Dr Rowan Allport of the Human Security Centre produced a detailed list of what he perceived to be Royal Navy readiness gaps and capability shortfalls which included: • Delays to the Type 26 frigate programme which have resulted in the Type 23 frigate force being run on far past its expected lifespan, meaning sustainment of the platform had become increasingly difficult and expensive. • The reliance on RFA Fort Victoria as the only RFA solid stores ship is compounded by the fact that it is at reduced readiness due to personnel shortages. The replacement Fleet Solid Support Ships are (currently) due to enter service from 2028 onwards—meaning that RFA Fort Victoria will more than likely be required for the Carrier Strike Group deployment when it travels to the Indo- Pacific in 2025. • The availability of SSNs has dropped as a result of delays in the Astute-class attack submarine building programme. Even once all seven Astutes are in service, it is questionable whether the force will be able to sustain their current tasks and the additional deployments to Australia and wider region from 2026 onwards. • Delays to the Power Improvement Project (PIP) upgrade on the Type 45s to replace the two existing diesel generators with three more powerful models have impacted availability of the vessels. • The Littoral Response Group (South), which will operate in the Indo-Pacific, will be led by RFA Argus—the ship “is now 42 years old and will inevitably be increasingly prone to mechanical and other issues as time passes”. 85 Q100 86 Oral evidence taken on 18 April 2023, HC (2022–23) 1246, Q44 87 Oral evidence taken on 4 July 2023, HC (2022–23) 1689, Q63 88 Q13 89 SSN (Ship Submersible Nuclear) is the designation for a nuclear-powered attack submarines. 90 Q26 91 Q100 Ready for War? 23 • The Royal Navy’s Merlin HM2 fleet has only 30 aircraft but is over-tasked, responsible for both most Navy airborne anti-submarine warfare missions92 and Airborne Surveillance and Control taskings.93