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MOD procurement frequently suffers significant delays and cost overruns, failing Armed Forces
Conclusion
In 2023, we examined the organisation responsible for the majority of MOD procurement (Defence Equipment & Support).248 Pointing to the conclusion by the Public Accounts Committee that defence equipment “arrives into service many years late and significantly over-budget, with depressing regularity”, something which means that “neither taxpayers nor our Armed Forces are being served well”,249 we welcomed the acknowledgement by the CEO of Defence Equipment & Support that “we have some really horrible, broken programmes that aren’t good enough”.250 240 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q46; Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 241 Oral evidence taken on 12 December 2023, HC (2023–24) 54, Q97 242 Q318 243 Q34–5; 48–9 244 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 245 Q99 246 Q115 247 Oral evidence taken on 5 September 2023, HC (2022–23) 1804, Q37–8 248 Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2022–23, It is broke — and it’s time to fix it The UK’s defence procurement system, HC 1099 249 Public Accounts Committee, Forty-Eighth Report of Session 2022–23, MoD Equipment Plan 2022–2023, HC 731 250 Oral evidence taken on 21 February 2023, HC 1119, Q110 Ready for War? 47
Government Response
A response document is linked to this report, dated 25 April 2024. Response attribution to this conclusion has not been verified. Read the response document.
Source
Committee
Defence Committee
Inquiry
Armed Forces Readiness
Report
First Report - Ready for War?
04 Feb 2024
HC 26
Addressee Bodies
Ministry of Defence
Timeline
Recommendation age
2.6 yrs
Report published
04 Feb 2024