Saif Hussain
PFD Report
Partially Responded
Ref: 2021-0399
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
The trust lacked a single, integrated system for drug record-keeping and monitoring, with insufficient limits on administration and inadequate implementation of safety software like Guardrails.
View full coroner's concerns
The trust should consider :
1. A single system for record keeping and monitoring.
2. How the system could incorporate appropriate limits on the administration of certain drugs within that system.
3. Whether software like Guardrails should be implemented more widely, and consideration given to when and how it is possible to override this, and how that should then be documented.
4. Adopting a system of flagging up where prescription and administration of drugs is different.
1. A single system for record keeping and monitoring.
2. How the system could incorporate appropriate limits on the administration of certain drugs within that system.
3. Whether software like Guardrails should be implemented more widely, and consideration given to when and how it is possible to override this, and how that should then be documented.
4. Adopting a system of flagging up where prescription and administration of drugs is different.
Responses
Action Taken
Oxford University Hospitals acknowledges the issue of multiple clinical systems and has taken interim mitigations, including a checklist for safe handovers, transcription of drug charts, creation of discharge summaries, and the automated upload of clinical notes from CareVue to Cerner since July 2021. They are also introducing new infusion pumps with drug libraries. (AI summary)
Oxford University Hospitals acknowledges the issue of multiple clinical systems and has taken interim mitigations, including a checklist for safe handovers, transcription of drug charts, creation of discharge summaries, and the automated upload of clinical notes from CareVue to Cerner since July 2021. They are also introducing new infusion pumps with drug libraries. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Mrs Connor Regulation 28 Report / Prevention of Future Deaths Inquest into the Death of Saif Mubeen Hussain Thank you for your letter dated 25 November 2021 with the enclosed Prevention of Future Death Report. I am sorry that you have had cause to write to the Trust in this manner. We have reviewed the concerns raised in your letter and set out below our response:
1. A single system for record keeping and monitoring The Trust acknowledges there are multiple clinical systems making up the electronic patient record in the organisation. We accept the need to rationalise the number of clinical systems in use across our critical care units. This is likely to take to take at least two years to consider and implement. In the intervening period additional mitigations have been taken to address the identified risk and improve patient safety when a patient is moved from one intensive care unit to another. Clinical staff will be required to undertake a checklist to execute a safe handover. There are already procedures in place to mitigate for any loss of information on transfer from a CareVue using area (Adult Intensive Care Unit) to a Cerner using area (Neurosciences Intensive Care Unit) of the Trust. These include transcription of the CareVue drug chart into the Cerner system, the production of an intensive care discharge summary within the Cerner system, and more recently (July 2021) the automated upload of clinical notes generated within the CareVue system into the Cerner system. The last of these procedures has been put in place since Mr Hussain’s death.
2. How the system could incorporate appropriate limits on the administration of certain drugs within that system The Trust accepts the need to strengthen the decision support tools within the current clinical systems. We are looking to further improve the embedded system rules regarding drug prescription and administration. We have identified the need for the implementation of a ‘closed loop’ solution, that will remove some human elements of drug administration. The complete technical solution will be dependent on the rationalisation of the clinical systems into a single system (see point 1 above). The future single clinical system procurement process will include specifications to cover the automation of drug prescription to administration.
3. Whether software like Guardrails should be implemented more widely, and consideration given to when and how it is possible to override this, and how that should then be documented. The Trust is in the process of implementing infusion pumps with inbuilt dose error reduction software (DERS) throughout all clinical areas. Once the project has successfully been completed, clinical areas which use infusion pumps will utilise a medication library to infuse their drugs, if appropriate. The roll out schedule is such that all clinical areas will receive new infusion pumps by the end of the 2023 calendar year. The schedule has been prioritised based on each areas perceived risks, determined by factors such as clinical need, status and quantity of working equipment and staffing limitations which may affect training and implementation. Each medication library will contain a list of medications with specified concentrations and/or dosing safety limits to reduce the risk of infusion related incidents e.g., overdosing or underdosing. Resource will be allocated to ensure that medication entries on the libraries are accurate, relevant, and appropriate so that staff should not need to override safety limits if following usual practice; the software is designed not to be overridden if inappropriate dosing is entered outside of the safe limits put in place. However, in some exceptional circumstances outside the norm, it may be necessary for patient care to deviate from the specified dosing limits and therefore the infusion pumps offer the capability to infuse medication outside of the library where safety limits are not imposed. Staff will be educated that they must not work outside of the medication library unless in exceptional circumstances and an escalation process will be devised to enable a clear audit trail of all communication and decisions made between staff members which will be documented in the patients’ medical notes. This will be detailed in a standard operating procedure and will contain a flowsheet of the escalation process as a quick reference guide for staff members. A working group has been set up on NICU, who already use a medication library, to trial this.
4. Adopting a system of flagging up where prescription and administration of drugs is different. Many drugs delivered as infusions in critical care areas must have their infusion rates constantly adjusted to maintain physiological stability. As such, it is impractical for prescriptions to be changed to match the infusion rate each time the rate is altered by the bedside nurse. The issue raised refers to the current situation where a user can input a value for a drug infusion rate into the iView infusion section of the Cerner clinical system chart without any limits. This was identified as a contributing factor in the drug dosing error associated with Mr Hussain’s care. In the short term, we are investigating the possibility of developing a system which would put limits on the values which could be entered in this section of the chart for a select
number of drugs with narrow dose safety profiles. This would initially include heparin, argatroban, vancomycin and insulin. In addition, the Trust is in the process of introducing new infusion pumps across all sites. One of the requirements for the procurement of these pumps was that they should allow bi-directional communication between the pumps and the Cerner clinical system. This would allow auto-programming of the pump from the electronic prescription and would automatically update the hourly infusion rate recorded in the iView infusion section of the drug chart. If the bi-directional communication capability of these pumps were to be used, this would significantly reduce the volume of manually entered data and remove the risk of transcription errors by bedside nurses when programming pumps or recording infusion rates. The Trust is looking at facilitating and funding this element of the new pump roll out in order to improve patient safety around administration of drug infusions in critical care. A second benefit of the new pumps is that each pump will contain a drug library. This is a database of drugs which aims to reduce the risk of underdosing or overdosing a drug. This forms part of the drug error reduction system described in point 3. I hope this response will help to assure you that the Trust is taking steps to review and explore clinical system options to improve patient safety in the areas you have identified. I would be grateful if a copy of this response can be shared with Mr Hussain’s family.
1. A single system for record keeping and monitoring The Trust acknowledges there are multiple clinical systems making up the electronic patient record in the organisation. We accept the need to rationalise the number of clinical systems in use across our critical care units. This is likely to take to take at least two years to consider and implement. In the intervening period additional mitigations have been taken to address the identified risk and improve patient safety when a patient is moved from one intensive care unit to another. Clinical staff will be required to undertake a checklist to execute a safe handover. There are already procedures in place to mitigate for any loss of information on transfer from a CareVue using area (Adult Intensive Care Unit) to a Cerner using area (Neurosciences Intensive Care Unit) of the Trust. These include transcription of the CareVue drug chart into the Cerner system, the production of an intensive care discharge summary within the Cerner system, and more recently (July 2021) the automated upload of clinical notes generated within the CareVue system into the Cerner system. The last of these procedures has been put in place since Mr Hussain’s death.
2. How the system could incorporate appropriate limits on the administration of certain drugs within that system The Trust accepts the need to strengthen the decision support tools within the current clinical systems. We are looking to further improve the embedded system rules regarding drug prescription and administration. We have identified the need for the implementation of a ‘closed loop’ solution, that will remove some human elements of drug administration. The complete technical solution will be dependent on the rationalisation of the clinical systems into a single system (see point 1 above). The future single clinical system procurement process will include specifications to cover the automation of drug prescription to administration.
3. Whether software like Guardrails should be implemented more widely, and consideration given to when and how it is possible to override this, and how that should then be documented. The Trust is in the process of implementing infusion pumps with inbuilt dose error reduction software (DERS) throughout all clinical areas. Once the project has successfully been completed, clinical areas which use infusion pumps will utilise a medication library to infuse their drugs, if appropriate. The roll out schedule is such that all clinical areas will receive new infusion pumps by the end of the 2023 calendar year. The schedule has been prioritised based on each areas perceived risks, determined by factors such as clinical need, status and quantity of working equipment and staffing limitations which may affect training and implementation. Each medication library will contain a list of medications with specified concentrations and/or dosing safety limits to reduce the risk of infusion related incidents e.g., overdosing or underdosing. Resource will be allocated to ensure that medication entries on the libraries are accurate, relevant, and appropriate so that staff should not need to override safety limits if following usual practice; the software is designed not to be overridden if inappropriate dosing is entered outside of the safe limits put in place. However, in some exceptional circumstances outside the norm, it may be necessary for patient care to deviate from the specified dosing limits and therefore the infusion pumps offer the capability to infuse medication outside of the library where safety limits are not imposed. Staff will be educated that they must not work outside of the medication library unless in exceptional circumstances and an escalation process will be devised to enable a clear audit trail of all communication and decisions made between staff members which will be documented in the patients’ medical notes. This will be detailed in a standard operating procedure and will contain a flowsheet of the escalation process as a quick reference guide for staff members. A working group has been set up on NICU, who already use a medication library, to trial this.
4. Adopting a system of flagging up where prescription and administration of drugs is different. Many drugs delivered as infusions in critical care areas must have their infusion rates constantly adjusted to maintain physiological stability. As such, it is impractical for prescriptions to be changed to match the infusion rate each time the rate is altered by the bedside nurse. The issue raised refers to the current situation where a user can input a value for a drug infusion rate into the iView infusion section of the Cerner clinical system chart without any limits. This was identified as a contributing factor in the drug dosing error associated with Mr Hussain’s care. In the short term, we are investigating the possibility of developing a system which would put limits on the values which could be entered in this section of the chart for a select
number of drugs with narrow dose safety profiles. This would initially include heparin, argatroban, vancomycin and insulin. In addition, the Trust is in the process of introducing new infusion pumps across all sites. One of the requirements for the procurement of these pumps was that they should allow bi-directional communication between the pumps and the Cerner clinical system. This would allow auto-programming of the pump from the electronic prescription and would automatically update the hourly infusion rate recorded in the iView infusion section of the drug chart. If the bi-directional communication capability of these pumps were to be used, this would significantly reduce the volume of manually entered data and remove the risk of transcription errors by bedside nurses when programming pumps or recording infusion rates. The Trust is looking at facilitating and funding this element of the new pump roll out in order to improve patient safety around administration of drug infusions in critical care. A second benefit of the new pumps is that each pump will contain a drug library. This is a database of drugs which aims to reduce the risk of underdosing or overdosing a drug. This forms part of the drug error reduction system described in point 3. I hope this response will help to assure you that the Trust is taking steps to review and explore clinical system options to improve patient safety in the areas you have identified. I would be grateful if a copy of this response can be shared with Mr Hussain’s family.
Sent To
- Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
- John Radcliffe Hospital
Response Status
Linked responses
1 of 2
56-Day Deadline
20 Jan 2022
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
I conducted an inquest into the death of Saif Mubeen Hussain on 19th November 2021. I recorded a conclusion of suicide
Circumstances of the Death
The family asked me to refer to the deceased as Saif during the inquest. I will respect that wish in this report. Saif Hussain was born on 22nd January 1998. He had no recorded mental health history. Tragically, for reasons unknown to family, he in Bracknell, Berkshire on 3rd June 2021 and . He was admitted to the John Radcliffe hospital later that day, but died there on 10th June 2021. His cause of death was polytrauma. For the absence of doubt, the issues raised below in relation to the hospital management are unlikely to have played a part in causing Saif’s death, but I do consider that there is a risk of future deaths for other patients unless these issues are addressed. Saif was managed in the AICU from 4th to 7th June. On the 7th June, he was transferred from AICU to NICU. He had various infusions running, including a Heparin infusion. At the time of transfer, he was prescribed a dose rate of 1.4 ml/hour. Saif was also on a phosphate infusion, prescribed at 8.3 ml/hour. Whilst the prescribed doses remained the same, he was in fact administered a dose almost 8 times higher than that, namely 8.3 ml /hour. It seems likely that the rate prescribed for the phosphate infusion was mistakenly applied to Heparin. This matter has been investigated, and the trust has produced an excellent report. The evidence heard at the inquest, and within that report, show that:
1. Nurses working in a NICU do not routinely use anticoagulant medication. The nurses who started the wrong Heparin rate were not familiar with usual dosage rates.
Classification: OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
Classification: OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
2. There were several nurses involved at that point, perhaps with a lack of ownership in terms of accuracy of the dose rate. This was also not double checked.
3. The Guardrails system (which would have prevented such an exceptionally high dose being administered) was switched off in order to allow the nurse/s to administer a rate of 8.3 ml/hour.
4. The systems in place at the time allow for the prescription rate and administration rate to be markedly different without that being flagged up.
5. Crucially, the hospital uses different computer systems in different parts of the hospital, to record patient records. The risks would clearly be much reduced, particularly for transfers within the hospital, by all departments being on the same system.
We heard in evidence that the trust has always planned to consider amalgamation of the different IT systems. It is not for me to say which system they should or should not adopt. I accept that there may be advantages to the current system that were not explored during the inquest. I do however consider that there should be some focus on these issues within the trust, and an urgent review should be conducted.
1. Nurses working in a NICU do not routinely use anticoagulant medication. The nurses who started the wrong Heparin rate were not familiar with usual dosage rates.
Classification: OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
Classification: OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
2. There were several nurses involved at that point, perhaps with a lack of ownership in terms of accuracy of the dose rate. This was also not double checked.
3. The Guardrails system (which would have prevented such an exceptionally high dose being administered) was switched off in order to allow the nurse/s to administer a rate of 8.3 ml/hour.
4. The systems in place at the time allow for the prescription rate and administration rate to be markedly different without that being flagged up.
5. Crucially, the hospital uses different computer systems in different parts of the hospital, to record patient records. The risks would clearly be much reduced, particularly for transfers within the hospital, by all departments being on the same system.
We heard in evidence that the trust has always planned to consider amalgamation of the different IT systems. It is not for me to say which system they should or should not adopt. I accept that there may be advantages to the current system that were not explored during the inquest. I do however consider that there should be some focus on these issues within the trust, and an urgent review should be conducted.
Copies Sent To
Classification: OFFICIAL
SENSITIVE
Classification: OFFICIAL
SENSITIVE
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.