The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century

Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 11 May 2022 Closed: 24 May 2024 Parliament page
The Committee is conducting an inquiry into how treaties and other international arrangements (such as Memorandums of Understanding) could be effectively scrutinised in the UK, now that the UK has left the EU. Our particular focus is on the House of Commons.
11 Recommendations
21 Conclusions
1 Report
8 Oral sessions
1 Letter
8 Events
Activity timeline 19 events
Oral evidence sessions 8 sessions
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
David Rutley MP · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office Leonie Lambert · Department for Business and Trade Nigel Huddleston MP · HM Treasury Paul Berman · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
Dr Mario Mendez · Queen Mary University of London Professor Emily Jones · Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford Professor Holger Hestermeyer · Kings College London
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
Angus MacNeil MP · Member of the House of Commons The Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town · Member of the House of Lords
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
Clare Adamson MSP · Scottish Parliament Huw Irranca-Davies MS · Senedd Cymru / Welsh Parliament Mick Antoniw MS · Welsh Government Rt Hon Angus Robertson MSP · Scottish Government
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
Penelope Nevill · Kings College London Professor Richard Gardiner · University College London (UCL)
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
Professor Lorand Bartels MBE · Trade and Agriculture Commission Professor Malgosia Fitzmaurice · Queen Mary University of London
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
Rt Hon Lord Frost CMG · Cabinet Office
The Scrutiny of International Treaties and other international agreements in the 21st century
Alexander Horne · Durham University Arabella Lang · Public Law Project Jill Barrett · Queen Mary University of London
Recommendations & Conclusions
24 results
1 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Negotiation of international agreements remains an executive prerogative power under UK law.
Under the UK’s constitutional arrangements, the power to negotiate and enter into international agreements is a prerogative power; as such, the power still sits notionally with the sovereign, but in practice is exercised exclusively by the executive (i.e Ministers of … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agreed that Parliament has an essential role in treaty scrutiny and accountability, but explicitly rejected the notion that the existing framework for treaty scrutiny is insufficient or requires changes.
2 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Exercise of prerogative powers must align with House of Commons' confidence and will.
While we believe that the prerogative should continue to be the source of the power for the Government to negotiate and enter into international agreements, it is clear that the manner and way in which that prerogative power is exercised … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the Committee's recognition of the Royal Prerogative and Parliament's scrutiny role, but explicitly states it does not accept that the existing framework for treaty scrutiny is insufficient.
3 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Domestic implementation required for treaties to affect UK law, but Parliament's influence is limited.
The UK is a dualist state, meaning that, in order for obligations entered into through treaties to have effect in UK law, domestic implementation is required. This is an important feature of the UK’s constitutional system, ensuring that any changes … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agreed on Parliament's dual role in treaty scrutiny and implementing legislation, but asserted that the existing framework is appropriate and provides sufficient flexibility, implicitly rejecting the need for changes to Parliament's scope to influence treaty terms.
5 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
International agreements increasingly function as domestic legislation, requiring parliamentary concern.
Over the last century, there have been significant quantitative and qualitative changes to the nature of international agreements; they now reach into people’s everyday lives in the UK and around the world. They seek not only to deal with relations … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agreed there has been growth in multilateral treaty making, but rejected the assertion that treaties have fundamentally changed or become more akin to domestic legislation, maintaining that the UK's dualist system ensures treaties remain distinct.
6 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Parliament's insufficient engagement with international agreements undermines its core constitutional function.
Parliament is not sufficiently engaged with international agreements. The UK’s parliamentary democracy operates on the basis of the dual constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. As such it must be understood that scrutiny of international agreements is a … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agreed that treaty scrutiny is a core constitutional function of Parliament but explicitly rejected the Committee's overarching position that parliamentary engagement with international agreements is insufficient.
7 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Require explicit House of Commons approval for all treaties before entering into force.
Currently, there is no requirement for Parliament to approve treaties. We find this situation untenable. Parliament’s approval must be sought when the Government seeks to bind or change in any material way the UK’s obligations under international law. We therefore … Read more
Government Response
The government rejected the recommendation for explicit House of Commons approval of all treaties, stating that Part 2 of the CRaG Act strikes the appropriate balance and that further powers would fundamentally undermine the Royal Prerogative of treaty making.
8 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Outdated Concordat on International Relations requires urgent update for devolved nations.
The UK Government carries out negotiations and enters into treaties for the whole of the UK. However, under the UK’s devolution arrangements, day to day responsibility for areas of domestic policy which could be impacted by treaties often lies with … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agreed that devolved governments have a strong interest in international policy making, but rejected the recommendation to update the Concordat on International Relations, arguing that newer structures from the 2022 Review of Intergovernmental Relations and existing engagement practices are sufficient.
9 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Prioritise updating Concordat on International Relations to clarify devolved treaty consultation arrangements.
While many of the principles in the Concordat on International Relations appear to us to continue to be the right ones, the Concordat itself clearly needs to be updated, and the cooperation that it facilitates must take place in earnest. … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the recommendation to update or replace the Concordat on International Relations, stating that its principles remain valid and that new intergovernmental relations structures (IGRR) published in January 2022 provide updated engagement frameworks. It describes existing close working relationships and engagement mechanisms with devolved governments regarding international policymaking.
10 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
CRAG Act 2010 provides insufficient treaty scrutiny and parliamentary approval mechanisms.
It is clear from the evidence we received that the arrangements set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are unsatisfactory in a modern democratic society. We identified three main areas of concern. First, the legislation provides a … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the committee's conclusion, stating it does not accept that Parliament requires further powers to scrutinise treaty-making. It argues that Part 2 of CRaG strikes the appropriate balance, aligns with other dualist states, and maintains the Royal Prerogative, concluding that Parliament already has sufficient scrutiny mechanisms.
11 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Mandate explicit active House of Commons approval vote for all treaties before ratification.
The explicit, active approval of the House of Commons should be a requirement for all treaties (legally binding international agreements) to be allowed to proceed to ratification or for it to be otherwise indicated that the UK gives consent to … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the recommendation for explicit House of Commons approval for all treaties, arguing that Part 2 of CRaG already strikes an appropriate balance and that giving Parliament binding votes would undermine the Royal Prerogative and treaty-making flexibility. It asserts Parliament already possesses sufficient scrutiny mechanisms.
12 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Amend CRAG Act 2010 to establish a sifting committee for treaty scrutiny periods.
To achieve this end, we recommend that the mechanisms contained in Sections 20 to 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are amended to implement the following arrangements in line with this principle of active approval: The legislation … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the recommendation to amend CRaG and introduce a parliamentary sifting committee for treaties. It reiterates that Part 2 of CRaG already provides appropriate scrutiny, defends the Royal Prerogative, and states that Parliament currently has sufficient mechanisms without further legislative changes.
13 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Sifting committee to determine criteria for extended treaty scrutiny and stakeholder input.
The exact criteria on which this decision should be made will be for the sifting committee to determine and to set out. The purpose of this longer scrutiny period would be to allow for the relevant parliamentary committees and other … Read more
Government Response
The government rejected the recommendation for a longer parliamentary scrutiny period and explicit approval of all treaties, including those entering into force on signature, arguing that the existing 21-sitting-day period under CRaG Part 2 is sufficient and provides necessary flexibility.
14 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Government must follow specific procedure to override sifting committee scrutiny recommendations.
If the Government does not wish to accept the longer period of scrutiny set out by the sifting committee, a Minister of the Crown must make a statement to the House setting out the reasons why they believe the period … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the recommendation for ministers to justify overriding a sifting committee's extended scrutiny period, stating that CRaG Part 2 already provides an appropriate balance and no legislative changes are needed. It considers the existing 21-day scrutiny period sufficient in most cases and views the proposed process as inefficient.
15 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Amend legislation to establish criteria and statement requirement for urgent treaty bypass.
We recognise that, while rare, there may be circumstances where a treaty needs to enter into force as a matter of urgency. To account for such circumstances, the amended legislation should set out the criteria under which the Government should … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the recommendation for amended legislation to set out criteria for urgent treaty ratification bypassing a sifting committee, stating that Part 2 of CRaG provides the appropriate balance and no legislative changes are required. It argues the existing framework offers sufficient flexibility for urgent action while ensuring accountability.
19 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Ensure all treaty amendments and decisions are considered by the sifting committee.
There is clearly potential for significant changes to be made following the conclusion of a treaty, and for those changes - for various reasons - not to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny under the current arrangements. All treaties, including any … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects the recommendation, stating it does not agree that all treaties, including amendments or decisions made under them, should be subject to explicit parliamentary approval before entering into force.
20 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Non-legally binding instruments carry significant political and financial obligations for the UK.
While non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs) do not place legal obligations on the UK, they can impose ‘political obligations’ that can guide government action and even result in financial obligations being placed on the UK. The UK is an internationally trusted … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects the recommendation to establish a central repository for non-legally binding instruments, deeming it impractical and unnecessary. However, it commits to updating its published guidance to encourage consistency and transparency in departmental approaches to managing NLBIs.
21 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Establish a central public repository for all NLBIs and notify Parliament of updates.
There was considerable concern expressed to us that adequate records of NLBIs were not being kept and that there is insufficient public access to those NLBIs which have been reached. We received calls for a central repository of all NLBIs … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the recommendation to establish a central, public repository for all non-legally binding instruments, citing impracticality, lack of value, resource implications, and the need for flexibility and confidentiality. It states that individual departments are responsible for managing and publishing such instruments as appropriate, but will update its published guidance to encourage consistency and transparency.
22 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Parliament needs to be informed and scrutinise new non-legally binding instruments.
It is clear that NLBIs are already a significant part of how states manage relations between one another and make policy decisions internationally. Arrangements therefore need to be put in place for Parliament to be informed of new NLBIs and, … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects the recommendation for new arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of non-legally binding instruments, stating it does not agree new votes or processes are needed as existing parliamentary procedures are sufficient for scrutiny when appropriate.
23 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Require government to make time for NLBI debates upon committee or Opposition request.
We further believe that if a request is made by a parliamentary committee or the Leader of the Official Opposition for a debate and vote on an NLBI, the Government should make time for this on the floor of the … Read more
Government Response
The Government rejects the recommendation to make time for parliamentary debates and votes on non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs). It argues against routine scrutiny for NLBIs, asserting that existing parliamentary procedures allow for debates on matters of public importance and committees can already scrutinise them within their subject areas.
24 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Establish confidential briefing arrangements for Commons committees on secret NLBIs.
We recognise that, on occasion, there may be good reasons why the Government has to reach NLBIs in secret, for instance in relation to matters of defence or national security. This does not diminish the Government’s accountability to Parliament for … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects the recommendation for new parliamentary scrutiny arrangements for non-legally binding instruments, stating that existing procedures are sufficient and it must retain its ability to enter such agreements in the national interest.
26 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Parliament's scrutiny of international agreements requires involvement throughout the entire lifecycle.
To carry out its constitutional function effectively in regard to the scrutiny of international agreements, it is not enough for Parliament to be involved only at the end of the process. A new approach to conceptualising international negotiations and international … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects the recommendation for Parliament to be involved throughout the lifecycle of international agreements, asserting that existing parliamentary mechanisms are sufficient and that mandates for treaties should not be subject to parliamentary approval.
27 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Reach a working agreement between Government and Parliament on negotiation progress and mandates.
Given our recommendation that all treaties need to be subject to a parliamentary process for the UK to indicate consent to be bound, it would be in a Government’s best interest to consult and update Parliament regularly. We recommend that … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects the recommendation for a new working agreement and parliamentary approval of negotiating mandates, citing that existing parliamentary mechanisms are sufficient and Parliament has previously rejected such amendments in the Trade Act 2021.
31 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Mandate Government to notify committees when discussing treaty extension with Crown Dependencies or Overseas Territories.
We are encouraged by the evidence we received on the regular and effective discussion and consultation between both the Ministry of Justice and Crown Dependencies and the FCDO and the Overseas Territories with regard to treaties that could be extended … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees on the importance of consultation, stating it will continue to consult Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories on treaty extensions. However, it explicitly rejects the recommendation to notify new committees about these discussions or entrustment letters, stating no new arrangements are required.
32 Conclusion Rejected
Second Report - Parliamentary Scru…
Establish a convention for Commons to approve CD/OT related treaties only with their consent.
We are satisfied that the existing conventions are strong enough to ensure that a treaty will not be extended to the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories without their consent. This consent should also be communicated to Parliament at the point … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees, stating it will continue its existing practice of consulting Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories on treaty matters. However, it rejects the need for new arrangements, including communicating their consent to Parliament or establishing a new convention for parliamentary approval processes.
Government Response AI assessment · 32 of 11 classified

Total 11 recs + 21 conclusions
Correspondence 1 letter
14 May 2024 From committee Letter to Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, Leader of the House of Commons on the Sifting Committee for International Agreements, dated 14.5.24
Parliament page