27
Not Addressed
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information...
Conclusion
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other strategically important regions. This limited funding risks the UK further losing influence in key regions such as Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Indo-Pacific as it cuts Official Development Assistance. This is especially concerning given the recent commitments by the Government to target funds to raising defence spending to achieve the NATO commitment of 3.5% of GDP by 2035 and the reorganisation of the UK Integrated Security Fund to deliver the ambitions of the National Security Strategy. Without immediate action, threat actors will continue to outspend democratic nations like the UK, increasing the challenge in combatting information operations. Strengthening the UK’s soft power capability and combatting FIMI in the information war should be recognised as an integral part of the UK’s defence and security strategy (Conclusion, Paragraph 141)
Government Response Summary
The government's response outlines measures related to the Representation of the People Bill, a consultation on digital replicas, an AI labelling taskforce, and a ban on crypto asset donations, failing to address the conclusion regarding FCDO funding limitations or the strategic recognition of FIMI.
Government Response
Not Addressed
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government
Not Addressed
99. The Representation of the People Bill is a landmark piece of legislation which will ensure everyone has a voice in our democracy. It is the boldest and most ambitious change to our democracy for decades. 100. As set out in our response to recommendation 25, recognising the importance of addressing this and related risks, the Government will launch a consultation in the summer to seek views on how we address potential harms from digital replicas, while protecting legitimate innovation and freedom of expression. 101. DSIT will also establish a Taskforce to put forward proposals for government on best practice for labelling AI-generated content, with an interim report to be published in Autumn. 102. We acknowledge concerns about the role of algorithms in amplifying harmful content. That is why the Online Safety Act gives Ofcom the power to request information on algorithm design, including as it relates to illegal mis- and disinformation. While the OSA provides one of the strongest online safety frameworks anywhere in the world, including protections against illegal content, such as illegal election-related disinformation, we must ensure that protections keep pace with evolving threats, including to UK democracy. The Government will continue to actively review the framework to understand where the Act can be strengthened through evidence-based measures. 103. Finally, we have accepted the recommendation in the independent Rycroft Review, published in March, to impose a moratorium on the use of crypto assets as political donations, to safeguard the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference. We will implement this measure through the Representation of the People Bill and apply it retrospectively so that any political donations made in crypto assets from 25 March must be returned. With this policy, we are taking decisive action to defend the legitimacy and integrity of our democratic system from foreign interference. Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Source
Committee
Foreign Affairs Committee
Report
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy
27 Mar 2026
HC 703
Addressee Bodies
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
Timeline
Recommendation age
0.3 yrs
Report published
27 Mar 2026