemic Exercises to Include Emergency Procurement
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should evaluate the readiness of the structures, systems and processes for the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment as part of UK-wide pandemic response exercises.
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.1 — Pandemic Stockpile Composition and Inspection
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should ensure, within 12 months of the publication of this Report, that the pandemic stockpiles: retain stock that is better aligned with the range and severity of pandemic risks identified in the National Security …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M3.7 — ICU Resource Allocation Framework
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should publish a UK-wide framework setting out ethical and operational principles to guide the allocation of adult intensive care resources in the extreme event that they are saturated during a pandemic. That framework must: …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M3.6 — Scale Up Hospital Capacity
Recommendation: The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should work with trusts and health boards to ensure that pandemic plans include practical steps to rapidly scale up hospital capacity to treat acutely unwell patients. This should include …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M3.5 — Scale Up Urgent and Emergency Care
Recommendation: The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive, in conjunction with organisations responsible for delivering services, should plan for surge capacity in urgent and emergency care during a pandemic. Plans must ensure that there is sufficient workforce …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M3.2 — Visiting Restrictions Guidance
Recommendation: The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should publish guidance for the implementation of visiting restrictions in hospitals in the event of a future pandemic. The guidance should identify the circumstances in which visiting restrictions should …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
FENN-88 — Conduct biannual joint emergency services exercises involving staff and public
Recommendation: There shall be a joint exercise with the emergency services at least twice each year. London Underground must involve as many different fire stations, staff and members of the public as possible.
Unknown
FENN-12 — Include evacuation by train within all station emergency evacuation plans.
Recommendation: Station evacuation plans should include evacuation by train.
Unknown
FENN-9 — Agree station emergency instructions with LFB for staff training
Recommendation: Station instructions for emergencies and closure must be agreed with the London Fire Brigade and used in training station staff.
Unknown
HIDD-87 — Develop and regularly exercise effective emergency plans for all station staff
Recommendation: BR shall ensure that each area manager, station manager and all senior station staff have an effective emergency plan for their area that is understood by all their staff and is the subject of regular exercises.
Unknown
HIDD-82 — BR to review and test communication systems with emergency services weekly
Recommendation: BR shall review its communication systems with the emergency services to ensure that efficient methods exist to provide and disseminate early information requiring immediate action. In the course of the review BR shall look particularly at communication between signal boxes …
Unknown
HIDD-81 — BR to equip signal boxes with direct lines and emergency dialling systems
Recommendation: BR shall complete its programme of equipping major signal boxes with direct lines to the appropriate electrical control and equipping other signal boxes with priority emergency dialling systems. Those direct lines and emergency dialling systems shall be logged and tested …
Unknown
HIDD-79 — Department of Health to review Circular 71, clarifying Major Incident declaration terms
Recommendation: The Department of Health shall review DHSS Circular 71 in consultation with emergency and medical services to reflect all lessons learned but in particular in relation to procedures for declaring a Major Incident. The Department of Health shall specifically require …
Unknown
HIDD-76 — Require BR and emergency services to maintain joint planning with table-top exercises
Recommendation: In the exercise of command and control at accident sites BR and the emergency services shall maintain their policy of joint planning supported by table-top exercises.
Unknown
HIDD-74 — Require emergency services to recognise Civil Police primacy in non-fire accidents
Recommendation: The emergency services shall recognise the primacy of the Civil Police authority in accidents of this kind where there is no fire. This recognition does not preclude delegation to the LFB of control at trackside.
Unknown
P1-44 — Investigate LFB-MPS-LAS system compatibility
Recommendation: Steps be taken to investigate the compatibility of the LFB systems with those of the MPS and the LAS with a view to enabling all three emergency services' systems to read each other's messages.
Gov response: The London Fire Brigade accepted all Phase 1 recommendations directed to it, stating: "We accept the recommendations in both the Phase 1 Grenfell Report and HMICFRS inspection report." LFB published a Transformation Delivery Plan setting …
Accepted
P1-43 — Use METHANE messages for Major Incidents
Recommendation: A 'METHANE' (Major incident declared, Exact location, Type of incident, Hazards, Access, Number and type of casualties, Emergency services present and required) message should be sent as soon as possible by the emergency service declaring a Major Incident.
Gov response: The government accepted in principle all Phase 1 recommendations directed at central government. The Housing Secretary Robert Jenrick presented the formal response to Parliament on 21 January 2020, committing to new duties on building owners …
Accepted
P1-42 — Designate single point of contact in control rooms
Recommendation: A single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication.
Gov response: The government accepted in principle all Phase 1 recommendations directed at central government. The Housing Secretary Robert Jenrick presented the formal response to Parliament on 21 January 2020, committing to new duties on building owners …
Accepted
P1-41 — Establish inter-service control room communications
Recommendation: On the declaration of a Major Incident clear lines of communication must be established as soon as possible between the control rooms of the individual emergency services.
Gov response: The government accepted in principle all Phase 1 recommendations directed at central government. The Housing Secretary Robert Jenrick presented the formal response to Parliament on 21 January 2020, committing to new duties on building owners …
Accepted
P1-40 — Communicate Major Incident declarations to all responders
Recommendation: Each emergency service must communicate the declaration of a Major Incident to all other Category 1 Responders as soon as possible.
Gov response: The government accepted in principle all Phase 1 recommendations directed at central government. The Housing Secretary Robert Jenrick presented the formal response to Parliament on 21 January 2020, committing to new duties on building owners …
Accepted
MAI-157 — Review stretcher availability for mass casualties
Recommendation: The Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, the Department for Transport and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities should conduct a review to ensure that stretchers that are appropriate in design and adequate in numbers …
Gov response: The Home Secretary made a written statement to Parliament on 3 November 2022 following publication of Volume 2, acknowledging the findings on emergency response failures and stating the government would work with emergency services to …
Accepted
MAI-130 — Public Access Trauma kit availability
Recommendation: The Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care should consider how to ensure Public Access Trauma kits are available in all locations where they are most likely to be needed.
Gov response: The Home Secretary made a written statement to Parliament on 3 November 2022 following publication of Volume 2, acknowledging the findings on emergency response failures and stating the government would work with emergency services to …
Accepted
In progress
MAI-107 — Ensure immediate HART resource deployment
Recommendation: The Department of Health and Social Care and the National Ambulance Resilience Unit should develop procedures to ensure that, so far as possible, each ambulance service trust is able to deploy or call upon HART resources immediately in the event …
Gov response: The Home Secretary made a written statement to Parliament on 3 November 2022 following publication of Volume 2, acknowledging the findings on emergency response failures and stating the government would work with emergency services to …
Accepted
In progress
MAI-47 — Sufficient resources for operational planning
Recommendation: His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing and the Home Office should work together to put in place robust systems, policies and guidance to ensure that all police services have sufficient resources dedicated …
Gov response: The Home Secretary made a written statement to Parliament on 3 November 2022 following publication of Volume 2, acknowledging the findings on emergency response failures and stating the government would work with emergency services to …
Accepted
In progress
MAI-46 — Guidance on Major Incident plan review frequency
Recommendation: His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the College of Policing and the Home Office should issue guidance for all police services on how often operational plans for responding to a Major Incident, including a terrorist incident, …
Gov response: The Home Secretary made a written statement to Parliament on 3 November 2022 following publication of Volume 2, acknowledging the findings on emergency response failures and stating the government would work with emergency services to …
Accepted
In progress
MAI-44 — Ambulance trusts submit resource recommendations
Recommendation: Having carried out that review, the trusts should make recommendations to their NHS commissioners about the additional and/or different resources they require in order to ensure that they are able to respond effectively to a mass casualty incident in the …
Gov response: The Home Secretary made a written statement to Parliament on 3 November 2022 following publication of Volume 2, acknowledging the findings on emergency response failures and stating the government would work with emergency services to …
Accepted
In progress
MAI-42 — SMG sharing of emergency response plans
Recommendation: SMG should review its processes to ensure that it shares with Greater Manchester Police, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, British Transport Police and North West Ambulance Service its most current emergency response plans and policies for dealing with an …
Gov response: The Home Secretary made a written statement to Parliament on 3 November 2022 following publication of Volume 2, acknowledging the findings on emergency response failures and stating the government would work with emergency services to …
Accepted
COVID-M5.10 — Transparency, Governance and Accountability in Emergencies
Recommendation: The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should improve transparency, governance and accountability for procurement in an emergency. As a minimum, these improvements should include the following: Enhancing transparency Any central digital platform used for procurement …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
COVID-M5.8 — Training in Emergency Procurement and Distribution
Recommendation: The UK government and devolved administrations should each establish a pool of officials who are trained in the emergency procurement and distribution of healthcare equipment. Completion of the training should be mandatory for at least 20% of the workforce of …
Gov response: No formal response published by this government.
Unknown
SP9 — NWAS Major Incident declaration procedures
Recommendation: North West Ambulance Service should review its procedures for declaring a Major Incident or Major Incident (Standby) to ensure clarity in how declarations are made and how they are communicated internally and to other emergency services.
Gov response: DHSC and NHS England support the issues that the recommendations for the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) are directed towards. However, while NHS England considers local review of procedures and terminology to be important and …
Accepted
In progress
TAYL-F63 — Brief entrance police on emergency service plans and deployment information
Recommendation: Police officers posted at the entrances to the ground should be briefed as to the contingency plans for the arrival of emergency services and should be informed when such services are called as to where and why they are required.
Unknown
TAYL-F62 — Review emergency vehicle access, rendezvous points, and internal ground accessibility
Recommendation: Contingency plans for the arrival at each designated sports ground of emergency vehicles from all three services should be reviewed. They should include routes of access, rendezvous points, and accessibility within the ground itself.
Unknown
FENN-152 — Consider national disaster planning desk for experience and emergency coordination
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to a national disaster planning desk where the experience gained from disasters and their investigation and civil emergencies can be retained. Advice on the coordination of individual emergency plans should also be available at a national …
Unknown
FENN-119 — Improve London Fire Brigade radio communications for firefighters operating below ground.
Recommendation: The London Fire Brigade must improve the means of radio communications between fire-fighters below ground.
Unknown
FENN-118 — Provide public address equipment on all trains for crew and controller use.
Recommendation: There shall be public address equipment on all trains for use by the crew and the line controller.
Unknown
FENN-116 — Issue radios to station staff and ensure compatibility with tunnel equipment.
Recommendation: Station staff shall be issued with radios. Station radio equipment shall be made compatible with that used in the running tunnels.
Unknown
FENN-115 — Clearly mark station telephones, PA controls, and expand public payphone provision.
Recommendation: Platform and kiosk telephones, together with controls for public address equipment, must be clearly marked. At all telephone points there should be a list of key telephone numbers. An aide memoire of important telephone numbers should be issued to London …
Unknown
FENN-111 — Ensure British Transport Police and Fire Brigade radio compatibility in underground stations.
Recommendation: The radio equipment in underground stations for the British Transport Police must be made compatible with that used by the London Fire Brigade.
Unknown
FENN-48 — Fit locked emergency gates with alarmed panic bars
Recommendation: Locked emergency gates shall be fitted with alarmed panic bars.
Unknown
FENN-13 — Regularly test water fog equipment and train staff in its use.
Recommendation: Water fog equipment must be regularly tested and staff trained in its use.
Unknown
FENN-11 — Agree and mark emergency services rendezvous and staff assembly points at stations.
Recommendation: A rendezvous point for the emergency services and a staff assembly point at each station must be agreed and marked.
Unknown
POPP-A.12 — Amend Green Guide for comprehensive steward training and instruction on emergencies.
Recommendation: The Green Guide should be amended to contain a specific provision, in relation to stewards, (i) that they should be trained and instructed to deal with any emergency relating to fire or evacuation (see also Recommendations 7 and 10); (ii) …
Unknown
POPP-A.11 — Amend Green Guide to require manned, openable exit gates during public use.
Recommendation: Paragraphs 6.14.6 of the Green Guide should be amended to read: “All exit gates should be manned at all times while the ground is used by the public and be capable of being opened immediately from inside by anyone in …
Unknown