8th Report – Failures at South East Water
Select Committee
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee
HC 1861
1 May 2026
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Recommendations
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Conclusions (16) Observations and findings — click to expand
1
Conclusion
Select committees do not often focus directly on the leadership, behaviour and performance of individual private companies. The water sector, however, is a highly regulated monopoly provider of services essential to public health. Residents have no choice over their water provider yet rely on them entirely for their lives and …
2
Conclusion
South East Water did not have the right processes in place to identify and mitigate risks at Pembury Works, despite previous warnings from the DWI. That the company had “normalised” critical risks and was “flying blind” in the lead up to the crisis is a fundamental failure for a water …
3
Conclusion
Maintenance issues at Pembury contributed to the Tunbridge Wells incident in 2025, but it is South East Water’s self-identified lack of proactive and “instinctive” maintenance across its network that is most concerning. One of the most fundamental and basic responsibilities of a water company is to plan for and have …
4
Conclusion
As regulators told South East Water repeatedly and jointly for over four years, the company needed to invest in new infrastructure to be properly resilient to potential shocks. In particular, single points of failure, supply shortfalls and regional connectivity should have been improved, but the company failed to take action …
5
Conclusion
Despite South East Water’s assertions to the contrary, periods of peak demand and extreme weather can and should be broadly predicted and prepared for. Ofwat and the Drinking Water Inspectorate have shown that the company failed to model upcoming peaks and troughs and take the necessary steps in preceding weeks …
6
Conclusion
Both the Drinking Water Inspectorate and South East Water acknowledge the weaknesses of the escalation processes around the Pembury incident. This meant that operational staff were not given sufficient support to diagnose problems early and that key stakeholders were informed too late, inhibiting preparations and in breach of regulations. We …
7
Conclusion
Given the huge number of supply interruptions that South East Water has failed to manage over the years, it is remarkable that the company still struggles with the supply of bottled water during outages, has failed to learn and apply lessons and relies on the goodwill of communities. Problems discussed …
8
Conclusion
Similarly to the provision of alternative water supplies, South East Water now has years of experience in communicating during supply interruptions. It is incomprehensible that SEW still lacks a crisis communications strategy or a well-developed communications team given the company’s propensity for water outages. This put communication teams in a …
9
Conclusion
For a company with such regular issues with outages, South East Water’s approach to supporting vulnerable customers gives the impression of a business caught completely by surprise. We accept that it is challenging to continuously update the Priority Services Register: people will not always inform you of vulnerabilities, transient or …
10
Conclusion
The Tunbridge Wells incident and Ofwat investigations reveal that South East Water’s leadership has repeatedly proved itself incapable of implementing the lessons learnt from previous incidents, even simple ones such as having a communication strategy for when resolution timeframes are unclear. While the company was clearly trying to learn from …
11
Conclusion
Since at least 2020, South East Water clearly has had, and continues to demonstrate, an inability to establish the root causes of its supply resilience problems. There are likely many facets to this, including a failure to monitor the key asset indicators, and a tendency to blame external factors, as …
12
Conclusion
South East Water’s leadership team has demonstrated a clear preference for blaming factors outside of their control for performance issues, and in some cases, they continue to do so, despite clear evidence to the contrary. A lack of data-analysis skills might be partially to blame, but it is also clear …
13
Conclusion
South East Water has failed to engage with key stakeholders outside the company to help it learn from its mistakes. It is unwilling to properly listen to its customers, who have repeatedly complained of addressable failures 42 and yet continue to suffer them. The company’s leadership has taken a defensive …
14
Conclusion
Continued leadership failure is grounds for leadership change. Time and again, since 2020, South East Water’s leadership has failed in its fundamental task of supplying water to its customers. That is around six years of poor performance, sometimes with multiple incidents within the same year. Most problematic from a leadership …
15
Conclusion
These failures are symptomatic of significant cultural problems that cannot be readily explained by issues with the wider regulatory framework: this includes South East Water’s failure to engage with external stakeholders, inclination for groupthink, inability to analyse problems, incapability to implement basic changes and a propensity to shirk responsibility. This …
16
Conclusion
Repeating the same actions and expecting different results is not a well- regarded tactic for resolving problems. Yet the non-executives of South East Water have time and time again chosen to back a leadership that is clearly not capable of improving outcomes for customers. Their only response to the Tunbridge …