First Report - Ready for War?

Select Committee

Defence Committee HC 26 4 February 2024

Report Status Government responded

Conclusions & Recommendations 132 items (10 recs)

Source View on Parliament website

Government Response (AI assessment · 131 of 132 classified)

Accepted 79

Accepted in Part 5

Acknowledged 19

Deferred 11

Not Addressed 12

Rejected 5

Government response

Fourth Special Report - Ready for war?: Government response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2023-24 · published 25 Apr 2024

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Recommendations & Conclusions

13 results

60 Conclusion Not Addressed

RAF successfully increased operational sorties and performed exceptionally well in challenging Red Flag exercises.

Conclusion

The Chief of the Defence Staff told us that whilst there may be a tension between training and operational sorties, by Spring 2023 the RAF had delivered twice as many operational sorties as in the previous 12 months while also … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government published the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23) and articulates a new, clear purpose for Defence: to protect the nation, and to help it prosper.

Ministry of Defence

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61 Conclusion Not Addressed

Limited airfield flexibility hampers RAF warfighting ability despite past investment, requiring further resources.

Conclusion

The Chief of the Air Staff argued that the RAF had benefitted significantly from investment in the past 15 years which had resulted in the bringing into service the F-35 fleet; A400M fleet; the Voyager fleet and the P-8 Maritime … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address the RAF's acknowledged need for investment in spares, infrastructure, and people for dispersal and operational flexibility.

Ministry of Defence

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63 Conclusion Not Addressed

Strategic Command maintains constant readiness but raises concerns about war-fighting medical cover.

Conclusion

He acknowledged the difficulty of talking about readiness in relation to Strategic Command given that “a lot of my organisation operates at readiness all the time, and readiness does not apply to quite a lot of my organisation”. He cited … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government discusses the Defence Command Paper 2023's aims for modernising and mobilising conventional forces, enhancing lethality, and rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment, but does not specifically address concerns about the scale of medical cover needed for war-fighting operations.

Ministry of Defence

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65 Conclusion Not Addressed

Strategic Command addresses shortfalls by enhancing medical capacity and introducing digital career pathways.

Conclusion

When we asked the Commander Strategic Command how he was working on alleviating shortfalls, he provided the following examples: Health • Increasing the level of medical stocks whilst working with the NHS to ensure rotation the stock from MOD shelves … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government details £1.95Bn in funding from the 2023 Spring Budget allocated to improve resilience and build munitions and medical stockpiles, and nearly £1Bn in contracts to replenish equipment, but does not address the specific methods mentioned for alleviating personnel shortfalls.

Ministry of Defence

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69 Conclusion Not Addressed

Allocated funds for stockpile replenishment at risk of diversion to offset MOD funding shortfalls.

Conclusion

The Government has previously pointed to its successes in signing contracts—in June 2022 it noted that it had secured “contracts for Next Generation Light AntiTank Weapons, Starstreak High Velocity Missiles, Lightweight Multirole Missiles, Archer 6X6 Artillery 132 Q406 133 Q406–7 … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government reiterates the allocation of £1.95Bn from the 2023 Spring Budget for munitions and medical stockpiles and contracts to replenish equipment, but it does not address the committee's concern regarding the NAO's finding that these funds were not ringfenced and could be used to offset other funding shortfalls.

Ministry of Defence

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72 Conclusion Not Addressed

DCP23 policy intentions on MOD-industry relationship and industrial capacity to be addressed later.

Conclusion

We address the DCP23’s policy intentions on the MOD’s relationship with industry and the steps it has subsequently taken to improve industrial capacity in the final chapter on strategic readiness. Recruitment and retention

Government Response Summary

The response refers to the Defence Command Paper 2023, its purpose and objectives, but does not address industrial capacity or strategic readiness, the topic of the recommendation.

Ministry of Defence

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84 Conclusion Not Addressed

Budgetary constraints force cuts to training, impacting readiness, retention and maintenance

Conclusion

In December 2023, we were told that budgetary constraints meant that training had been cut in 2023 (and had the potential of being cut similarly in 2024) in order to manage the pressures on the defence budget.184 As the Chief … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government's response highlights the Defence Command Paper 2023 and its focus on enhancing capabilities and operational productivity, but does not directly address the committee's specific concern about cuts to training due to budgetary constraints and their impact on readiness and retention.

Ministry of Defence

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85 Conclusion Not Addressed

Government over-reliance on Military Aid to Civil Authorities pressures Armed Forces readiness

Conclusion

Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) requests are an additional operational pressure on the armed forces, but we are unable to quantify this without information on the impact of MACA on the readiness of the Armed Forces, requested from the … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government affirms that the Armed Forces will continue to provide support to civil authorities and maintain high readiness for national events, but the response does not address the committee's concern about other departments' over-reliance on military assistance or provide the requested information on MACA's impact on military readiness.

Ministry of Defence

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89 Conclusion

Service accommodation forms a crucial part of the Armed Forces incentive package.

Conclusion

Service accommodation is also part of the package of incentives available to the Armed Forces and their families. We expect to report separately on this later in 2024.193

Ministry of Defence

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93 Conclusion Not Addressed

Budgetary pressures hinder faster implementation of Haythornthwaite Review recommendations for the Armed Forces.

Conclusion

The Minister for the Armed Forces welcomed the work ongoing in relation to the Haythornthwaite recommendations but when asked whether that work could be speeded up, told us that whilst the MOD’s inclination was to implement as many of the … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government states that a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review's recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining implementation steps, but the response does not specifically address the Minister's previously noted concerns about budgetary pressures impacting the speed of this work.

Ministry of Defence

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94 Conclusion Not Addressed

DCP21 committed to new roles, flexible service for reserves and the Reserve Forces Review 2030.

Conclusion

The original Defence Command Paper (DCP21) had committed to reserve forces being “given new, more clearly defined roles” including providing “capacity, alongside their regular and civilian colleagues, and an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and … Read more The original Defence Command Paper (DCP21) had committed to reserve forces being “given new, more clearly defined roles” including providing “capacity, alongside their regular and civilian colleagues, and an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and abroad”. The MOD would “create an efficient and fluid spectrum of military service, providing our people with a range of commitment options at different stages of their lives” and improving “the way we recruit and employ reserves, enabling us to bring expertise from across society, government, industry and academia to bear on some of the greatest challenges we face”. In addition, DCP21 committed the MOD to considering the recommendations from the Lord Lancaster-led Reserves Forces Review 2030 (RF30) “in due course”.198 That Review was published in May 2021 and the Government has yet to respond to its 18 recommendations (despite our recommendation in July 2022 that it ought to prioritise the work).199 194 Oral evidence taken on 5 September 2023, HC (2022–23) 1804, Q13; 15 195 Ministry of Defence (CDS0001) 196 Q46 197 Q407 198 Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, Cm 411, March 2021, p 35 199 Defence Committee Second Report of Session 2022–23, The Integrated Review: Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, HC 180, Para 56 38 Ready for War? Box 4: The Reserve Forces Review 2030 The Reserve Forces Review 2030 was commissioned by the then-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, and conducted by a small team led by a senior serving reservist and former Minister of Armed Forces, Brigadier The Rt Hon the Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton TD PC. The Report offered 18 recommendations for consideration, in four key areas: • Re-defining the Reserves’ relationship with society, recognising the need to cooperate and share expertise with, for instance, industry and academia. • Expanding the role of the Reserves as part of an integrated joint force, h Show less

Government Response Summary

The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but the response does not specifically address the prior DCP21 commitments regarding reserve forces or the recommendations from the Lord Lancaster-led Reserve Forces Review.

Ministry of Defence

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95 Conclusion Not Addressed

MOD to create Reserves Roadmap synergising Haythornthwaite and Reserve Forces Review 2030 recommendations.

Conclusion

Both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the MOD Permanent Secretary pointed out that much of the work relating to the Haythornthwaite Review would impact on thinking about the Reserves.200 In July 2023 the Chief of the Defence Staff … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government states a formal response to the Haythornthwaite Review recommendations will be published in 2024, outlining future steps for recruitment and retention, but it does not address the previously stated intention to respond to the Reserve Forces Review 2030 by April 2024 or the creation of a Reserves Roadmap to synergize the two reviews.

Ministry of Defence

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115 Conclusion Not Addressed

Strategic readiness depends on other government departments to address national skills shortages and infrastructure.

Conclusion

It therefore goes wider than the remit of the Ministry of Defence—for example, having appropriate infrastructure and sufficient skilled and experienced workers are areas which are vital but are responsibilities of other government departments.230 A current example of this is … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government's response focuses on MOD's internal recruitment and retention efforts and the Haythornthwaite Review, but does not address the conclusion that issues like infrastructure and skilled workers extend beyond MOD's remit and involve other government departments.

Ministry of Defence

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