First Report - Ready for War?

Select Committee
Defence Committee HC 26 4 February 2024
Report Status Response document linked Recorded deadline: 4 Apr 2024

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Conclusions & Recommendations 132 items (10 recs)
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Government response
Fourth Special Report - Ready for war?: Government response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2023-24 · published 25 Apr 2024
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Recommendations & Conclusions

132 results
32 Conclusion
No regular mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial decisions on defence readiness
Conclusion
Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information … Read more
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33 Conclusion
Government's unacceptably slow and unhelpful response impeded inquiry, raising ministerial grip concerns
Conclusion
The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s … Read more
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34 Conclusion
Lack of adequate official information hinders public scrutiny of UK armed forces readiness
Conclusion
In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they … Read more
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35 Conclusion
Propose mechanism for annual, detailed updates to Defence Committee on UK Armed Forces readiness
Conclusion
In a functioning democracy, the House of Commons Defence Committee needs to be routinely informed about the planning assumptions and readiness of the nation’s armed forces. We therefore recommend that—following the Minister’s welcome commitment to work with us—the Government propose … Read more
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36 Recommendation
Require Government to explain readiness data classification and consult committees on future decisions.
Recommendation
We also recommend that the Government explain why previously unclassified information about readiness is no longer published, recognise the reduction in public and parliamentary accountability that this has brought about, and seek to rectify the situation. In future, when a … Read more
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37 Conclusion
Thousands of UK Armed Forces personnel deployed on numerous international operations.
Conclusion
At the end of 2023, over 7,000 UK Armed Forces personnel were deployed on more than 40 operations abroad.51 Some of these operations are long-standing commitments whereas others are in response to unexpected events. In the last quarter of 2023, … Read more
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38 Conclusion
Standing deployments and 'flying the flag' operations strengthen alliances and partnerships.
Conclusion
Standing commitments and ‘flying the flag’ operations can play a vital role in building alliances and partnerships that could help deter or win a future war. The Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the work which the Rangers carried out … Read more
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39 Conclusion
Armed Forces demonstrate effective operational readiness for recent crisis deployments.
Conclusion
The Secretary of State told us that in relation to the additional deployments to KFOR and the Middle East, his “experience of our Armed Forces has been that when I have needed something so far, it has been there”: They … Read more
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40 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces deployed beyond designed capacity, impacting platform maintenance.
Conclusion
The Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the UK Armed Forces were deployed in excess of what the force structure was designed for, noting that “there is absolutely no pretending that we are not spending resource more keenly than … Read more
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41 Conclusion
British Armed Forces lack sufficient preparation for industrial-scale war fighting.
Conclusion
Professor Michael Clarke told us “British forces over the past 30 years have done a great deal of operating, but have not prepared for war fighting, and there is a big difference between operating efficiently and well, and preparing for … Read more
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42 Conclusion
Significant concerns raised over UK Armed Forces' warfighting readiness and resilience.
Conclusion
All three witnesses in our first evidence session questioned the warfighting readiness of the UK Armed Forces.63 General Lord Houghton later told us that the “hollowing out” of the Armed Forces since 2010 had led to shortfalls in the UK’s … Read more
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43 Conclusion
MOD acknowledges significant warfighting readiness gaps requiring urgent investment.
Conclusion
The MOD have acknowledged that there are gaps in their warfighting readiness. In written evidence submitted to this inquiry, the MOD highlighted that investment is required in: • Defence rail outload theatre capability; • Infrastructure and warehousing munitions; 59 Q427; … Read more
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44 Conclusion
MOD investing in specific capabilities, yet urgent wider reinvestment is required for readiness.
Conclusion
The Chief of the Defence Staff also told us that the MOD was investing in capabilities such as “complex weapons, general munitions, and operational spares stocks to meet the needs of sustained operation”.68 The Minister for the Armed Forces argued … Read more
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45 Conclusion
Evidence demonstrates significant capability gaps and readiness shortfalls across Front Line Commands.
Conclusion
Using open source evidence provided to us, we have below set out a range of capability gaps and readiness shortfalls in each of the Front Line Commands. We do not doubt that the Government will be able to point to … Read more
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46 Conclusion
British Army suffering significant capability deficiencies across equipment, logistics, and readiness levels.
Conclusion
General Sir Nick Carter told us that the Army was the “weakest service” and that it had “significant capability deficiencies”.71 Both Dr Simon Anglim and General Lord Houghton questioned whether the UK could field the heavy division which is committed … Read more
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47 Conclusion
Army's heavy armoured vehicle capability confirmed to have serious deficiencies, with vehicles being old.
Conclusion
Many of Dr Allport’s assessments of the capability shortages regarding the Army’s fighting vehicles align with what we discovered when we produced our 2021 Report on the challenges faced by the Army in updating its heavy armoured capability.76 When we … Read more
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48 Conclusion
Army capability shortfalls persist despite substantial budget increases over the past decade.
Conclusion
These capability shortfalls exist despite the fact that the Army budget has increased over the past decade and investment in the Army as an overall proportion of Defence spending has been maintained. Between the financial years 2013–2014 and 2022–2023, the … Read more
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49 Conclusion
Chief of General Staff highlights ongoing work to improve Army readiness and address existing issues.
Conclusion
When we discussed the current state of the Army with the Chief of the General Staff, he acknowledged issues existed but pointed to the work which he had done to “mobilise the Army so that it would be ready to … Read more
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50 Conclusion
Full British Army fighting echelon renewal for NATO operations not expected until mid-2030s.
Conclusion
Despite these actions, the Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the “complete renewal of the British Army’s fighting echelon is in order to sustain our ability to put a British Division into the NATO fight under a British-led corps” … Read more
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51 Conclusion
Royal Navy faces significant capability gaps despite maritime renaissance and NATO contributions.
Conclusion
We have been told that the Navy is undergoing a “maritime renaissance”85 and that the UK is moving towards a maritime strategy (which prioritises a naval response above land or air capabilities).86 The Chief of the Defence Staff told us … Read more
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52 Conclusion
Royal Navy suffers readiness gaps due to frigate delays, ageing ships, and over-tasked aircraft.
Conclusion
Dr Rowan Allport of the Human Security Centre produced a detailed list of what he perceived to be Royal Navy readiness gaps and capability shortfalls which included: • Delays to the Type 26 frigate programme which have resulted in the … Read more
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53 Conclusion
Royal Navy capability gaps worsened by short-term fixes, equipment cannibalisation, and personnel issues.
Conclusion
These gaps are compounded by the efforts which have previously been made to improve the availability of Royal Navy vessels. Nick Childs described these as “in part, robbing Peter to pay Paul within the fleet in terms of stores, key … Read more
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54 Conclusion
Defence leadership highlights Royal Navy transformation and future capabilities will enhance readiness.
Conclusion
In response to questions on naval readiness, the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy was “on the up” with significant transformation between 2020 and 2030 as it “becomes a carrier Navy again, that alongside the … Read more
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55 Conclusion
Naval leadership acknowledges need for further steps in maintenance, stockpiles, training, and personnel support.
Conclusion
However, both First Sea Lord and the Director Force Generation of the Royal Navy (Rear Admiral Steve Moorhouse) acknowledged that there were further steps to be taken, in terms of maintenance of vessels,103 both increasing lethality and managing stockpiles (including … Read more
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56 Conclusion
Government reverses earlier consideration, now supportive of retaining amphibious assault ships.
Conclusion
The difficulty of crewing naval vessels has resulted in consideration being given to removing some ships from the Fleet.107 The Royal Navy currently has two amphibious assault ships (HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion) which cycle in availability with one placed … Read more
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57 Conclusion
RAF's peer-to-peer warfighting capability questioned due to inadequate platforms, pilot shortages, and unsuitable munitions.
Conclusion
Both Generals Lord Houghton and Sir Nick Carter questioned the RAF’s ability to engage in peer-to-peer warfighting. General Lord Houghton suggested that the RAF had “good kit” in relation to its platforms and weapons but not enough of them—and a … Read more
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58 Conclusion
RAF faces multiple capability shortfalls: combat aircraft, transport, pilot numbers, and maritime patrol.
Conclusion
The Human Security Centre again produced a list of outstanding or near-future capability, resource and readiness shortfalls which the RAF faces: • A shortfall in combat aircraft numbers. The retirement of 30 Tranche 1 Typhoon aircraft in 2025 (with the … Read more
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59 Conclusion
F-35 fleet overstretched and too small, compounded by pilot shortages and air base vulnerability.
Conclusion
Professor Justin Bronk also raised the issue of F-35 fleet size, describing the F-35 force as “triple or quadruple-hatted in terms of how many parts of UK defence are counting on it for how many mission outputs in the case … Read more
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60 Conclusion
RAF successfully increased operational sorties and performed exceptionally well in challenging Red Flag exercises.
Conclusion
The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that whilst there may be a tension between training and operational sorties, by Spring 2023 the RAF had delivered twice as many operational sorties as in the previous 12 months while also … Read more
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61 Conclusion
Limited airfield flexibility hampers RAF warfighting ability despite past investment, requiring further resources.
Conclusion
The Chief of the Air Staff argued that the RAF had benefitted significantly from investment in the past 15 years which had resulted in the bringing into service the F-35 fleet; A400M fleet; the Voyager fleet and the P-8 Maritime … Read more
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62 Conclusion
Strategic Command comprises diverse and critical defence capabilities, integrating forces across all domains.
Conclusion
Strategic Command is a joint force Command, working across defence and with the three Front Line Commands to integrate capabilities across all domains. Commander, Strategic Command told us that he would regard the different parts of his organisations as some … Read more
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63 Conclusion
Strategic Command maintains constant readiness but raises concerns about war-fighting medical cover.
Conclusion
He acknowledged the difficulty of talking about readiness in relation to Strategic Command given that “a lot of my organisation operates at readiness all the time, and readiness does not apply to quite a lot of my organisation”. He cited … Read more
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64 Conclusion
Defence faces skills and capability shortages in medical, cyber, intelligence, and engineering professions.
Conclusion
In July the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that, as well as in medical and health, there were also skills and capability shortages in cyber/digital127 and in addition, the MOD Annual Report and Accounts highlighted intelligence as a … Read more
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65 Conclusion
Strategic Command addresses shortfalls by enhancing medical capacity and introducing digital career pathways.
Conclusion
When we asked the Commander Strategic Command how he was working on alleviating shortfalls, he provided the following examples: Health • Increasing the level of medical stocks whilst working with the NHS to ensure rotation the stock from MOD shelves … Read more
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66 Conclusion
Modern workforce recruitment requires diverse interventions and better utilisation of specialist Reservist skills.
Conclusion
Both he and the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of exploring a range of interventions in order to attract a modern workforce, with the Minister highlighting the Haythornthwaite Report as an ongoing project in this area.133 Commander, … Read more
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67 Conclusion
Munitions stockpiles critically low across armed services due to high consumption rates in Ukraine.
Conclusion
When we asked each of the single service heads what shortfalls their Forces were carrying, all mentioned stockpiles as an area of significant (current) concern.135 The high rate of consumption of munitions in the war in Ukraine has exceeded the … Read more
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68 Conclusion
Munitions stockpiles have been declining for years, compromising high-intensity conflict readiness.
Conclusion
Although all of the Chiefs had pointed to events in Ukraine as the catalyst for investment in stockpiles, General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter both told us that stockpiles had been reducing for a number of years before … Read more
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69 Conclusion
Allocated funds for stockpile replenishment at risk of diversion to offset MOD funding shortfalls.
Conclusion
The Government has previously pointed to its successes in signing contracts—in June 2022 it noted that it had secured “contracts for Next Generation Light AntiTank Weapons, Starstreak High Velocity Missiles, Lightweight Multirole Missiles, Archer 6X6 Artillery 132 Q406 133 Q406–7 … Read more
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70 Conclusion
Industrial capacity and critical supply chain issues hinder rapid replenishment of munitions stockpiles.
Conclusion
Beyond securing investment, there are further difficulties in replenishing stockpiles at pace. We heard from Professor Michael Clarke that the companies responsible for supplying precision weapons to UK Armed Forces have had small production runs for some time which there … Read more
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71 Conclusion
Government acknowledges need for strategic alignment with industry to improve skills and supply chain resilience.
Conclusion
In our March 2023 Report ‘Special Relationships? The US, UK and NATO’ we highlighted the issue of industrial capacity in relation to supply chain capacity and a lack of skilled workers.152 We were told by Government that: Further developing strategic … Read more
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72 Conclusion
DCP23 policy intentions on MOD-industry relationship and industrial capacity to be addressed later.
Conclusion
We address the DCP23’s policy intentions on the MOD’s relationship with industry and the steps it has subsequently taken to improve industrial capacity in the final chapter on strategic readiness. Recruitment and retention
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73 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces suffer significant net outflow and critical skill shortages in key areas.
Conclusion
The Haythornthwaite Review (examined in the section below) found that in 2022 there was a net outflow (the difference between the number of people leaving and those joining) of 4,660 from the UK Armed Forces with the “overall voluntary outflow … Read more
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74 Conclusion
Army recruitment by Capita consistently falls short of targets, especially in critical professions.
Conclusion
In January 2024, we took evidence on Army recruitment from Capita with which the Army has a contract to administer recruitment services.156 We heard that in 2022– 23, Capita recruited 68% of the target number of people that the Army … Read more
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75 Conclusion
MOD acknowledges significant recruitment shortfall: five new personnel for every eight leaving.
Conclusion
The MOD publicly concedes that for every eight service personnel who leaves, it currently recruits five people, although we understand the situation may have deteriorated further.159
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76 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces face significant recruitment challenges competing for national talent
Conclusion
The Chief of the Air Force highlighted the difficulty in recruitment presented by the UK labour market which had 1.3 million vacancies at the start of 2023.160 The First Sea Lord described the Armed Forces as being “in a battle … Read more
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77 Conclusion
Allied nations also face significant challenges recruiting and retaining military personnel
Conclusion
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78 Conclusion
Significant pinch-point shortages in technical trades severely limit UK Armed Forces capability
Conclusion
In November, the Secretary of State told us that recruitment and retention was an area of concern for him given that in September 2023 there had been “183 pinch points, of which 61 were assessed as having a significant or … Read more
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79 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces fail to sustainably utilise reserve forces, hindering capability and deployment
Conclusion
A number of our witnesses were concerned with how the UK Armed Forces utilised their reserve forces. Professor Justin Bronk suggested that neither the Army nor the Air Force had “really figured out how to use the reserves sustainably” and … Read more
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80 Conclusion
Health of UK Reserve Forces poor and declining, with higher outflow than intake
Conclusion
As with the regular Forces, the Reserve Forces also saw a higher outflow than intake in the year up to October 2023.168 The External Scrutiny Team (mandated to report on the ‘state of the volunteer reserve forces’) found in their … Read more
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81 Conclusion
Reserve forces recruitment challenging, lacking mass required for large-scale conflict
Conclusion
Both the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff told us that they were trying to grow their reserve forces but were concerned by their ability to recruit.171 Conversely First Sea Lord felt that “recruiting … Read more
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82 Conclusion
Lack of prioritisation in defence strategies leads to widespread, unfocused Armed Forces commitments
Conclusion
Professor Justin Bronk told us that the IR23 and DCP23 had demonstrated “the broad challenges and ambitions that the UK is faced with” but had given no indication of priority.175 We made the same criticism (which the Government rejected) of … Read more
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83 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces operating significantly beyond designed capacity, leading to severe overstretch
Conclusion
The Chief of the General staff told us that the Army is currently delivering 130% of its capacity.180 The First Sea Lord admitted that there are always more tasks for a Navy than there are ships.181 We heard that by … Read more
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84 Conclusion
Budgetary constraints force cuts to training, impacting readiness, retention and maintenance
Conclusion
In December 2023, we were told that budgetary constraints meant that training had been cut in 2023 (and had the potential of being cut similarly in 2024) in order to manage the pressures on the defence budget.184 As the Chief … Read more
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85 Conclusion
Government over-reliance on Military Aid to Civil Authorities pressures Armed Forces readiness
Conclusion
Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) requests are an additional operational pressure on the armed forces, but we are unable to quantify this without information on the impact of MACA on the readiness of the Armed Forces, requested from the … Read more
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86 Conclusion
Armed Forces readiness depends on trained personnel, viable equipment, budgets and policy changes.
Conclusion
Readiness is determined by the number of trained personnel and viable equipment the Armed Forces have available to deploy and sustain on operations determined by ministerial priorities. However, whilst the size of the Forces and the equipment available to them … Read more
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87 Conclusion
Haythornthwaite Review recommends flexible service and total reward to boost recruitment and retention.
Conclusion
The Haythornthwaite Review ‘Agency and agility: Incentivising people in a new era’, was an independent study commissioned by the MOD and published in June 2023. The Review looked at a number of areas where recruitment and retention could possibly be … Read more
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88 Conclusion
Defence Command Paper Refresh prioritises Haythornthwaite recommendations for career flexibility and total reward.
Conclusion
Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) identified the areas of the Haythornthwaite Review that Defence would take forward as a priority: • greater career flexibility through a Spectrum of Service, which will enable Defence to be better at retaining and surging … Read more
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89 Conclusion
Service accommodation forms a crucial part of the Armed Forces incentive package.
Conclusion
Service accommodation is also part of the package of incentives available to the Armed Forces and their families. We expect to report separately on this later in 2024.193
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90 Conclusion
Expert highlights critical need for implementation targets and plans for DCP23 proposals.
Conclusion
When we took evidence from Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, he welcomed the proposals in DCP23 but told us that he would have liked to have seen actual targets and descriptions of how the MOD was planning to achieve them: 189 … Read more
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91 Conclusion
MOD's detailed formal response to Haythornthwaite Review recommendations remains outstanding.
Conclusion
In Autumn 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Secretary of State “will continue to study the Review’s 67 complex, interconnected recommendations and make a more detailed formal response later in the year”.195 At the time … Read more
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92 Conclusion
MOD Permanent Secretary acknowledges high outflow and low inflow, planning new entry routes.
Conclusion
In December 2023, the MOD Permanent Secretary acknowledged that “inflow [into the UK Armed Forces] is not at the level we need, and outflow is too high” and (alongside the recommendations produced by the Haythornthwaite Review on zig-zag careers and … Read more
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93 Conclusion
Budgetary pressures hinder faster implementation of Haythornthwaite Review recommendations for the Armed Forces.
Conclusion
The Minister for the Armed Forces welcomed the work ongoing in relation to the Haythornthwaite recommendations but when asked whether that work could be speeded up, told us that whilst the MOD’s inclination was to implement as many of the … Read more
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94 Conclusion
DCP21 committed to new roles, flexible service for reserves and the Reserve Forces Review 2030.
Conclusion
The original Defence Command Paper (DCP21) had committed to reserve forces being “given new, more clearly defined roles” including providing “capacity, alongside their regular and civilian colleagues, and an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and … Read more
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95 Conclusion
MOD to create Reserves Roadmap synergising Haythornthwaite and Reserve Forces Review 2030 recommendations.
Conclusion
Both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the MOD Permanent Secretary pointed out that much of the work relating to the Haythornthwaite Review would impact on thinking about the Reserves.200 In July 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff … Read more
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96 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces maintain high readiness despite significant fleet capability limitations
Conclusion
General Lord Houghton told us that the UK Armed Forces have maintained high levels of readiness for standing commitments (to domestic security and overseas non- discretionary tasks) and contingent commitments (commitments to allies and alliances such as the commitment to … Read more
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97 Conclusion
Armed Services are inadequate to fulfil ambitious, unprioritised ministerial defence demands
Conclusion
Professor Michael Clarke told us that both Integrated Review documents (the original and the refresh) had demonstrated that ministerial priorities were that “Britain should have a series of multiple roles that it can perform in the world and that it … Read more
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98 Conclusion
Prime Minister and Cabinet own the ultimate risk for defence readiness
Conclusion
General Lord Houghton was clear that the only way to reduce risk to readiness was to increase funding, while noting that this was a political choice, not a military one. The readiness assessments carried out by the MOD were shared … Read more
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99 Conclusion
Specialisation in defence roles is crucial, as generic forces are inadequate for modern warfare
Conclusion
One option that was suggested was that the UK Armed Forces could specialise in certain roles, relying on Allies to fill gaps in capability. Professor Bronk used the example of the Typhoon force which he described as covering “far too … Read more
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100 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces are overstretched beyond design capacity due to global instability
Conclusion
When we raised the prospect of specialisation with the Minister for the Armed Forces, he suggested that the greatest challenge would be coming to a consensus on what the UK might specialise in.212 He acknowledged that due to the current … Read more
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101 Conclusion
Chinook procurement delays and cost increases threaten critical Special Forces capabilities
Conclusion
A further example was presented at our sessions with the Secretary of State and senior MOD officials, when we questioned the utility of a contract to procure the Chinook CH-47. The project had already been delayed and (as a result … Read more
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102 Conclusion
Defence faces stark choice: full spectrum funding or ruthless prioritisation for deterrence
Conclusion
Professor Bronk told us the choice was stark: either sufficiently resource the UK Armed Forces to allow them to have “full spectrum forces that can concurrently provide a reference force as a backbone of European NATO, while also doing expeditionary … Read more
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103 Conclusion
Insufficient defence funding means Armed Forces operate well beyond reasonable planning assumptions
Conclusion
Professor Chalmers thought it unlikely there would be an increase in defence spending anytime soon given the UK’s poor economic performance, as any increase would have to come either from cuts in other government spending or an increase of taxation.218 … Read more
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104 Conclusion
Mothballing retired equipment to create a strategic reserve remains a viable option
Conclusion
Successive Defence Committees have looked at the possibility of mothballing equipment due to be retired220 to create a strategic reserve of equipment which could be utilised in the event of high intensity warfare. In 2018, the Government told our predecessor … Read more
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105 Conclusion
High costs and cannibalisation needs hinder mothballing retired Tranche 1 Typhoons
Conclusion
In response to our recommendation last year that the Government mothball the 30 Tranche 1 Typhoons it is proposing to retire in 2025 (with 60% of their airframe fatigue lives remaining), we were told that whilst it would be feasible … Read more
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106 Conclusion
Mass of military capabilities remains essential in future conflicts, as demonstrated in Ukraine.
Conclusion
The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there was no point in holding on to capabilities which would become extinct, a point supported by the Secretary of State. However, he also acknowledged that … Read more
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107 Recommendation
Produce detailed breakdown of budget allocations for replenishing and increasing military stockpiles.
Recommendation
The commitments made to replenish and increase stockpiles made since the 2022 Autumn Budget have all been welcome. The question remains whether this is anywhere near enough to meet the potential threats we face. It is therefore disturbing to hear … Read more
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108 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces face significant capability shortfalls and unresolved personnel recruitment crisis.
Conclusion
There are multiple capability shortfalls within the UK Armed Forces. For that reason, we welcome the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out of service dates in the 2030s. However, we are also increasingly concerned … Read more
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109 Conclusion
Produce and share an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables for adopted recruitment plans.
Conclusion
Efforts to improve the recruitment and retention of both Regulars and Reserves are currently being considered by the MOD. We therefore recommend that once decisions have been made to adopt these recommendations, an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables is produced … Read more
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110 Conclusion
UK Armed Forces' broad commitments are delaying development of vital warfighting readiness.
Conclusion
The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention … Read more
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111 Recommendation
Introduce budget uplift or NSC-led prioritisation ranking for UK Armed Forces' operational commitments.
Recommendation
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of … Read more
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112 Conclusion
MOD's disposal policy for retired military equipment limits future warfighting resilience and capacity.
Conclusion
We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not … Read more
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113 Conclusion
Strategic readiness is defined as the nation's full strength to compete with adversaries.
Conclusion
Strategic readiness is described by the Minister for the Armed Forces as “the readiness of the nation to bring to bear all the nation’s strength to compete with an adversary”.227
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114 Conclusion
Strategic readiness requires whole-of-nation mobilisation encompassing industrial base, enablers, and resilient supply chains.
Conclusion
Describing the key components of strategic readiness, the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of the industrial base and its ability to increase its capacity; enablers which project and sustain the force (not just in terms of equipment … Read more
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115 Conclusion
Strategic readiness depends on other government departments to address national skills shortages and infrastructure.
Conclusion
It therefore goes wider than the remit of the Ministry of Defence—for example, having appropriate infrastructure and sufficient skilled and experienced workers are areas which are vital but are responsibilities of other government departments.230 A current example of this is … Read more
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116 Conclusion
MOD engaged in national defence planning for strategic resilience and readiness
Conclusion
As well as addressing its own resilience and readiness issues, the MOD is involved in drawing up the national defence plan which will address the wider issues in strategic resilience and readiness. Initial work was carried out for the Defence … Read more
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117 Conclusion
DCP23 highlights MOD's critical role in homeland strategic resilience and defence improvements
Conclusion
The Defence Command Paper Refresh (DCP23) looked at the requirements for strategic resilience in its final chapter. In relation to the defence of the homeland, the MOD highlighted areas where Defence plays a critical role, including the policing of national … Read more
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118 Conclusion
DCPR23 commits MOD to inter-governmental collaboration for wartime resilience and risk management
Conclusion
The DCPR23 committed the MOD to working with partners across Government to plan and test how vulnerabilities could be identified and to work together to exercise the systems required in a time of war. It states that Defence will “support … Read more
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119 Conclusion
DCP23 highlights Defence's ongoing efforts to mitigate economic security risks and protect knowledge
Conclusion
Finally, the DCP23 highlights the work carried out by Defence to “identify and mitigate a range of economic security risks” including the screening of investment in defence- relevant sectors of the UK economy. Work is ongoing to establish how Defence … Read more
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120 Conclusion
Exercise AGILE STANCE enhances Armed Forces readiness and survivability through dispersal training
Conclusion
External to the DCP23 process, the MOD has also been engaged in Exercise AGILE STANCE which is a five-year programme originally set up by General Sir Nick Carter to “up [the UK Armed Forces’] game in terms of what our … Read more
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121 Conclusion
Strategic Reserves mobilised under Exercise Agile Stance after recent neglect
Conclusion
The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Reserve was also being mobilised under Exercise Agile Stance with a series of mobilisation exercises of Active Reserve elements taking place across each of the single Services, between January and … Read more
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122 Conclusion
Defence industry plays integral role in Armed Forces readiness and recruitment
Conclusion
Defence industry plays an integral role in Armed Forces readiness. The First Sea Lord explained that the UK Armed Forces rely heavily on the defence industry to deliver “world-leading capability to deal with those who may wish us harm”.242 Nick … Read more
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123 Conclusion
MOD-defence industry relationship ineffective for strategic readiness despite acknowledged reliance
Conclusion
Despite the acknowledged reliance on industry, both General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter questioned whether the relationship between the MOD and industry was effective in supporting strategic readiness. General Lord Houghton told us that despite numerous reviews on … Read more
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124 Conclusion
MOD procurement frequently suffers significant delays and cost overruns, failing Armed Forces
Conclusion
In 2023, we examined the organisation responsible for the majority of MOD procurement (Defence Equipment & Support).248 Pointing to the conclusion by the Public Accounts Committee that defence equipment “arrives into service many years late and significantly over-budget, with depressing … Read more
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125 Conclusion
Slow MOD procurement response to Ukraine war, exemplified by delayed 155mm shell contract
Conclusion
Professor Clarke warned us in April 2023 that the implications of the Ukraine war were “taking time to filter through to Governments.”251 One of the most obvious examples of this is the length of time it took to conclude a … Read more
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126 Conclusion
Industry desires long-term consistency, earlier engagement, and multi-year budgets from DE&S, alongside cultural change.
Conclusion
When we took evidence on DE&S, we heard from industry that it wanted: long- term consistency on required capabilities; earlier engagement in the requirement setting process, multi-year budgets; an improved (and consistent) social value framework; and decisions made with reference … Read more
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127 Conclusion
Previous report recommended earlier MOD industry engagement, workforce development, multi-year funding, and spiral development.
Conclusion
In our Report on DE&S we recommended that: • The MOD should engage with industry at an earlier stage, particularly on future requirements and their feasibility; • The MOD should consider the implications of the shortage of skilled and experienced … Read more
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128 Conclusion
Ministers acknowledge issues with current and future tri-service recruitment contracts requiring improvement.
Conclusion
Our Report did not cover issues with the outsourcing of Army recruitment as that is (currently) a contract managed by the Army rather than DE&S. However, we raised it and the proposed future tri-service recruitment contract with the Secretary of … Read more
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129 Conclusion
DCP23 concluded Ukraine lessons demand faster acquisition, industry partnership, and quicker deployment of platforms.
Conclusion
Shortly after our Report was published, the DCP23 was produced by the Government. It announced that key lessons from Ukraine had resulted in the following conclusions: • The pace of battlefield innovation means that decades-long acquisition programmes and upgrades are … Read more
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130 Conclusion
DCP23 adopted committee recommendations for earlier industry engagement in strategic conversations and capability development.
Conclusion
Many of our recommendations were adopted within the DCP23. That document commits Defence to engaging at an earlier stage in strategic conversations with industry about requirements and developing relationships with key Defence Executives. This should allow Defence and industry to … Read more
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131 Conclusion
MOD recognizes importance of long-term munitions contracts and industry commitment for skills development.
Conclusion
In December 2023, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there had been recognition of the importance of trying “to make sure that our pipeline of munitions is always on, rather than boom … Read more
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132 Conclusion
Acquisition process shifting towards 'spiral development' of capabilities to counter vendor lock-in.
Conclusion
As well as earlier engagement on requirements, the acquisition process is moving from one focused on specifying exact requirements to one which focuses on the ‘spiral development’ of capabilities—this will allow for the iterative development of capabilities to keep pace … Read more
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133 Conclusion
DCP23 recognizes need for robust, resilient defence supply chains and MOD launches new strategy.
Conclusion
In order to ensure that Defence can replenish and increase stockpiles of munitions, spares and operational supplies, the DCP23 recognises that industry needs to have robust and resilient supply chains which have assured access to “key materials, components and 263 … Read more
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134 Conclusion
DCP23 commits Defence to prioritising acquisition speed and radically reducing time to front-line delivery.
Conclusion
The DCP23 commits Defence to prioritising time within its acquisition system (within the parameters of time, cost and performance) as: driving pace is critical–even if it forces us to increase our risk tolerance elsewhere. Our ambition is to reduce radically … Read more
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135 Conclusion
Defence aims for maximum five-year acquisition and three-year digital programme commitments, with tailored approaches.
Conclusion
It also states that Defence intends to set “a maximum five-year commitment for acquisition programmes, with a maximum three-year commitment for digital programmes” although it acknowledges that the MOD procures a wide range of equipment, goods and services and so … Read more
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136 Conclusion
Defence needs fundamental shift towards long-term, resilient munitions supply pipelines
Conclusion
Both Commander, Strategic Command and the Minister for the Armed Forces were at pains to emphasise that this was a real change in approach. Commander, Strategic Command told us that Defence needed to look at long-term pipelines to supply the … Read more
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137 Conclusion
Current defence procurement processes unable to ensure industrial resilience for scale
Conclusion
The Minister was clear that current procurement processes were no longer viable as a result of the pace of innovation.277 He acknowledged that this was a complete paradigm shift and a “frankly nascent part of policy making”.278 He warned that … Read more
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138 Conclusion
Government's assessment of warfighting effort welcome but long overdue
Conclusion
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in … Read more
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139 Conclusion
Government's defence procurement reform approach remains unfinalised and unassessed
Conclusion
The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not … Read more
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140 Recommendation
Publish departmental responsibilities under national defence plan, naming lead Ministers
Recommendation
Under a national defence plan, each relevant Government Department would have its own responsibilities. We recommend that these responsibilities are published as far as possible, and—if any responsibilities cannot be published for national security reasons—these should be provided in confidence … Read more
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141 Conclusion
Russia's invasion necessitates wholesale shift to warfighting resilience in UK and Allies
Conclusion
Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK … Read more
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142 Conclusion
Overtasking Armed Forces risks UK warfighting readiness amid global instability
Conclusion
It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have sustained this effort for … Read more
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143 Conclusion
Growing capability shortfalls and overstretched personnel create vicious cycle in Armed Forces
Conclusion
Personnel need time to recover from operations, and time to train and develop new skills. But the demand of operations makes that harder to achieve. It is unsurprising that more people are leaving the Forces than joining them. All three … Read more
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144 Recommendation
Act swiftly to break overtasking cycle, ensuring UK readiness for future challenges
Recommendation
The Government must act to break this cycle, and do so swiftly, to ensure that the UK is ready not only to face the challenges of today, but also to face the storm clouds on the horizon. Ready for War? … Read more
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1 Conclusion
Para 31
Ministry of Defence transparency has significantly decreased over past decade
Conclusion
The protection of sensitive information plays a vital role in the security of this country. However, the Ministry of Defence has become demonstrably less transparent over the past decade. The fact that the Minister and senior military personnel did not … Read more
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2 Conclusion
Para 32
Parliament lacks adequate information to scrutinise ministerial decisions on defence readiness
Conclusion
Readiness is about acceptable risk. The decisions on what risks to take are ultimately political (based partly on military advice) rather than solely military or parliamentary decisions. Ministers will also inevitably need to reach judgments about the availability of information … Read more
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3 Conclusion
Para 33
Government's slow and unhelpful responses impeded inquiry work on defence readiness
Conclusion
The Government’s reaction to this specific inquiry has also been unacceptably slow and has impeded our work. Responses to our requests for written evidence have arrived many months late and contained very little useful information. We took up the Government’s … Read more
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4 Conclusion
Para 34
Lack of official information hinders public scrutiny of UK armed forces readiness
Conclusion
In the absence of adequate official information, public and parliamentary scrutiny of and debate about UK armed forces readiness currently relies on media reporting and corridor conversations, leading to suspicion that the forces are less ready than in fact they … Read more
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5 Conclusion
Propose annual mechanism for the Defence Committee to receive detailed updates on armed forces readiness
Conclusion
In a functioning democracy, the House of Commons Defence Committee needs to be routinely informed about the planning assumptions and readiness of the nation’s armed forces. We therefore recommend that—following the Minister’s welcome commitment to work with us—the Government propose … Read more
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6 Recommendation
Rectify reduction in public accountability and consult committees before classifying readiness information
Recommendation
We also recommend that the Government explain why previously unclassified information about readiness is no longer published, recognise the reduction in public and parliamentary accountability that this has brought about, and seek to rectify the situation. In future, when a … Read more
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7 Recommendation
Para 107
Produce breakdown of Autumn 2022 and Spring 2023 budget allocations for stockpiles
Recommendation
The commitments made to replenish and increase stockpiles made since the 2022 Autumn Budget have all been welcome. The question remains whether this is anywhere near enough to meet the potential threats we face. It is therefore disturbing to hear … Read more
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8 Conclusion
Para 108
UK Armed Forces face persistent capability shortfalls and an unresolved recruitment crisis
Conclusion
There are multiple capability shortfalls within the UK Armed Forces. For that reason, we welcome the decision to maintain the Albion-class vessels in operational service until their out of service dates in the 2030s. However, we are also increasingly concerned … Read more
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9 Conclusion
Para 109
Produce and share implementation timetable with measurable deliverables for recruitment and retention
Conclusion
Efforts to improve the recruitment and retention of both Regulars and Reserves are currently being considered by the MOD. We therefore recommend that once decisions have been made to adopt these recommendations, an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables is produced … Read more
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10 Conclusion
Para 110
Breadth of UK Armed Forces commitments delays warfighting readiness development
Conclusion
The UK Armed Forces have sufficient Readiness for operations—they can carry out standing operations and contingent commitments. However, the breadth of their commitments is having an inevitable impact, in terms of budget requirements, subsequent constraints on training and the retention … Read more
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11 Recommendation
Para 111
Introduce budget uplift or prioritisation ranking for Armed Forces commitments via National Security Council
Recommendation
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of … Read more
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12 Conclusion
UK policy of disposing retired warfighting equipment limits strategic resilience capacity.
Conclusion
We understand the financial implications of retaining capabilities after they have been retired but we question whether the MOD have considered all the options. We accept that maintaining equipment comes at significant cost but argue that such platforms do not … Read more
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13 Conclusion
Para 138
Government's warfighting effort assessment is welcome but long overdue.
Conclusion
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in … Read more
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14 Conclusion
Para 139
Procurement reform approach remains unfinalised, hindering committee assessment of its appropriateness.
Conclusion
The Government’s approach to procurement reform is not yet finalised and we have heard many promises of change before. The MOD has shown willing to engage with us as it finalises this approach. We welcome this engagement, but are not … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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15 Recommendation
Publish departmental responsibilities within the national defence plan and assign to named Ministers.
Recommendation
Under a national defence plan, each relevant Government Department would have its own responsibilities. We recommend that these responsibilities are published as far as possible, and—if any responsibilities cannot be published for national security reasons—these should be provided in confidence … Read more
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16 Conclusion
Para 141
Russia's invasion requires wholesale shift in UK and Allied warfighting resilience approach.
Conclusion
Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the threat— demonstrating that Russia has both the capability and intent to prosecute a war in Europe. This requires a wholesale shift in approach towards warfighting resilience both in the UK … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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17 Conclusion
Para 142
Overtasking Armed Forces threatens UK warfighting readiness and personnel well-being.
Conclusion
It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have 56 Ready for War? … Read more
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18 Conclusion
Para 143
Operational demands create personnel retention issues and growing capability shortfalls in services.
Conclusion
Personnel need time to recover from operations, and time to train and develop new skills. But the demand of operations makes that harder to achieve. It is unsurprising that more people are leaving the Forces than joining them. All three … Read more
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19 Recommendation
Act swiftly to break overtasking cycle, ensuring UK's future warfighting readiness.
Recommendation
The Government must act to break this cycle, and do so swiftly, to ensure that the UK is ready not only to face the challenges of today, but also to face the storm clouds on the horizon. (Paragraph 144) Ready for War? 57
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