45
Accepted in Part
Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should...
Recommendation
Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should declassify information relating to foreign information manipulation and interference. In addition, the Government should provide Parliamentarians and other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society organisations and media organisations) with regular briefings on their work to combat foreign information manipulation and interference as well as training to identify and report disinformation campaigns. This should mirror the offerings provided by the National Cyber Security Centre for cyber security and resilience. (Recommendation, Paragraph 190) Media literacy
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, highlighting its track record of exposing and sanctioning actors involved in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). They commit to continuing to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, including briefings, and will engage with NCSC to understand best practice, while noting the need to protect sensitive information.
Government Response
Accepted in Part
Government Response
Accepted in Part
HM Government
Accepted in Part
Partially agree. We share the Committee’s objective of improving awareness of FIMI and support greater resilience and public literacy. The UK has a track record of publicly exposing actors propagating FIMI and their tactics, techniques and procedures. Since October 2024, the UK has exposed and sanctioned 96 actors engaged in FIMI. In December 2025, during her Locarno Speech, the Foreign Secretary exposed Russia for engaging in information warfare against the UK and Ukraine and announced action to counter this. This May, the UK went even further to sanction and expose 56 additional interference actors for delivering Russia’s information warfare. As part of this, the FCDO published details of this destabilising activity and the actors responsible on gov.uk. We recognise the importance of regular engagement with key stakeholders including Parliamentarians, the private sector and civil society organisations, in strengthening collective awareness of and resilience to FIMI. Building on existing engagement and outreach, the FCDO will continue to work across Government to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement on hybrid threats, including through briefings and media freedom initiatives. We will continue to make judgements on correct way to provide briefings ensuring we are protecting sensitive information and handling appropriately. The FCDO will continue engagement with the National Cyber Security Centre to understand best practice and consider how relevant lessons can be applied, including on providing briefings where appropriate, on efforts to counter FIMI, while recognising that approaches to countering FIMI must reflect the distinct nature of information threats.
Source
Committee
Foreign Affairs Committee
Report
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy
27 Mar 2026
HC 703
Addressee Bodies
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
Timeline
Recommendation age
0.3 yrs
Report published
27 Mar 2026