Stephen Coulson

PFD Report Partially Responded Ref: 2017-0307
Date of Report 27 October 2017
Coroner Rashid Sohail
Coroner Area Manchester (City)
Response Deadline est. 23 January 2018
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Inadequate systems for controlled drug management and patient observation policies, coupled with a failure to learn from investigations, posed risks to patient safety.
View full coroner's concerns
1) Controlled drugs the system in place for the administration, documentation and audit of processes associated with the use of controlled drugs
2) Observation policy the lack of escalation of the need to admit patients for observation and review should fulfil the criteria to require continued observation review prior to discharge
3) High Level Investigation the witness did not accept that any lessons could be learnt from the investigation surrounding the death of the deceased.
Responses
NHS England NHS / Health Body
24 Jan 2018
Action Taken
The Trust has updated its Controlled Drug Policy, updated the Opiate Patch Monitoring Form, amended nursing admission documentation, developed education around delirium and neurological assessment, implemented a new electronic neurological observation chart, and educated doctors on fentanyl patch prescribing. The CDAO reports incidents into a reporting system to share lessons learned. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Dr Sohail; Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths ~ Stephen Coulson (died 01.01.2016) Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report dated 27 October 2017 concerning the death of Mr Coulson on 15 January 2016. Firstly, would like to express my deep condolences to Mr Coulson's family. Following the inquest you raised concerns to NHS England regarding The use, documentation and audit of controlled drugs, The Trust's observation policy for patients controlled drugs and The high Ievel investigation itself. All NHS Trusts must have a Controlled Accountable Officer (CDAO): This person would be senior manager within their organisation but who does not routinely supply or handle controlled drugs themselves. The roles and responsibilities of CDAOs, ad the requirement to appoint them, are governed by the Controlled Drugs_ Supenvision of Management and Use) Regulations
2013. As we understand the Trust's initial response did not include engagement with their Controlled Drug Accountable Officer: We recognise that there was a lack of engagement with the relevant personnel regarding this incident: We are pleased to learn that the Trust's revised response does now include an action plan which is a good indication that lessons have been learnt about the vital role CDAOs play in reference to controlled drugs The Trust has now implemented an extensive action plan, have: Updated the Trust Controlled Policy to include reference to the Opiate Patch Monitoring Form to ensure that the clinical team are aware of the opiate patches worn and administration date. Update the Opiate Patch Monitoring Form to ensure it is explicit that opiate patches worn on admission are recorded and that removal of any opiate patch is documented and signed for by a registered nurse. That patient observations are recorded a minimum of 12 hourly in addition to routine observations. This will be audited to ensure compliance_ High quality care for all, now and for future generations using Drug they Drug

Amend Nursing admission documentation within surgery to include the questions to all patients to check if they are wearing an opiate patch and what dose this is. Develop and deliver further education around assessment and treatment of delirium Undertaken further education in relation to neurological assessment and completing physiological observations if a patient has a new confusion Implement teaching on new starters induction, mandatory training and 3 yearly acute illness training regarding when to undertake neurological assessment and escalation of deterioration Implement a new electronic neurological observation chart. The above will ensure any alteration in patient physiology specifically in any alteration in neurological status. Include clinical scenarios involving the prescribing of fentanyl patches and appropriate dose increases ad monitoring requirements in doctors education: Educate regarding the appropriate of patches as opposed to other routes_ The CDAQ at the Trust reports controlled drug incidents into the Greater Manchester Controlled Incident Reporting system which they investigate and where applicable share the lessons learnt: This system is rolled out across England with the prime object to share good practice and implement lessons learnt: A newsletter will be shared with prescribers and nursing staff across Greater Manchester to highlight the issues above in the Trust's action plan: NHS England will recommend to all Controlled Accountable Officers in each locality to remind the Controlled Accountable Offices of Designated Bodies to ensure are actively involved in providing evidence at the Coroner's Inquest. Thank you for bringing this important patient safety issue to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
CQC Regulator / Inspectorate
2 Feb 2018
Action Taken
CQC obtained and reviewed the Trust's revised action plan and will monitor its implementation during quarterly engagement meetings and future inspections. They also considered whether further regulatory action was needed but found no evidence of a systemic issue. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Dr.Sohal Thank you for the Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 14 November 2017 regarding Mr Stephen George Coulson (deceased): Your letter has been forwarded to me for response as have regulatory responsibility for acute health care in the north west of England. In your report; you raised concerns regarding the care of Mr Stephen George Coulson at Manchester Royal Infirmary on the 30 and 31 December 2015, prior to his unfortunate death on January 2016. In particular; you were concerned about: the system in place for the administration, documentation and audit processes associated with the use of controlled drugs the lack of escalation of the need to admit patients for observation and review should fulfil the criteria to require continued observation or review prior to discharge , and the high level investigation with particular concern that the witness did not accept that any lessons could be learnt from the investigation surrounding the death of the deceased would like to thank you for bringing these matters to our specific attention. As you are aware, Manchester Royal Infirmary is part of Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust Central (formerly Manchester NHS Foundation Trust) This NHS Care they

trust became new legal entity on October 2017 . It is registered with the Care Quality Commission ("the Commission") to provide regulated activities in accordance with the Health and Social Care Act 2008. Manchester Royal Infirmary was last inspected on 3 to 6 November 2015 and 26 November 2015. The report was published on 13 June 2016. The overall rating for the hospital was 'good:' There were no regulatory breaches identified regarding medicines management at that time, which was prior to the death of Mr Coulson_ requirement of registration is that organisations notify the Commission about certain changes, events and incidents that affect their service or the people who use it_ NHS trusts can send most types of notification through the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) This includes incidents resulting in serious harm or death: However, the NRLS does not contain person identifiable information and we are not able to confirm if, and when Mr Coulson's death was reported to the Commission. We do monitor trends and mortality data and include these in regular engagement meetings with the Trust. will now respond to each of the concerns raised within the Regulation 28 report and action the Commission has taken in response to these 1, Controlled drugs the system in place for the administration, documentation and audit of processes associated with the use of controlled drugs: As you are aware, the Trust have a controlled drugs policy in place The pharmacy team within the Commission has reviewed this policy:. The policy is of an acceptable standard, with some suggestions for improvements, such as making it clear who has responsibility for investigating medicines incidents, which occur outside of pharmacy_ We will share these with the trust The policy was updated in November 2017 to include reference to an opioid patch monitoring form; The use of the form should minimise the risk of similar incident experienced by Mr Coulson being repeated. The trust managers have informed the Commission that they plan to audit implementation of the form: We will monitor this through our quarterly engagement meetings and subsequently consider this at the next inspection, which is likely to take place between October and December 2018. The trust must also have in place a controlled drug Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). We will review these as part of our ongoing engagement with the trust For your information, we have recently implemented system of having named pharmacist inspector who has responsibility for the Trust and who meets with the head pharmacist: They are aware of this Regulation 28 report and will include this as part of their next meeting: 2_ Observation policy the lack of escalation of the need to admit patients for observation and review should fulfil the criteria to require continued observation review prior to discharge. they

As you are aware the Trust has an observation policy in place_ The most recent version is dated June 2017. This includes the policy statement that observations must be recorded on the day of discharge home_ There is also an associated early warning score policy that supports escalation to more senior or medical staff for review. During the inspection in 2015, it was noted that staff monitored patients by using an electronic early warning score system that automatically notified medical staff and some non-medical staff (such as the surgical lead pharmacist) if there was deterioration in a patient's medical condition. This process was considered to be embedded across the main site and all the staff we spoke with were positive about using this system. That said, we will ensure that the use of the early warning score and escalation is considered at the next inspection: We will also continue to monitor through our quarterly engagement with the Trust:
3. High Level Investigation the witness did not accept that any lessons could be learnt from the investigation surrounding the death of the deceased: In light of the Regulation 28 report; the Commission obtained the revised action plan regarding this tragic incident;, which has been submitted directly to you: This does now identify a number of lessons for the Trust; As with other significant concerns, we will monitor the action plan through our regular quarterly engagement meetings with the Trust We will also take into account the action plan and the implementation of these actions at the next inspection_ In addition, in light of the Regulation 28 report;, we have also considered whether there is sufficient evidence to take further regulatory action regarding this matter We have concluded, based on the information we currently hold, that there is no evidence there is systemic issue_ However, please be assured we will continue to monitor the issues you have raised from regulatory perspective and use the information to inform future regulatory activity at the Trust: hope my response has been helpful in outlining the response of the Commission to the Regulation 28 report. If you have any questions about this letter; you can make contact through our National Contact Centre using the details below: fully

Telephone: 03000 616161 Email: Enquiries@CQC.org uk Write to: Care Quality Commission Citygate Gallowgate Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4PA It is helpful to have the reference number (above) to hand. This will help avoid any delays in responding to you:
Sent To
  • Care Quality Commission
  • Central Manchester University Hospitals
  • NHS England
Response Status
Linked responses 2 of 3
56-Day Deadline 23 Jan 2018
About PFD responses

Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.

Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
concluded the inquest into the death of Stephen George Coulson on 4t October 2017 and recorded that he died from: Ia Hypoxic brain injury 1b Acute left ventricular failure Ic Idiopathic left ventricular hypertrophy on background of opioid toxicity
Circumstances of the Death
The deceased was admitted to Manchester Royal Infirary on 30t December 2015 with abdominal He had a complex past medical history which included operations for diverticular disease and a twisted bowel He had also sustained severe spinal & nerve damage following a fall for which he was on long tem treatment including oral Oramorph and Fentanyl patches. On the 31s December 2015,following review by the Colorectal Surgical Team, his Fentanyl patch prescription was increased from SOmcg to 75mcg with a view to discharging him home with subsequent follow up for a pre-arranged colonoscopy: The deceased had been noted to be self-administering his own Oramorph whilst he had in the hospital ward. Prior to his discharge a 75mcg Fentanyl patch was applied, though there is no record of his current 50mcg patch having been removed as was required by Trust policy. Later that morning he had telephoned his wife in a somewhat confused and agitated state The deceased's wife queried whether he should be discharged in that state and was SO informed by the nursing staff. There was a policy in place at Manchester Royal Infirmary at the time such that patients exhibiting a change in presentation andlor symptoms of confusion required clinical observation before discharged: It has been documented that the nurse had discussed this with the House Officer on call who suggested it would be due to the increased dose of Fentanyl Despite this concern being raised the deceased was not seen or reviewed by any member of the surgical team prior to his discharge on December 31s Nor was this lack of review escalated to a senior member of the surgical team. The deceased required assistance his wife to reach his bedroom at home The deceased was awoken by his wife at 23.30hrs on December 31s 2015 as had been agreed earlier so could see the New Year celebrations, but he stated that he was too tired and sleepy: At
03.OOhrs his wife awoke to find the deceased unwell, an ambulance was called and the deceased was found to be in cardiac arrest Resuscitation was commenced and he was taken to the_Manchester Royal Infirmary He_was admitted to the ICU where despite City pain. opioid been being from they they treatment he died on 1st January 2016. High Level Investigation conducted by the Trust found that no lessons needed to be learned. However, during the course of the inquest it became apparent from the evidence that lessons could be learnt by the Trust:
Action Should Be Taken
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe you and your organisation have the power to take such action.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.