Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

Foreign Affairs Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 15 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Misinformation and disinformation campaigns are increasingly weaponised by hostile state and non-state actors and this inquiry will seek to understand which actors are primarily responsible, and which channels and technologies are being used. It will seek to map motivations, sources and locations of the most pressing disinformation threats to democracy, … Read more
24 Recommendations
31 Conclusions
1 Report
7 Oral sessions
11 Letters
7 Events
Activity timeline 26 events
27 Mar
2026
Report published
9 Mar
2026
Oral evidence
9 Mar
2026
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Grimond Room, Portcullis House
25 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
20 Jan
2026
Correspondence
14 Jan
2026
Correspondence
Oral evidence sessions 7 sessions
9 Mar 2026
View on parliament.uk
Ali Law · TikTok David Agranovich · Meta Wifredo Fernández · X Corp.
13 Jan 2026
View on parliament.uk
Ana Revenco · Moldovan Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation Ciaran Martin CB · National Cyber Security Centre Vijay Rangarajan CMG · Electoral Commission
6 Jan 2026
View on parliament.uk
Jonny Hall CMG OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Stephen Doughty MP · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
18 Nov 2025
View on parliament.uk
Alexandre Brasil · Brazilian Embassy in London Jon Bateman · Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nina Jankowicz · American Sunlight Project Nishant Lalwani · International Fund for Public Interest Media Roberta Braga · Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas
16 Sep 2025
View on parliament.uk
Dr Antonio Giustozzi · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Dr Dani Madrid-Morales · The University of Sheffield Grace Theodoulou · The Council on Geostrategy James Kynge · Chatham House Mr Andrew Yeh · China Strategic Risks Institute
1 Apr 2025
View on parliament.uk
Salome Zourabichvili
11 Feb 2025
View on parliament.uk
Foreign Affairs Committee
Dr Jon Roozenbeek · King's College London Professor Martin Innes · Cardiff University Professor Vera Tolz-Zilitinkevic · University of Manchester
Title HC No. Published Items Response
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are see… HC 703 27 Mar 2026 55 Overdue
Recommendations & Conclusions
55 results
1 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic...
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic security. The depth and intensity of hostile activity orchestrated by Russia across the West leaves us with no ambiguity. Russia’s behaviour is that of a … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
2 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance...
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
3 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete,...
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
4 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state.
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
5 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and...
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
6 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the...
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
7 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three...
We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three of its leaders in July 2025, mirroring those implemented by the European Union in December 2024. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
8 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by...
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
9 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it...
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
10 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase...
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
11 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal...
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
12 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred...
The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the UK and Ukraine, including specific information on the operation and intent of Article 7, combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
13 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Committee is deeply concerned about the continued deterioration of democracy in Georgia which, on...
The Committee is deeply concerned about the continued deterioration of democracy in Georgia which, on its current trajectory, will lead to an entrenched autocracy firmly under Russia’s sphere of influence, like Belarus. We condemn the actions of the Georgian Dream … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
14 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian...
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
15 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the...
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
16 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to...
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
17 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking...
The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking to distort public opinion, promote authoritarian alternatives, and destabilise its democracies. Stability in the Western Balkans is vital for European security and NATO cohesion, while … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
18 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Working with the European Union, the UK Government should scale-up assistance for independent media, civil...
Working with the European Union, the UK Government should scale-up assistance for independent media, civil society organisations and media literacy whilst continuing to monitor and expose foreign influence operations in these regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
19 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase...
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
20 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid...
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
21 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns...
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
22 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese...
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
23 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political...
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
24 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States.
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
25 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional...
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
26 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and...
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
27 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information...
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
28 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the...
Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is presently under-resourced. The Government should immediately rectify this by utilising the funds associated with the defence uplift to increase … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
29 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The need for media freedoms is greater today than it has been at any previous...
The need for media freedoms is greater today than it has been at any previous time. Limits are increasingly being placed on journalists which in turn endangers liberty. As funding for independent media organisations like the BBC World Service and … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
30 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Committee welcomes the announcement that the UK Government will become the new co-Chair of...
The Committee welcomes the announcement that the UK Government will become the new co-Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in March 2026, following this Committee’s suggestion to Ministers. This indicates that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office are serious about … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
31 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the...
To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the Committee six-monthly updates, including an assessment of threats to media freedom and the UK’s response to foreign information manipulation and interference in priority regions. (Recommendation, … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
32 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The BBC World Service plays a critical role in providing life-saving information and updates during...
The BBC World Service plays a critical role in providing life-saving information and updates during conflict and crisis, whilst leading the global fight against disinformation and promoting democratic values. Much of the evidence received by the Committee highlights the essential … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
33 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security...
The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security and overseas interests and should be treated by Government as a strategic national asset in an era of information warfare. At a time when the … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
34 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) proliferation over the last few years has ushered a new digital era...
Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) proliferation over the last few years has ushered a new digital era by invigorating research and innovation, whilst introducing unique challenges to national security. AI offers malicious users the opportunities to create novel content at speed, greatly … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
35 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation...
The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation and technology. The sandbox should facilitate experimentation of AI tools across Whitehall, the intelligence community and trusted international partners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 165) Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
36 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with...
Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with allies. Whilst we welcome the Government’s increased engagement with EU partners, there is a need to move faster and significantly increase coordination to deter malign … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
37 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on...
The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on foreign information manipulation and interference. The Government should also outline how it is using the Security and Defence Partnership and other bilateral agreements with EU … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
38 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering...
It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, with no one department or associated body taking overall leadership. This has created a system which seems to prioritise discussion … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
39 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre.
To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre. The UK’s National Counter Disinformation Centre should be placed on a statutory footing, be subject to oversight by Parliament, and be directed to understand, identify … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
40 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and...
The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. We are concerned that at present the Government is not adequately utilising the expertise and evidence collated by its overseas network to inform its … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
41 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how...
The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how it utilises its overseas network to detect, defend and deter foreign information manipulation and interference and how these insights are informing policy responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
42 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
There is an apparent lack of public awareness about disinformation campaigns from foreign malign actors.
There is an apparent lack of public awareness about disinformation campaigns from foreign malign actors. By exposing the broader public to the threat of malicious content the Government can inoculate the target audience from the threat of disinformation. Public awareness … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
43 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of...
The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of foreign information manipulation and interference. This should include the measures taken and mechanisms in place to protect 91 democratic institutions. Additionally, the Foreign, Commonwealth and … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
44 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat...
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference due to an unwillingness to declassify intelligence. It is the Committee’s opinion that there is a culture of secrecy … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
45 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should...
Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should declassify information relating to foreign information manipulation and interference. In addition, the Government should provide Parliamentarians and other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society organisations and … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
46 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK Government has indicated it will take an all-of-society approach through various commitments outlined...
The UK Government has indicated it will take an all-of-society approach through various commitments outlined in the Strategic Defence Review, National Security Strategy and the Resilience Action Plan. Yet media literacy was notably absent. Whilst we welcome the Government’s media … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
47 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to...
The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to strengthening and securing the UK’s national security, including foreign information manipulation and interference from malign actors. The Government should seek to learn best practice from … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
48 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Social media companies are a key component in tackling the dissemination of foreign information manipulation...
Social media companies are a key component in tackling the dissemination of foreign information manipulation and interference. It is our opinion that they are failing to tackle the threat of foreign interference on their platforms. The continued lack of algorithmic … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
49 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases),...
The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
50 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on...
By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on social media platforms. We are concerned that the National Security Act 2023 foreign interference offence, which is critical in combatting malign activity online, is limited … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
51 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference...
The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, to ensure it is fit for purpose given the difficulties in meeting the foreign power … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
52 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including...
We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including whether a new statutory regime of personality rights may be appropriate to protect individuals against the threat of deepfakes. At a minimum, the Government should … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
53 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide...
The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide transparency of user location. This should include publicly available information about 1) the region an account was created; 2) the region the account is based; … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
54 Conclusion
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned about the UK’s legislative ability to withstand the kinds of threats reported...
We are concerned about the UK’s legislative ability to withstand the kinds of threats reported during elections in other countries. We therefore welcome the Government’s intention to legislate to protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes and institutions through … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
55 Recommendation
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated...
The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated content, the creation and dissemination of disinformation, limits on the potential abuse of social media algorithmic biasing for political advantage, and a ban on cryptoasset … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View details
Correspondence 11 letters
25 Feb 2026 Correspondence with Ofcom relating to disinformation, dated 17 February and 03 February 2026
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Government Affairs Department at X relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 28 and 14 January
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 30 and 14 January 2026
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence from the Director of UK Public Policy at Meta relating to disinformation, dated 16 January 2026
Parliament page
28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Democracy, MHCLG, relating to disinformation, dated 22 and 07 January
Parliament page
28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Security, Home Office, and Minister of State, Cabinet Office, relating to disinformation, dated 26 and 07 January
Parliament page
28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for AI and Online Safety, DSIT, relating to disinformation, dated 16 January and 07 January
Parliament page
20 Jan 2026 Correspondence from Minister Doughty following up on the oral evidence session on 06 January, dated 19 January
Parliament page
14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Head of Government Affairs (UK and Ireland) at X, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January
Parliament page
14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy (UK) at Meta, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
Parliament page
14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
Parliament page