Rail Industry Fragmentation
Fragmentation within the rail industry leading to siloed decision-making and misaligned incentives, hindering integrated investment.
153 items
7 sources
4 inquiries
Source spread
Where this theme appears
Rail Industry Fragmentation has been flagged across 7 independent accountability sources:
55 inquiry recs
6 PFD reports
73 committee recs
1 HMICFRS rec
1 NAO rec
3 IMB recs
14 LGO/SPSO decisions
When the same issue appears across inquiries, coroner reports, and regulators independently, it indicates a recurring issue across the public record.
Browse by source
Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Inquiry Recommendations (55) — showing 50 strongest matches
LADB-81 — Research removable windows and window adequacy for emergency egress and spacing.
Recommendation: There should be research into the feasibility of, and risks associated with, removable windows, the adequacy of windows as a means of emergency egress, the number of dedicated windows which are necessary and the provision as to the maximum distance …
Unknown
LADB-80 — Review emergency hammer adequacy, signage, and illuminated location with backup power.
Recommendation: There should be a thorough review of the adequacy of the number of, and signage relating to, emergency hammers. This should include the provision of means of illuminating the location of hammers in an emergency, with a back-up power supply …
Unknown
LADB-79 — Ensure emergency ladders are readily usable and quickly releasable on trains.
Recommendation: The daily routine check of every train should include confirming that all ladders can readily be used. A mechanism to enable ladders to be released quickly should be devised and fitted (para 14.35).
Unknown
LADB-78 — Develop illuminated pictogram signage for emergency door mechanisms, conforming to standards.
Recommendation: Signage primarily in the form of pictograms similar to those used on aircraft, and depicting the correct operation of emergency door mechanisms, should be developed. The signage should conform to current human factors standards on signage and be displayed prominently …
Unknown
LADB-77 — Install override devices on staff-only doors for passenger emergency use.
Recommendation: The staff-only doors on all trains should have an override device to enable them to be used by passengers in an emergency (para 14.29).
Unknown
LADB-76 — Modify internal coach doors to facilitate emergency egress by December 2003.
Recommendation: In the case of every coach (on any train) which has internal doors which slide in the same direction one of the following should be carried out by 31 December 2003: (i) the coach should be fitted instead with opposite- …
Unknown
LADB-75 — Consider providing "snap wands" as supplementary emergency lighting on trains.
Recommendation: The provision of “snap wands” should be considered as a supplementary means of providing lighting in an emergency (para 14.22).
Unknown
LADB-74 — Research methods to safeguard emergency lighting systems from sudden deceleration forces.
Recommendation: Research should be carried out into the means of safeguarding emergency lighting systems from disablement by the forces involved in sudden deceleration (para 14.21).
Unknown
LADB-73 — Research and implement a common emergency signage system across all Great British trains.
Recommendation: There should be research with the aim of arriving at a system of signage which is common to all trains in Great Britain (para 14.20).
Unknown
LADB-72 — Develop universally understandable emergency signs for all trains, without text.
Recommendation: So far as is feasible, emergency signs on all trains should be capable of being understood by passengers without the necessity to read text (para 14.19).
Unknown
LADB-71 — Make luminous emergency sign requirement retrospective for all trains
Recommendation: The requirement for emergency signs to be luminous should be made retrospective (para 14.18).
Unknown
LADB-70 — Endorse using onboard announcements to highlight passenger safety information
Recommendation: The use of on-board announcements to draw attention to safety information is endorsed (para 14.16).
Unknown
LADB-69 — Endorse providing onboard explanatory information about individual train emergency facilities
Recommendation: The provision on board of explanatory information about the emergency facilities of individual trains is endorsed (para 14.14).
Unknown
LADB-68 — Obtain expert advice on passenger actions during known serious onboard dangers
Recommendation: Expert assistance should be obtained on the advice which should be given to passengers as to what to do in the event of there being a known threat of serious danger to them in remaining on board (para 14.14).
Unknown
LADB-67 — Provide general safety advice to passengers before and after boarding trains
Recommendation: Passengers should be given general safety advice both before and after they have boarded their train (para 14.14).
Unknown
LADB-66 — Establish system to collect human factors data on passenger safety after rail accidents
Recommendation: A system should be established for the collection of human factors information pertinent to issues of passenger safety following rail accidents (para 14.8).
Unknown
LADB-65 — Standardise passenger safety information and train evacuation and escape procedures
Recommendation: So far as is feasible, the safety information issued to passengers and the means by which they can be evacuated or escape from a train should be standardised (para 14.8).
Unknown
LADB-64 — Keep public information code of practice on train safety and emergencies updated
Recommendation: The code of practice on public information on train safety and emergencies should be kept up to date (para 14.6).
Unknown
LADB-63 — Ensure HSE provides adequate guidance for evacuation and escape provisions
Recommendation: The provisions in the schedule as to evacuation and escape should be supported by adequate guidance from the HSE (para 14.3).
Unknown
LADB-62 — Extend Railway Safety Case Regulations to include emergency escape arrangements explicitly
Recommendation: The scope of Schedule 1 to the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 should be extended so as to include explicitly the arrangements which the duty holder has established in regard to facilities, instructions and signs for the escape of persons …
Unknown
LADB-61 — Enhance fire protection by reviewing fuel tank standards and repositioning vulnerable tanks
Recommendation: The following measures should be considered with a view to enhancing protection against fire: (i) a review of Group Standards in respect of improved crash resistance of fuel tanks; (ii) consideration of the feasibility of reducing fuel inventories and of …
Unknown
LADB-60 — Conduct market research on safety measures to include informed passenger views
Recommendation: Comprehensive market research in regard to safety related measures should be carried out in order to take account of the views of informed passengers (para 13.20).
Unknown
LADB-59 — Consider retrofitting enhanced security for seating in Turbos and tables in HSTs
Recommendation: The enhancement of the security of seating in Turbos and of tables in HSTs should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting (para 13.19).
Unknown
LADB-58 — Revise crashworthiness Group Standard for realistic scenarios and high-speed testing
Recommendation: The revision of the Group Standard for crashworthiness should be pursued with particular reference to: (i) the design requirements for more realistic scenarios; (ii) high speed accidents; and (iii) dynamic verification testing (para 13.17).
Unknown
LADB-57 — Consider improved welding and aluminium grades for new aluminium vehicles
Recommendation: In the case of new vehicles constructed of aluminium, consideration should be given to: (i) the use of alternatives to fusion welding; (ii) the use of improved grades of aluminium which are less susceptible to fusion weld weakening; and (iii) …
Unknown
LADB-56 — Review crashworthiness standard to safeguard survival space after Ladbroke Grove crash
Recommendation: The current standard for crashworthiness should be reviewed, in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove, in order to ensure that there are adequate measures for safeguarding survival space (para 13.5).
Unknown
LADB-55 — Consider retrofitting Turbos with enhanced welds, couplers, and anti-overriding devices
Recommendation: In the case of Turbos, the enhancement of end pillar weld connections, the possible enhancement of crashworthiness by weakening the ends and strengthening the saloon of the cars, and the fitting of shear-out couplers and anti-overriding devices should be considered, …
Unknown
LADB-54 — Review crashworthiness standard for new vehicles after Ladbroke Grove crash
Recommendation: The current standard for crashworthiness in respect of new vehicles should be reviewed in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove with respect to the objectives referred to in Recommendation 53 (para 13.4).
Unknown
LADB-53 — Consider HST cab and bogie enhancements for improved driver protection and safety
Recommendation: The enhancement of the cabs on HSTs to improve driver protection along with energy absorption and compatibility with other vehicles, and the enhancement of measures for the retention of bogies on the coaches of HSTs, should be considered, subject to …
Unknown
LADB-52 — Instruct IECC staff to preserve CSR data disks following SPAD incidents
Recommendation: Signallers, managers and maintenance staff working at IECCs should be instructed as to the need to preserve CSR data disks in the event of a SPAD taking place (para 12.30).
Unknown
LADB-51 — Establish national direct radio communication system between trains and signallers
Recommendation: There should be a national system of direct radio communication between trains and signallers (para 12.29).
Unknown
LADB-50 — Introduce automatic audible cab warning for CSR trains passing danger signals
Recommendation: Subject to satisfactory risk assessment, an arrangement should be made whereby, when a train which is fitted with the CSR passes a signal at Danger, an audible warning automatically sounds in the cab (para 12.28).
Unknown
LADB-49 — Investigate automatic signal replacement to Danger after SPADs to prevent collisions
Recommendation: There should be a study of the possibility of the automatic replacement of a signal to Danger where a SPAD has occurred and the layout is such that there is a significant danger of collision (para 12.27).
Unknown
LADB-48 — Enhance signaller speed for emergency point movement actions
Recommendation: The speed with which signallers can take action to move points in an emergency should be improved (para 12.22).
Unknown
LADB-47 — Implement unique, persistent alarm for all SPAD occurrences
Recommendation: There should be a unique alarm for SPADs, which should sound until it is turned off (para 12.21).
Unknown
LADB-8 — Railtrack to complete signal risk assessments for the Paddington area promptly.
Recommendation: Railtrack should ensure that the risk assessments and any consequent actions required under Group Standard GK/RT 0078 in respect of the signals in the Paddington area are carried out as soon as possible (para 7.125).
Unknown
LADB-7 — Extend recommendation implementation monitoring to include Train Operating Companies
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to extending sub-para (ix) of Recommendation 6 to recommendations which are directed to one or more of the TOCs and others (para 7.106).
Unknown
LADB-6 — Improve Railtrack procedures for implementing and monitoring accepted recommendations with clear accountability
Recommendation: Railtrack procedures, and the actions of management to enforce them, should be directed to ensuring that: (i) a recommendation which is accepted is implemented according to a defined timescale; (ii) the person to whom a recommendation is allocated for implementation …
Unknown
LADB-5 — Require holistic safety and risk assessment for all track or signalling changes
Recommendation: Where a material change to track or signalling or both is proposed, there should be an express consideration of all relevant safety issues by an analysis of the material factors, if necessary by means of a risk assessment. This should …
Unknown
LADB-34 — Reconsider the use of "disregard" in the SPAD Group Standard
Recommendation: The use of the word “disregard” in the Group Standard on SPADs and its associated documentation should be reconsidered (para 11.29).
Unknown
LADB-16 — Consider applying NVQs to the driver licensing scheme by ATOC
Recommendation: ATOC should consider the application of NVQs to the driver licensing scheme presently under their consideration (para 9.52).
Unknown
LADB-15 — Expeditiously progress ATOC study on central licensing of drivers
Recommendation: The ATOC study on the central licensing of drivers should be progressed expeditiously (para 9.50).
Unknown
FENN-150 — Consider establishing a single passenger safety inspectorate for all transport
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the establishment of a single passenger safety inspectorate charged with monitoring and supervising standards in all passenger transport.
Unknown
LADB-88 — Ensure unrestricted availability of all standard emergency equipment on passenger trains.
Recommendation: The availability on trains carrying passengers of the items of emergency equipment mentioned in the standard on emergency and safety equipment should be unrestricted (para 14.74).
Unknown
LADB-87 — Investigate implementing remote broadcasting from outside the train where unavailable.
Recommendation: The possibility of remote broadcasting from outside the train, where it is not already available, should be investigated (para 14.68).
Unknown
LADB-86 — Examine feasibility of a "roaming" communication system for train staff.
Recommendation: The feasibility of a “roaming” communication system for train staff should be examined (para 14.68).
Unknown
LADB-85 — Study passenger-to-signaller communication systems for driver-only trains in emergencies.
Recommendation: The possibility of installing on driver-only trains a telephone by which passengers can communicate with the signaller in the event of the driver being killed or incapacitated should be studied (para 14.65).
Unknown
LADB-84 — Train all on-board train staff in evacuation and protection procedures.
Recommendation: All members of the on-board train staff (including persons working under contract) should be persons who have been trained in train evacuation and protection (para 14.62).
Unknown
LADB-83 — Assess feasibility and risk of incorporating escape hatches in all train carriages.
Recommendation: The incorporation of escape hatches in existing carriages should be the subject of feasibility and risk assessment and the provision of escape hatches in new carriages should likewise be considered (para 14.54).
Unknown
LADB-82 — Test integrating emergency hammers into passenger alarm system for controlled release.
Recommendation: Tests should be carried out into the practicability of building emergency hammers into the passenger alarm system so that they could be released only after an alarm has been activated (para 14.50).
Unknown
PFD Reports (6)
Lauris Kodors
Concerns: The RSSB Rule Book inadequately permits stopping trains only when a person threatens damage to the train, not when a person is in danger from an approaching train.
Overdue
Robert Mullis
Concerns: A vulnerable, partially sighted patient with dementia was able to disembark a high-speed train unaccompanied and access railway tracks directly from the end of the platform.
Response (Robert Mullis): Network Rail has installed platform-end fencing and anti-trespass panels on platforms 2, 5, and 6 and the London end of platform 1 at Ashford International Station. Equivalent fencing will be …
Overdue
Richard Hill
Concerns: The railway crossing lacked essential telephones and Network Rail contact information, posing a risk of repeat incidents due to inadequate emergency communication at the site.
Responded
Christopher McGuffie
Concerns: Railway stations lack immediate and effective alert systems for detecting and reporting persons on the line.
Response (Arriva): Arriva Rail North is developing a campaign using various media, providing bespoke training for customer service controllers and are looking to bring forward the planned installation of CCTV at Chester …
Responded
Carl Klimaytys
Concerns: The fact that a member of the public discovered the body on the railway platform raises concerns about monitoring and detection systems.
Response (Network Rail): Network Rail clarifies that Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR) is responsible for signage at Preston Park station under the terms of their lease and that Network Rail supports safety awareness programmes, …
Response (GTR): GTR has enhanced training for Help Point Assessment, including functional tasks and a competency management system. Information resources now include access to a 'Track Access' system and the Stations Made …
Responded
Croydon Tram Incident
Concerns: The absence of a centrally funded national tram safety passenger group creates a significant systemic oversight for public safety.
Response (Transport for London): Transport for London has already procured, developed, and installed a bespoke Physical Prevention of Overspeed System (PPOS) on the London Tram network, reducing the risk of overturning by 76%. They …
Response (Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd): Bombardier Transportation (now Alstom) has completed a door vulnerability assessment, performed design reviews for current and future tram door systems, and engaged with suppliers regarding enhancements. They plan to finalize …
Response (Tram Operations Ltd): Tram Operations Ltd is already a member of CIRAS (Confidential Reporting for Safety) for anonymous staff reporting and publicises this to staff. Regarding passenger ejection through doors, they confirm they …
Response (Transport Focus): Transport Focus clarifies its limited remit and resources to initiate a centrally funded national tram passenger safety group. They state they will engage with operators on passenger safety issues brought …
Response (Department for Transport): The Department for Transport reports that the Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB) has published guidance on driver inattention and speed management, and all tram networks in England now …
Response (Light Rail Safety and Standards Board Anonymous reporting CIRAS): The Light Rail Safety and Standards Board confirms that all seven UK tramways already subscribe to the Confidential Incident Reporting & Analysis System (CIRAS). LRSSB further plans to produce a …
Response (Light Rail Safety and Standards Board Doors): The Light Rail Safety and Standards Board is engaging with European Standards working groups to inform regulation on tram door security and crashworthiness, and plans to consult with TfL/London Trams …
Response (Light Rail Safety and Standards Board Auto Braking): The LRSSB has published new Light Rail Guidance on Driver Inattention (LG3) and Light Rail Standards on Speed Management Systems (LS4), incorporating RAIB recommendations. They have also commissioned a trial …
Responded
Committee Recommendations (73) — showing 50 strongest matches
#1 — Committee supports the Railways Bill's purpose to establish Great British Railways as the 'directing mind'.
Recommendation: We recognise the need for structural change on the railways. We support the main purpose of the Railways Bill: to establish Great British Railways as a single organisation overseeing both track and train, and capable of acting as a ‘directing …
Gov response: The Government agrees with this recommendation. The Government recognises the value in providing further clarity to parliament and stakeholders in the run up to GBR establishment. Providing stakeholders with certainty as we transform our railways …
Accepted
#24 — Government acknowledges rail industry fragmentation and commits to Great British Railways for integration.
Recommendation: We welcome the Government’s recognition that industry fragmentation has contributed to siloed decision-making and misaligned incentives between stakeholders, and its commitment to establishing a whole- system organisation, Great British Railways, to tackle this. We look forward to holding GBR and …
Gov response: We welcome the provision made in the Railways Bill for a Long Term Rail Strategy: it is long past time that such a vision is set out for the railways. The Strategy must provide a …
Response Pending
#1 — Uncertain and uneven rail investment cycles weaken the UK rail industry sector.
Recommendation: The UK rail network is a core national asset, supporting its own industrial ecosystem and underpinning broader economic growth and employment. The message from the rail industry has been clear: investment in that asset has too often been characterised by …
Gov response: Fifth Special Report of Session 2024–26 HC 1852 Transport Committee The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated …
Not Accepted
#13 —
Recommendation: The Rail white paper outlines government’s plans for a new rail system, with one body responsible for overseeing infrastructure and passenger services and with less complex financial transactions.32 The Office of Rail and Road told us that such a “guiding …
Not Addressed
#11 —
Recommendation: After our evidence session, on 20 May, the Department published its long-delayed Rail white paper, which outlines its “once-in-a-generation” reforms planned for the rail system, including replacing franchising and better integrating infrastructure with passenger services.25 The Department acknowledges that it …
Not Addressed
#10 —
Recommendation: We were interested to hear the Department’s views on the main issues caused by the rail system’s current structural organisation. The Department recognised that problems have emerged over a number of years, partly the result of poor alignment between Network …
Not Addressed
#9 —
Recommendation: We have previously reported on the problems inherent in the rail system which have led to poor performance and reliability of the network. Even before the pandemic, we and the Transport Committee had reported on the Department’s franchising model and …
Not Addressed
#3 —
Recommendation: Published information from the Department and the Office of Rail and Road on whole-system costs and revenues is not sufficient to inform proper oversight of the rail system, given the extent of taxpayer exposure. The arrangements for delivering rail services …
Gov response: 3.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: December 2021 3.2 The government will write to the Committee in December 2021. The government’s financial support for the railway has increased sharply since …
Not Addressed
#2 —
Recommendation: In recent years, we have identified serious failings in the rail system, and the Department must now overcome significant long-standing issues to bring about complex reform. We have previously reported on the problems inherent in the rail system, such as: …
Gov response: 2: PAC conclusion: In recent years, we have identified serious failings in the rail system, and the Department must now overcome significant long-standing issues to bring about complex reform. 2: PAC recommendation: By December, the …
Not Addressed
#13 —
Recommendation: The Williams-Shapps review said that the UK Government wishes to establish a new working agreement between Great British Railways (GBR) and Transport for Wales. We believe that the Wales Rail Board we have recommended would be the correct setting in …
Gov response: DfT recognises the potential benefits identified by the Committee of a dedicated forum to develop a shared vision and a prioritised set of proposals for rail infrastructure improvement and investment to deliver improvements for passengers …
Under Consideration
#11 —
Recommendation: If clear benefits for both passengers and freight users could be delivered by devolving rail infrastructure to the Welsh Government then the case for further devolution would be compelling. However, few benefits to rail users have been identified and the …
Gov response: The UK Government agrees with these recommendations in part. Together with their industry partners in Wales, DfT has undertaken a review of the governance arrangements applicable to the development and delivery of railway enhancements. The …
Not Addressed
#17 —
Recommendation: The Department recognised two primary risks in relation to railway systems: the physical practicalities of different contractors working on the ground together; and, systems not integrating effectively.41 We asked HS2 Ltd how it planned to avoid the issues with railway …
Gov response: 3.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 3.2 The third HS2 6 monthly report to Parliament highlighted that the procurements for the remaining 14 rail systems packages are successfully underway and will …
Under Consideration
#16 —
Recommendation: The High Speed 2 programme has many interdependent elements, including stations, infrastructure and railway systems. We raised concerns in our previous report that, given the scale of the programme and its future impact on the rail network, if the Department …
Under Consideration
#3 —
Recommendation: HS2 Ltd has started planning how it will integrate its systems for Phase One to ensure the railway works, but this is an inherently risky part of the programme. We previously raised concerns that, given the scale of the programme …
Gov response: 3.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 3.2 The third HS2 6 monthly report to Parliament highlighted that the procurements for the remaining 14 rail systems packages are successfully underway and will …
Under Consideration
#26 —
Recommendation: In 2020, the Office of Rail and Road reported inherent uncertainty in the value of some of the efficiency savings made by Network Rail in 2019–20.69 The Office of Rail and Road told us that it has now agreed a …
Gov response: 6.2 Network Rail will write to the Committee in December 2021. Network Rail remain committed to delivering the committed efficiency improvements in Control Period 6, and Network Rail will continue to be held to account …
Not Addressed
#25 —
Recommendation: But Network Rail recognised that there “is still a mountain to climb” to achieve the full efficiency improvements it has committed to, and that it will need to continue to increase savings.63 Network Rail estimated that 60% of remaining planned …
Gov response: 6.2 Network Rail will write to the Committee in December 2021. Network Rail remain committed to delivering the committed efficiency improvements in Control Period 6, and Network Rail will continue to be held to account …
Not Addressed
#24 —
Recommendation: In the first year of Control Period 6 (2019–20), Network Rail exceeded its planned efficiency savings; achieving £385 million compared to £316 million expected.61 The Office of Rail and Road told us that Network Rail has improved its efficiency through …
Gov response: 6.2 Network Rail will write to the Committee in December 2021. Network Rail remain committed to delivering the committed efficiency improvements in Control Period 6, and Network Rail will continue to be held to account …
Not Addressed
#23 —
Recommendation: The Office of Rail and Road told us that in Control Period 5 (2014–15 to 2018–19), Network Rail became less efficient and failed to meet efficiency targets.58 Indeed, in contrast to assumptions made by the Office of Rail and Road …
Gov response: 6.2 Network Rail will write to the Committee in December 2021. Network Rail remain committed to delivering the committed efficiency improvements in Control Period 6, and Network Rail will continue to be held to account …
Not Addressed
#22 —
Recommendation: The Department acknowledged that long-term, strategic direction on electrification is needed to provide market certainty for operators, rolling stock companies and the procurement of trains that will be able to operate on the network and to drive innovation. It also …
Gov response: 5.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: December 2021 5.2 The government will write to the Committee in December 2021. In July 2021, the government published the Transport Decarbonisation Plan, which …
Not Addressed
#21 —
Recommendation: The Department told us that electrifying the rail network is a key part of decarbonising and achieving net zero on the railway and that to ensure success, a steady long-term plan for electrification is needed. However, the Department acknowledged that …
Gov response: 5: PAC conclusion: We are disappointed at the lack of progress in agreeing a specific and funded plan for the electrification required to achieve the government’s own net zero targets 5: PAC recommendation: In its …
Not Addressed
#19 —
Recommendation: We were concerned that the short-term nature of these new contracts could fail to incentivise operators to make cost savings and improve performance, and asked the Department to explain how operators would be incentivised to keep costs down. The Department …
Not Addressed
#18 —
Recommendation: Following our session on 13 May 2021, the Department told the Transport Committee that negotiations with all train operators have concluded around terminating the underlying franchise agreements, which is necessary to enable the transition of operators 37 Qq 19, 31 …
Not Addressed
#17 —
Recommendation: The Department updated us on the Emergency Recovery Measures Agreements (ERMAs), which it put in place as an overlay to franchising agreements in response to the dramatic loss in passenger revenue caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The ERMAs transferred all …
Not Addressed
#16 —
Recommendation: Our previous reports have covered some of the commercial difficulties caused by the Department’s franchising model. In the worst-case scenarios, issues such as over- optimistic assumptions of passenger growth led to severe operator losses and early contract terminations.39 These contract …
Not Addressed
#15 —
Recommendation: The Department acknowledged that there were significant challenges inherent in its franchising model used prior to the pandemic. It told us that the previous surplus in franchising costs had become a deficit prior to the pandemic.37 During the final four …
Not Addressed
#14 —
Recommendation: Specifically in relation to passenger service operations, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, private sector companies operated passenger services under a franchise model but still received some level of government funding. The amount of government funding provided to train operators has …
Not Addressed
#12 —
Recommendation: Since privatisation in the 1990s, cash flows in the rail system have become increasingly complex. Although the rail system is privatised, government still provides significant funding for infrastructure operations, maintenance and renewals, and ongoing subsidy for passenger service operations. The …
Not Addressed
#8 —
Recommendation: The Department referred to its recently published strategies on bus travel18 and cycling and walking19 and told us that integration between modes of transport is “critical” to make public transport an attractive and practical choice for passengers.20 However, in these …
Gov response: 1.3 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendations. Target implementation date: December 2021 1.4 The government will write to the Committee in December 2021. The UK already has a well-developed and integrated public transport system. …
Not Addressed
#7 —
Recommendation: As well as providing critical revenue for the rail system, passenger rail travel supports wider government objectives around transport decarbonisation and achieving net zero. We asked the Department how they planned to encourage people out of their cars onto rail. …
Gov response: 2021. This is the government’s response to the Committee’s report. Relevant reports • NAO report: Overview of English Rail System – Session 2021-22 (HC 1373) • PAC report: Overview of English Rail System – Session …
Under Consideration
#20 —
Recommendation: Net government funding increased 99.7% in real terms between 2015–16 and 2019–20 from £2.6 billion to £5.1 billion. This reflects increases in expenditure on operating and maintaining rail network infrastructure and the pre-COVID-19 deterioration in the passenger rail market as …
Not Addressed
#6 —
Recommendation: It is not clear to us how Network Rail expects to achieve the remaining efficiencies planned in Control Period 6. In Control Period 5 (2014–15 to 2018–19), Network Rail failed to achieve its efficiencies target as agreed with the Office …
Gov response: 6.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: December 2021 6.2 Network Rail will write to the Committee in December 2021. Network Rail remain committed to delivering the committed efficiency improvements in …
Not Addressed
#5 —
Recommendation: We are disappointed at the lack of progress in agreeing a specific and funded plan for the electrification required to achieve the government’s own net zero targets. Electrification of the network is the key mechanism for delivering rail decarbonisation. It …
Gov response: 5.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: December 2021 5.2 The government will write to the Committee in December 2021. In July 2021, the government published the Transport Decarbonisation Plan, which …
Not Addressed
#4 —
Recommendation: It is not yet clear that the interim National Rail contracts fairly distribute risks between government and operators, or provide incentives for operators to deliver efficient, high-quality, and value-for-money passenger services. In previous reports the Committee highlighted failings in the …
Gov response: 4.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2021 4.2 National Rail Contracts (NRCs) require train operators to deliver against annually- agreed business plans (ABPs) and performance targets. This allows these …
Not Addressed
#10 —
Recommendation: Network Rail’s revised structure has helped Network Rail respond to incidents in Wales, build relationships with Transport for Wales (TfW) and sharpen its focus on Wales and borders services. However, Network Rail should be alive to concerns that its regional …
Gov response: The UK Government notes this recommendation. Network Rail operates at arm’s length and is free to structure itself as it sees fit to deliver a safe, efficient railway for taxpayers and rail users. DfT will …
Not Addressed
#18 —
Recommendation: HS2 Ltd recognised that the integration of railway systems would be crucial and explained that it planned to establish a collaborative alliance amongst the main railway systems contractors to encourage them to work together to deliver the integrated systems. Although …
Gov response: 3.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented 3.2 The third HS2 6 monthly report to Parliament highlighted that the procurements for the remaining 14 rail systems packages are successfully underway and will …
Under Consideration
#19 — Significant disagreements persist between the Department and HM Treasury regarding GBR's remit and future commercial model.
Recommendation: We asked the Department about the challenges presented by not having agreement with HM Treasury from the outset of the programme about some of these aspects. The Department told us that the white paper had the collective agreement of ministers …
Gov response: 5. PAC conclusion: Six years since the Department started work on rail reform, it has failed to resolve fundamental disagreements and clarify key aspects of reform. 5. PAC recommendation: The Department should urgently resolve disagreements …
Accepted
#18 — Department and HM Treasury fundamentally disagreed on GBR's remit, independence, and commercial model from the outset.
Recommendation: The Department intended that Great British Railways (GBR) would act as the ‘guiding mind’ for the railways, with responsibility for the whole rail system.40 But the Department and HM Treasury disagreed on key areas of rail reform from the start, …
Not Addressed
#11 — Risk of cutting passenger services due to cost focus, reducing revenue and customer experience.
Recommendation: Rail Partners highlighted to us the risk that the Department may look to cut passenger services to save costs which would make the railway less attractive for passengers, mean lower revenues flowing into HM Treasury, and add to cost pressures. …
Gov response: 2.4 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Spring 2025 2.5 The government is committed to delivering a unified and simplified governance structure for the railways, alongside passenger train services under public …
Accepted
#10 — Pandemic exposed rail cost challenges and created conflicting priorities for financial framework.
Recommendation: The Department told us that the pandemic presented a fundamental challenge to sustainably funding the railways and that the financial pressures have driven a stronger focus to look at the whole system and improve performance, both financially and for passengers.21 …
Gov response: 2.4 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Spring 2025 2.5 The government is committed to delivering a unified and simplified governance structure for the railways, alongside passenger train services under public …
Not Addressed
#5 — Urgently resolve fundamental disagreements with stakeholders on Great British Railways' role and commercial model.
Recommendation: Six years since the Department started work on rail reform, it has failed to resolve fundamental disagreements and clarify key aspects of reform. The Department acknowledges that, while its white paper set the broad direction and detail for some areas …
Gov response: The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. role, function and oversight of Great British Railways to ensure the railway is financially sustainable as the railways are brought into public ownership. Further information will be set …
Accepted
#15 —
Recommendation: In responding to this Report, if not earlier, the Department should publish the list of “no regret” electrification schemes identified by Network Rail and confirm which schemes they intend to deliver as a priority, the costs of doing so, and …
Gov response: The Government partially agrees with this recommendation. Having learned the lessons from Network Rail’s Control Period 5, where we overcommitted to a number of electrification schemes before they had been sufficiently developed, we now have …
Under Consideration
#14 —
Recommendation: We recommend that Network Rail and the ORR continue to explore the potential for an extension in third-rail electrification capability and that the Department, as the overall sponsor of rail decarbonisation, proactively monitors this development in Trains fit for the …
Gov response: The Government agrees with this recommendation where it is appropriate. The Department is proactively and carefully monitoring the work that Network Rail and ORR are currently undertaking to look at the potential for third rail …
Under Consideration
#12 —
Recommendation: However, even if one puts aside the question of affordability and liabilities, there is the issue of how closely connected and densely populated the border between Wales and England is. The mainline connecting north and south Wales runs through England …
Gov response: The UK Government agrees with these recommendations in part. Together with their industry partners in Wales, DfT has undertaken a review of the governance arrangements applicable to the development and delivery of railway enhancements. The …
Not Addressed
#17 —
Recommendation: Construction work on the programme started in 2009 and tunnelling began in 2012.47 The majority of major construction work is complete and Crossrail Ltd is now transferring assets, such as stations, to Rail for London Infrastructure (RfLi) and London Underground …
Gov response: Introduction from the Committee Crossrail is a complex major programme to run new, direct rail services between Reading and H Heathrow Airport at the western ends of the railway, to Shenfield in Essex and Abbey …
Not Addressed
#23 —
Recommendation: We welcome the steps the Government have taken to get more freight off our roads and on to our railways. We hope this is a process the establishment of Great British Railways will accelerate. The current model which sees freight …
Gov response: The Government agrees that more freight should be taken from the road and on to rail and water. The Government is supportive of modal shift of freight from road to rail wherever possible and is …
Under Consideration
#5 — Develop a clear and consistent approach to integrate active travel with public transport.
Recommendation: DfT has not ensured that active travel schemes are sufficiently joined-up with wider transport infrastructure, for example enabling people to safely walk to bus stops or take their bike on the bus or train. DfT recognises the importance of integrating …
Gov response: The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Recommendation implemented The department is taking forward research to understand the experience of disabled bus and coach users, including aspects of bus stop and station design which enables …
Accepted
#20 — Lack of consensus exists regarding GBR's 'guiding mind' role and central versus devolved authority.
Recommendation: We asked the Department for its views on the current commentary around GBR and the balance between it acting as a guiding or directing mind. The Department said it is important to find the right balance between the guiding mind …
Gov response: 2.3 Going forward, the government’s ambition is to set the long-term strategy and priorities for the railway, with a new arm’s length body, Great British Railways (GBR), acting as a “directing mind” focused on improving …
Not Addressed
#16 — Delays in rail reform legislation mean significant forecast savings will not be achieved.
Recommendation: We asked the Department for clarity around how the new contracts would work. The Department told us that it is in the process of developing a further version of national rail contracts, designed to further encourage growth in revenue and …
Not Addressed
#1 — Committee took evidence on rail reform from Department for Transport and Network Rail.
Recommendation: On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department) and Network Rail, in its capacity as lead for the Great British Railways Transition Team (GBRTT), about rail …
Gov response: The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Labour Party manifesto via the rail sector transformation programme. The government has introduced legislation to bring passenger services back into public ownership. Services will transition as existing contracts …
Accepted
#26 —
Recommendation: The UK aviation sector’s recovery from the pandemic is still in its early stages. The Civil Aviation Authority’s price control proposals, due to be implemented in summer 2022, must be postponed by one year to allow the collection of further …
Gov response: The government has noted this recommendation. The CAA is independent of government in its role as economic regulator of Heathrow, through powers granted by the 2012 Civil Aviation Act. As part of that role, the …
Under Consideration
IMB Recommendations (3)
Hollesley Bay (2022)
That the transport arrangements currently in operation at the prison are explored and developed;
Governor / Director
Hollesley Bay (2022)
That the transport arrangements currently in operation at the prison are explored and developed;
Governor / Director
Wymott (2023)
The Board considers the proposal to build a new prison next to HMPs Wymott and Garth will have a detrimental effect on the local infrastructure. Prison staffing and IMB recruitment are already stretched, and this will further impact upon them.
HMPPS
LGO / SPSO Decisions (14)
21-013-597 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about the cancellation of tube train services. This is because the complaint does not meet the tests in our Assessment Code on how we decide which complaints to investigate. Any injustice is not significant enough to justify our involvement and we could not …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jan 2022
21-014-830 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a disrupted tube journey in 2017 because it is a late complaint.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Feb 2022
21-013-023 — Transport for London
Summary: Mr X complained Transport for London (TfL) refused to issue a refund for his cycle hire. NHS staff were offered a discount code to use bikes for free during Covid, but Mr X was charged £2 per use when he had originally sought to purchase annual membership. We find …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Upheld
Mar 2022
22-011-402 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about problems with public transport. This is because there is another body better placed to consider the issues raised.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Dec 2022
24-001-966 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about Mrs X’s train journey on a TfL line. This is because an investigation would be unlikely to lead to a different outcome.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jun 2024
24-008-920 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaint that a rail replacement bus service operated on behalf of Transport for London damaged his car. This is because it would be reasonable for Mr X to make a claim against Transport for London at court if he believes it is responsible …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Sep 2024
25-005-834 — Merseyside Passenger Transport Authority & Exec
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaint about the Authority telling him he is not entitled to a concessionary travel pass. This is because there is not enough evidence of fault.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Sep 2025
25-007-569 — Liverpool City Region Combined Authority
Summary: We will not investigate Ms X’s complaint about the Authority’s handling of her transport survey complaint. This is because there is not enough remaining injustice and an investigation would be unlikely to reach a different outcome.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Oct 2025
24-012-797 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about Transport for London issuing traffic Penalty Charge Notices and failing to provide reasonable adjustments. This is because further investigation would not lead to a different outcome.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Dec 2024
NIPSO-202005280 — Northern Ireland Housing Executive
We upheld a man's complaint about the Housing Executive's failure to deal with his enquiries about emergency accommodation.
NIPSO (NI Public Service…
Housing
Upheld
Oct 2024
22-002-190 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a personal injury claim. This is because the courts are better placed to consider this complaint.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
May 2022
22-002-699 — London Travelwatch
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaint that London Travelwatch failed to resolve his complaint against Transport for London. This is because its actions did not cause him significant injustice.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jun 2022
23-014-202 — West Yorkshire Combined Authority
Summary: Mr X complained the Authority failed to keep a disabled toilet facility at a bus station in a clean and usable condition. We have found fault by the Authority in failing to ensure the facility was kept clean when Mr X used it, causing injustice. The Authority has agreed …
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Upheld
Jun 2024
24-001-985 — Kent County Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a delay by the Council in renewing the complainant’s bus pass. This is because there is insufficient evidence of fault by the Council.
LGO (Local Government & …
Transport And Highways
Jun 2024