Proscribing Wagner Network
Government's failure to proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation despite it appearing to meet legal criteria.
52 items
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Proscribing Wagner Network has been flagged across 1 independent accountability source:
52 committee recs
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Committee Recommendations (52) — showing 50 strongest matches
#28 — Proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation, meeting legal criteria.
Recommendation: As a ‘stick’, the Government should proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation, recognising that—while there are risks of doing so—there are also risks of failing to do so, when the Network appears to meet the legal criteria. (Paragraph …
Gov response: Agree. On 6 September, the Government laid a draft proscription order which has now been approved in both Houses and came into force on 15 September. The order added Wagner Group to the list of …
Accepted
#1 — Wagner Network operates globally, undertaking military and non-military operations in many countries since 2014.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. …
Gov response: Agree. 9. We agree with the Committee that intelligence gathering on Wagner’s activities is a priority and have re-examined the extent and scale of our effort. We believe that we have sufficient resources in place …
Accepted
#31 — Government under-estimated Wagner Network, lacking strategy, leadership, and joined-up working.
Recommendation: For nearly 10 years, the Government has under-played and under-estimated the Wagner Network’s activities, as well as the security implications of its significant expansion. The Government has not told us anything specific that it is doing to challenge the network’s …
Gov response: 7. The Government will pay close attention to the repercussions of these events in the coming months, including how they play out across Wagner’s dispersed network in Africa. We agree with the Committee that we …
Accepted
#25 — Offer customised packages of military, aid, and trade support to priority countries.
Recommendation: The Government should offer a genuinely compelling alternative to priority countries in need of investment and security partnership, in collaboration with partners. Priority countries are especially likely to be neighbouring countries to those where the Wagner Network is engaged. A …
Gov response: Partially agree. 23. In some highly insecure countries, Wagner offers protection services to the government and fights alongside local soldiers on offensive operations. Unlike respectable security providers, Wagner frequently ignores its obligations in areas like …
Accepted
#21 — Urgently assess compiled Wagner-linked names and impose sanctions if thresholds are met.
Recommendation: We implore the Government to urgently assess these names and impose sanctions on these individuals and entities if the necessary threshold is met.
Gov response: Partially agree. 12. The Wagner Group was designated in its entirety under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in March 2022. Yevgeny Prigozhin, its then leader, was designated under The Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) …
Partially Accepted
#17 — Expedite and strengthen sanctions against all Wagner-linked individuals and entities, closing enforcement gaps.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government move faster and harder in sanctioning Wagner- linked individuals and entities. Specifically, it should: (Paragraph 58) (a) Sanction all individuals and entities provided in Appendix 1, which the United States and European Union have already …
Gov response: Partially agree. 12. The Wagner Group was designated in its entirety under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in March 2022. Yevgeny Prigozhin, its then leader, was designated under The Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) …
Partially Accepted
#7 — Explicitly state government opposition to countries cooperating with Wagner Network and impose consequences.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government explicitly states that it opposes the co-operation of any country with the Wagner Network, or future iterations thereof, due to the security threats of the ‘Wagner model’ of business and governance. Where countries can be …
Gov response: Agree. 30. We have a team dedicated to coordinating the Government’s response to the cross- cutting challenge posed by Wagner Group and Russian use of PMSCs as proxies. This team is also focused on driving …
Accepted
#5 — Wagner Network's continued growth presents serious national security threats to the UK.
Recommendation: There are serious national security threats to the UK and its allies of allowing the network to continue to thrive, not to mention devastating human consequences, including contributing to the refugee crisis for example, Sudan. (Paragraph 30) Guns for gold: …
Gov response: Partially agree. 23. In some highly insecure countries, Wagner offers protection services to the government and fights alongside local soldiers on offensive operations. Unlike respectable security providers, Wagner frequently ignores its obligations in areas like …
Accepted
#4 — Wagner Network functions as an international criminal mafia, committing atrocities and plundering resources.
Recommendation: There is a significant gap between perception and capability when it comes to the Wagner Network. Despite the continued belief by some that inviting them into a country will result in benefits, the reality is that regimes pay a high …
Gov response: Agree. 20. On 6 September, the Government laid a draft proscription order which has now been approved in both Houses and came into force on 15 September. The order added Wagner Group to the list …
Accepted
#100 — Unaccompanied children in contingency accommodation highly vulnerable to trafficking and going missing.
Recommendation: Unaccompanied children living in contingency accommodation are particularly vulnerable to being trafficked, or re-trafficked. Between July 2021 and 19 October 2022, there were 391 episodes where children went missing from hotels. This is unacceptable.
Gov response: 113. The Government agrees that the best place for unaccompanied asylum- seeking children (UASC) is within the care of a local authority. Six of seven hotels were closed on 30 November 2023, with the remaining …
Partially Accepted
#34 — Government remains complacent regarding states' malign use of Private Military Companies.
Recommendation: The Government appears remarkably complacent about the growing practice of states using PMCs for malign purposes. Although the expansion of the Wagner Network and the harm it has caused appears to have led to some re-examination of the Government’s approach …
Gov response: Partially agree. 36. As outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, our new approach to countering state threats encompasses four strands: a. protecting ourselves, allies, and partners from the impact of this activity; b. engaging domestically …
Accepted
#32 — Government lacks knowledge and policy on other malign Private Military Companies.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network is merely the best-known and documented example of a PMC acting deniably on behalf of a state to further its interests and enrich its elites, at the expense of local citizens’ safety and stability in the long …
Gov response: Partially agree. 36. As outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, our new approach to countering state threats encompasses four strands: a. protecting ourselves, allies, and partners from the impact of this activity; b. engaging domestically …
Accepted
#24 — Declassify and share intelligence on Wagner Network's destabilising effects with engaging countries.
Recommendation: As the Government improves its intelligence on the network, it should declassify it strategically and share it with countries that are considering engaging with the Wagner Network, to demonstrate the organisation’s destabilising effects, following the lead of the United States …
Gov response: Partially agree. 52. We agree on the need to tackle Wagner, and that this will require co-ordinated action with our partners, and a mix of incentives and levers, some of which we have set out …
Partially Accepted
#23 — Seize opportunity to deter countries from engaging with Wagner Network using international cooperation.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government seizes this opportunity and works with international partners to deter countries from engaging with the Wagner Network, using a carrot and stick approach.
Gov response: Partially agree. 52. We agree on the need to tackle Wagner, and that this will require co-ordinated action with our partners, and a mix of incentives and levers, some of which we have set out …
Accepted
#20 — Committee compiles public Wagner-linked names to aid government understanding of the network.
Recommendation: In the public interest, we have compiled Wagner-linked names that are already a matter of public record, as identified via our commissioned open-source research (see Appendix 2). In doing so, we hope to challenge the mystique that the Wagner Network …
Gov response: Partially agree. 12. The Wagner Group was designated in its entirety under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in March 2022. Yevgeny Prigozhin, its then leader, was designated under The Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) …
Accepted
#19 — Prioritise introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals, collaborating with Turkey.
Recommendation: We further recommend that the Government prioritises introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals as a likely deterrent to involvement in the network, in particular working with Turkey, a popular holiday destination for Russians.
Gov response: Partially agree. 19. We agree that travel bans have some deterrent effect, as well as an impact on the operations and morale of those designated and their networks. Designations made under UK autonomous sanctions regimes …
Partially Accepted
#18 — Establish a regular mechanism for coordinating Wagner-linked sanctions with US and EU partners.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government establishes a specific and regular mechanism for coordinating with the United States and the European Union over Wagner- linked sanctions; it should report back to us on what these mechanisms are, and how frequently and …
Gov response: Disagree. 16. The Government recognises the importance of close coordination with the EU and US to maximise the effectiveness of UK sanctions but strong coordination mechanisms are already in place. Since President Putin’s invasion of …
Not Accepted
#15 — Government's blanket Wagner Group sanctions approach creates enforcement gaps for linked entities.
Recommendation: The Government claimed that its sanctioning of the ‘Wagner Group’ automatically covered all the entities that the Group owns or controls. This approach under- appreciates the complexity of the network. It is also completely unrealistic. It leaves both enforcement agencies …
Gov response: Partially agree. 12. The Wagner Group was designated in its entirety under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in March 2022. Yevgeny Prigozhin, its then leader, was designated under The Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) …
Accepted
#14 — UK's Wagner Network sanctioning efforts and allied coordination remain inadequate.
Recommendation: The UK’s efforts to sanction the Wagner Network are underwhelming in the extreme, compared to those of the European Union and the United States. The responses from the Minister leave us with limited confidence that the UK coordinates effectively with …
Gov response: Partially agree. 12. The Wagner Group was designated in its entirety under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in March 2022. Yevgeny Prigozhin, its then leader, was designated under The Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) …
Accepted
#13 — Improve intelligence-gathering on Wagner Network activities in more countries and establish a taskforce.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government improve its intelligence-gathering on the Wagner Network’s activities in a wider range of countries, particularly in the countries where 54 Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed we have medium-confidence of attempts at Wagner involvement. …
Gov response: Agree. 9. We agree with the Committee that intelligence gathering on Wagner’s activities is a priority and have re-examined the extent and scale of our effort. We believe that we have sufficient resources in place …
Accepted
#9 — Focusing solely on Europe for Wagner Network activities is a significant failing.
Recommendation: However, it is a significant failing to see the Wagner Network primarily through the prism of Europe, not least given its geographic spread, the impact of its activities on UK interests further abroad, and the fact that its wealth creation …
Gov response: Partially agree. 36. As outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, our new approach to countering state threats encompasses four strands: a. protecting ourselves, allies, and partners from the impact of this activity; b. engaging domestically …
Accepted
#6 — Wagner Network's links to the Russian state confirmed, but countries may still engage.
Recommendation: Over the past year and a half, the Russia-Ukraine war eroded the Wagner Network’s deniability and Prigozhin’s public arguments with the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed the network’s long-suspected links to the Russian state. The brutality of its fighters in …
Gov response: Partially agree. 27. We believe that it is not possible to end extreme poverty in low and middle-income countries without also tackling conflict and fragility. Issues of Fragile & Conflict Affected States are therefore central …
Under Consideration
#3 — Host governments engage Wagner Network due to perceived security benefits, furthering regime objectives.
Recommendation: Host governments and other non-regime actors must perceive benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network, because they consider it the most effective form of protection and security. There are examples of its fighters furthering a regime’s security objectives, even if …
Gov response: Disagree. 16. The Government recognises the importance of close coordination with the EU and US to maximise the effectiveness of UK sanctions but strong coordination mechanisms are already in place. Since President Putin’s invasion of …
Under Consideration
#102 — Consider every child missing from home or care as a potential victim of trafficking.
Recommendation: Every child who goes missing from home or care should be considered as a potential victim of trafficking, even if they are subsequently found safe.
Gov response: 113. The Government agrees that the best place for unaccompanied asylum- seeking children (UASC) is within the care of a local authority. Six of seven hotels were closed on 30 November 2023, with the remaining …
Not Accepted
#14 —
Recommendation: We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on …
Response Pending
#38 — Identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network using support to Ukraine's Prosecutor General.
Recommendation: The UK Government should use its significant support to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Ukraine to identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network. A prosecution in this theatre would serve to help deter the sense of impunity abroad.
Gov response: Agree. We agree on the importance of holding Wagner to account for its actions. In some areas, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has an existing authority to investigate situations where Wagner is present (including Mali …
Accepted
#35 — Voluntary model of Private Military Company regulation remains ineffective and detrimental.
Recommendation: The Government continues to rely on a largely voluntary model of PMC regulation. Our predecessor committee conducted a detailed report into the subject of PMCs in 2002. Even then, the risks of a voluntary model were clear, in that it …
Gov response: The Government should provide the evidence base that leads it to believe in the effectiveness of its mostly voluntary model of PMC regulation. The UK supports using a mix of existing legal and regulatory measures …
Accepted
#33 — Assign clear responsibility for Wagner Network and establish cross-government lead on PMCs.
Recommendation: The Government should take a more strategic and coherent approach to addressing the challenges of this network and other proxy ‘PMCs’ by: (Paragraph 84) (a) assigning clear responsibility for the Wagner Network and adjacent ‘PMCs’ to a senior official in …
Gov response: Agree. We have a team dedicated to coordinating the Government’s response to the cross-cutting challenge posed by Wagner Group and Russian use of PMSCs as proxies. This team is also focused on driving forward international …
Accepted
#29 — Wagner Network effectively reconfigures and its activities will continue due to value.
Recommendation: The last decade has shown that the Wagner Network is highly effective at reconfiguring itself. We expect its activities to continue in some form, as they are too valuable, especially financially, to the Russian state to be lost. The question …
Gov response: 2. In recent years, Wagner has grown in importance, both for Russian foreign policy, and for many countries in which it operates. We agree with the Committee that it has had a destabilising impact, and …
Not Addressed
#16 — Ministerial knowledge and FCDO-Treasury coordination on Wagner sanctions waivers are insufficient.
Recommendation: The Minister had no specific knowledge of work within his Department to analyse whether Wagner activities undermine the financial impact of UK sanctions on the Russian war machine. Despite finding it “likely”, he could not confirm that the FCDO had …
Gov response: Partially agree. 12. The Wagner Group was designated in its entirety under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in March 2022. Yevgeny Prigozhin, its then leader, was designated under The Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) …
Not Addressed
#11 — Government's delayed and limited focus on Wagner beyond Ukraine is regrettable.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network began its activities in 2014. By early 2022, when the Government began to invest greater resource in understanding the network, Wagner fighters had already undertaken military deployments in at least seven countries. It is deeply regrettable that …
Gov response: Partially agree. 52. We agree on the need to tackle Wagner, and that this will require co-ordinated action with our partners, and a mix of incentives and levers, some of which we have set out …
Under Consideration
#8 — Government prioritises military support to Ukraine for countering the Wagner Network.
Recommendation: Supporting Ukraine militarily is the Government’s priority when it comes to countering the Wagner Network. We fully support the continued supply of defence assistance and wider support to Ukraine as it fights to liberate itself from Russian illegal occupation. Through …
Gov response: Agree. 33. We welcome the Committee’s recommendation and in recent months, we have increased our efforts to use the FCDO’s overseas network and strategic communications channels to highlight Wagner’s human rights’ abuses and its destabilising …
Accepted
#2 — Wagner Network is opportunistic but ultimately guided by the Russian state, delivering geopolitical benefits.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in …
Gov response: Partially agree. 12. The Wagner Group was designated in its entirety under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in March 2022. Yevgeny Prigozhin, its then leader, was designated under The Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) …
Partially Accepted
#10 — Unacceptable 18-month vacancy for Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner breached statutory duty.
Recommendation: We welcome the Home Office’s appointment of a new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner (IASC) and look forward to inviting her to speak to us as soon as possible, to understand how she intends to prioritise the prevention of human trafficking—including tackling …
Gov response: The Government were also delighted to welcome a new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner at the end of 2023, who we trust will provide tremendous insight and expertise as she takes up this role. We note that …
Not Addressed
#8 — Modern Slavery Unit prioritises Illegal Migration Act over preventing human trafficking.
Recommendation: The Modern Slavery Unit’s outputs, including belated information about its new model for stakeholder engagement (Modern Slavery Stakeholder Forums) is opaque to say the least. We deeply regret that a unit comprising 56 staff has prioritised work on the Illegal …
Gov response: We welcome the report from the Committee and, as we have set out, remain committed to tackling the crime of modern slavery. Whilst recent focus has been on delivering the Government’s work to tackle illegal …
Under Consideration
#7 — Home Office stakeholder engagement on modern slavery legislation remains unacceptably poor.
Recommendation: The Home Office’s approach to stakeholder engagement has been lackadaisical. It has taken the Home Office two years to launch a new formation of stakeholder groups (Modern Slavery Stakeholder Forums), during which time key legislation affecting victims of trafficking has …
Gov response: 3. The Government were also delighted to welcome a new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner at the end of 2023, who we trust will provide tremendous insight and expertise as she takes up this role. 18. We …
Partially Accepted
#6 — Reinstate full modern slavery policy remit to Safeguarding Minister, removing immigration oversight.
Recommendation: In accordance with the recommendation made by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in its 2023 UK country visit report, we urge the Government to withdraw the issue of modern slavery and human trafficking from the Minister …
Gov response: 15. As set out in the introduction, given the close links between modern slavery and migration, with around three-quarters of potential victims being subject to immigration controls from January to September 20222, it is right …
Not Accepted
#5 — Accelerate development of an overhauled Modern Slavery Strategy with child-specific and financial crime actions.
Recommendation: The Home Office, working together with key human trafficking sector partners, criminal justice practitioners and survivors, must accelerate and scale up efforts to develop a new and overhauled Modern Slavery Strategy. This should include actions to address all forms of …
Gov response: 17. We share the Committee’s focus on the importance of a strategy to guide work tackling this crime. As set out in the introduction, the UK’s response to modern slavery is underpinned by the Modern …
Under Consideration
#4 — Treat human trafficking primarily as a protection issue, not an irregular migration concern.
Recommendation: The Home Office and respective public authorities should treat human trafficking as primarily a protection issue and not an irregular migration concern. Future legislation must take account of the legitimate protection and support needs of all victims including UK nationals.
Gov response: 15. As set out in the introduction, given the close links between modern slavery and migration, with around three-quarters of potential victims being subject to immigration controls from January to September 20222, it is right …
Not Accepted
#3 — Home Office policy shift hinders modern slavery strategy and victim protection efforts.
Recommendation: The Home Office’s shift in policy focus to irregular migration is also demonstrated by the Government’s long delay in producing a new Modern Slavery Strategy and by the recent transfer of elements of responsibility for modern slavery and human trafficking …
Gov response: 15. As set out in the introduction, given the close links between modern slavery and migration, with around three-quarters of potential victims being subject to immigration controls from January to September 20222, it is right …
Under Consideration
#2 — Prevent Home Office from conflating immigration with human trafficking and modern slavery.
Recommendation: The Home Office must not conflate immigration with human trafficking and modern slavery at the expense of protection of victims of human trafficking.
Gov response: 15. As set out in the introduction, given the close links between modern slavery and migration, with around three-quarters of potential victims being subject to immigration controls from January to September 20222, it is right …
Not Accepted
#39 — Provide evidence base for effectiveness of voluntary Private Military Company regulation model.
Recommendation: The Government should provide the evidence base that leads it to believe in the effectiveness of its mostly voluntary model of PMC regulation. (Paragraph 90) Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed 59
Gov response: The Government should provide the evidence base that leads it to believe in the effectiveness of its mostly voluntary model of PMC regulation. The UK supports using a mix of existing legal and regulatory measures …
Accepted
#37 — Set out steps to strengthen international legal framework governing PMCs and accountability.
Recommendation: In its response, the Government should set out the steps that it will take to strengthen the international legal framework governing PMCs’ activities, drawing on the UK’s deep legal expertise. Its response should address the following aspects: (Paragraph 88) 58 …
Gov response: Partially agree. (i) The UK supports the need for clarification on definitions of mercenaries and PMCs. The UN Convention on Mercenaries in its current form is unlikely to provide a workable basis for regulation under …
Partially Accepted
#36 — Improve understanding of Private Military Companies and provide information on new state threat approach.
Recommendation: The Government should improve its understanding of other PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSCs) connected in particular to Russia and China, and from all states. This is likely to be a growth industry, with more Governments seeking to create PMCs …
Gov response: Partially agree. As outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, our new approach to countering state threats encompasses four strands: a. protecting ourselves, allies, and partners from the impact of this activity; b. engaging domestically and …
Accepted
#22 — Significant opportunity exists to disrupt the Wagner Network amid its uncertain future.
Recommendation: There is an opportunity to disrupt the Wagner Network at a time when its future is uncertain.
Gov response: Partially agree. 52. We agree on the need to tackle Wagner, and that this will require co-ordinated action with our partners, and a mix of incentives and levers, some of which we have set out …
Not Addressed
#12 — No evidence of serious government effort to track Wagner Network activities outside Ukraine.
Recommendation: We have received no evidence of any serious effort by the Government to track the Network’s activities in countries other than Ukraine.
Gov response: Agree. 9. We agree with the Committee that intelligence gathering on Wagner’s activities is a priority and have re-examined the extent and scale of our effort. We believe that we have sufficient resources in place …
Accepted
#10 — Government acknowledges increased importance of understanding Wagner Network's activities.
Recommendation: The Government believes that it is becoming more important to consider the network’s activities, although it did not say where it would do so. In February 2023, the FCDO told us there was now “much more activity” in Government to …
Gov response: Partially agree. 40. In 2002, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights panel of experts recommended amending the UN Convention on Mercenaries to clarify its definition of mercenaries. The UK supports the need …
Accepted
#22 — Announce a clear zero-tolerance policy for transnational repression and expel offending foreign diplomats.
Recommendation: The Government should have had a policy of zero tolerance of transnational repression. It is unacceptable that this has not been the position up to now. It should now announce a clear policy of zero tolerance of transnational repression and …
Gov response: 100. The Government agrees with the Committee that it is unacceptable that any foreign government or its proxies should engage in transnational repression (TNR) on UK soil or against UK citizens. That is why the …
Accepted
#103 — Require the Home Office to provide regular updates on progress in finding missing children.
Recommendation: The Committee has previously challenged the Home Office with our concerns that children have gone missing. The Home Office must update the Committee with its progress in finding these children by the end of this year, and we expect to …
Gov response: 113. The Government agrees that the best place for unaccompanied asylum- seeking children (UASC) is within the care of a local authority. Six of seven hotels were closed on 30 November 2023, with the remaining …
Not Addressed
#1 — Government prioritises irregular migration at the expense of tackling human trafficking.
Recommendation: We are deeply concerned that the Government is prioritising irregular migration issues at the expense of tackling human trafficking. The Government’s de- prioritisation of human trafficking is not reflective of the scale of the threat it poses or the gravity …
Gov response: 15. As set out in the introduction, given the close links between modern slavery and migration, with around three-quarters of potential victims being subject to immigration controls from January to September 20222, it is right …
Not Accepted