Armed Forces Readiness

Defence Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 24 Apr 2023 Closed: 24 May 2024 Parliament page
The Committee welcomes written evidence on the following: Are the armed forces sufficiently capable, resourced and ready to protect the UK and our allies? What are the main gaps in capability and/or readiness, and what will it take to fill these gaps? Are the UK armed forces a ‘tier one … Read more
10 Recommendations
122 Conclusions
1 Report
6 Oral sessions
6 Events
Activity timeline 14 events
25 Apr
2024
Report published
4 Feb
2024
Report published
22 Nov
2023
Oral evidence
22 Nov
2023
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Grimond Room, Portcullis House
14 Nov
2023
Oral evidence
14 Nov
2023
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Thatcher Room, Portcullis House
7 Nov
2023
Oral evidence
7 Nov
2023
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Thatcher Room, Portcullis House
21 Jun
2023
Oral evidence
21 Jun
2023
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 15, Palace of Westminster
20 Jun
2023
Oral evidence
20 Jun
2023
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 5, Palace of Westminster
Oral evidence sessions 6 sessions
22 Nov 2023
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Panel 1
General Sir Jim Hockenhull · Ministry of Defence Rt Hon James Heappey MP · Ministry of Defence
14 Nov 2023
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Panel 1
Admiral Sir Ben Key KCB CBE · Ministry of Defence Rear Admiral Steve Moorhouse CBE · Ministry of Defence
7 Nov 2023
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Panel 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton KCB · Ministry of Defence General Sir Patrick Sanders · Ministry of Defence
21 Jun 2023
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Panel 1
General (Retd) Sir Nick Carter, Former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
20 Jun 2023
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Panel 1
The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL
6 Jun 2023
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Panel 1
Dr Simon Anglim · Kings College London Nick Childs · The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Professor Justin Bronk · RUSI
Title HC No. Published Items Response
First Report - Ready for War? HC 26 4 Feb 2024 132 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
132 results
32 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
No regular mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial decisions on defence readiness
Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees that there is no regular mechanism for scrutiny on readiness and offers a regular annual open session for the Committee to meet with Ministers and Service Chiefs to address this gap.
Ministry of Defence
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33 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Government's unacceptably slow and unhelpful response impeded inquiry, raising ministerial grip concerns
The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees that the response time for this specific inquiry was slow and commits to making every effort to prevent recurrence. They assure that the newly offered annual open session will be prioritised and provide useful, timely information.
Ministry of Defence
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34 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Lack of adequate official information hinders public scrutiny of UK armed forces readiness
In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they … Read more
Government Response
The government recognizes the need for more public information on planning assumptions and readiness, committing to releasing headlines from current Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) and 'as much as possible' of future DPAs when national and NATO planning processes mature.
Ministry of Defence
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35 Conclusion Accepted in Part
First Report - Ready for War?
Propose mechanism for annual, detailed updates to Defence Committee on UK Armed Forces readiness
In a functioning democracy, the House of Commons Defence Committee needs to be routinely informed about the planning assumptions and readiness of the nation’s armed forces. We therefore recommend that—following the Minister’s welcome commitment to work with us—the Government propose … Read more
Government Response
The government commits to releasing headlines from current Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) and 'as much as possible' of future DPAs. However, it does not explicitly propose a mechanism for providing annual, detailed updates specifically to the Committee.
Ministry of Defence
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36 Recommendation Accepted in Part
First Report - Ready for War?
Require Government to explain readiness data classification and consult committees on future decisions.
We also recommend that the Government explain why previously unclassified information about readiness is no longer published, recognise the reduction in public and parliamentary accountability that this has brought about, and seek to rectify the situation. In future, when a … Read more
Government Response
The government explains the historical evolution and classification of Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) and has released a version of the 2023 DPAs to enhance transparency. However, it does not commit to consulting select committees before classifying previously available information in the future.
Ministry of Defence
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37 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Thousands of UK Armed Forces personnel deployed on numerous international operations.
At the end of 2023, over 7,000 UK Armed Forces personnel were deployed on more than 40 operations abroad.51 Some of these operations are long-standing commitments whereas others are in response to unexpected events. In the last quarter of 2023, … Read more
Government Response
The government states that the UK Armed Forces continue to meet all their operational commitments, including participation in NATO missions, support for Ukraine, and addressing Houthi shipping attacks in the Red Sea.
Ministry of Defence
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38 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Standing deployments and 'flying the flag' operations strengthen alliances and partnerships.
Standing commitments and ‘flying the flag’ operations can play a vital role in building alliances and partnerships that could help deter or win a future war. The Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the work which the Rangers carried out … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of alliances and partnerships, stating that the UK, as a leading NATO member, already leverages these relationships and deploys assets like aircraft carriers to build international defence capabilities.
Ministry of Defence
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39 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Armed Forces demonstrate effective operational readiness for recent crisis deployments.
The Secretary of State told us that in relation to the additional deployments to KFOR and the Middle East, his “experience of our Armed Forces has been that when I have needed something so far, it has been there”: They … Read more
Government Response
The government affirms that the Armed Forces continue to meet all operational commitments, including NATO missions, support for Ukraine, and tackling Houthi attacks, demonstrating their ability to respond effectively to crises.
Ministry of Defence
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40 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces deployed beyond designed capacity, impacting platform maintenance.
The Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the UK Armed Forces were deployed in excess of what the force structure was designed for, noting that “there is absolutely no pretending that we are not spending resource more keenly than … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the need to prioritise resources for modernisation and readiness, stating that lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War have led to a re-evaluation of assumptions and a greater focus on warfighting readiness, balancing existing programmes.
Ministry of Defence
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41 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
British Armed Forces lack sufficient preparation for industrial-scale war fighting.
Professor Michael Clarke told us “British forces over the past 30 years have done a great deal of operating, but have not prepared for war fighting, and there is a big difference between operating efficiently and well, and preparing for … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees the threat has changed and states that Defence is being optimized to fight, with lessons from Ukraine leading to re-evaluation of capabilities and readiness. It highlights £1.95bn allocated to address capability gaps and improve resilience.
Ministry of Defence
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42 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Significant concerns raised over UK Armed Forces' warfighting readiness and resilience.
All three witnesses in our first evidence session questioned the warfighting readiness of the UK Armed Forces.63 General Lord Houghton later told us that the “hollowing out” of the Armed Forces since 2010 had led to shortfalls in the UK’s … Read more
Government Response
The government confirms £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget has been allocated to improve defence resilience by building munitions and medical stockpiles, enhancing critical infrastructure, and supporting activities like supply chain mapping and wargaming.
Ministry of Defence
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43 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD acknowledges significant warfighting readiness gaps requiring urgent investment.
The MOD have acknowledged that there are gaps in their warfighting readiness. In written evidence submitted to this inquiry, the MOD highlighted that investment is required in: • Defence rail outload theatre capability; • Infrastructure and warehousing munitions; 59 Q427; … Read more
Government Response
The government confirms £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget has been allocated to improve defence resilience by building munitions and medical stockpiles, enhancing critical infrastructure, and supporting activities like supply chain mapping and wargaming, directly addressing identified investment needs.
Ministry of Defence
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44 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD investing in specific capabilities, yet urgent wider reinvestment is required for readiness.
The Chief of the Defence Staff also told us that the MOD was investing in capabilities such as “complex weapons, general munitions, and operational spares stocks to meet the needs of sustained operation”.68 The Minister for the Armed Forces argued … Read more
Government Response
The government details that it has placed almost £1Bn in contracts to replenish UK stocks of equipment and munitions, including various anti-tank weapons, missiles, and artillery rounds, which were provided to Ukraine.
Ministry of Defence
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45 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Evidence demonstrates significant capability gaps and readiness shortfalls across Front Line Commands.
Using open source evidence provided to us, we have below set out a range of capability gaps and readiness shortfalls in each of the Front Line Commands. We do not doubt that the Government will be able to point to … Read more
Government Response
The government states that a significant recapitalisation programme is already underway across all domains, with new platforms entering service and commitments made in DCP23 to prioritize lethality, stockpiles, munitions, and a transformed partnership with industry to address capability shortfalls.
Ministry of Defence
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46 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
British Army suffering significant capability deficiencies across equipment, logistics, and readiness levels.
General Sir Nick Carter told us that the Army was the “weakest service” and that it had “significant capability deficiencies”.71 Both Dr Simon Anglim and General Lord Houghton questioned whether the UK could field the heavy division which is committed … Read more
Government Response
The government responds to concerns about the Army's capability deficiencies by detailing existing recapitalisation and modernisation programmes, new platforms, and commitments under DCP23 to enhance lethality, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships.
Ministry of Defence
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47 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Army's heavy armoured vehicle capability confirmed to have serious deficiencies, with vehicles being old.
Many of Dr Allport’s assessments of the capability shortages regarding the Army’s fighting vehicles align with what we discovered when we produced our 2021 Report on the challenges faced by the Army in updating its heavy armoured capability.76 When we … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the concerns regarding the Army's heavy armoured capability by outlining its ongoing recapitalisation programme and modernisation efforts across all domains, prioritizing new platforms, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships.
Ministry of Defence
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48 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Army capability shortfalls persist despite substantial budget increases over the past decade.
These capability shortfalls exist despite the fact that the Army budget has increased over the past decade and investment in the Army as an overall proportion of Defence spending has been maintained. Between the financial years 2013–2014 and 2022–2023, the … Read more
Government Response
The government responds to the observation about capability shortfalls despite budget increases by outlining existing recapitalisation programs, new platforms coming into service, and current prioritization of lethality, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships under DCP23.
Ministry of Defence
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49 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Chief of General Staff highlights ongoing work to improve Army readiness and address existing issues.
When we discussed the current state of the Army with the Chief of the General Staff, he acknowledged issues existed but pointed to the work which he had done to “mobilise the Army so that it would be ready to … Read more
Government Response
The government reiterates its ongoing recapitalisation programme, new platforms, and commitments under DCP23 to prioritize lethality, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships, in line with the Chief of the General Staff's previous statements about mobilizing the Army.
Ministry of Defence
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50 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Full British Army fighting echelon renewal for NATO operations not expected until mid-2030s.
Despite these actions, the Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the “complete renewal of the British Army’s fighting echelon is in order to sustain our ability to put a British Division into the NATO fight under a British-led corps” … Read more
Government Response
The government outlines its ongoing recapitalisation programme and modernisation efforts across all domains, encompassing new platforms, stockpiles, and industrial partnerships, as its strategy to address Army renewal.
Ministry of Defence
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51 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Royal Navy faces significant capability gaps despite maritime renaissance and NATO contributions.
We have been told that the Navy is undergoing a “maritime renaissance”85 and that the UK is moving towards a maritime strategy (which prioritises a naval response above land or air capabilities).86 The Chief of the Defence Staff told us … Read more
Government Response
The government addresses concerns about Navy capability gaps by detailing an ongoing recapitalisation programme, commitments under DCP23, and specific enhancements like the Naval Strike Missile, which are intended to transform and improve the Armed Forces' capabilities.
Ministry of Defence
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52 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Royal Navy suffers readiness gaps due to frigate delays, ageing ships, and over-tasked aircraft.
Dr Rowan Allport of the Human Security Centre produced a detailed list of what he perceived to be Royal Navy readiness gaps and capability shortfalls which included: • Delays to the Type 26 frigate programme which have resulted in the … Read more
Government Response
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Ministry of Defence
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53 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Royal Navy capability gaps worsened by short-term fixes, equipment cannibalisation, and personnel issues.
These gaps are compounded by the efforts which have previously been made to improve the availability of Royal Navy vessels. Nick Childs described these as “in part, robbing Peter to pay Paul within the fleet in terms of stores, key … Read more
Government Response
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Ministry of Defence
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54 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Defence leadership highlights Royal Navy transformation and future capabilities will enhance readiness.
In response to questions on naval readiness, the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy was “on the up” with significant transformation between 2020 and 2030 as it “becomes a carrier Navy again, that alongside the … Read more
Government Response
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Ministry of Defence
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55 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Naval leadership acknowledges need for further steps in maintenance, stockpiles, training, and personnel support.
However, both First Sea Lord and the Director Force Generation of the Royal Navy (Rear Admiral Steve Moorhouse) acknowledged that there were further steps to be taken, in terms of maintenance of vessels,103 both increasing lethality and managing stockpiles (including … Read more
Government Response
The government states it has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains, bringing new platforms into service, prioritising lethality, and implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model to address capability shortfalls.
Ministry of Defence
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56 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Government reverses earlier consideration, now supportive of retaining amphibious assault ships.
The difficulty of crewing naval vessels has resulted in consideration being given to removing some ships from the Fleet.107 The Royal Navy currently has two amphibious assault ships (HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion) which cycle in availability with one placed … Read more
Government Response
The government welcomes the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out-of-service dates in the 2030s.
Ministry of Defence
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57 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
RAF's peer-to-peer warfighting capability questioned due to inadequate platforms, pilot shortages, and unsuitable munitions.
Both Generals Lord Houghton and Sir Nick Carter questioned the RAF’s ability to engage in peer-to-peer warfighting. General Lord Houghton suggested that the RAF had “good kit” in relation to its platforms and weapons but not enough of them—and a … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people, stating that increasing recruitment and improving retention are absolute priorities, with measures outlined in the Haythornthwaite Review and DCP23, and a new Transformation Directorate driving delivery.
Ministry of Defence
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58 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
RAF faces multiple capability shortfalls: combat aircraft, transport, pilot numbers, and maritime patrol.
The Human Security Centre again produced a list of outstanding or near-future capability, resource and readiness shortfalls which the RAF faces: • A shortfall in combat aircraft numbers. The retirement of 30 Tranche 1 Typhoon aircraft in 2025 (with the … Read more
Government Response
The government explains that aircraft are retired when no longer cost-effective to maintain due to obsolescence or compliance costs, and that components from retired aircraft are used to maintain the operational fleet, which applies to Hawk and Typhoon Tranche 1.
Ministry of Defence
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59 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
F-35 fleet overstretched and too small, compounded by pilot shortages and air base vulnerability.
Professor Justin Bronk also raised the issue of F-35 fleet size, describing the F-35 force as “triple or quadruple-hatted in terms of how many parts of UK defence are counting on it for how many mission outputs in the case … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people, stating that increasing recruitment and improving retention are absolute priorities, with measures outlined in the Haythornthwaite Review and DCP23, and a new Transformation Directorate driving delivery.
Ministry of Defence
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60 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
RAF successfully increased operational sorties and performed exceptionally well in challenging Red Flag exercises.
The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that whilst there may be a tension between training and operational sorties, by Spring 2023 the RAF had delivered twice as many operational sorties as in the previous 12 months while also … Read more
Government Response
The government published the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23) and articulates a new, clear purpose for Defence: to protect the nation, and to help it prosper.
Ministry of Defence
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61 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Limited airfield flexibility hampers RAF warfighting ability despite past investment, requiring further resources.
The Chief of the Air Staff argued that the RAF had benefitted significantly from investment in the past 15 years which had resulted in the bringing into service the F-35 fleet; A400M fleet; the Voyager fleet and the P-8 Maritime … Read more
Government Response
The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address the RAF's acknowledged need for investment in spares, infrastructure, and people for dispersal and operational flexibility.
Ministry of Defence
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62 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Strategic Command comprises diverse and critical defence capabilities, integrating forces across all domains.
Strategic Command is a joint force Command, working across defence and with the three Front Line Commands to integrate capabilities across all domains. Commander, Strategic Command told us that he would regard the different parts of his organisations as some … Read more
Government Response
The government explains that the Defence Command Paper 2023 outlines a new purpose for Defence and details significant investments to upgrade nuclear systems and enhance ISTAR, Electronic Warfare, signals intelligence, and cyber capabilities, alongside improving the lethality of the Royal Navy, Army, and RAF with new technologies like counter-UAS and swarming drones.
Ministry of Defence
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63 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Strategic Command maintains constant readiness but raises concerns about war-fighting medical cover.
He acknowledged the difficulty of talking about readiness in relation to Strategic Command given that “a lot of my organisation operates at readiness all the time, and readiness does not apply to quite a lot of my organisation”. He cited … Read more
Government Response
The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address concerns about the scale of medical cover needed for war-fighting operations.
Ministry of Defence
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64 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Defence faces skills and capability shortages in medical, cyber, intelligence, and engineering professions.
In July the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that, as well as in medical and health, there were also skills and capability shortages in cyber/digital127 and in addition, the MOD Annual Report and Accounts highlighted intelligence as a … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges its responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people in the right place with the right skills and recognizes the challenge of competing in a demanding labour market to recruit and retain personnel.
Ministry of Defence
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65 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Strategic Command addresses shortfalls by enhancing medical capacity and introducing digital career pathways.
When we asked the Commander Strategic Command how he was working on alleviating shortfalls, he provided the following examples: Health • Increasing the level of medical stocks whilst working with the NHS to ensure rotation the stock from MOD shelves … Read more
Government Response
The government details £1.95Bn in funding from the 2023 Spring Budget allocated to improve resilience and build munitions and medical stockpiles, and nearly £1Bn in contracts to replenish equipment, but does not address the specific methods mentioned for alleviating personnel shortfalls.
Ministry of Defence
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66 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Modern workforce recruitment requires diverse interventions and better utilisation of specialist Reservist skills.
Both he and the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of exploring a range of interventions in order to attract a modern workforce, with the Minister highlighting the Haythornthwaite Report as an ongoing project in this area.133 Commander, … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges its responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people and recognizes the importance of attracting new generations with modern and flexible offers in a competitive labour market.
Ministry of Defence
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67 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Munitions stockpiles critically low across armed services due to high consumption rates in Ukraine.
When we asked each of the single service heads what shortfalls their Forces were carrying, all mentioned stockpiles as an area of significant (current) concern.135 The high rate of consumption of munitions in the war in Ukraine has exceeded the … Read more
Government Response
The government has allocated £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget and placed nearly £1Bn in contracts to build munitions and medical stockpiles and replenish UK stocks of equipment, directly addressing concerns about current stockpile levels.
Ministry of Defence
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68 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Munitions stockpiles have been declining for years, compromising high-intensity conflict readiness.
Although all of the Chiefs had pointed to events in Ukraine as the catalyst for investment in stockpiles, General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter both told us that stockpiles had been reducing for a number of years before … Read more
Government Response
The government has allocated £1.95 billion to address long-standing challenges in defence, specifically using this funding to build munitions and medical stockpiles, including significant purchases of 155mm munitions and Storm Shadow, and has developed a strategy for munitions.
Ministry of Defence
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69 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Allocated funds for stockpile replenishment at risk of diversion to offset MOD funding shortfalls.
The Government has previously pointed to its successes in signing contracts—in June 2022 it noted that it had secured “contracts for Next Generation Light AntiTank Weapons, Starstreak High Velocity Missiles, Lightweight Multirole Missiles, Archer 6X6 Artillery 132 Q406 133 Q406–7 … Read more
Government Response
The government reiterates the allocation of £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget for munitions and medical stockpiles and contracts to replenish equipment, but it does not address the committee's concern regarding the NAO's finding that these funds were not ringfenced and could be used to offset other funding shortfalls.
Ministry of Defence
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70 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Industrial capacity and critical supply chain issues hinder rapid replenishment of munitions stockpiles.
Beyond securing investment, there are further difficulties in replenishing stockpiles at pace. We heard from Professor Michael Clarke that the companies responsible for supplying precision weapons to UK Armed Forces have had small production runs for some time which there … Read more
Government Response
The government outlines funding for munitions and medical stockpiles and commits to transforming its partnership with industry, engaging earlier in strategic conversations to create a more resilient industrial base and improve supply chain capacity, alongside implementing a new Integrated Procurement Model.
Ministry of Defence
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71 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Government acknowledges need for strategic alignment with industry to improve skills and supply chain resilience.
In our March 2023 Report ‘Special Relationships? The US, UK and NATO’ we highlighted the issue of industrial capacity in relation to supply chain capacity and a lack of skilled workers.152 We were told by Government that: Further developing strategic … Read more
Government Response
The government details funding for stockpiles and commits to a transformed partnership with industry, including earlier engagement and a new Integrated Procurement Model, to build a more resilient industrial base and address supply chain and skills challenges, aligning with previous commitments.
Ministry of Defence
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72 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP23 policy intentions on MOD-industry relationship and industrial capacity to be addressed later.
We address the DCP23’s policy intentions on the MOD’s relationship with industry and the steps it has subsequently taken to improve industrial capacity in the final chapter on strategic readiness. Recruitment and retention
Government Response
The response refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, its purpose and objectives, but does not address industrial capacity or strategic readiness, the topic of the recommendation.
Ministry of Defence
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73 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces suffer significant net outflow and critical skill shortages in key areas.
The Haythornthwaite Review (examined in the section below) found that in 2022 there was a net outflow (the difference between the number of people leaving and those joining) of 4,660 from the UK Armed Forces with the “overall voluntary outflow … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges its responsibility to ensure the Armed Forces have the right people and skills, and recognizes the importance of attracting and retaining personnel with modern offers in a competitive labour market.
Ministry of Defence
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74 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Army recruitment by Capita consistently falls short of targets, especially in critical professions.
In January 2024, we took evidence on Army recruitment from Capita with which the Army has a contract to administer recruitment services.156 We heard that in 2022– 23, Capita recruited 68% of the target number of people that the Army … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges recruitment and retention as absolute priorities, detailing pay increases for Armed Forces personnel and referencing measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023 to address staffing challenges, including establishing a new Transformation Directorate.
Ministry of Defence
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75 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD acknowledges significant recruitment shortfall: five new personnel for every eight leaving.
The MOD publicly concedes that for every eight service personnel who leaves, it currently recruits five people, although we understand the situation may have deteriorated further.159
Government Response
The government acknowledges recruitment and retention as absolute priorities and has introduced pay increases, explored 'zig-zag' careers, and established a new Transformation Directorate to address staffing challenges and improve the flow of personnel.
Ministry of Defence
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76 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces face significant recruitment challenges competing for national talent
The Chief of the Air Force highlighted the difficulty in recruitment presented by the UK labour market which had 1.3 million vacancies at the start of 2023.160 The First Sea Lord described the Armed Forces as being “in a battle … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the challenge of recruitment and retention in a competitive labour market, highlighting recent pay increases, measures outlined in the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, and the establishment of a new Transformation Directorate to address these issues.
Ministry of Defence
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77 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Allied nations also face significant challenges recruiting and retaining military personnel
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Government Response
The government acknowledges the global nature of the recruitment challenge for Armed Forces, outlining ongoing efforts like pay increases, measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, and a new Transformation Directorate to improve recruitment and retention.
Ministry of Defence
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78 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Significant pinch-point shortages in technical trades severely limit UK Armed Forces capability
In November, the Secretary of State told us that recruitment and retention was an area of concern for him given that in September 2023 there had been “183 pinch points, of which 61 were assessed as having a significant or … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the concerns regarding recruitment and retention "pinch points" within the Armed Forces, detailing ongoing initiatives such as recent pay increases, measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, and the creation of a new Transformation Directorate to address these staffing challenges.
Ministry of Defence
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79 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces fail to sustainably utilise reserve forces, hindering capability and deployment
A number of our witnesses were concerned with how the UK Armed Forces utilised their reserve forces. Professor Justin Bronk suggested that neither the Army nor the Air Force had “really figured out how to use the reserves sustainably” and … Read more
Government Response
The committee's response indicates that the government has acknowledged the issues with reserve forces and is deferring detailed action to be based on recommendations from the upcoming Reserve Forces 2030 Review and Haythornthwaite Review.
Ministry of Defence
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80 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Health of UK Reserve Forces poor and declining, with higher outflow than intake
As with the regular Forces, the Reserve Forces also saw a higher outflow than intake in the year up to October 2023.168 The External Scrutiny Team (mandated to report on the ‘state of the volunteer reserve forces’) found in their … Read more
Government Response
The committee's response implies the government acknowledged the concerns regarding the declining state of the Reserve Forces and intends to address them through recommendations from the forthcoming Reserve Forces 2030 Review and Haythornthwaite Review.
Ministry of Defence
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81 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Reserve forces recruitment challenging, lacking mass required for large-scale conflict
Both the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff told us that they were trying to grow their reserve forces but were concerned by their ability to recruit.171 Conversely First Sea Lord felt that “recruiting … Read more
Government Response
The committee's response indicates that the government has acknowledged the challenges in growing and utilising reserve forces, deferring plans for improvement to future recommendations from the Reserve Forces 2030 Review and Haythornthwaite Review.
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82 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Lack of prioritisation in defence strategies leads to widespread, unfocused Armed Forces commitments
Professor Justin Bronk told us that the IR23 and DCP23 had demonstrated “the broad challenges and ambitions that the UK is faced with” but had given no indication of priority.175 We made the same criticism (which the Government rejected) of … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the importance of prioritising resources and outlines existing mechanisms, such as continuous review with NATO allies, balancing the Global Operate programme with DCP23 outcomes, the Capability Readiness Assessment Framework (CRAF), and the Defence Design review, which aim to improve prioritisation within Defence.
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83 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces operating significantly beyond designed capacity, leading to severe overstretch
The Chief of the General staff told us that the Army is currently delivering 130% of its capacity.180 The First Sea Lord admitted that there are always more tasks for a Navy than there are ships.181 We heard that by … Read more
Government Response
The government points to the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23) as its strategy to address defence challenges, outlining its purpose to protect the nation, enhance capabilities (including nuclear, ISTAR, electronic warfare, cyber, and lethality), and increase operational productivity by rebalancing investment.
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84 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Budgetary constraints force cuts to training, impacting readiness, retention and maintenance
In December 2023, we were told that budgetary constraints meant that training had been cut in 2023 (and had the potential of being cut similarly in 2024) in order to manage the pressures on the defence budget.184 As the Chief … Read more
Government Response
The government's response highlights the Defence Command Paper 2023 and its focus on enhancing capabilities and operational productivity, but does not directly address the committee's specific concern about cuts to training due to budgetary constraints and their impact on readiness and retention.
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85 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Government over-reliance on Military Aid to Civil Authorities pressures Armed Forces readiness
Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) requests are an additional operational pressure on the armed forces, but we are unable to quantify this without information on the impact of MACA on the readiness of the Armed Forces, requested from the … Read more
Government Response
The government affirms that the Armed Forces will continue to provide support to civil authorities and maintain high readiness for national events, but the response does not address the committee's concern about other departments' over-reliance on military assistance or provide the requested information on MACA's impact on military readiness.
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86 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Armed Forces readiness depends on trained personnel, viable equipment, budgets and policy changes.
Readiness is determined by the number of trained personnel and viable equipment the Armed Forces have available to deploy and sustain on operations determined by ministerial priorities. However, whilst the size of the Forces and the equipment available to them … Read more
Government Response
The government recognizes the importance of ensuring the Armed Forces have the right people and skills, committing to increasing recruitment and improving retention through measures such as pay increases, zig-zag careers, and the establishment of a new Transformation Directorate to build an evolving people system.
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87 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Haythornthwaite Review recommends flexible service and total reward to boost recruitment and retention.
The Haythornthwaite Review ‘Agency and agility: Incentivising people in a new era’, was an independent study commissioned by the MOD and published in June 2023. The Review looked at a number of areas where recruitment and retention could possibly be … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the need for the right people and skills, outlining priorities for increasing recruitment and improving retention. It highlights measures from the Haythornthwaite Review and Defence Command Paper 2023, such as pay increases, zig-zag careers, and a new Transformation Directorate, to address staffing challenges.
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88 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Defence Command Paper Refresh prioritises Haythornthwaite recommendations for career flexibility and total reward.
Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) identified the areas of the Haythornthwaite Review that Defence would take forward as a priority: • greater career flexibility through a Spectrum of Service, which will enable Defence to be better at retaining and surging … Read more
Government Response
The government reaffirms its commitment to ensuring the Armed Forces have the right people and skills, outlining ongoing priorities such as increasing recruitment, improving retention, introducing zig-zag careers, reviewing pay and progression, and establishing a new Transformation Directorate, all of which align with areas already identified by the Defence Command Paper Refresh 2023.
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89 Conclusion
First Report - Ready for War?
Service accommodation forms a crucial part of the Armed Forces incentive package.
Service accommodation is also part of the package of incentives available to the Armed Forces and their families. We expect to report separately on this later in 2024.193
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90 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Expert highlights critical need for implementation targets and plans for DCP23 proposals.
When we took evidence from Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, he welcomed the proposals in DCP23 but told us that he would have liked to have seen actual targets and descriptions of how the MOD was planning to achieve them: 189 … Read more
Government Response
The government states that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's 67 accepted recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining next steps for delivery and implementation, including a broad roadmap for recruitment and retention and regular reporting of key indicators to measure progress.
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91 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD's detailed formal response to Haythornthwaite Review recommendations remains outstanding.
In Autumn 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Secretary of State “will continue to study the Review’s 67 complex, interconnected recommendations and make a more detailed formal response later in the year”.195 At the time … Read more
Government Response
The government confirms that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's 67 recommendations, which were accepted in the Defence Command Paper refresh in 2023, will be published during 2024. This response will detail next steps for delivery and implementation, including a broad roadmap and key progress indicators.
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92 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD Permanent Secretary acknowledges high outflow and low inflow, planning new entry routes.
In December 2023, the MOD Permanent Secretary acknowledged that “inflow [into the UK Armed Forces] is not at the level we need, and outflow is too high” and (alongside the recommendations produced by the Haythornthwaite Review on zig-zag careers and … Read more
Government Response
The government indicates that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's 67 accepted recommendations, outlining next steps for delivery and implementation, will be published during 2024, deferring the Permanent Secretary's hope for a detailed plan by the end of 2023.
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93 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Budgetary pressures hinder faster implementation of Haythornthwaite Review recommendations for the Armed Forces.
The Minister for the Armed Forces welcomed the work ongoing in relation to the Haythornthwaite recommendations but when asked whether that work could be speeded up, told us that whilst the MOD’s inclination was to implement as many of the … Read more
Government Response
The government states that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining implementation steps, but the response does not specifically address the Minister's previously noted concerns about budgetary pressures impacting the speed of this work.
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94 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP21 committed to new roles, flexible service for reserves and the Reserve Forces Review 2030.
The original Defence Command Paper (DCP21) had committed to reserve forces being “given new, more clearly defined roles” including providing “capacity, alongside their regular and civilian colleagues, and an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and … Read more
Government Response
The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but the response does not specifically address the prior DCP21 commitments regarding reserve forces or the recommendations from the Lord Lancaster-led Reserve Forces Review.
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95 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD to create Reserves Roadmap synergising Haythornthwaite and Reserve Forces Review 2030 recommendations.
Both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the MOD Permanent Secretary pointed out that much of the work relating to the Haythornthwaite Review would impact on thinking about the Reserves.200 In July 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff … Read more
Government Response
The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but it does not address the previously stated intention to respond to the Reserve Forces Review 2030 by April 2024 or the creation of a Reserves Roadmap to synergize the two reviews.
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96 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces maintain high readiness despite significant fleet capability limitations
General Lord Houghton told us that the UK Armed Forces have maintained high levels of readiness for standing commitments (to domestic security and overseas non- discretionary tasks) and contingent commitments (commitments to allies and alliances such as the commitment to … Read more
Government Response
The government refers to Defence Command Paper 2023, which outlines a clear purpose for Defence and a program of modernisation and mobilisation to address capability shortfalls, enhance lethality across the Royal Navy, Army, and RAF, and increase operational productivity.
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97 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Armed Services are inadequate to fulfil ambitious, unprioritised ministerial defence demands
Professor Michael Clarke told us that both Integrated Review documents (the original and the refresh) had demonstrated that ministerial priorities were that “Britain should have a series of multiple roles that it can perform in the world and that it … Read more
Government Response
The government published the Defence Command Paper 2023, outlining a new purpose for Defence focused on protecting the nation and its prosperity, and highlighting the UK's role within NATO and its alliances. This paper, built on an increased MOD budget and refreshed Integrated Review, aims to address the evolving threat picture.
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98 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Prime Minister and Cabinet own the ultimate risk for defence readiness
General Lord Houghton was clear that the only way to reduce risk to readiness was to increase funding, while noting that this was a political choice, not a military one. The readiness assessments carried out by the MOD were shared … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the need to prioritise resources for modernization and readiness, stating that lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War have led to a re-evaluation of assumptions and a greater focus on warfighting readiness. It details ongoing work, including balancing the Global Operate programme with the Defence Command Paper's outcomes and evolving the Capability Readiness Assessment Framework to inform decision-making.
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99 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Specialisation in defence roles is crucial, as generic forces are inadequate for modern warfare
One option that was suggested was that the UK Armed Forces could specialise in certain roles, relying on Allies to fill gaps in capability. Professor Bronk used the example of the Typhoon force which he described as covering “far too … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the discussion on specialisation, stating that the UK's approach through NATO leverages the collective capabilities of 32 nations, and Defence continuously reviews priorities in concert with allies.
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100 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces are overstretched beyond design capacity due to global instability
When we raised the prospect of specialisation with the Minister for the Armed Forces, he suggested that the greatest challenge would be coming to a consensus on what the UK might specialise in.212 He acknowledged that due to the current … Read more
Government Response
The government reaffirms its commitment to providing NATO with a full spectrum of defence capabilities, including nuclear and offensive cyber, arguing this comprehensive approach underpins both its NATO contributions and wider global hard-power projection. It highlights the dual utility of assets like aircraft carriers in fulfilling both NATO commitments and other foreign policy aims.
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101 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Chinook procurement delays and cost increases threaten critical Special Forces capabilities
A further example was presented at our sessions with the Secretary of State and senior MOD officials, when we questioned the utility of a contract to procure the Chinook CH-47. The project had already been delayed and (as a result … Read more
Government Response
The government has introduced a new Integrated Procurement Model to address issues of over-complex, over-budget, and delayed programmes by ensuring earlier expert assurance and empowering subject matter experts.
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102 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Defence faces stark choice: full spectrum funding or ruthless prioritisation for deterrence
Professor Bronk told us the choice was stark: either sufficiently resource the UK Armed Forces to allow them to have “full spectrum forces that can concurrently provide a reference force as a backbone of European NATO, while also doing expeditionary … Read more
Government Response
The government reaffirms its commitment to providing NATO with a full spectrum of defence capabilities, including nuclear and offensive cyber, arguing this comprehensive approach underpins both its NATO contributions and wider global hard-power projection. It highlights the dual utility of assets like aircraft carriers in fulfilling both NATO commitments and other foreign policy aims.
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103 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Insufficient defence funding means Armed Forces operate well beyond reasonable planning assumptions
Professor Chalmers thought it unlikely there would be an increase in defence spending anytime soon given the UK’s poor economic performance, as any increase would have to come either from cuts in other government spending or an increase of taxation.218 … Read more
Government Response
The government states that the MOD's budget has increased to over £50 billion, projected to rise further, and that it is prioritising transforming the workforce model to attract and retain talent. It highlights recent pay increases for junior service personnel (up to 9.7%) and other efforts to boost recruitment and retention amidst existing challenges.
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104 Conclusion Rejected
First Report - Ready for War?
Mothballing retired equipment to create a strategic reserve remains a viable option
Successive Defence Committees have looked at the possibility of mothballing equipment due to be retired220 to create a strategic reserve of equipment which could be utilised in the event of high intensity warfare. In 2018, the Government told our predecessor … Read more
Government Response
The government clarifies that decisions on retiring equipment are made by Front-Line Commands, considering factors like obsolescence, maintenance costs, and the availability of spares. It explains that long-term storage is often not viable due to expense and unsupportability, and that equipment may be cannibalised for parts for remaining fleets or offered for sale/gifting.
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105 Conclusion Rejected
First Report - Ready for War?
High costs and cannibalisation needs hinder mothballing retired Tranche 1 Typhoons
In response to our recommendation last year that the Government mothball the 30 Tranche 1 Typhoons it is proposing to retire in 2025 (with 60% of their airframe fatigue lives remaining), we were told that whilst it would be feasible … Read more
Government Response
The government reiterates that decisions on equipment retirement lie with Front-Line Commands, citing obsolescence, maintenance costs, and lack of spares as key factors against long-term storage. It states that equipment may be cannibalised for parts for operational fleets (e.g., Hawk and Typhoon Tranche 1) or disposed of through sales or gifting to allies.
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106 Conclusion Rejected
First Report - Ready for War?
Mass of military capabilities remains essential in future conflicts, as demonstrated in Ukraine.
The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there was no point in holding on to capabilities which would become extinct, a point supported by the Secretary of State. However, he also acknowledged that … Read more
Government Response
The government reiterates that decisions on equipment retirement lie with Front-Line Commands, citing obsolescence, maintenance costs, and lack of spares as key factors against long-term storage. It explains that long-term storage is often not viable due to expense and unsupportability, and that equipment may be cannibalised for parts for remaining fleets or offered for sale/gifting.
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107 Recommendation Accepted in Part
First Report - Ready for War?
Produce detailed breakdown of budget allocations for replenishing and increasing military stockpiles.
The commitments made to replenish and increase stockpiles made since the 2022 Autumn Budget have all been welcome. The question remains whether this is anywhere near enough to meet the potential threats we face. It is therefore disturbing to hear … Read more
Government Response
The government stated that the £1.95 billion from the Spring 2023 Budget is being used to build munitions and medical stockpiles and for critical defence activities, providing examples such as 155mm munitions and Storm Shadow. It also noted nearly £1 billion in contracts to replenish UK stocks sent to Ukraine, but declined to provide exact stockpile holdings due to national security, while confirming a new munitions strategy.
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108 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces face significant capability shortfalls and unresolved personnel recruitment crisis.
There are multiple capability shortfalls within the UK Armed Forces. For that reason, we welcome the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out of service dates in the 2030s. However, we are also increasingly concerned … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the challenges in recruitment and retention, stating that all 67 recommendations from the Haythornthwaite Review were accepted in the Defence Command Paper refresh. It commits to publishing a formal government response outlining next steps for delivery and implementation, including a roadmap for recruitment and retention, during 2024.
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109 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Produce and share an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables for adopted recruitment plans.
Efforts to improve the recruitment and retention of both Regulars and Reserves are currently being considered by the MOD. We therefore recommend that once decisions have been made to adopt these recommendations, an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables is produced … Read more
Government Response
The government commits to publishing a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review during 2024, which will outline next steps for delivery, a broad roadmap for recruitment and retention, and regularly reported key progress indicators.
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110 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces' broad commitments are delaying development of vital warfighting readiness.
The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention … Read more
Government Response
The government responds by detailing existing efforts and newly published strategies (DCP23, Haythornthwaite Review) to recapitalise, modernise, and improve the readiness, lethality, and personnel retention of the Armed Forces.
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111 Recommendation Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Introduce budget uplift or NSC-led prioritisation ranking for UK Armed Forces' operational commitments.
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of … Read more
Government Response
The government states it continuously reviews priorities with NATO, balances programmes based on DCP23, and uses the Capability Readiness Assessment Framework (CRAF) to inform investment and prioritisation. It also mentions an ongoing review of the Defence Operating Model to better achieve prioritised outcomes.
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112 Conclusion Rejected
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD's disposal policy for retired military equipment limits future warfighting resilience and capacity.
We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects the premise of alternative long-term storage, explaining that equipment disposal decisions consider obsolescence, lack of spares, high maintenance costs, and the 'reduce to produce' policy for maintaining existing fleets.
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113 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Strategic readiness is defined as the nation's full strength to compete with adversaries.
Strategic readiness is described by the Minister for the Armed Forces as “the readiness of the nation to bring to bear all the nation’s strength to compete with an adversary”.227
Government Response
The government explains that strategic resilience is maintained through the ability to mobilize military resources, with Reserves and the Strategic Reserve playing a central role. It adds that the Armed Forces are integral to countering threats and supporting civil authorities, maintaining high readiness for national events and crises.
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114 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Strategic readiness requires whole-of-nation mobilisation encompassing industrial base, enablers, and resilient supply chains.
Describing the key components of strategic readiness, the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of the industrial base and its ability to increase its capacity; enablers which project and sustain the force (not just in terms of equipment … Read more
Government Response
The government is implementing a 'transformed partnership with industry' to build a more resilient industrial base, and is prioritising stockpiles, munitions, enablers, and storage facilities to enhance strategic readiness.
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115 Conclusion Not Addressed
First Report - Ready for War?
Strategic readiness depends on other government departments to address national skills shortages and infrastructure.
It therefore goes wider than the remit of the Ministry of Defence—for example, having appropriate infrastructure and sufficient skilled and experienced workers are areas which are vital but are responsibilities of other government departments.230 A current example of this is … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on MOD's internal recruitment and retention efforts and the Haythornthwaite Review, but does not address the conclusion that issues like infrastructure and skilled workers extend beyond MOD's remit and involve other government departments.
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116 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD engaged in national defence planning for strategic resilience and readiness
As well as addressing its own resilience and readiness issues, the MOD is involved in drawing up the national defence plan which will address the wider issues in strategic resilience and readiness. Initial work was carried out for the Defence … Read more
Government Response
The government confirms that MOD has consistently maintained national defence plans, recently consolidated its contributions, and works collaboratively with other departments, welcoming continued scrutiny of these ongoing efforts.
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117 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP23 highlights MOD's critical role in homeland strategic resilience and defence improvements
The Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) looked at the requirements for strategic resilience in its final chapter. In relation to the defence of the homeland, the MOD highlighted areas where Defence plays a critical role, including the policing of national … Read more
Government Response
The government lists military outputs and non-discretionary tasks related to strategic resilience, confirms the importance of Reserves, and reiterates the Armed Forces' ongoing role in civil contingencies and national security.
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118 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
DCPR23 commits MOD to inter-governmental collaboration for wartime resilience and risk management
The DCPR23 committed the MOD to working with partners across Government to plan and test how vulnerabilities could be identified and to work together to exercise the systems required in a time of war. It states that Defence will “support … Read more
Government Response
The government states it has increased transparency in the National Risk Register and that departmental responsibilities for national defence planning will follow the Cabinet Office's Resilience Directorate approach for inter-departmental collaboration on risk.
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119 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP23 highlights Defence's ongoing efforts to mitigate economic security risks and protect knowledge
Finally, the DCP23 highlights the work carried out by Defence to “identify and mitigate a range of economic security risks” including the screening of investment in defence- relevant sectors of the UK economy. Work is ongoing to establish how Defence … Read more
Government Response
The government refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, which addresses the identification and mitigation of economic security risks, access to critical minerals, and securing the defence supply chain, implying that work is already underway.
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120 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Exercise AGILE STANCE enhances Armed Forces readiness and survivability through dispersal training
External to the DCP23 process, the MOD has also been engaged in Exercise AGILE STANCE which is a five-year programme originally set up by General Sir Nick Carter to “up [the UK Armed Forces’] game in terms of what our … Read more
Government Response
The government refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, implying that ongoing work already addresses the exercise of the Services’ ability to disperse from their bases in order to maintain survivability in the event of an attack.
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121 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Strategic Reserves mobilised under Exercise Agile Stance after recent neglect
The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Reserve was also being mobilised under Exercise Agile Stance with a series of mobilisation exercises of Active Reserve elements taking place across each of the single Services, between January and … Read more
Government Response
The government reaffirms the critical role of Reserves and the Strategic Reserve in national resilience and civil contingencies, highlighting their importance for mobilising military resources and sustaining warfighting capabilities.
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122 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Defence industry plays integral role in Armed Forces readiness and recruitment
Defence industry plays an integral role in Armed Forces readiness. The First Sea Lord explained that the UK Armed Forces rely heavily on the defence industry to deliver “world-leading capability to deal with those who may wish us harm”.242 Nick … Read more
Government Response
The government states it will implement a transformed partnership with industry through DCP23 commitments, engaging earlier in strategic conversations to create a more resilient, reliable, and adaptable industrial base.
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123 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD-defence industry relationship ineffective for strategic readiness despite acknowledged reliance
Despite the acknowledged reliance on industry, both General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter questioned whether the relationship between the MOD and industry was effective in supporting strategic readiness. General Lord Houghton told us that despite numerous reviews on … Read more
Government Response
The government is reforming the defence acquisition system with a new Integrated Procurement Model and committing to earlier engagement with industry under DCP23 to create a more resilient industrial base.
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124 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD procurement frequently suffers significant delays and cost overruns, failing Armed Forces
In 2023, we examined the organisation responsible for the majority of MOD procurement (Defence Equipment & Support).248 Pointing to the conclusion by the Public Accounts Committee that defence equipment “arrives into service many years late and significantly over-budget, with depressing … Read more
Government Response
The government is reforming the defence acquisition system with a new Integrated Procurement Model, which includes earlier expert assurance and empowerment of subject matter experts, to prevent over-complex and over-budget programmes.
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125 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Slow MOD procurement response to Ukraine war, exemplified by delayed 155mm shell contract
Professor Clarke warned us in April 2023 that the implications of the Ukraine war were “taking time to filter through to Governments.”251 One of the most obvious examples of this is the length of time it took to conclude a … Read more
Government Response
The government allocated £1.95Bn and placed £1Bn in contracts to build munitions stockpiles, including 155mm rounds, and has developed a strategy for munitions based on lessons from the Ukraine war.
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126 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Industry desires long-term consistency, earlier engagement, and multi-year budgets from DE&S, alongside cultural change.
When we took evidence on DE&S, we heard from industry that it wanted: long- term consistency on required capabilities; earlier engagement in the requirement setting process, multi-year budgets; an improved (and consistent) social value framework; and decisions made with reference … Read more
Government Response
The government's new Integrated Procurement Model aims for earlier expert assurance, empowerment of subject matter experts, and spiral development, alongside a transformed partnership with industry that includes earlier strategic engagement to build resilience.
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127 Conclusion Accepted in Part
First Report - Ready for War?
Previous report recommended earlier MOD industry engagement, workforce development, multi-year funding, and spiral development.
In our Report on DE&S we recommended that: • The MOD should engage with industry at an earlier stage, particularly on future requirements and their feasibility; • The MOD should consider the implications of the shortage of skilled and experienced … Read more
Government Response
The government committed to earlier engagement with industry and accepted all Haythornthwaite Review recommendations for the workforce, with a formal response detailing implementation to be published in 2024.
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128 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Ministers acknowledge issues with current and future tri-service recruitment contracts requiring improvement.
Our Report did not cover issues with the outsourcing of Army recruitment as that is (currently) a contract managed by the Army rather than DE&S. However, we raised it and the proposed future tri-service recruitment contract with the Secretary of … Read more
Government Response
The government accepted all 67 recommendations from the Haythornthwaite Review addressing recruitment and retention, with a formal response outlining next steps and a broad roadmap to be published in 2024.
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129 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP23 concluded Ukraine lessons demand faster acquisition, industry partnership, and quicker deployment of platforms.
Shortly after our Report was published, the DCP23 was produced by the Government. It announced that key lessons from Ukraine had resulted in the following conclusions: • The pace of battlefield innovation means that decades-long acquisition programmes and upgrades are … Read more
Government Response
The government highlighted its new Integrated Procurement Model and transformed partnership with industry, which aligns with the DCP23 conclusions by focusing on earlier expert assurance, driving pace through spiral development, and creating a resilient industrial base.
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130 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP23 adopted committee recommendations for earlier industry engagement in strategic conversations and capability development.
Many of our recommendations were adopted within the DCP23. That document commits Defence to engaging at an earlier stage in strategic conversations with industry about requirements and developing relationships with key Defence Executives. This should allow Defence and industry to … Read more
Government Response
The government reiterated its commitments from DCP23, detailing how the new Integrated Procurement Model supports earlier engagement with industry, expert assurance, and spiral development to build a resilient industrial base.
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131 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
MOD recognizes importance of long-term munitions contracts and industry commitment for skills development.
In December 2023, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there had been recognition of the importance of trying “to make sure that our pipeline of munitions is always on, rather than boom … Read more
Government Response
The government highlighted its new Integrated Procurement Model and transformed partnership with industry, which aims for earlier strategic engagement, expert assurance, and spiral development to create a resilient industrial base and align with long-term commitments.
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132 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Acquisition process shifting towards 'spiral development' of capabilities to counter vendor lock-in.
As well as earlier engagement on requirements, the acquisition process is moving from one focused on specifying exact requirements to one which focuses on the ‘spiral development’ of capabilities—this will allow for the iterative development of capabilities to keep pace … Read more
Government Response
The government confirmed that its new Integrated Procurement Model emphasizes earlier engagement and spiral development of capabilities, aiming for iterative improvements and a resilient industrial base.
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133 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP23 recognizes need for robust, resilient defence supply chains and MOD launches new strategy.
In order to ensure that Defence can replenish and increase stockpiles of munitions, spares and operational supplies, the DCP23 recognises that industry needs to have robust and resilient supply chains which have assured access to “key materials, components and 263 … Read more
Government Response
The government committed £1.95 billion from the 2023 Spring Budget to build munitions and medical stockpiles and support critical activities, including supply chain mapping. It detailed significant investments in various munitions purchases and confirmed £1 billion in contracts to replenish UK stocks of equipment sent to Ukraine.
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134 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
DCP23 commits Defence to prioritising acquisition speed and radically reducing time to front-line delivery.
The DCP23 commits Defence to prioritising time within its acquisition system (within the parameters of time, cost and performance) as: driving pace is critical–even if it forces us to increase our risk tolerance elsewhere. Our ambition is to reduce radically … Read more
Government Response
The government reiterated its commitment to prioritising speed in the acquisition system through the new Integrated Procurement Model, which involves earlier expert assurance, empowering subject matter experts, and using 'spiral' development to reduce programme complexity and delivery times.
Ministry of Defence
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135 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Defence aims for maximum five-year acquisition and three-year digital programme commitments, with tailored approaches.
It also states that Defence intends to set “a maximum five-year commitment for acquisition programmes, with a maximum three-year commitment for digital programmes” although it acknowledges that the MOD procures a wide range of equipment, goods and services and so … Read more
Government Response
The government states that the new Integrated Procurement Model, which involves earlier expert assurance and empowered subject matter experts, is designed to ensure future military programs are delivered efficiently, avoiding past challenges of over-complexity and delays, and will incorporate 'spiral' development.
Ministry of Defence
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136 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Defence needs fundamental shift towards long-term, resilient munitions supply pipelines
Both Commander, Strategic Command and the Minister for the Armed Forces were at pains to emphasise that this was a real change in approach. Commander, Strategic Command told us that Defence needed to look at long-term pipelines to supply the … Read more
Government Response
The government affirmed its commitment to a transformed partnership with industry and a new Integrated Procurement Model to create a more resilient industrial base, engaging earlier in strategic conversations to avoid previous challenges of over-complex and delayed programmes.
Ministry of Defence
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137 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Current defence procurement processes unable to ensure industrial resilience for scale
The Minister was clear that current procurement processes were no longer viable as a result of the pace of innovation.277 He acknowledged that this was a complete paradigm shift and a “frankly nascent part of policy making”.278 He warned that … Read more
Government Response
The government highlighted its new Integrated Procurement Model, a system designed to reform military procurement with earlier expert assurance, empowered subject matter experts, and 'spiral' development to avoid over-complex, over-budget, and delayed programmes.
Ministry of Defence
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138 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Government's assessment of warfighting effort welcome but long overdue
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in … Read more
Government Response
The government stated the MOD has always maintained defence plans, recently consolidating its contribution and improving operational planning, and is considering options for sustaining warfighting capabilities. It welcomed continued scrutiny of warfighting and strategic readiness efforts.
Ministry of Defence
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139 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Government's defence procurement reform approach remains unfinalised and unassessed
The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not … Read more
Government Response
The government confirmed that details of the new Integrated Procurement Model were announced by the Minister for Defence Procurement on 28 February 2024, prior to the Easter recess, and a supporting document is publicly available.
Ministry of Defence
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140 Recommendation Accepted in Part
First Report - Ready for War?
Publish departmental responsibilities under national defence plan, naming lead Ministers
Under a national defence plan, each relevant Government Department would have its own responsibilities. We recommend that these responsibilities are published as far as possible, and—if any responsibilities cannot be published for national security reasons—these should be provided in confidence … Read more
Government Response
The government committed to making departmental responsibilities in national defence planning as transparent as possible, following the approach for the National Risk Register, but did not address the recommendation to add these roles to the responsibilities of a named Minister.
Ministry of Defence
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141 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Russia's invasion necessitates wholesale shift to warfighting resilience in UK and Allies
Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK … Read more
Government Response
The government agreed that Russia's invasion changed the threat, requiring a wholesale shift, and outlined its response via the 2023 Defence Command Paper, a sustained campaigning approach, Euro-Atlantic focus, NATO commitments, and reliance on Reserves and a Strategic Reserve for warfighting resilience.
Ministry of Defence
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142 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Overtasking Armed Forces risks UK warfighting readiness amid global instability
It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have sustained this effort for … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledged challenges like overtasking, recruitment shortfalls, and industrial capacity, outlining its strategy through DCP23, increased budget, and a transformed industry partnership. It is prioritising workforce model transformation with improved career opportunities, easier re-joining, pay increases, and a new Transformation Directorate to boost recruitment and retention.
Ministry of Defence
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143 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Growing capability shortfalls and overstretched personnel create vicious cycle in Armed Forces
Personnel need time to recover from operations, and time to train and develop new skills. But the demand of operations makes that harder to achieve. It is unsurprising that more people are leaving the Forces than joining them. All three … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledged the challenges of operational demands on personnel, retention, and capability shortfalls, committing to implement all 67 recommendations from the Haythornthwaite Review. A formal response outlining delivery and implementation steps for recruitment and retention will be published in 2024.
Ministry of Defence
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144 Recommendation Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Act swiftly to break overtasking cycle, ensuring UK readiness for future challenges
The Government must act to break this cycle, and do so swiftly, to ensure that the UK is ready not only to face the challenges of today, but also to face the storm clouds on the horizon. Ready for War? … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees the threat has changed and states it is already embedding a sustained campaigning approach and leveraging existing commitments to NATO, reserves, and strategic reserves to ensure readiness.
Ministry of Defence
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1 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Ministry of Defence transparency has significantly decreased over past decade
The protection of sensitive information plays a vital role in the security of this country. However, the Ministry of Defence has become demonstrably less transparent over the past decade. The fact that the Minister and senior military personnel did not … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the need for greater transparency regarding planning assumptions and readiness, immediately releasing 'headlines' from current Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA23) and committing to release as much information as possible from the next iteration.
Ministry of Defence
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2 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Parliament lacks adequate information to scrutinise ministerial decisions on defence readiness
Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information … Read more
Government Response
The government committed to establishing a regular annual open session for the committee to meet with Ministers and Chiefs of the Single Services to scrutinize readiness decisions and risk management.
Ministry of Defence
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3 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Government's slow and unhelpful responses impeded inquiry work on defence readiness
The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledged its slow response time for this inquiry and committed to making every effort to prevent recurrence, assuring the planned annual open session would be prioritised and substantive for providing information.
Ministry of Defence
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4 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Lack of official information hinders public scrutiny of UK armed forces readiness
In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they … Read more
Government Response
The government explained the evolution of Defence Planning Assumptions into classified documents but committed to enhancing transparency and has released a version of the 2023 DPAs.
Ministry of Defence
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5 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Propose annual mechanism for the Defence Committee to receive detailed updates on armed forces readiness
In a functioning democracy, the House of Commons Defence Committee needs to be routinely informed about the planning assumptions and readiness of the nation’s armed forces. We therefore recommend that—following the Minister’s welcome commitment to work with us—the Government propose … Read more
Government Response
The government did not commit to providing routine detailed updates on planning assumptions and readiness, instead detailing recent financial allocations for resilience, munitions stockpiles, and replenishment of aid to Ukraine.
Ministry of Defence
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6 Recommendation Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Rectify reduction in public accountability and consult committees before classifying readiness information
We also recommend that the Government explain why previously unclassified information about readiness is no longer published, recognise the reduction in public and parliamentary accountability that this has brought about, and seek to rectify the situation. In future, when a … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discussed the importance of recruitment and retention for the Armed Forces, committing to publish a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations during 2024, which does not address the committee's recommendation about classifying readiness information.
Ministry of Defence
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7 Recommendation Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Produce breakdown of Autumn 2022 and Spring 2023 budget allocations for stockpiles
The commitments made to replenish and increase stockpiles made since the 2022 Autumn Budget have all been welcome. The question remains whether this is anywhere near enough to meet the potential threats we face. It is therefore disturbing to hear … Read more
Government Response
The government's response deflects the recommendation regarding stockpiles and budget allocation by focusing entirely on recruitment and retention issues, stating a formal HMG response to the Haythornthwaite Review will be published in 2024 to outline next steps for people-related reforms.
Ministry of Defence
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8 Conclusion Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
UK Armed Forces face persistent capability shortfalls and an unresolved recruitment crisis
There are multiple capability shortfalls within the UK Armed Forces. For that reason, we welcome the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out of service dates in the 2030s. However, we are also increasingly concerned … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the concerns about attracting and retaining personnel, stating a formal HMG response to the Haythornthwaite Review will be published during 2024 to outline next steps for delivery and implementation of recruitment and retention reforms.
Ministry of Defence
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9 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Produce and share implementation timetable with measurable deliverables for recruitment and retention
Efforts to improve the recruitment and retention of both Regulars and Reserves are currently being considered by the MOD. We therefore recommend that once decisions have been made to adopt these recommendations, an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables is produced … Read more
Government Response
The government's response outlined the new purpose of Defence and broad strategic investments and capabilities from the Defence Command Paper 2023, but did not commit to providing an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables for recruitment and retention initiatives.
Ministry of Defence
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10 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Breadth of UK Armed Forces commitments delays warfighting readiness development
The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention … Read more
Government Response
The government responded by referencing the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23), which outlines its strategy to protect the nation and enhance lethality of forces through initiatives like the Naval Strike Missile, Army deep fire capabilities, and RAF drone technology, alongside increasing operational productivity. This outlines existing strategic direction rather than new specific commitments.
Ministry of Defence
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11 Recommendation Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Introduce budget uplift or prioritisation ranking for Armed Forces commitments via National Security Council
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of … Read more
Government Response
The government stated it is taking forward work to balance the Global Operate programme with Defence Command Paper priorities, continuously reviewing capabilities and utilising the Capability Readiness Assessment Framework, but did not commit to a budget uplift or a new, strictly adhered to prioritisation ranking.
Ministry of Defence
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12 Conclusion Rejected
First Report - Ready for War?
UK policy of disposing retired warfighting equipment limits strategic resilience capacity.
We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not … Read more
Government Response
The government rejected the recommendation for alternative mothballing solutions, explaining that decisions on equipment disposal are made based on obsolescence, lack of spares, high maintenance costs, and the need to use components from retired platforms.
Ministry of Defence
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13 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Government's warfighting effort assessment is welcome but long overdue.
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in … Read more
Government Response
The government stated that the MOD has always maintained defence plans and has recently consolidated contributions and improved command, control, and operational planning, and is currently considering capability options to sustain warfighting.
Ministry of Defence
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14 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Procurement reform approach remains unfinalised, hindering committee assessment of its appropriateness.
The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not … Read more
Government Response
The government committed to and has now delivered details of the new Integrated Procurement Model, which were set out in an oral statement on 28 February 2024 with a supporting document made available.
Ministry of Defence
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15 Recommendation Acknowledged
First Report - Ready for War?
Publish departmental responsibilities within the national defence plan and assign to named Ministers.
Under a national defence plan, each relevant Government Department would have its own responsibilities. We recommend that these responsibilities are published as far as possible, and—if any responsibilities cannot be published for national security reasons—these should be provided in confidence … Read more
Government Response
The government committed to making departmental responsibilities in national defence planning as transparent as possible, following the existing approach for lead government departments in risk planning, but did not commit to publishing specific responsibilities or assigning a named minister.
Ministry of Defence
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16 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Russia's invasion requires wholesale shift in UK and Allied warfighting resilience approach.
Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK … Read more
Government Response
The government agreed that the threat has fundamentally changed due to Russia's invasion and described its ongoing efforts, including updating the Defence Command Paper and embedding a campaigning approach, to maintain warfighting resilience.
Ministry of Defence
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17 Conclusion Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Overtasking Armed Forces threatens UK warfighting readiness and personnel well-being.
It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have 56 Ready for War? … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the changed threat context and references the Defence Command Paper 2023, outlining existing strategic ambitions to protect the nation. It details ongoing efforts by the Armed Forces, Reserves, and Strategic Reserve to meet operational and civil contingency commitments, implying current approaches address the concerns without committing to new specific investments.
Ministry of Defence
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18 Conclusion Deferred
First Report - Ready for War?
Operational demands create personnel retention issues and growing capability shortfalls in services.
Personnel need time to recover from operations, and time to train and develop new skills. But the demand of operations makes that harder to achieve. It is unsurprising that more people are leaving the Forces than joining them. All three … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the issue of personnel shortfalls and states that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations on recruitment and retention, outlining next steps and a roadmap, will be published in 2024.
Ministry of Defence
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19 Recommendation Accepted
First Report - Ready for War?
Act swiftly to break overtasking cycle, ensuring UK's future warfighting readiness.
The Government must act to break this cycle, and do so swiftly, to ensure that the UK is ready not only to face the challenges of today, but also to face the storm clouds on the horizon. (Paragraph 144) Ready for War? 57
Government Response
The government agrees the threat environment has changed and asserts that it is already responding by embedding a sustained campaigning approach, maintaining strong NATO commitments, and developing strategic reserves and civil contingencies support.
Ministry of Defence
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Government Response AI assessment · 131 of 10 classified
Accepted 79
Accepted in Part 5
Acknowledged 19
Deferred 11
Not Addressed 12
Rejected 5
Total 10 recs + 122 conclusions