Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

Foreign Affairs Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 15 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Misinformation and disinformation campaigns are increasingly weaponised by hostile state and non-state actors and this inquiry will seek to understand which actors are primarily responsible, and which channels and technologies are being used. It will seek to map motivations, sources and locations of the most pressing disinformation threats to democracy, … Read more
33 Recommendations
22 Conclusions
1 Report
7 Oral sessions
11 Letters
7 Events
Activity timeline 20 events
8 Jun
2026
Report published
27 Mar
2026
Report published
9 Mar
2026
Oral evidence
25 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
20 Jan
2026
Correspondence
14 Jan
2026
Correspondence
Oral evidence sessions 7 sessions
9 Mar 2026
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Ali Law · TikTok David Agranovich · Meta Wifredo Fernández · X Corp.
13 Jan 2026
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Ana Revenco · Moldovan Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation Ciaran Martin CB · National Cyber Security Centre Vijay Rangarajan CMG · Electoral Commission
6 Jan 2026
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Jonny Hall CMG OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Stephen Doughty MP · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
18 Nov 2025
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Alexandre Brasil · Brazilian Embassy in London Jon Bateman · Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nina Jankowicz · American Sunlight Project Nishant Lalwani · International Fund for Public Interest Media Roberta Braga · Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas
16 Sep 2025
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Dr Antonio Giustozzi · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Dr Dani Madrid-Morales · The University of Sheffield Grace Theodoulou · The Council on Geostrategy James Kynge · Chatham House Mr Andrew Yeh · China Strategic Risks Institute
1 Apr 2025
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Salome Zourabichvili
11 Feb 2025
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Foreign Affairs Committee
Dr Jon Roozenbeek · King's College London Professor Martin Innes · Cardiff University Professor Vera Tolz-Zilitinkevic · University of Manchester
Title HC No. Published Items Response
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are see… HC 703 27 Mar 2026 55 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
55 results
1 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic...
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic security. The depth and intensity of hostile activity orchestrated by Russia across the West leaves us with no ambiguity. Russia’s behaviour is that of a … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the threat of Russian FIMI and details specific investments and support provided to countries in the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Armenia. This support includes strengthening civil society, independent media, cyber resilience, and media literacy to harden information ecosystems against Russian interference, with a commitment to continue these efforts.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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2 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance...
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and … Read more
Government Response
The government responds with general statements about national security, threats from China, and the Counter-Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan, but does not address the recommendation to prioritize funds for civil society/media or step up counter-FIMI efforts in the Black Sea region and Western Balkans against Russian influence.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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3 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete,...
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at … Read more
Government Response
The government's response is entirely focused on its commitment to protecting the UK from hostile activity by Iran, including sanctions and the FCDO Iran Unit's expertise, and does not address the Committee's conclusion regarding the government's "three C's" approach to China.
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4 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state.
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses the CounterDaesh Communications Cell and its work against Daesh and al-Shabaab disinformation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding transparency on China's state influence and cyber-attacks.
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5 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and...
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on its ongoing commitment to support Ukraine against Russian information operations and disinformation through the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership, and does not address the Committee's support for the specification of Iran under the National Security Act.
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6 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the...
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses entirely on its actions to counter Russian foreign information manipulation and interference in Georgia, including imposing sanctions, and does not address the recommendation to develop programming against Iranian FIMI.
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7 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three...
We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three of its leaders in July 2025, mirroring those implemented by the European Union in December 2024. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)
Government Response
The government acknowledges the conclusion and provides further detail on its ongoing support for Moldova against Russian hybrid threats, including imposing sanctions on related networks and establishing a UK-Moldova Defence and Security Partnership.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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8 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by...
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses countering information manipulation in Armenia and the Western Balkans, completely failing to address the committee's concerns about the effectiveness of the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell.
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9 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it...
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on media freedom in Africa, the Media Freedom Coalition, and sanctions against a Russian information operation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding counter-Daesh communications and identifying partners.
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10 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase...
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses its concerns and actions regarding Chinese misinformation in Taiwan, and support for Taiwan's democratic processes, but does not address the Committee's commendation of UK support for Ukraine against Russian information warfare.
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11 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal...
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses the UK's partnership with the US and freedom of speech, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement and its roadmap.
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12 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred...
The Government should provide greater clarity on the progress made in implementing the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the UK and Ukraine, including specific information on the operation and intent of Article 7, combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. … Read more
Government Response
The government commits to providing a verbal briefing session to the Committee on its international approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, which partially addresses the request for clarity on the UK-Ukraine Partnership Agreement.
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13 Conclusion Acknowledged
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Committee is deeply concerned about the continued deterioration of democracy in Georgia which, on...
The Committee is deeply concerned about the continued deterioration of democracy in Georgia which, on its current trajectory, will lead to an entrenched autocracy firmly under Russia’s sphere of influence, like Belarus. We condemn the actions of the Georgian Dream … Read more
Government Response
The government shares the Committee's concerns about threats to democracy and security, stating its commitment to go further and faster to counter hybrid threats, including FIMI, through existing departmental allocations and continued resource prioritization.
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14 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian...
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses its longstanding commitment to protecting media freedoms and offers to provide verbal briefings, but it does not address the recommendation to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials and other entities.
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15 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the...
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on BBC World Service funding and acknowledges a separate recommendation for additional funding, thereby not addressing the provided conclusion regarding Moldova's resilience and UK support.
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16 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to...
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses the use of AI in information manipulation and its potential for countering FIMI, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope a bespoke AI counter disinformation sandbox, but does not address the recommendation to support Moldova's investigations or impose sanctions.
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17 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking...
The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking to distort public opinion, promote authoritarian alternatives, and destabilise its democracies. Stability in the Western Balkans is vital for European security and NATO cohesion, while … Read more
Government Response
The government describes ongoing actions to address hybrid threats and FIMI, including increased coordination with the EU and member states through the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership, with consultations focusing on the Western Balkans. It commits to continuing this collaboration and joint action with European partners.
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18 Recommendation Acknowledged
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Working with the European Union, the UK Government should scale-up assistance for independent media, civil...
Working with the European Union, the UK Government should scale-up assistance for independent media, civil society organisations and media literacy whilst continuing to monitor and expose foreign influence operations in these regions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's suggestion and states they will take it into account alongside the Rycroft Review and lessons from allies, as they are working to cohere the government's approach to countering foreign information threats.
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19 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase...
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, … Read more
Government Response
The government's response details the FCDO's investment in FIMI training for staff in Africa and leveraging its diplomatic network to engage with host governments and civil society on FIMI threats, but it does not address the committee's observation regarding the West's alleged retreat from Africa or the impact of reduced overseas development aid.
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20 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid...
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government … Read more
Government Response
The government's response details its commitment to increasing public awareness of foreign information manipulation and interference through publications and media literacy campaigns, but does not address the recommendation concerning reductions in aid programming or funding for independent media in Africa.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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21 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns...
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for … Read more
Government Response
The government shares the objective of improving FIMI awareness, highlights its track record of exposing and sanctioning FIMI actors (primarily Russia), and states it will continue to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, but does not specifically acknowledge the Committee's observation regarding Chinese FIMI targeting Taiwan.
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22 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese...
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on general media literacy campaigns and engagement with social media platforms, but it does not address the specific recommendation to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan or expand bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups.
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23 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political...
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by … Read more
Government Response
The government's response addresses concerns about algorithms, the Online Safety Act, and a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but fails to engage with the committee's conclusion regarding the impact of the US political landscape on transatlantic cooperation and specific US actions.
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24 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States.
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, … Read more
Government Response
The government describes its domestic legislative tools for countering foreign interference, such as the National Security Act 2023, but does not specifically address the recommendation for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States or standing up for those countering disinformation globally.
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25 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional...
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses concerns about digital replicas and a forthcoming consultation on their potential harms, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the information environment in Latin America.
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26 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and...
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be … Read more
Government Response
The government responds by discussing the Online Safety Act, VPN usage, and transnational repression, but does not address the recommendation to work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media, strengthen FIMI monitoring capacity, or report on diplomatic engagement in the specified regions.
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27 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information...
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other … Read more
Government Response
The government's response outlines measures related to the Representation of the People Bill, a consultation on digital replicas, an AI labelling taskforce, and a ban on crypto asset donations, failing to address the conclusion regarding FCDO funding limitations or the strategic recognition of FIMI.
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28 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the...
Given the importance of combatting foreign information manipulation and interference, it is unacceptable that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is presently under-resourced. The Government should immediately rectify this by utilising the funds associated with the defence uplift to increase … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the importance of the issue, stating that it has ensured existing allocations target hybrid threats, and confirms the Hybrid Threats Directorate has been allocated a non-ODA budget for the current spending review period to enable effective action.
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29 Conclusion Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The need for media freedoms is greater today than it has been at any previous...
The need for media freedoms is greater today than it has been at any previous time. Limits are increasingly being placed on journalists which in turn endangers liberty. As funding for independent media organisations like the BBC World Service and … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, reiterating its commitment to media freedom and outlining steps such as co-chairing the Media Freedom Coalition and a new approach to Africa, while also highlighting actions like sanctions to disrupt information networks.
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30 Conclusion Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Committee welcomes the announcement that the UK Government will become the new co-Chair of...
The Committee welcomes the announcement that the UK Government will become the new co-Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in March 2026, following this Committee’s suggestion to Ministers. This indicates that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office are serious about … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, recognising the importance of updates on media freedoms and committing to periodic verbal briefing sessions for the Committee while reviewing options for formal written reporting, in response to the cessation of previous updates.
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31 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the...
To show its continued commitment to media freedoms, the Government should again provide to the Committee six-monthly updates, including an assessment of threats to media freedom and the UK’s response to foreign information manipulation and interference in priority regions. (Recommendation, … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, committing to periodic verbal briefings for committee members on media freedoms while reviewing options for formal written reporting, rather than the requested six-monthly updates.
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32 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The BBC World Service plays a critical role in providing life-saving information and updates during...
The BBC World Service plays a critical role in providing life-saving information and updates during conflict and crisis, whilst leading the global fight against disinformation and promoting democratic values. Much of the evidence received by the Committee highlights the essential … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, highlighting its increased funding for the BBC World Service to £148 million per annum. However, it notes but does not commit to further additional funding, citing defence budget rules and deferring longer-term funding considerations to the BBC Charter Review.
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33 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security...
The Government must recognise that accurate, impartial news is essential to the UK’s national security and overseas interests and should be treated by Government as a strategic national asset in an era of information warfare. At a time when the … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, stating it has already increased BBC World Service funding to £148 million per annum, which it considers a real-terms uplift. However, it defers the recommendation for further increased funding drawn from the defence budget, citing stringent NATO rules and the ongoing BBC Charter Review.
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34 Conclusion Acknowledged
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) proliferation over the last few years has ushered a new digital era...
Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) proliferation over the last few years has ushered a new digital era by invigorating research and innovation, whilst introducing unique challenges to national security. AI offers malicious users the opportunities to create novel content at speed, greatly … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the Committee's observation on AI's dual nature, acknowledging its use for both information manipulation and defensive capabilities. It states that FCDO capabilities are under review and existing AI sandboxes are in place, with a commitment to assess their utility for a bespoke counter-disinformation sandbox.
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35 Recommendation Deferred
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation...
The Government should establish an AI counter disinformation sandbox to test the boundaries of regulation and technology. The sandbox should facilitate experimentation of AI tools across Whitehall, the intelligence community and trusted international partners. (Recommendation, Paragraph 165) Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope whether a bespoke AI counter-disinformation sandbox would be useful, rather than immediately establishing one.
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36 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with...
Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with allies. Whilst we welcome the Government’s increased engagement with EU partners, there is a need to move faster and significantly increase coordination to deter malign … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees, detailing recent increases in coordination with the EU and member states through consultations and bilateral agreements, and stating its intention to continue strengthening collaboration and joint action, including information sharing and coordinating sanctions.
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37 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on...
The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on foreign information manipulation and interference. The Government should also outline how it is using the Security and Defence Partnership and other bilateral agreements with EU … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees and confirms it has already initiated UK-EU consultations on hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), under the Security and Defence Partnership, and will continue to strengthen collaboration through information sharing, analysis, and coordinated sanctions.
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38 Recommendation Deferred
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering...
It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, with no one department or associated body taking overall leadership. This has created a system which seems to prioritise discussion … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, noting that the Rycroft Review also highlighted fragmentation issues. It will take the Committee's suggestion for an NCSC-like model into account alongside the Rycroft Review conclusions and lessons from allies, without committing to specific action yet.
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39 Recommendation Deferred
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre.
To ensure a whole-of-society approach, the Government should establish a public-facing National Counter Disinformation Centre. The UK’s National Counter Disinformation Centre should be placed on a statutory footing, be subject to oversight by Parliament, and be directed to understand, identify … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, acknowledging the need for a joined-up approach, but defers action by stating it will note the suggestion and take it into account alongside the conclusions of the Rycroft Review and lessons from allies.
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40 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and...
The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. We are concerned that at present the Government is not adequately utilising the expertise and evidence collated by its overseas network to inform its … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the conclusion, stating that the FCDO is investing in staff training for FIMI, leveraging its overseas network of political officers for intelligence gathering and collaboration, and deepening dialogue with international partners.
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41 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how...
The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how it utilises its overseas network to detect, defend and deter foreign information manipulation and interference and how these insights are informing policy responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees and states the FCDO is investing in staff upskilling, leveraging its network of political officers, and using reporting from overseas missions to build a global picture of the threat which informs policy responses.
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42 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
There is an apparent lack of public awareness about disinformation campaigns from foreign malign actors.
There is an apparent lack of public awareness about disinformation campaigns from foreign malign actors. By exposing the broader public to the threat of malicious content the Government can inoculate the target audience from the threat of disinformation. Public awareness … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees on the importance of public awareness, stating it will continue to highlight the threat via gov.uk and is considering adapting its existing "You Won’t Know Until You Ask" media literacy campaign to address foreign information manipulation and interference.
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43 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of...
The government should launch a public awareness campaign to educate citizens about the risk of foreign information manipulation and interference. This should include the measures taken and mechanisms in place to protect 91 democratic institutions. Additionally, the Foreign, Commonwealth and … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, stating it will continue to highlight the threat and is already pursuing media literacy initiatives like the 'You Won't Know Until You Ask' campaign, which it is considering extending or adapting. It does not commit to launching a new dedicated information portal as recommended.
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44 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat...
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference due to an unwillingness to declassify intelligence. It is the Committee’s opinion that there is a culture of secrecy … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the concern, highlighting its track record of publicly exposing foreign information manipulation and interference actors and committing to continue enhancing information sharing and stakeholder engagement while protecting sensitive intelligence.
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45 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should...
Where examples would resonate with the public, the Government and the National Security Community should declassify information relating to foreign information manipulation and interference. In addition, the Government should provide Parliamentarians and other key stakeholders (e.g., civil society organisations and … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, highlighting its track record of exposing and sanctioning actors involved in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). They commit to continuing to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, including briefings, and will engage with NCSC to understand best practice, while noting the need to protect sensitive information.
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46 Conclusion Acknowledged
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK Government has indicated it will take an all-of-society approach through various commitments outlined...
The UK Government has indicated it will take an all-of-society approach through various commitments outlined in the Strategic Defence Review, National Security Strategy and the Resilience Action Plan. Yet media literacy was notably absent. Whilst we welcome the Government’s media … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees that media literacy is crucial for resilience to FIMI and is evaluating its 'You Won’t Know Until You Ask’ campaign to adapt it for specific FIMI risks. It also acknowledges the critical role of social media platforms in promoting media literacy, stating that DSIT engages directly with them while Ofcom plays a coordinating role under the Online Safety Act.
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47 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to...
The Government must not overlook media literacy as part of its all-of- society approach to strengthening and securing the UK’s national security, including foreign information manipulation and interference from malign actors. The Government should seek to learn best practice from … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees that media literacy is important and acknowledges the value of learning from Baltic and Nordic partners. It is evaluating its existing 'You Won't Know Until You Ask' campaign for children and considering options to extend or adapt it to address FIMI and focus on all ages.
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48 Conclusion Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Social media companies are a key component in tackling the dissemination of foreign information manipulation...
Social media companies are a key component in tackling the dissemination of foreign information manipulation and interference. It is our opinion that they are failing to tackle the threat of foreign interference on their platforms. The continued lack of algorithmic … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns about algorithms and noting Ofcom's existing powers, and commits to operationalising a legislated Researcher Access to Data Scheme through consultations and regulations later this year to provide legitimate data access to researchers.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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49 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases),...
The Government should require social media companies to publish algorithmic transparency data (logic and biases), provide legitimate data access to researchers free of charge and without cumbersome restrictions, and oblige platforms to publish an annual report on the detection of … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, noting the Online Safety Act already gives Ofcom powers to request algorithm design information. It agrees social media companies should provide legitimate data to researchers and will be consulting on how to operationalise a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but does not address requiring annual reports on artificial amplification and foreign interference.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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50 Recommendation Rejected
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on...
By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on social media platforms. We are concerned that the National Security Act 2023 foreign interference offence, which is critical in combatting malign activity online, is limited … Read more
Government Response
The government disagrees, stating the National Security Act 2023 is carefully designed and needs time to be robustly tested. They note a live case may clarify its operation and will review legislation, working with Ofcom on platform duties under the Online Safety Act.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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51 Recommendation Rejected
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference...
The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, to ensure it is fit for purpose given the difficulties in meeting the foreign power … Read more
Government Response
The government disagrees with conducting an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, stating the Act is new and has not been robustly tested, with a live case expected to clarify its operation.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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52 Recommendation Deferred
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including...
We welcome the Government’s proposals to explore options to address potential digital replica harms including whether a new statutory regime of personality rights may be appropriate to protect individuals against the threat of deepfakes. At a minimum, the Government should … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns but stating it will launch a consultation in the summer to seek views on addressing digital replica harms, deferring a commitment to specific personality rights coverage.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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53 Recommendation Rejected
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide...
The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide transparency of user location. This should include publicly available information about 1) the region an account was created; 2) the region the account is based; … Read more
Government Response
The government explicitly disagrees with amending the Online Safety Act, citing legitimate reasons for VPN use and confidence that the current Act effectively addresses online harms, including those associated with transnational repression. It will continue to monitor the Act's effectiveness.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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54 Conclusion Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned about the UK’s legislative ability to withstand the kinds of threats reported...
We are concerned about the UK’s legislative ability to withstand the kinds of threats reported during elections in other countries. We therefore welcome the Government’s intention to legislate to protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes and institutions through … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, acknowledging concerns about democratic protection, and details further actions it is taking or planning, including a consultation on digital replicas, an AI-generated content labelling taskforce, ongoing review of the Online Safety Act framework, and a moratorium on crypto asset political donations via the Representation of the People Bill.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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55 Recommendation Accepted in Part
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated...
The Government should include provisions in the Representation of the People Bill that tackle AI-generated content, the creation and dissemination of disinformation, limits on the potential abuse of social media algorithmic biasing for political advantage, and a ban on cryptoasset … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees. It will launch a consultation and establish a taskforce on AI-generated content, and acknowledges concerns about algorithms, noting the Online Safety Act's powers. However, it fully accepts and will implement a moratorium on crypto asset donations through the Representation of the People Bill.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 55 of 33 classified
Accepted 8
Accepted in Part 15
Acknowledged 4
Deferred 4
Not Addressed 21
Rejected 3
Total 33 recs + 22 conclusions
Correspondence 11 letters
25 Feb 2026 Correspondence with Ofcom relating to disinformation, dated 17 February and 03 February 2026
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 30 and 14 January 2026
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence from the Director of UK Public Policy at Meta relating to disinformation, dated 16 January 2026
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Government Affairs Department at X relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 28 and 14 January
Parliament page
28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Democracy, MHCLG, relating to disinformation, dated 22 and 07 January
Parliament page
28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Security, Home Office, and Minister of State, Cabinet Office, relating to disinformation, dated 26 and 07 January
Parliament page
28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for AI and Online Safety, DSIT, relating to disinformation, dated 16 January and 07 January
Parliament page
20 Jan 2026 Correspondence from Minister Doughty following up on the oral evidence session on 06 January, dated 19 January
Parliament page
14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy (UK) at Meta, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
Parliament page
14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
Parliament page
14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Head of Government Affairs (UK and Ireland) at X, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January
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