4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

The government acknowledges the threat of Russian FIMI and details specific investments and support provided to countries in the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Armenia. This support includes strengthening civil society, independent media, cyber resilience, and media literacy to harden information ecosystems against Russian interference, with a commitment to continue these efforts.

The government responds with general statements about national security, threats from China, and the Counter-Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan, but does not address the recommendation to prioritize funds for civil society/media or step up counter-FIMI efforts in the Black Sea region and Western Balkans against Russian influence.

The government's response is entirely focused on its commitment to protecting the UK from hostile activity by Iran, including sanctions and the FCDO Iran Unit's expertise, and does not address the Committee's conclusion regarding the government's "three C's" approach to China.

The government's response discusses the CounterDaesh Communications Cell and its work against Daesh and al-Shabaab disinformation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding transparency on China's state influence and cyber-attacks.

The government's response focuses on its ongoing commitment to support Ukraine against Russian information operations and disinformation through the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership, and does not address the Committee's support for the specification of Iran under the National Security Act.

The government's response focuses entirely on its actions to counter Russian foreign information manipulation and interference in Georgia, including imposing sanctions, and does not address the recommendation to develop programming against Iranian FIMI.

The government acknowledges the conclusion and provides further detail on its ongoing support for Moldova against Russian hybrid threats, including imposing sanctions on related networks and establishing a UK-Moldova Defence and Security Partnership.

The government's response discusses countering information manipulation in Armenia and the Western Balkans, completely failing to address the committee's concerns about the effectiveness of the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell.

The government's response focuses on media freedom in Africa, the Media Freedom Coalition, and sanctions against a Russian information operation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding counter-Daesh communications and identifying partners.

The government's response discusses its concerns and actions regarding Chinese misinformation in Taiwan, and support for Taiwan's democratic processes, but does not address the Committee's commendation of UK support for Ukraine against Russian information warfare.

The government's response discusses the UK's partnership with the US and freedom of speech, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement and its roadmap.

The government commits to providing a verbal briefing session to the Committee on its international approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, which partially addresses the request for clarity on the UK-Ukraine Partnership Agreement.

The government shares the Committee's concerns about threats to democracy and security, stating its commitment to go further and faster to counter hybrid threats, including FIMI, through existing departmental allocations and continued resource prioritization.

The government's response discusses its longstanding commitment to protecting media freedoms and offers to provide verbal briefings, but it does not address the recommendation to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials and other entities.

The government's response focuses on BBC World Service funding and acknowledges a separate recommendation for additional funding, thereby not addressing the provided conclusion regarding Moldova's resilience and UK support.

The government's response discusses the use of AI in information manipulation and its potential for countering FIMI, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope a bespoke AI counter disinformation sandbox, but does not address the recommendation to support Moldova's investigations or impose sanctions.

The government describes ongoing actions to address hybrid threats and FIMI, including increased coordination with the EU and member states through the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership, with consultations focusing on the Western Balkans. It commits to continuing this collaboration and joint action with European partners.

The government acknowledges the committee's suggestion and states they will take it into account alongside the Rycroft Review and lessons from allies, as they are working to cohere the government's approach to countering foreign information threats.

The government's response details the FCDO's investment in FIMI training for staff in Africa and leveraging its diplomatic network to engage with host governments and civil society on FIMI threats, but it does not address the committee's observation regarding the West's alleged retreat from Africa or the impact of reduced overseas development aid.

The government's response details its commitment to increasing public awareness of foreign information manipulation and interference through publications and media literacy campaigns, but does not address the recommendation concerning reductions in aid programming or funding for independent media in Africa.

The government shares the objective of improving FIMI awareness, highlights its track record of exposing and sanctioning FIMI actors (primarily Russia), and states it will continue to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, but does not specifically acknowledge the Committee's observation regarding Chinese FIMI targeting Taiwan.

The government's response focuses on general media literacy campaigns and engagement with social media platforms, but it does not address the specific recommendation to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan or expand bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups.

The government's response addresses concerns about algorithms, the Online Safety Act, and a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but fails to engage with the committee's conclusion regarding the impact of the US political landscape on transatlantic cooperation and specific US actions.

The government describes its domestic legislative tools for countering foreign interference, such as the National Security Act 2023, but does not specifically address the recommendation for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States or standing up for those countering disinformation globally.

The government's response discusses concerns about digital replicas and a forthcoming consultation on their potential harms, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the information environment in Latin America.

The government responds by discussing the Online Safety Act, VPN usage, and transnational repression, but does not address the recommendation to work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media, strengthen FIMI monitoring capacity, or report on diplomatic engagement in the specified regions.

The government's response outlines measures related to the Representation of the People Bill, a consultation on digital replicas, an AI labelling taskforce, and a ban on crypto asset donations, failing to address the conclusion regarding FCDO funding limitations or the strategic recognition of FIMI.

The government partially agrees with the importance of the issue, stating that it has ensured existing allocations target hybrid threats, and confirms the Hybrid Threats Directorate has been allocated a non-ODA budget for the current spending review period to enable effective action.

The government partially agrees, reiterating its commitment to media freedom and outlining steps such as co-chairing the Media Freedom Coalition and a new approach to Africa, while also highlighting actions like sanctions to disrupt information networks.

The government partially agrees, recognising the importance of updates on media freedoms and committing to periodic verbal briefing sessions for the Committee while reviewing options for formal written reporting, in response to the cessation of previous updates.

The government partially agrees, committing to periodic verbal briefings for committee members on media freedoms while reviewing options for formal written reporting, rather than the requested six-monthly updates.

The government partially agrees, highlighting its increased funding for the BBC World Service to £148 million per annum. However, it notes but does not commit to further additional funding, citing defence budget rules and deferring longer-term funding considerations to the BBC Charter Review.

The government partially agrees, stating it has already increased BBC World Service funding to £148 million per annum, which it considers a real-terms uplift. However, it defers the recommendation for further increased funding drawn from the defence budget, citing stringent NATO rules and the ongoing BBC Charter Review.

The government partially agrees with the Committee's observation on AI's dual nature, acknowledging its use for both information manipulation and defensive capabilities. It states that FCDO capabilities are under review and existing AI sandboxes are in place, with a commitment to assess their utility for a bespoke counter-disinformation sandbox.

The government partially agrees, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope whether a bespoke AI counter-disinformation sandbox would be useful, rather than immediately establishing one.

The government agrees, detailing recent increases in coordination with the EU and member states through consultations and bilateral agreements, and stating its intention to continue strengthening collaboration and joint action, including information sharing and coordinating sanctions.

The government agrees and confirms it has already initiated UK-EU consultations on hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), under the Security and Defence Partnership, and will continue to strengthen collaboration through information sharing, analysis, and coordinated sanctions.

The government partially agrees, noting that the Rycroft Review also highlighted fragmentation issues. It will take the Committee's suggestion for an NCSC-like model into account alongside the Rycroft Review conclusions and lessons from allies, without committing to specific action yet.

The government partially agrees, acknowledging the need for a joined-up approach, but defers action by stating it will note the suggestion and take it into account alongside the conclusions of the Rycroft Review and lessons from allies.

The government agrees with the conclusion, stating that the FCDO is investing in staff training for FIMI, leveraging its overseas network of political officers for intelligence gathering and collaboration, and deepening dialogue with international partners.

The government agrees and states the FCDO is investing in staff upskilling, leveraging its network of political officers, and using reporting from overseas missions to build a global picture of the threat which informs policy responses.

The government partially agrees on the importance of public awareness, stating it will continue to highlight the threat via gov.uk and is considering adapting its existing "You Won’t Know Until You Ask" media literacy campaign to address foreign information manipulation and interference.

The government partially agrees, stating it will continue to highlight the threat and is already pursuing media literacy initiatives like the 'You Won't Know Until You Ask' campaign, which it is considering extending or adapting. It does not commit to launching a new dedicated information portal as recommended.

The government partially agrees with the concern, highlighting its track record of publicly exposing foreign information manipulation and interference actors and committing to continue enhancing information sharing and stakeholder engagement while protecting sensitive intelligence.

The government partially agrees, highlighting its track record of exposing and sanctioning actors involved in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). They commit to continuing to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, including briefings, and will engage with NCSC to understand best practice, while noting the need to protect sensitive information.

The government agrees that media literacy is crucial for resilience to FIMI and is evaluating its 'You Won’t Know Until You Ask’ campaign to adapt it for specific FIMI risks. It also acknowledges the critical role of social media platforms in promoting media literacy, stating that DSIT engages directly with them while Ofcom plays a coordinating role under the Online Safety Act.

The government agrees that media literacy is important and acknowledges the value of learning from Baltic and Nordic partners. It is evaluating its existing 'You Won't Know Until You Ask' campaign for children and considering options to extend or adapt it to address FIMI and focus on all ages.

The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns about algorithms and noting Ofcom's existing powers, and commits to operationalising a legislated Researcher Access to Data Scheme through consultations and regulations later this year to provide legitimate data access to researchers.

The government partially agrees, noting the Online Safety Act already gives Ofcom powers to request algorithm design information. It agrees social media companies should provide legitimate data to researchers and will be consulting on how to operationalise a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but does not address requiring annual reports on artificial amplification and foreign interference.

The government disagrees, stating the National Security Act 2023 is carefully designed and needs time to be robustly tested. They note a live case may clarify its operation and will review legislation, working with Ofcom on platform duties under the Online Safety Act.

The government disagrees with conducting an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, stating the Act is new and has not been robustly tested, with a live case expected to clarify its operation.

The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns but stating it will launch a consultation in the summer to seek views on addressing digital replica harms, deferring a commitment to specific personality rights coverage.

The government explicitly disagrees with amending the Online Safety Act, citing legitimate reasons for VPN use and confidence that the current Act effectively addresses online harms, including those associated with transnational repression. It will continue to monitor the Act's effectiveness.

The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns about democratic protection, and details further actions it is taking or planning, including a consultation on digital replicas, an AI-generated content labelling taskforce, ongoing review of the Online Safety Act framework, and a moratorium on crypto asset political donations via the Representation of the People Bill.

The government partially agrees. It will launch a consultation and establish a taskforce on AI-generated content, and acknowledges concerns about algorithms, noting the Online Safety Act's powers. However, it fully accepts and will implement a moratorium on crypto asset donations through the Representation of the People Bill.