44
Accepted
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat...
Conclusion
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference due to an unwillingness to declassify intelligence. It is the Committee’s opinion that there is a culture of secrecy and overclassification, especially for state threats which risk leaving Parliament and the public in the dark. (Conclusion, Paragraph 189)
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees with the concern, highlighting its track record of publicly exposing foreign information manipulation and interference actors and committing to continue enhancing information sharing and stakeholder engagement while protecting sensitive intelligence.
Government Response
Accepted
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
Partially agree. We share the Committee’s objective of improving awareness of FIMI and support greater resilience and public literacy. The UK has a track record of publicly exposing actors propagating FIMI and their tactics, techniques and procedures. Since October 2024, the UK has exposed and sanctioned 96 actors engaged in FIMI. In December 2025, during her Locarno Speech, the Foreign Secretary exposed Russia for engaging in information warfare against the UK and Ukraine and announced action to counter this. This May, the UK went even further to sanction and expose 56 additional interference actors for delivering Russia’s information warfare. As part of this, the FCDO published details of this destabilising activity and the actors responsible on gov.uk. We recognise the importance of regular engagement with key stakeholders including Parliamentarians, the private sector and civil society organisations, in strengthening collective awareness of and resilience to FIMI. Building on existing engagement and outreach, the FCDO will continue to work across Government to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement on hybrid threats, including through briefings and media freedom initiatives. We will continue to make judgements on correct way to provide briefings ensuring we are protecting sensitive information and handling appropriately. The FCDO will continue engagement with the National Cyber Security Centre to understand best practice and consider how relevant lessons can be applied, including on providing briefings where appropriate, on efforts to counter FIMI, while recognising that approaches to countering FIMI must reflect the distinct nature of information threats.
Source
Committee
Foreign Affairs Committee
Report
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy
27 Mar 2026
HC 703
Addressee Bodies
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
Timeline
Recommendation age
0.3 yrs
Report published
27 Mar 2026